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The Politics of Metropolitan Bias in China 
Abstract  
 Policymakers in China and other developing countries grapple with a metropolitan dilemma. 
Building on the existing advantages of leading cities makes it easier to achieve fast, visible progress 
in economic development. But further concentrating resources in top urban centers can marginalize 
other areas, worsen urban congestion, and increase inequality. The degree to which governments 
favor key metropolitan centers relative to other cities and outlying areas in the distribution of policy 
support and resources is thus a consequential issue in development politics. Yet, scholars lack a 
systematic understanding of “metropolitan bias,” and existing theories have difficulty explaining 
wide variation in development approaches over time and across regions in countries like China. 
This project analyzes variation in development strategies across China’s provinces during the 
1990s and 2000s to shed light on the nature and sources of metropolitan bias. Existing research 
generally views favoritism toward large cities as an unintended consequence of rapid industrialization 
and rent-seeking dynamics. In contrast, I highlight more strategic efforts by higher-level 
governments to shape the growth of cities and regions, and probe the politics surrounding spatial 
development policies. First, I argue that metropolitan bias tends to be greater in provinces that have 
experienced lagging economic performance, where policymakers build up top cities as a means of 
enhancing regional competitiveness. Second, I argue that metropolitan-oriented development has 
been driven in large part by provincial governments, and that there is greater metropolitan bias 
where the provincial level is strong relative to other government tiers. 
 To develop and test these claims, I employ a mixed-method research design and draw on 
Chinese- and English-language written sources, interview material, and statistical data. Through 
comparative case studies of Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces and analysis of China’s policy 
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institutions, I explore how different explanatory factors influence the formulation and 
implementation of development strategies. Meanwhile, I use statistical analysis to test how well key 
claims generalize to a larger sample of units. Beyond contributing in a timely way to our knowledge 
of the politics behind China’s urban boom, the study advances our theoretical understanding of the 
politics of state-led development and multilevel governance more broadly.   
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I. Introduction: Research Questions, Theoretical Framework, and Methods 
 
“There has always been a tension […] between the perceived ills of metropolis and its attractions 
and benefits, and this has been particularly apparent since the growth of the industrial city.”  
—Emrys Jones, Metropolis (1990), 208 
 
Introduction 
Policymakers in China and other developing economies confront a spatial dilemma: Should 
they give priority to core metropolitan areas, building on the competitive advantages of their biggest, 
wealthiest cities? Or, conversely, should they promote a more dispersed form of urban and regional 
growth, making development more even across space, and perhaps more sustainable? Coordinating 
metropolitan growth with the development of broader national or regional economies has always 
been a challenge, but spatial policy has become an especially fraught subject under contemporary 
conditions. Large metropolitan centers are poised to thrive in a more open, integrated, and 
knowledge-driven world economy, and many governments seek to foster their leading cities as 
growth engines and global platforms. At the same time, however, metropolitan-oriented 
development excludes many people and places, and carries economic, social, and political risks.  
The degree of “metropolitan bias”1 in development policies – that is, the extent to which 
governments favor large cities relative to other areas and reinforce such cities’ existing advantages –
has important implications for growth, resource distribution, and governance alike. Yet scholars lack 
a clear picture of the evolving nature and determinants of metropolitan bias. Traditionally, scholars 
have attributed metropolitan-oriented development and urban primacy to basic economic policies, 
large cities’ underlying economic advantages, and the political ability of urban constituencies to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Scholars have previously used the term “metropolitan bias” to denote favoritism toward large cities over other urban 
centers in the provision of state support, but the term has not been widely adopted. See, for example, Ferré et al (2012). 
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extract state benefits.2 Past scholarship has given less attention to the spatial development strategies 
governments adopt or to the politics of urban and regional policy, and key questions remain: Why 
do development policies favor the largest, most advanced urban areas more in some cases than 
others? How do governments intervene to shape the growth of cities and regions, and which state 
actors take the lead? How do spatial policies fit into broader strategies of economic development? 
Understanding the politics of urban and regional policy in contemporary China is especially 
vital. Big cities are growing explosively across China even as concerns about inequality and instability 
loom. State actors continue to play a leading role in development, and policy choices have major 
impacts on the distribution of resources, economic activity, and people in space. While nationwide 
debates over development policy continue, different Chinese provinces – themselves as big as 
countries – have taken varying approaches in practice. In some provinces and at some times, 
policymakers have focused heavily on building up metropolitan infrastructure and industry. In other 
cases, development strategies have shown more spatial balance, helping smaller cities and rural areas. 
China scholars have noted an increasing metropolitan orientation to policy and growth,3 but little 
work has examined puzzling variation in development approaches across provinces and over time.  
This dissertation analyzes provincial development approaches in China to further our 
understanding of metropolitan bias and to gain more general insights into the politics of state-led 
development and the dynamics of policymaking in multilevel systems.4 I focus on the years from 
1996-2010, a period of increasingly rapid urban development,5 and combine in-depth case studies 
with statistical analysis to shed light on patterns and drivers of metropolitan bias. I start by exploring !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See, for example, Ades and Glaeser (1995); Bates (1981). 
3 See, for example, Lin (2007); Shi and Zhuang (2007); Hsing (2010); Ke and Feser (2010). 
4 My subnational comparative approach follows the lead of past work by Chung (2000), Snyder (2001), Sinha (2005), 
Donaldson (2011), and Murali (2011), among others. 
5 I also focus on this timeframe because it spans three different national Five-Year Plan (FYP) periods: the Ninth (1996-
2000), 10th (2001-2005), and 11th (2006-2010) FYP periods. 
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metropolitan development trends over time and across different Chinese provinces. I find that basic 
economic and structural variables are important in explaining policy approaches and development 
outcomes, but leave considerable variation unaccounted for. Meanwhile, changing national-level 
policies and governance institutions help to explain an overall metropolitan turn in China’s 
development since the 1990s, but do not account for diverging provincial outcomes. 
I call attention to the importance of provincial-level variables in explaining metropolitan bias 
outcomes. Provinces are key units for governance and occupy a pivotal position in China’s 
fragmented, multilevel policy process. Provincial governments often favor rapid metropolitan 
development as a means of boosting economic competitiveness and visibility, whereas actors at 
other levels may resist such approaches. I argue that the degree of metropolitan bias in development 
policies depends in large part on two variables: First, metropolitan bias tends to be greater in 
provinces that have experienced lagging economic performance. Lagging growth creates more 
demand for policies that enhance economic competitiveness, and it also mitigates some downsides 
of metropolitan-oriented development. Second, metropolitan bias tends to be greater when 
provincial units are strong relative to the central government and localities, because provincial 
authorities prioritize the metropolitan agenda more than actors at other levels (seen in the aggregate).  
The dissertation uses case studies of Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces to probe the 
political processes behind urban and regional policy outcomes, and carries out statistical analysis to 
test the generalizability of key claims. Jiangsu, a thriving eastern province, represents a case of 
relatively unbiased urban development. Both economic and political factors in Jiangsu prevented 
sustained favoritism toward particular areas of the province. Development in the lagging inland 
province of Hunan, on the other hand, displays pronounced and persistent metropolitan bias. In 
Hunan, a strong provincial establishment responded to a crisis of competitiveness with aggressive 
efforts to build up the capital-city region. Jiangxi, which neighbors Hunan and is similar in most 
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respects, offers an instructive contrast. Sharp swings over time in Jiangxi’s development approach 
reflect the influence of a shifting intergovernmental power balance on policy outcomes. Meanwhile, 
analysis of data from a larger sample of 20 provinces reveals that lagging economic performance and 
provincial government strength are associated with greater metropolitan bias more broadly.   
In this opening chapter, I first introduce the issue of metropolitan bias and lay out the 
empirical puzzles and theoretical questions that motivate the project. I then proceed to outline the 
dissertation’s theoretical framework, methodology, and organization. 
 
Metropolitan-oriented development at large and in China 
Over the past three decades, development worldwide has taken a metropolitan turn. Amid a 
more connected and competitive global economy, large urban centers have grown quickly and 
reasserted their centrality. New York, London, and other first-world hubs that declined between the 
1960s and 1980s are again brimming with people and economic activity. Developing world mega-
cities such as Mumbai and Bangkok have seen explosive economic and population growth (Scott, ed. 
2001; Sassen 2006). Beyond global city regions, second-tier metropolises like Atlanta, Bangalore, and 
Belo Horizonte have also entered the spotlight. “Metropolitanization” – the growing dominance of 
top urban areas in broader economies and societies – has reshaped economic, social, and political 
landscapes in many countries and regions (Veltz 2000). The contemporary big-city boom has also 
changed attitudes toward highly concentrated urban growth, with policy elites coming to view the 
growth of major metropolitan centers in a more positive light. Urban economists trumpet the 
benefits of large cities (Glaeser 2011). Researchers from the World Bank and leading consultancies 
call for building more mega-cities in emerging economies (World Bank 2008; McKinsey Global 
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Institute 2009). Policymakers across the world increasingly look at their large metropolitan centers 
not as governance problems but as engines of growth and globalization.6 
 Nowhere has the recent metropolitan turn in development been sharper or more significant 
than in China. As hundreds of millions of Chinese have entered cities in the largest and fastest 
episode of urbanization in history, a growing number have streamed into national and provincial 
hubs. During the 1980s and early 1990s, China experienced relatively balanced urban growth: larger 
cities grew briskly in some places, but small cities expanded rapidly in number and size. China’s 
urban hierarchy grew flatter, and economic growth was spread out among cities of different sizes 
(Wei 1994; Fan 1999; Anderson and Ge 2005). Since the late 1990s, however, large cities have grown 
much more quickly. Whereas the number of cities with core urban populations over two million 
rose from nine to 13 between 1990-2000, it jumped from 13 to 24 between 2000-2010.7 During the 
2000s, large cities’ share of urban population and GDP also rose in many provinces (China Data 
Online; author’s calculations). Policymakers across China, looking to Shanghai and Shenzhen as 
examples, have rushed to improve urban infrastructure and win high marks for their cities in 
nationwide rankings of urban competitiveness.8 By 2005, 183 cities across China had announced 
plans to build themselves into “international metropolises” (guojihua dadushi) (Tian 2011, 553). 
 Metropolitan-oriented development has reshaped the landscapes – and indeed the very 
personalities – of several Chinese provinces. Hunan, a central province famous as the home of Mao 
Zedong and a cradle of China’s rural revolution, has witnessed especially dramatic change. In 1996, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For example, Shaw (2012) discusses the Indian government’s 1993 Mega Cities Programme. 
7 National Bureau of Statistics 1991, 2001; China Data Online (http://chinadataonline.org); Xie 2012; author’s 
calculations.  
8 Prominent economists such as Ni Pengfei have released rankings of major cities’ economic competitiveness annually 
since the early 2000s. These rankings take into account a variety of factors, such as localities’ industrial strength, 
economic size, science and technology resources, governance quality, infrastructure and amenities, environmental 
conditions, and cultural development. See Global Urban Competitiveness Research Center (2011). These rankings are 
widely watched by academics and policymakers (Interview XA61112a).  
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the capital city of Changsha – home to nine percent of the province’s 64 million people – accounted 
for less than 16 percent of the province’s total GDP. Over the following 15 years, Changsha 
absorbed 31 percent of Hunan’s fixed-asset investment, and nearly doubled its share of Hunan’s 
economy (China Data Online; author’s calculations). A backwater in 1996, Changsha had by the end 
of the 2000s established itself as a major destination for multinational investors and domestic 
tourists alike. The city could boast sprawling industrial zones and university clusters, lavish 
entertainment and shopping quarters, huge waterfront parks, towering monuments, new high-speed 
rail hubs, and a gleaming international airport terminal. Much of Hunan, however, trailed far behind. 
The province’s population remained largely rural, and by 2010 Changsha’s GDP was greater than 
that of Hunan’s next three largest cities combined (China Data Online; author’s calculations). 
In China and more broadly, metropolitan-oriented development like that seen in Hunan 
carries important economic benefits but also poses major problems. Large cities have reemerged as 
powerful hubs of industry, providing employment on a huge scale and propelling the economies of 
larger regions or countries. Investment in urban infrastructure and real estate can boost GDP while 
addressing genuine social need and enhancing future productivity. Yet, the metropolitan boom also 
involves significant downsides. Rapid growth of what are already the largest, wealthiest, and most 
crowded cities in a country or region increases spatial and socioeconomic inequality. People and 
economic activity often become increasingly concentrated in top metropolitan centers while urban 
and industrial growth elsewhere remains stunted (Hirschman 1978; Henderson 2002). The 
coexistence of rich metropolitan areas with poor or depressed peripheries can produce intense 
political fights over the spatial distribution of public resources (Brenner 2004; Wei 2000; Vogel et al 
2010). Large cities themselves are notorious for high – and highly visible – socioeconomic inequality 
(Jones 1990). Rising congestion and sprawl-style growth cause economic losses and environmental 
damage, and may harm social development (Cohen 2004; Henderson 1999). Meanwhile, 
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governments have reason to fear that high urban concentration will increase the risk of severe 
political unrest (Wallace 2013), and they may also perceive a threat to higher-level political and 
administrative authority from powerful city governments (Davis 2002). Such concerns are felt very 
acutely in contemporary China, given the pace of urbanization, the sharpness of regional and social 
inequalities, and leaders’ emphasis on political stability and top-down administrative control.  
The benefits and costs of metropolitanization make for acute policy dilemmas and political 
conflicts. The political question is not whether cities and regions will develop in an uneven manner; 
this is a widespread phenomenon and, to a large extent, inevitable. The political question, rather, is 
how government actors behave amid these trends—what role the state plays in shaping 
development patterns, and how policymakers react to economic tendencies of polarization and 
spatial imbalance. Do governments counteract these development patterns? To what extent do state 
interventions and political dynamics further concentrate policy benefits and resources in core 
metropolitan areas? Under what conditions do government policies promote, rather than limit, more 
polarized development? 
 
Metropolitan bias: policy logic and politics  
The outcome of main interest in this dissertation is the extent to which governments 
privilege top metropolitan centers relative to other cities or rural areas in the course of urban and 
regional development. I use the term “metropolitan bias” to refer to the systematic slant of 
development policies in favor of the leading urban area of a country or province.9 National or 
provincial-level policies may favor core metropolitan areas relative to smaller urban centers and 
outlying areas in the allocation of various forms of state support, including public investment, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 In this dissertation, I identify the leading urban area based on economic size, unless otherwise noted. Top cities are 
often, but not always capital cities. In some cases, countries or provincial-level units have two cities that vie to be the 
leading economic and cultural center. 
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economic resources, public services, and preferential policies. Both broad policy frameworks, such 
as multi-year provincial development strategies, and more concrete policy interventions, such as the 
construction of transport infrastructure, can privilege metropolitan areas relative to other locations.  
Of course, it is sometimes easy to overlook the ways in which state institutions affect urban 
and regional development patterns. This is especially true where the contemporary metropolitan 
boom is concerned. Large urban areas enjoy important underlying economic advantages – market 
scale, diversity, agglomeration economies, amenities, pre-existing financial and human capital 
endowments – that help them thrive under more open and competitive economic conditions. These 
strengths have positioned major cities as nodes in a more integrated global economy, which has 
further reinforced their initial advantages (Glaeser and Ponsetto 2007; Sassen 2006; Scott et al 2001). 
Rapid metropolitan growth has occurred during a “neoliberal” moment of market-oriented reforms 
and economic integration: the boom of big cities has been associated with intensifying market-based 
competition and a new wave of “urban entrepreneurialism” from the 1980s on. In many cases, city 
governments have emerged as stronger territorial actors in their own right, gaining more policy 
authority and adopting measures to promote faster development—from investments in new urban 
infrastructure to institutional reforms that improve their business environments (Kresl and Fry 2005; 
Hall and Hubbard, eds. 1998). As such, one may perceive higher-level governments to be playing a 
secondary part in boom of big cities, with their main role being to deregulate the economy and 
devolve power to localities. By this view, the worsening of spatial and social disparities amid the 
contemporary metropolitan boom reflects a sin of omission rather than a sin of commission.   
Yet, urban and regional development is driven by state actors as well as by spontaneous 
market forces. Governments may be ill advised to choose which locations should win out, but 
public policies and the distribution of state support powerfully affect urban and regional growth 
prospects. Decisions about where to place infrastructure and industry, how to allocate land and 
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financing, and where to provide preferential policies and public services, among others, influence 
which areas thrive and which become marginalized. More general policies, including fiscal, trade, and 
sectoral policies, also have strong spatial implications and may powerfully influence patterns of 
urban and regional development (Davis and Henderson 2003; Glaeser 2008, 204).  
Higher-level state actors in China have particularly powerful means for shaping the spatial 
form of development. It is true that market-oriented reforms and opening-up have placed municipal 
governments at the forefront of development, and that fierce competition among localities has 
become a defining feature of China’s economy. But Chinese cities remain politically and 
economically embedded in the Party-state, and subject to higher-level policies and interventions (Lu 
2011).10 China’s economy continues to be state-dominated, and higher-level governments retain 
considerable influence over development planning, land policy, finance, trade and foreign 
investment policy, and industrial policy.11 Higher-level authority has even grown stronger in some 
areas following fiscal recentralization and rebuilding of the central administrative apparatus.  
Almost invariably, and usually by design, state interventions in the economy favor particular 
sectors and locations over others in the distribution of policy support and resources. In many cases, 
state interventions serve to increase, rather than to reduce, existing disparities. Scholars of “urban !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Local governments and private or foreign actors now account for much more investment activity than in the past. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, “rescaling” of governmental functions occurred as city-level units became key for managing 
economic activity and public goods provision, and the development role of higher-level state actors shrank somewhat 
(Shue and Sun 2010; Lin 1997; Zhang 2011). Although the growing administrative power and entrepreneurial behavior 
of municipalities has inspired comparisons to “neoliberal” governance patterns seen elsewhere (Kresl and Fry 2005; Yeh 
and Xu 2005; Wu and Zhang 2007; Luo and Shen 2008), the rise of the municipal state is more circumscribed and 
uneven than some accounts suggest. Higher-level governments’ influence over urban and industrial development is most 
conspicuous in inland areas, but is also substantial in coastal areas (Solinger 1996; Lin 2011). 
11 While a growing constellation of business actors in China seek to assert their interests in policy-making (Kennedy 
2005), the cohesiveness of business as a political group and capacity for autonomous influence over higher-level policies 
remain limited. Particularistic lobbying has been more typical than program-based policy advocacy, and business actors 
generally require allies and patrons inside the Party-state to protect and advance their interests. See Pearson (1997) and 
Tsai (2005). As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Beijing and provincial governments have administrative levers for 
controlling the allocation of key development resources such as land and financing. Higher-level governments shape the 
distribution of state investments and preferential policies, and have political sway over much non-state business activity. 
Fixed-asset investment has constituted nearly half of China’s GDP in recent years, and the spatial distribution of such 
investment is heavily influenced by state policies (Geng and N’Diaye 2012).  
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bias” have long called attention to the pro-urban slant of development policies in many settings. 
Lipton (1977), Bates (1981), and later authors have highlighted how policy institutions and 
government interventions in developing economies often systematically favor cities and urban 
residents at the expense of the countryside and rural dwellers. Such research has found that the 
single-minded pursuit of modernization, combined with the political need to cater to powerful urban 
constituencies, can lead policymakers to devote far more attention and resources to cities than to the 
countryside—often with negative economic and social consequences.12 
Beyond urban bias in general, however, the more specific issue of metropolitan bias also 
looms large in development politics. The spatial bias of development policies can fall along urban-
urban as much as urban-rural lines, and in many cases governments favor what are already by a large 
margin the biggest, wealthiest cities in their territory. Past scholarship has noted metropolitan bias at 
various historical moments and in various settings. Jefferson (1939) was early in linking urban 
primacy to the privileged political status of capital cities. Gravier (1947) described how French 
government policies in the late 19th and early 20th century overwhelmingly favored the development 
of the metropolitan area, reducing provincial France to an economic “desert.” Looking at the 
postwar period, Hirschman (1978) explains how government policies in developing countries often 
reinforced the initial advantages of leading urban-industrial centers. Along similar lines, Gilbert and 
Gugler (1992) note widespread state favoritism toward the largest cities amid import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) during the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars looking at the contemporary period have 
highlighted developmental bias toward the Bangkok region in Thailand, and preferential 
development of capital cities in many Indian states (Dixon 1999; Shaw 2012). Ferré et al (2012) note !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Urban bias is linked with sectorally unbalanced development, inefficient investment, rising urban-rural and regional 
income gaps, large-scale internal migrations, and the growth of a marginalized informal sector. Lipton (1977) and others 
have argued that rural underinvestment is inefficient economically. In the decades since the early urban bias literature 
appeared, some scholars have offered powerful critiques. Varshney (1993) argues that the relationship between the urban 
and rural sectors in development has varied a great deal in practice, and has not always been detrimental to rural interests.  
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the concentration of urban poverty in smaller cities, and discuss widespread metropolitan bias in the 
provision of social infrastructure and public services.  
Metropolitan bias in the allocation of state support and resources is not just an unintended 
consequence of economic policy or politics more broadly; it is often a conscious development 
strategy in its own right. During the heyday of ISI in the mid-20th century, and also in the post-1980s 
period of economic globalization, governments in many countries have strategically concentrated 
investment and policy support in top cities, effectively picking winners in space. They have done so 
both with the aim of accelerating the overall development of their economies, and also with the goal 
of building larger and more competitive centers of industry, commerce, and culture. As with state-
led industrialization, wherein policymakers concentrate resources in key firms and launch large-scale 
undertakings to economize on limited capital and know-how, state-led spatial development focuses 
investment in key locations to exploit economies of scale and external economies in urban and 
regional growth (Hirschman 1978; Krugman 1991; Henderson 2002).13 The selective build-up of 
certain cities as national or regional “growth poles” has been a key element of many state-led 
development programs. Policymakers often focus heavily on metropolitan cities, as their existing 
resource endowments make them well suited for advanced economic and administrative functions.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 State-led development strategies are based on the notion that for late-industrializing economies, state institutions are 
required to solve development problems market actors cannot overcome on their own. Classic studies by Hirschman 
(1988), Gerschenkron (1962), Evans (1992), Kohli (2004) and others highlight the importance of political capital and 
administrative capacity in successful late development. Poor, structurally backward economies jump to higher levels of 
development by mobilizing resources widely and launching coordinated investment programs that target key bottlenecks 
in industry, infrastructure, and other spheres. ‘Big pushes’ of this sort are necessary because industry and urban 
development, infrastructure, and technological upgrading feature economies of scale and external economies that cannot 
be realized through voluntary or uncoordinated market decisions of firms and households.  
14 “Growth pole” strategies were originally associated with Soviet planners and European economists such as Perroux, 
Myrdal, and Boudeville, but entered widespread use after the 1950s, becoming influential in developed and developing 
countries alike (Higgins and Savoie 1995; Parr 1999). During the mid-20th century, many governments promoting 
import-substitution industrialization adopted “growth pole” strategies (or variants thereof) that used bursts of 
investment in key locations in order to drive rapid economic progress and spur wider regional development. In East 
Asian developmental states pursuing export-oriented growth models, strategies of concentrated industrial and urban 
growth focused on top metropolitan areas were also common (Hansen et al 1990; Glickman 1979; Chung and Kirkby 
2002; Gilbert and Gugler 2002).  
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The basic logic of concentrating resources to reap economies of scale in investment, 
agglomeration economies for industry, and higher overall economic efficiency has persisted into the 
post-1980s era, even as outward-oriented economic activity has become more important and many 
aspects of governance have been “rescaled” to the urban or regional level (Brenner 2004). As many 
scholars have noted, higher-level governments in many settings continue to play active roles in 
urban and regional development. Even in Western countries, where state actors play a relatively 
limited role in the economy, national and provincial governments have targeted resources and policy 
support to build up specific urban areas as hubs for outward-oriented economic activity (Ibid.; Veltz 
2000). State interventions in spatial development have gone much further in settings such as East 
Asia. In several cases, higher-level governments have coordinated industry and infrastructural 
development to build-up metropolitan regions that can serve as platforms for export industries and 
for global business services (Park, Hill, and Saito, eds. 2012; Dixon 1999). 
If it is widely accepted that investing heavily in major urban centers is important for 
upgrading industry and boosting outward competitiveness, distributional considerations and 
governance concerns make metropolitan bias controversial. Development strategies that channel 
investment to leading cities are likely to exacerbate social and spatial disparities, and may produce 
backlash from locations and segments of society that lose out. Policymakers who worry about the 
tendency of metropolitan-oriented development to increase political instability, economic volatility, 
and regional fragmentation may clash with other elites who prioritize economic competitiveness. 
As such, metropolitan bias is a contentious political issue in many settings. Debates have 
raged for decades in Mexico and Argentina over whether national governments should concentrate 
investment in and give preferential treatment to primate cities or offer more support to other 
regions (Davis 2002; Libertun de Duren 2008). The United Kingdom has seen heated policy debate 
over whether to focus on strengthening London’s position as a global hub or to channel more fiscal 
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support, industrial subsidies, and infrastructure investment to lagging northern cities (Vogel et al 
2010). In India, there has been conflict at the subnational level as state capitals like Bangalore pull 
further ahead of peripheral regions (Shiddalingaswami and Raghavendra 2010).  
The stakes of such political battles are especially high in China, where metropolitan-oriented 
development strategies emerged late but have gained ground very quickly. Since the late 1990s, 
deepening reform and opening – not least China’s 2001 WTO accession – has created economic 
motives for building more competitive urban areas, while debates and policy shifts at the center have 
opened space for new development approaches. New “growth pole” strategies, aimed at increasing 
the size and competitiveness of major cities so as to propel larger regional economies and accelerate 
industrial upgrading, have taken shape in many provinces (Xu 2008; Ke and Feser 2010; Yin 2011). 
As I discuss in Chapter 3, the adoption of such strategies has been facilitated by China’s long history 
of spatially selective development policies. Decades of activist regional policy in China have 
bequeathed administrative tools for staging targeted interventions, and have ingrained a culture of 
“concentrating strength to do big things” (jizhong liliang ban da shi).15 Policymakers have been able to 
draw on longstanding modes and discourses of state-led development even as they embrace an 
agenda of global urban competition (Fan 1997; Yin 2011).16  
While the new generation of growth pole strategies has progressed rapidly, the question of 
how much to prioritize metropolitan development relative to other goals has remained a very 
sensitive one. The speed and scale of China’s urbanization make the form urban development takes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Deng Xiaoping himself reportedly described the strength of China’s socialist system as its ability to “concentrate 
strength and accomplish big things” (Xinhua meiri dianxun 2012). Policymaking “culture,” in the sense of “shared decision 
rules, recipes, standard operating procedures, and decision routines,” does not directly determine outcomes, but it may 
delimit the range of goals and approaches under consideration (Johnston 1995, 35, 36-39). 
16 Between the 1950s and 1970s, policymakers in China used growth pole policies widely as part of state-led 
industrialization efforts (Larsen 1992; Yang 1990). Since 1978, China’s leaders have continued the practice of 
concentrating investment and policy support in key locations to “spur along” (daidong) growth more broadly.  
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consequential and the policy debates surrounding urban development intense.17 Amid glaring urban-
rural and regional disparities, policies that further concentrate resources in wealthy metropolitan 
areas invite controversy (Wang and Hu 1999; Fan 1995; Wu 2003). And the historically anti-urban 
bent of the Communist Party has made metropolitan development a delicate ideological issue (Yeh 
et al 2011). Prior to the 1949 Communist takeover, Mao led rural-based revolutionaries in “using the 
countryside to encircle the cities” (Mao 1956), and suspicion toward large cities persisted as China 
pushed forward industrialization in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the later years of the Maoist era, 
China pursued a more dispersed, rural-oriented model of development (Sit 1985; McGee 2008). 
Since the beginning of the reform period, urban development has remained a delicate issue, 
and debate over what approach to pursue has continued. Concerned about overly rapid and 
concentrated urban growth, Chinese policymakers maintained a policy of curbing the growth of 
large cities during the 1980s and well into the 1990s. In line with the suggestions of Fei Xiaotong 
and other public intellectuals, Beijing and provincial governments promoted the dispersed 
development of smaller cities and towns to absorb the surplus population of rural areas (Marton 
1995). Amid China’s fast, outward-oriented economic development in the 1990s, however, the long-
term viability of this model was called into question. 
After the late 1990s, national leaders accepted the need for faster urbanization as a means to 
support economic and social development, but they remained divided on the question of how to 
urbanize. Some policymakers and academics continued to champion “small city-based urbanization” 
(chengzhenhua) and balanced regional development, and the official policy of limiting the growth of 
large cities remained on the books. Other policy elites, more concerned with economic efficiency, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Both Chinese policy elites and foreign experts have stressed that whether rural-urban and urban-urban migrants 
gravitate toward ten or so megalopolises, several dozen large cities, or disperse across many smaller settlements will have 
profound economic, social, and even political consequences. See, for instance, Liu He (2012); McKinsey Global Institute 
(2009). 
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called for “big city-based urbanization” (chengshihua) and faster development of metropolitan regions 
(Cao and Zhu 2010; Gu et al 2012a; Yeh et al 2011). These debates continued throughout the 2000s. 
Under China’s new premier, Li Keqiang, the central government in recent years has made 
urbanization one of its top development priorities,18 but high-level consensus on urban policy issues 
has remained surprisingly elusive.19 Disagreements among top policymakers delayed for several years 
the adoption of a new national urbanization strategy, and continued even after the policy’s release in 
early 2014 (Johnson 2014; Yao 2013; The Economist 4/19/2014).  
With national-level policies toward urban and regional development remaining unsettled, the 
practical problem of how to coordinate the development of metropolitan cities with larger regional 
economies has fallen to the provincial level. Chinese provinces, like India’s states, are as big as 
medium-sized countries (with populations often exceeding 50 million people), and face country-
sized development dilemmas. Sharper economic disparities are found within provinces than across 
them, as top cities tend to be far wealthier than smaller cities and rural areas (Wei and Fan 2000). 
Locked in economic competition with one another, provincial governments have good reasons to 
worry about the economic strength and attractiveness of their top cities. Yet development policies 
that concentrate investment in top cities can further widen regional gaps, perpetuating deprivation in 
outlying areas, causing internal migration, and producing social and political tensions.20 How these 
pros and cons of metropolitan bias are weighed against one another is ultimately a political question. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Li has been a major champion of urbanization as a development strategy through much of his political career. Indeed, 
Li’s early-1990s doctoral dissertation in economics argued for accelerated urbanization as a way to promote growth of 
consumption and service industries. Li also promoted rapid urban development while serving as a provincial leader in 
Henan and Liaoning (Yao 2013; Bloomberg News 11/13/2012). 
19 In addition to debates over big city versus small city-based urbanization, there have been disagreements over the pace 
of urbanization, the balance between investment in physical infrastructure and spending on public services, and the 
approach to reforming China’s household registration (hukou) system. 
20 This is a particularly large concern given the persistence of hukou-based urban residency restrictions that subject many 
migrants in large cities to second-class citizenship and limited access to economic opportunities and social services 
(Chan and Buckingham 2008). 
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Questions for research: empirical puzzles and gaps in the literature 
 Marked variation – both over time and across units – in development approaches raises 
important questions about the nature and determinants of metropolitan bias. While many scholars 
have noted the importance of policy factors in shaping the growth of cities and regions, little China-
focused or comparative research has explored the politics behind spatial development policies in 
depth. Such empirical puzzles and theoretical gaps call for a more systematic analysis of the factors 
that drive metropolitan bias—and of the politics of urban and regional development more broadly. 
 
Variation in metropolitan bias outcomes  
Around the globe and in China, one observes marked variation in the extent to which 
development strategies focus on and favor top cities. On the one hand, there is considerable 
variation across countries and province-level units in metropolitan bias. For example, during the 
1980s and 1990s, development policies in Thailand focused heavily on the Bangkok region, while 
policies in Taiwan prioritized the development of multiple urban regions. This occurred in spite of 
the fact that Taiwan was a smaller political unit with less-severe regional gaps to begin with (Dixon 
1999; Hsu 2001). And while development policies in Indian states such as West Bengal emphasized 
spatially balanced development during these decades, other states, such as Karnataka, strongly 
prioritized metropolitan growth (Shaw 2012). On the other hand, there have also been in many cases 
sharp shifts over time in urban and regional development strategies. Several countries, from the 
United Kingdom to South Korea, saw major shifts between the 1970s and 1980s in the orientation 
of spatial development policies, with growing emphasis on top metropolitan areas (Brenner 2004; 
Rondinelli 1991). Such variation in spatial policies across units and over time has contributed to 
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different patterns of urban and industrial growth, and varying social and environmental outcomes. It 
is not fully clear, however, why particular policy approaches have won out in each case. 
Variation in development policy approaches over time and across provinces in China during 
recent decades is particularly striking. Whereas Chinese policymakers stressed the development of 
small and medium-sized cities for much of the 1980s and 1990s, there has been growing state 
support for metropolitan cities with urban populations over one million since the late 1990s. Beyond 
this broad pro-metropolitan shift in development policies, however, there has been striking variation 
across individual provinces in the extent to which growth strategies have prioritized top urban areas. 
In cases like Hunan, mentioned above, development policies since the mid-1990s have consistently 
emphasized metropolitan development. In other provinces, such as Jiangxi, which neighbors Hunan 
to the east and resembles it in many ways, policymakers have placed greater emphasis on cross-
regional coordination, urban-rural balance, and the environmental sustainability of development. 
Such variation in policy approaches is reflected in concrete development outcomes. Across a 
sample of 20 large Chinese provinces, economic activity has generally grown more concentrated in 
provinces’ leading urban centers21 since the late 1990s. Figure 1.1 below plots the share of total 
provincial fixed-asset investment (FAI)22 captured by each province’s leading city for the period 
1996-2010 against the top city’s initial share of provincial GDP. The figure gives us a picture of the 
degree to which the distribution of investment has been slanted in favor of top cities. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Here and throughout the dissertation, I identify each province’s leading city on the basis of GDP size, unless 
otherwise noted. 
22 Fixed-asset investment (FAI) is a broad category that includes public, collective, and private investment in various 
categories of infrastructure, industrial plant and equipment, and real estate. See National Bureau of Statistics (2001). I 
discuss in Chapter 2 the reasons for using FAI data as an indicator for spatial development outcomes. 
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Figure 1.1: Top-city FAI share (1996-2010) and initial top-city GDP share across 20 provinces 
!
                                      Sources: China Data Online; provincial statistical yearbooks; author’s calculations 
As the figure shows, there is a broad tendency for top cities’ share of provincial FAI 
between 1996-2010 to exceed these cities’ initial GDP share. Yet there is also marked variation 
across provinces in the metropolitan slant of investment. In Hunan, Changsha’s share of provincial 
FAI between 1996-2010 dramatically exceeded its initial GDP share, indicating a pro-metropolitan 
tilt in development. Other provinces, such as Jiangxi, saw less metropolitan concentration, or even a 
slant away from top cities, in the distribution of FAI. In general, investment was more metropolitan-
oriented in inland provinces than coastal provinces. But even pairs of similarly situated provinces, 
such as Hunan and Jiangxi, display markedly different outcomes. As I will show in Chapter 2, we 
find similarly puzzling patterns when looking at trends in top-city shares of provincial GDP: top-city 
GDP share has risen abruptly in some cases while staying flat or falling elsewhere.23 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 In Anhui, for instance, top-city GDP share rose from under 10 percent to over 20 percent between 1996-2010, while 
in Hebei top-city GDP share dropped from 19 percent to 17 percent during the same period (China Data Online; 
author’s calculations). 
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       Figure 1.2: Varying trends over time in top-city share of provincial FAI and GDP 
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Sources: China Data Online; provincial statistical yearbooks; author’s calculations 
Looking within cases, there has been striking variation over time in the extent to which 
policies have favored metropolitan development, and in the concentration of investment and GDP 
in the largest cities. In Jiangsu province, for example, development policies emphasized balanced 
regional development during the late 1990s and late 2000s, but put greater stress on urban 
competitiveness and metropolitan growth in the early 2000s. Reflecting these shifts, development 
outcomes in Jiangsu varied considerably over time. There was a spike in the share of investment 
going to the province’s leading economic center, Suzhou, during the early 2000s, followed by a 
decline thereafter. As Figure 1.2 above shows, there have been sharp swings over time in the top-
city concentration of economic activity in multiple provinces, and different provinces’ overall 
trajectories have also varied.!!!!!!! 
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It is surprising to observe abrupt changes over time in policies and development trends 
within cases, and to find similarly situated units following very different development trajectories. 
Along with variation in metropolitan bias outcomes more generally, these empirical puzzles in China 
point to questions of broader theoretical importance: To what extent do government policies 
reinforce or reduce underlying tendencies of uneven development? Under what conditions is 
metropolitan bias most likely to emerge? How are urban and regional policies formulated and 
implemented, and which state actors and levels play the most important roles? Addressing these 
questions is important for our understanding of development outcomes and of the politics of 
development in China and beyond, but existing literature does not provide satisfying answers. 
 
Gaps in the literature!
China-focused and comparative research has given relatively scant attention to the politics of 
spatial development policy. Although work by economists and geographers notes the important 
influence of government policies on urban and regional development outcomes, it often brackets 
questions about the political origins of policies. Research on the political economy of development, 
meanwhile, tends to ignore the politics surrounding spatial development strategies, focusing 
primarily on issues of macroeconomic and industrial policy. And although China scholars have 
highlighted state efforts to shape urban and regional development, few have systematically analyzed 
variation in policy approaches across different regions and over time.  
Past work by economists and geographers has highlighted economic-structural factors as 
well as political variables that may affect spatial development outcomes. Scholars have long 
emphasized that the economic development of countries and regions is a spatially polarized process: 
some areas invariably develop first, because a critical mass of economic resources and people is 
required before more sophisticated industrial and urban activities can emerge. Empirically, economic 
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development and urban growth tend to be more spatially concentrated at early and intermediate 
development stages and in less open or market-oriented economies (Friedmann 1956; Williamson 
1965). Governments are constrained by these development dynamics to a certain extent, and they 
may even have motives for reinforcing uneven development in the short term. Concentrated 
development allows governments to take advantage of economies of scale and agglomeration 
economies, and once dynamic economic centers have emerged, spillovers to other areas may occur 
naturally (Hirschman 1978; Krugman 1991; Henderson 2002).  
Such work notes that policy factors and political variables, as well as underlying structural 
constraints, can shape development approaches and outcomes in important ways. State provision of 
urban and regional infrastructure, public services, financing, land, and other developmental 
resources can contribute to rapid urban growth and reinforce cities’ agglomeration economies. Less 
overtly spatial policies, such as industrial, trade, and foreign investment policies, may also affect city 
growth in important ways (Glaeser 2008; Henderson 2002; Xu and Zhu 2008; Demurger et al 2004). 
Political institutions, too, matter. Capital cities tend to be disproportionately large, and non-
democratic regime type and political centralization are associated with more highly concentrated 
urban development (Jefferson 1939; Ades and Glaeser 1995; Henderson 1999; Galiani and Kim 
2011). At the end of the day, however, economists and geographers tend to treat political and policy 
factors as exogenous, rather than explore why particular policies were adopted and implemented. 
Scholarship on the political economy of development aims more directly at clarifying the 
political determinants of policy outcomes and the dynamics of the policy process. Yet, while many 
studies of state-led development have looked at the politics of industrial policy in depth, scholarship 
is often silent on the question of urban and regional development—why states’ development efforts 
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were organized in space in particular ways, and with what consequences.24 The urban bias literature 
discussed earlier more directly considers the spatial aspects of development policy and politics. 
Scholars note the tendency in rapidly modernizing states to extract wealth from the rural sector to 
subsidize industrialization, and to concentrate public investment and services in cities. Urban bias is 
attributed, on the one hand, to ideological factors such as state elites’ prioritization of industry and 
the outward trappings of modernization. On the other hand, urban bias is seen as arising from state-
society politics: the collective action and rent-seeking capacity of urban-based groups outweighs that 
of rural interests, and there is thus political pressure on authoritarian incumbents to give policy 
benefits and resources to cities (Lipton 1977; Bates 1981; Wallace 2013).  
However, there is far less emphasis in urban bias literature on the bureaucratic and 
intergovernmental – as opposed to state-society – politics of development policy, despite indications 
that there is considerable conflict within the state over the spatial orientation of development.25 And, 
by viewing urban bias as a side effect of state-led industrialization and authoritarian politics, urban 
bias scholarship assigns little weight to spatial development policies per se, even though such 
policies feature centrally in many development programs. It thus remains unclear to what extent 
metropolitan bias in policies is deliberate and strategic, and which actors support such an approach. 
Recent China scholarship goes further in analyzing urban and regional policy and the politics 
surrounding it, but there is often a lack of attention to patterns of subnational variation. Scholars of 
reform-era China have looked in depth at evolving approaches to urban and regional development, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Canonical studies of state-led development by Gerschenkron (1962), Johnson (1982), Evans (1992), Amsden (2002) 
and Kohli (2004), for instance, have looked more closely at the political factors and institutional dynamics associated 
with successful programs of state-led industrialization. These studies emphasize the political autonomy and legitimacy of 
governments, the administrative strength and mobilization capacity of state actors, and the ability of state actors to 
maintain close ties and information flows with societal actors without falling prey to rent-seeking behavior. But such 
studies largely neglect questions about what spatial strategies developmental states adopt, and how the spatial 
configuration of development affects the politics of development. 
25 Indeed, later analyses of urban bias by Varshney (1993) and Bates (1993) have stressed the need for greater attention 
to the intra-state politics and dynamics that shape the spatial allocation of resources and policy support.   
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and have examined the political debates surrounding policy change. Recent work highlights a shift in 
China toward a more metropolitan-oriented urban and industrial growth model (Lin 2007, 2011; 
Wang and Zhu 2013). In addition, scholars have called attention to “rescaled” modes of urban and 
regional governance that have emerged in a context of rising economic competition and reassertion 
of higher-level authority, such as metropolitan-regional planning and new regional development 
initiatives (Xu 2008; Ke and Feser 2010; Shue and Sun 2010; Zhang 2011; Li and Wu 2012). 
Yet, much of this work emphasizes broad trends across China, rather than analyzing regional 
variation in how new approaches are playing out. And although such work stresses the role of state 
institutions in shaping urban and regional development outcomes, it rarely looks in depth at how 
state institutions operate. Intergovernmental relations and political agency in the policy process 
remain obscure, and there is rarely a systematic picture of the factors influencing policy outcomes. 26 
Meanwhile, there are several more general questions about multilevel governance in China 
that remain unanswered, even as scholars have worked to clarify the policy process and pinpoint the 
sources of subnational policy variation. Past work by political scientists has highlighted institutional 
dynamics and political variables that affect development policy outcomes. From Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg’s (1988) portrait of China’s “fragmented authoritarianism,” to Mertha’s (2005) theory of 
“soft centralization,” to Zheng’s (2007) discussion of “de facto federalism,” to Heilmann’s (2008) 
characterization of “experimentation under hierarchy,” scholars have emphasized the importance of 
administrative decentralization and fragmentation, institutional flexibility, bureaucratic and territorial 
competition, and the mix of top-down supervision and bottom-up initiative in Chinese governance. 
Rigorous subnational comparative work by Li (1997), Chung (2000), and Donaldson (2011), 
meanwhile, has highlighted a number of variables that affect provincial and local policy outcomes in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Xu (2008) and Shue and Sun (2010) go much further than most authors in analyzing the bureaucratic and 
intergovernmental conflicts that arise in urban and regional governance. 
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China, ranging from local economic structure and administrative legacies, to the institutional 
structure of central-local relations, to local leadership attributes.  
Nonetheless, many basic questions about the dynamics of policymaking in China’s 
fragmented system remain. There has been little analysis of how intergovernmental relations in the 
policy process vary across different parts of China.27 Despite widespread emphasis on subnational 
leadership initiative, there has been little discussion of the ex ante conditions that enable or hinder 
bold action on the part of local leaders. As Rithmire (2014) and others point out, it is unclear even 
how to conceptualize influence and agency in China’s hierarchical policymaking system. Addressing 
these questions is necessary in order to gain a clearer picture of development policy outcomes, and 
to advance broader debates over how China’s fragmented state functions. 
 In what follows, I lay out a theoretical framework that begins to address the above empirical 
puzzles and gaps in the literature. Building on previous comparative and Chinese political economy 
scholarship, I develop an argument about the political determinants of spatial policy outcomes. 
 
Theoretical framework: the multilevel politics of metropolitan bias  
 This section proposes an explanation of why we see greater metropolitan bias in some 
Chinese provinces and at some times than others. The main aim of this theoretical framework is to 
explain policy outcomes, by which I mean both the broad development strategies adopted in different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 As is clear from past work by Shirk (1993), Goodman, ed. (1997), and others, there are major differences in how 
Beijing and provinces approach development and even how central-local relations function between wealthier coastal 
regions and lagging interior regions. Most studies of urban and regional governance in China have been based on data 
gathered in the relatively developed and internationalized provinces of southeastern China, where city-level units enjoy 
more resources, wealth, and access to the global economy. It is unclear to what extent findings from these areas 
generalize to inland regions with poorer, more closed, and more state-oriented economies. And, while Zheng (2007) and 
other scholars have noted China’s ambiguous separation of policy-making powers among different tiers of government, 
little work has explored whether different levels of government play varying roles in development from place to place. 
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provinces and the more concrete implementation outcomes that follow.28 (In the dissertation’s 
empirical chapters, I will also explore some of the consequences of different policy approaches for 
economic outcomes and governance arrangements.) The framework is intended as a “middle range 
theory,”29 developed in dialogue with empirical data and geared to a specific context—contemporary 
China. In the concluding chapter, I explore how parts of the argument might travel to other settings. 
To identify key variables affecting development policy outcomes in China, it is first necessary 
to examine the structure and dynamics of policymaking. Provinces are a key scale for urban and 
regional governance, but policymaking is a multilevel process in which provincial, central, and local30 
actors maneuver to advance their respective priorities (Lu 2011; Yin 2011). Actors at different levels 
have varying preferences about how development policy should be administered, and about how 
investment and policy support should be distributed across space. To understand urban and regional 
policy outcomes, we must consider both the preferences of different government levels and the 
power balance between different levels in the policy process. 
  From this set-up, I develop my main claims about the drivers of metropolitan bias. I argue 
that provincial governments, focused on the economic competitiveness of their jurisdictions, should 
be more inclined to concentrate investment in top metropolitan areas than either local governments 
(in the aggregate) or central policymakers. But actors at each level have a basic interest in ensuring 
that a provincial economy remains competitive, so all may accept higher metropolitan concentration 
of investment when a province is underperforming economically relative to its peers. Policy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Following Frieden (1991), I distinguish analytically between policy outcomes, political outcomes, and economic 
outcomes. Policy outcomes, or “what government policies are adopted,” often have direct implications for patterns of 
resource distribution and economic development, which can in turn feed back into the policymaking process. In order to 
reshape policymaking more systematically, political actors may seek to change institutional arrangements and the 
distribution of power—a political outcome (Frieden 1991, 27). 
29 I borrow this term from Merton (1949) and Ziblatt (2006).  
30 Here, and in the rest of the dissertation, I use the term “local governments” mainly to refer to sub-provincial 
governments, typically city-level governments. Technically, of course, Chinese provinces, cities, counties, and townships 
all are considered “local” (difang) units. 
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outcomes also depend on which levels of government are able to dominate the making and 
implementation of development strategies. When provincial governments are administratively and 
politically strong relative to other tiers, their pro-metropolitan preferences should influence policy 
outcomes to a greater extent.  
Therefore, we can expect to observe greater metropolitan bias when provinces are lagging 
economically (and all levels of government support greater concentration of investment), and/or 
when provincial governments are strong (and can shape policies in line with their preferences). 
These provincial-level variables – relative economic performance and intergovernmental power 
balance – should help explain the variation in top-city concentration of investment that is not 
accounted for by underlying local development trends or by broad national policies. 
 
China’s fragmented state and multilevel policy process 
Over the past two decades, higher-level state actors have continued to play a key role in 
China’s urban and regional development, notwithstanding reform and opening and the growing 
clout of municipal governments. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, Beijing and 
provincial authorities have strong tools with which to shape urban and regional development. 
Efforts to revamp China’s state apparatus since the mid-1990s have increased higher-level regulatory 
authority and control over state resources, requiring localities to work more closely with higher 
echelons in various aspects of development. Whether it comes to fiscal and financial resources, land 
use, urban and regional infrastructure, industrial policy, or urban planning approvals, central and 
provincial state actors play a key role in distributing resources and defining the scope of local 
autonomy in the development process.31 If higher-level governments and state institutions have the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 China’s 1994 fiscal reforms, which recentralized many forms of fiscal revenue, made localities more reliant on central 
fiscal transfers and lending from state banks to cover their budgetary needs (Wong 2002; Tang 2011). Since its 2003 
creation, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and its provincial counterparts have established 
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capacity to shape urban and regional development, however, how this capacity is actually used 
remains a political question. Which scales of governance should take precedence, and which 
locations and sectors should be prioritized, are matters of fierce debate. Development strategies are 
formulated and implemented through a multilevel political process in which different preferences 
collide and different actors bargain.  
China’s state apparatus contains various actors and agendas, and the policy process is 
conflict-prone and lacking in institutionalization. The division of government along functional lines 
(tiao tiao) and into geographic units (kuai kuai) creates a constellation of bureaucratic and territorial 
entities with corporate characters of their own and thus makes for “fragmented” governance.32 
Policy-making authority and control over state resources is broken up among different levels, units, 
and functional domains, and the division of responsibility and authority is rarely clear-cut. As a result, 
policy formulation and implementation is a messy, multilevel process with a limited degree of 
institutionalization. With territorial and bureaucratic actors “encapsulating” and fighting on behalf of 
different state and societal interests, policymaking is also a highly politicized process. Conflict among 
different actors and agendas is rife, and policy consensus is hard to attain without interventions from 
authoritative actors (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Zheng 2007; Xu 2008).33  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
far-reaching authority over both broad industrial and regional planning and approval of specific large-scale projects 
(Yang 2004; Heilmann and Melton 2013). Strengthening of China’s Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLAR) since the 
turn of the century has tightened land-use planning and regulation, increasing central and provincial control (Naughton 
2007). Urban master plans and urban system plans formulated under the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development (the Construction system) and provincial construction departments continue to affect the quotas cities 
receive for population and state resources, while higher-level transportation agencies influence where airports, roads, and 
rail networks are built. Reform and recentralization of China’s commercial banks expanded Beijing’s oversight 
(Heilmann 2005), while more policy-driven financial institutions such as the China Development Bank have grown 
enormously in influence and lent staggering amounts of capital to industry and infrastructure projects (Sanderson and 
Forsythe 2012).  
32 Although central ministries and subnational governments fall under the authority of the central Party and state 
leadership and must observe basic central policies, they have room to advance more particularistic interests. 
33 A high degree of subnational administrative autonomy and political influence has become institutionalized over the 
course of the reform era (Zheng 2007). Partly, this is due to the strong political standing of provincial leaders in China. 
Provincial leaders have been one of the most important constituencies of China’s central Party establishment in recent 
decades. Provincial leaders form a large – often the largest – bloc in the ranks of the CPC’s Central Committee, and 
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Because the size and fragmentation of the state makes it difficult to administer China as a 
whole, provinces are key units for governance. Past scholarship has emphasized that China is both 
politically centralized and administratively decentralized: the Party leadership maintains control over 
key personnel and sets basic policy guidelines, but in practice allows considerable subnational 
policymaking discretion. During the reform era, provinces often have enjoyed considerable latitude 
in economic and social development policy (Chung 2000; Zheng 2007; Landry 2008; Donaldson 
2011). Provinces’ importance as governance units is also bolstered by China’s tradition of “regionally 
differentiated governance” (yin di zhi yi). Communist leaders have not merely allowed but also 
encouraged “experimentation under hierarchy” (Heilmann and Perry 2011; Heilmann 2008). Central 
authorities often strike particularistic deals with different provinces, and it has been common for 
reforms and new policies to emerge in a piecemeal fashion, with some areas moving ahead of others 
(Shirk 1993).  
Provincial units are particularly important for urban and regional governance because many 
key policy decisions and interventions are made at the regional scale. Provinces contain multiple 
urban centers, and encompass both developed core areas and less developed peripheries. It is at the 
provincial level that policymakers most directly confront the dilemmas associated with uneven 
development. Provincial governments formulate industrial and spatial development strategies for 
their units, and assign the cities under them different functional roles. Provincial governments 
coordinate the growth of different urban areas, allocating the land-use quotas and fiscal transfers 
cities rely on, overseeing and facilitating major capital investment projects, and helping localities 
obtain financial resources and policy support from central state agencies (Lu 2011; Gu et al 2012b; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
former provincial leaders dominate the upper ranks of the Party elite and the membership of elite political factions (Li 
2008; Shih 2008). Administratively, provincial governments also enjoy the autonomy they need to advance provincial 
interests. China’s hierarchical system of policy-making requires provincial officials to constantly consult with and seek 
approval from the center, but this hardly means that central priorities or ideas always drive the agenda (Heilmann and 
Melton 2013). Competition among territorial units for economic resources has increased as liberalization has progressed, 
and the material stakes of bureaucratic turf battles have also grown markedly along with the size of the economy. 
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Watson et al 1999, 93; Hsing 2010). Municipal master plans that specify the size, function, and 
growth configuration of cities must be approved by provinces, and provincial authorities play a key 
role in developing regional infrastructure such as highways, rail lines, and water supply systems (Lin 
2012; Vermeer 2004). Because provinces have institutionally strong executives and occupy a pivotal 
position in the administrative hierarchy, the provincial level is especially important for staging 
regional development initiatives that span different localities and functional sectors. 
While provincial development strategies play a major role in shaping growth, the formulation 
and implementation of development strategies is a multilevel process, with extensive consultation 
and coordination – as well as conflict – between different government tiers (Chung 2000). Central 
and local government actors, as well as provincial authorities, play a role in formulating provincial 
development strategies. Provinces are expected to abide by basic central policies, and the central 
leaders may give provincial governments guidance regarding what development approaches to 
pursue. City-level needs and interests also factor into the design of provincial development strategies, 
with close consultation between provincial and city governments and heavy lobbying of provincial 
authorities by city actors (Donaldson 2011; Lu 2011). 
Implementation of development strategies also involves actors at different levels. Provincial-
level policy measures are crucial to the implementation of development strategies, but there is much 
which provincial governments are unable to accomplish on their own. Provincial authorities look to 
the central government for material resources and authoritative policy support, and they also rely on 
the operational capacity and local knowledge of city-level governments (Vermeer 2004; Yin 2011). 
The successful implementation of development strategies depends in large part on whether, and to 
what extent, central and local actions complement provincial policies. Figure 1.3 below depicts in 
schematic form the intergovernmental dynamics of policy formulation and implementation. 
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                Figure 1.3: The multilevel dynamics of policymaking 
 
This multilevel policy process is highly politicized. The divergent policy preferences of 
different government levels and bureaucracies make for conflicts and aggressive bargaining at each 
stage of policymaking. Development strategies ultimately matter insofar as they lead to targeted and 
coordinated policy interventions in the form of investments, resource allocations, administrative 
support, or institutional changes. But bringing different levels and agencies into alignment on the 
outlines of a development strategy is difficult, and orchestrating implementation efforts may be even 
more difficult. In the absence of a fully institutionalized process or well defined division of authority 
across government levels and bureaucracies, actors maneuver to shape policies and mobilize state 
resources in line with their own priorities (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Zheng 2007).34 There is 
no ex ante formula for aggregating divergent preferences; policymaking and implementation is fluid 
and political, driven by power relations. Crafting and executing coherent development strategies in 
such a system depends on a given actor’s ability to take the initiative and work independently toward 
a goal if necessary, and also on the actor’s ability to apply effective pressure to and enlist cooperation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Provincial and local lobbying for spatially selective policies is widespread and well-documented: subnational 
governments vie to get central backing for local development programs and to capture spatially targeted benefits (Shirk 
1993; Zweig 2002; Yin 2011). The great importance of personal and factional relationships in Chinese politics only 
intensifies these bargaining dynamics (Lieberthal and Oksenber 1988; Shih 2008). 
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from other actors. Depending on which actors are able to dominate this process, the resulting 
policies may prioritize the interests of different government levels and territorial units.35 
To understand the policy outcomes that arise from this multilevel process, it is necessary to 
have a clearer picture of the policy preferences different actors bring to the table, and of the 
distribution of political clout and administrative capacity across different government levels. The 
following sections address these issues in turn, discussing the preferences of different government 
levels toward urban and regional development, how preferences vary under different economic 
circumstances, and how the power balance among different levels should affect ultimate outcomes. 
 
Divergent policy preferences across different government levels 
Preferences toward urban and regional development policy should vary across levels of 
government, and these preferences should, in turn, define the range of possible policy outcomes. 
Because provincial, local, and central authorities preside over different territorial units and face 
varying time horizons, they internalize or externalize different costs and benefits of metropolitan 
bias and thus should have different attitudes toward pro-metropolitan policies. I use a three-level 
framework to consider how different government tiers’ preferences toward development policy vary, 
and how preferences factor into ultimate policy outcomes. 
Provincial leaders have particular reason to favor metropolitan-oriented development 
strategies. Appointed by the central Party, provincial leaders are tasked with promoting China’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 When policy-making involves extensive central-local consultation and where central bureaucratic processes are 
fragmented and have many “choice points,” subnational actors such as provincial leaders can insert themselves into 
central deliberations to secure favorable policy decisions and win state resources (Sinha 2005; Shih 2008). In her study of 
the multi-level developmental state in India, Sinha (2005) emphasizes how the “porous” nature of an otherwise strong 
central state allowed subnational actors to wield considerable influence over development policies. In China, officials 
and policy experts describe local leaders’ aggressive lobbying of central agencies using the punning phrase “running 
through ministries, obtaining monies” (paobu qianjin). Recent research by Yin and Tang (2010) and Heilmann and Melton 
(2013), as well as anecdotal evidence gathered during interviews between 2011-2013 with staff and researchers associated 
with different central government agencies, suggests that provincial leaders relentlessly lobby central bureaucrats to get 
approvals for key development plans and projects.  
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economic and social development and safeguarding political order. In ordinary times, though, 
provincial leaders have strong incentives as well as considerable autonomy to promote provincial-
level economic and political interests. To advance their careers, provincial leaders seek to amass 
economic and administrative accomplishments that will impress superiors in Beijing. At the same 
time, provincial leaders seek to advance provincial-level economic and bureaucratic interests so as to 
build local support bases and foster clients (Huang 1996; Bo 2002; Zhou 2004; Zheng 2007; Tang 
2011). Achieving these aims requires provincial leaders to exploit the resource endowments of their 
provinces, and also to compete effectively for outside investment and state support. These 
imperatives have major implications for urban and regional strategy. 
From the standpoint of provincial leaders, building up top metropolitan areas is appealing as 
a means of accelerating economic development, raising the profile of their regions, and expanding 
their administrative influence (Xu 2008; Kennedy 2014). First, metropolitan cities are key assets in 
provinces’ efforts to boost economic growth and upgrade their economies. By developing large, 
economically diversified urban centers, it may be possible to reap economies of scale in investment, 
exploit spillovers across firms and sectors, and – because major cities already have strong economic 
foundations – achieve relatively rapid results (McKinsey Global Institute 2009). Cities with high-
quality infrastructure and institutions and large local markets are better able to attract outside 
investment and boost local productivity (World Bank 2006). The size and competitiveness of major 
cities is particularly important as provinces work to develop outward-oriented economic sectors and 
upgrade their economies into capital- and knowledge-intensive industries. Advanced industry and 
globally oriented economic activity require infrastructure, amenities, business networks, and human 
talent that are more easily available or more efficiently provided in large cities (Henderson 1997).36  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Where such conditions do not exist, concentrated efforts to improve the business environment or foster new 
industries in a single major city may be considerably easier than spreading support across multiple urban centers. 
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From the standpoint of provincial leaders, metropolitan-oriented development has other 
advantages as well. Insofar as provincial leaders seek to make their development achievements 
visible and raise the profile of their jurisdictions, metropolitan centers function as natural 
showcases—and showpieces. Major urban public works and large-scale industrial projects are easy to 
display, and can be used to make an impression on political superiors, investors, and tourists alike.37 
At the same time, metropolitan planning and development initiatives may offer an opportunity for 
provincial authorities to expand their role in managing the growth of cities and industry. Insofar as 
metropolitan governance requires coordinating the actions of different localities and agencies, it 
justifies an expansion of higher-level authority (Xu 2008; Kennedy 2014).38  
Of course, there are countervailing factors that should limit provincial governments’ 
metropolitan favoritism. Marginal returns to investment in top cities are likely to diminish beyond a 
certain point, such that provinces would reap greater benefits from channeling resources elsewhere 
(Henderson 1997; 1999).39 The downsides of metropolitan bias may also give pause to provincial 
governments. As discussed above, concentration of development in top cities worsens urban 
congestion and environmental strain, and heightens spatial and social inequality. Policies that 
marginalize outlying areas and trigger migration to top urban centers may increase social tensions 
and regional fragmentation in a province. Meanwhile, major cities themselves can pose political risks. 
Concerns about concentrated public unrest loom large in China, so rapid population growth in top 
cities remains a matter of great concern (Wallace 2009). Meanwhile, authorities in many provinces 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Also, insofar as major metropolitan centers – and particularly capital cities – serve as important symbolic centers – 
“theaters of state power,” in the words of Blockmans (2003) – for the larger regional units to which they belong, 
building up such cities may enhance the profile and political power of regional governments. 
38 As Xu (2008) observes, metropolitan-regional initiatives give provincial and central actors a way to exert greater 
control and guidance over processes of urban development that might otherwise be dominated by city governments.  
39 There are practical limits to how much investment – and economic limits to how much productive investment – can 
be undertaken in one place at one time. In addition, the economic benefits of city size may decline beyond a certain 
point (Henderson 1997; 1999) 
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have historically struggled to maintain administrative dominance over their largest cities (Fitzgerald 
2002), and provincial leaders may be loath to further build up cities they cannot fully control 
(Solinger 1993).40 Notwithstanding these downsides, however, provincial governments have strong 
incentives to support metropolitan development—at least up to a point. 
Taken in the aggregate, city-level governments should be far less supportive of metropolitan-
oriented development approaches than provincial authorities. While metropolitan cities and nearby 
localities have good reason to support policies that would advance their development, other local 
governments are likely to oppose metropolitan-oriented development strategies that would relegate 
them to the margins. City-level governments in China have tight links to local industry and real 
estate and capture many of the direct economic benefits associated with growth. Fierce economic 
and political competition among localities means that city-level governments put their own 
jurisdictions’ development first. Indeed, local leaders’ promotion chances may depend heavily on 
how well their jurisdictions perform relative to counterparts in terms of economic growth and fiscal 
revenue generation, so they also have strong career incentives to boost development (Tong 2011; 
Landry and Lu forthcoming). Of course, cities’ economic fortunes are at least somewhat connected 
with the larger provincial economies to which they belong, so even self-interested city governments 
should have some concern for provinces’ overall economic performance. But with localities 
primarily focused on their own development, and most cities situated outside of metropolitan 
regions, city governments on the whole should favor more spatially balanced development policies. 
Central government actors should also favor a more spatially balanced mode of development 
than provincial authorities, if for different reasons than local governments. Central state actors have 
a broader territorial ambit and longer time horizons than subnational actors. Many of the negative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Such concerns are likely to loom large in cases where cities have economic and administrative resources of their own 
and are relatively independent in development, or where there is a possibility that a city may be detached from the 
jurisdiction to which it belongs. 
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externalities arising from rapid, uneven urban growth – latent social tensions and political threats, 
environmental pollution, inflation, wasteful investment and associated bad debt, etc. – are 
internalized at the national level. Central policymakers – especially the senior politicians who make 
up the central Party and State Council leadership and have the most encompassing interests – assign 
less weight to the short-term development outcomes of specific provinces, and put more emphasis 
on ensuring the economic and political order of the country as a whole (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988; Huang 1996). As I discuss in Chapter 3, China’s leaders historically have seen concentrated 
urban development, sharp regional and urban-rural disparities, and rising social inequality as long-
term threats, and have worked to promote more spatially even and inclusive development.  
Of course, the central state is not monolithic, and different central actors and constituencies 
contend with one another. Top Party and state leaders, along with bureaucracies whose mandates 
relate to sustainability and inclusive development, such as the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development,41 are likely to prefer development approaches that balance emphasis on metropolitan 
areas with attention to secondary cities and rural areas (Interview BJ081206a). But central 
policymakers also have an interest in seeing each province develop urban and industrial centers 
strong enough to sustain regional growth. And, state agencies whose mandates are linked with 
economic development, such as the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the China Development Bank, may be particularly supportive of more elitist, 
metropolitan-oriented policies (Gu et al 2012a).42 Overall, the divided nature of the central 
government should keep different priorities in tension with one another. While different concerns 
may prevail under specific circumstances, central government preferences should be relatively 
moderate on the whole. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development was formerly known as the Ministry of Construction. 
42 In addition, government and Party policy experts and academic researchers representing a wide range of viewpoints 
participate in central policy debates. 
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Based on the preceding discussion, we can place different government levels’ policy 
preferences on a spectrum ranging from low to high metropolitan bias, as in Figure 1.4. Local 
governments, taken in the aggregate, should prefer development strategies with a low degree of 
metropolitan bias. Provincial governments, by contrast, have strong reasons to prioritize the growth 
of leading metropolitan areas. And, as just noted, Beijing’s policy preferences are mixed and should 
fall somewhere in between.  
Because the making and implementation of development strategies is a multilevel process 
and no tier fully dominates, ultimate metropolitan bias outcomes can be expected to fall somewhere 
inside the range of different levels’ preferences. The specific outcomes seen should depend on the 
relative weight given to each level’s preferences; one possible outcome is shown in Figure 1.4. 
       Figure 1.4: Different government levels’ preferences toward metropolitan bias  
  
Relative economic performance  
Of course, different government tiers’ policy preferences should reflect the specific 
development circumstances of the province in question as well as each tier’s more general concerns.  
In particular, how a province has performed economically relative to its counterparts can be 
expected to affect preferences at each tier regarding how metropolitan-oriented development is. By 
highlighting the problem of economic competitiveness relative to other development concerns, and 
by foregrounding the interests of the provincial unit relative to other governance scales, lagging 
provincial economic performance should produce a stronger preference for metropolitan-oriented 
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development at each level of government. Conversely, a situation of leading economic performance 
should make the issue of external competitiveness less salient relative to concerns over intra-
provincial disparities and the sustainability of development, and hence should produce a stronger 
preference at each government level for balanced urban and regional development. By shaping each 
level’s preferences, relative economic performance should influence ultimate policy outcomes as well. 
 The term “relative economic performance” here refers to how a province’s record of 
economic growth, upgrading, and internationalization over a multi-year prior period compares with 
the outcomes of its counterparts (or of the country as a whole).43 This idea differs from economic 
performance in an absolute sense: the issue is not whether a province is experiencing fast or slow 
development per se, but whether a province is outperforming or underperforming its peers. The 
concept also differs from the idea of development level (absolute or relative) in that it relates to the 
preceding trend of development rather than the development level which has been attained.44  
Relative economic performance is politically salient because different territorial units – and 
Chinese provinces especially – compete for economic resources and political recognition. Provinces 
that achieve faster growth or economic upgrading than their peers draw in capital and talent from 
other provinces, and may be given special recognition or granted special privileges by the center. 
Officials in well performing provinces may enjoy enhanced status and better career prospects, 
whether because leaders who preside over prosperity have an easier time building bases of support, 
or because Beijing rewards development achievements with faster promotion (Shirk 1993, 190; 
Zhou 2004). Conversely, provinces with lagging economic performance for an extended period may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 The simplest way of operationalizing relative economic performance, which I will use below, is calculating the 
difference between a given province’s average annual growth rate and that of the national economy as a whole over a 
given period of time.  
44 The idea of relative economic performance as a determinant of development approaches is similar to Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) contention that an economy’s backwardness relative to the most developed countries shapes the concerns of its 
leaders and the trajectory of its development. Whereas Gerschenkron sees an economy’s relative level of development as 
decisive, though, I stress the recent trend of development (i.e., whether a country is closing the gap with leading areas.) 
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face growing economic and political marginalization, and officials from these provinces may suffer 
diminished career prospects (Bo 2002). Given the high stakes involved, a province’s relative 
economic performance should affect the policy preferences of government actors at different levels. 
 Leaders of provinces that have experienced lagging economic performance can be expected 
to more strongly favor metropolitan-oriented development policies, insofar as lagging performance 
heightens the salience of competitiveness concerns relative to other development priorities. Lagging 
areas face the immediate risk of losing valuable economic factors to other areas, and may also derive 
greater benefits from attracting outside investment to their jurisdictions.45 At the same time, leaders 
in lagging areas are more likely to feel political pressure from above and/or below to demonstrate 
new progress in economic development, whether in the form of large-scale public investments, 
industry-promotion initiatives, or efforts to boost the profile of their jurisdictions.46  For reasons 
discussed earlier, provincial governments seeking economic breakthroughs are more likely to achieve 
quick, visible development results by focusing efforts and resources on large urban centers that have 
strong economic foundations and external links than by dispersing support across multiple locations. 
Provincial leaders in lagging units should thus have a very strong preference for metropolitan bias. 
 Beyond increasing the urgency of efforts to boost provincial competitiveness, lagging 
economic performance may also mitigate some of the risks inherent in metropolitan-oriented 
development. First, insofar as lagging provinces often experience out-migration to other areas, urban 
congestion in leading cities and development gaps between leading cities and outlying areas are likely 
to be smaller concerns than in provinces whose economies are growing rapidly and experiencing in-
migration. Second, in lagging provinces, concerns about the availability of employment are likely to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 A given increment of investment should be more highly valued in a provincial economy with slower growth and less 
investment overall. Outside investment may also bring coveted technology, management practices, and human capital. 
46 Past work has noted instances in which crises of lagging provincial economic performance have placed pressure on 
leaders and triggered major overhauls of policy. See Chung (1998); Goodman (1999); Bo (2002). 
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trump questions about the spatial distribution of resources and job opportunities, whereas the latter 
issue may be more salient when employment itself is less of a concern. Third, in lagging provinces, 
the integrity of the provincial unit is more likely to be threatened by the economic breakaway of 
poor cities pursuing ties with more-dynamic regions outside of the province than by the 
administrative breakaway of a leading metropolitan area.47 Policies that concentrate investment and 
economic growth in top cities should thus entail smaller political risks, in addition to greater 
economic benefits. 
 Beijing and local governments should also be more sympathetic to pro-metropolitan policies 
in the context of lagging economic performance. Although Beijing is less concerned about economic 
competitiveness and more committed to inclusive development than provincial authorities, lagging 
provincial performance imposes costs on the center. When a province’s economy struggles, large-
scale outmigration may occur, and the burdens of financing public services and promoting 
development may fall more heavily on Beijing (Yang 2010, 69). As a result, in cases of lagging 
economic performance, central policymakers may be more amenable to policies that seek to build 
stronger, more self-sufficient provincial economic centers.  
 Finally, local governments may also be more tolerant of metropolitan bias amid lagging 
development. Cities’ development prospects depend in part on the competitiveness of broader 
provincial economies, as provinces whose economies are uncompetitive in the present are likely to 
have lower future economic output and redistributive capacity. Self-interested local governments in 
lagging provinces may tolerate pro-metropolitan policies in the short term if there is a good prospect 
that this will mean a larger economic pie tomorrow. In provinces that have outperformed their peers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 The central government is unlikely to separate leading cities administratively from provinces that depend heavily on 
these cities’ economic potential and fiscal resources, because doing so would only increase its own fiscal burden. It falls 
to China’s central government to provide economic or fiscal assistance to provinces that are unable to provide for their 
own fiscal and welfare needs. 
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and enjoyed flush times, however, such trickle-down logic should be less persuasive. Poorer, more 
peripheral localities are likely to clamor for more investment and state support upfront. 
In sum, lagging economic performance should be associated with a greater preference for 
pro-metropolitan policies at each government tier, while leading economic performance should 
translate to less support for metropolitan-oriented development. Holding other conditions constant 
and moving from a situation of leading performance to a situation of lagging performance, we 
would expect to see each tier’s preferred level of metropolitan bias increase, as in Figure 1.5. 
Assuming each government tier’s preferences factor into the policy process to at least some degree, 
we should see an outcome of greater metropolitan bias regardless of the precise balance of power. 
   Figure 1.5: Preferences toward metropolitan bias under varying economic circumstances 
 
 
The intergovernmental balance of power (provincial government strength) 
 Preferences matter, but they must be translated into concrete policy measures to count. In a 
multilevel system such as China’s, different levels’ preferences all affect metropolitan bias outcomes 
to some degree, but these preferences may not carry equal weight in the policy process. A given 
government tier’s preferences should affect ultimate policy outcomes inasmuch as said tier has the 
political leverage or administrative capacity to advance its concerns and interests. The design and 
implementation of development policies may work out differently depending on which government 
actors take the lead in policymaking, and how much support or resistance other levels offer 
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(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Li 1997; Sinha 2005). Insofar as provincial authorities are more 
pro-metropolitan than other government levels, the degree of metropolitan bias should depend in 
large part on the extent to which provincial authorities are able to dominate policymaking. This, in 
turn, depends on what Falletti (2005) terms the “intergovernmental balance of power,” and more 
specifically what I call “provincial government strength”—provincial policymakers’ capacity to act 
autonomously of, and mobilize support from, other government levels. 
Past work by Falletti (2005), Ziblatt (2004), Sinha (2005), Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), 
Li (1997), and others suggests that a given tier’s ability to prevail in a multilevel policy process 
depends on how state capacity and political power are distributed vertically. First, there is the 
question of how administrative capacity, or “infrastructural power,”48 is distributed among different 
levels. Material resources, bureaucratic capacity, and policymaking authority enable a given level of 
government to do things on its own, and enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis other levels. Second, 
there is the question of what political power relationship exists between different government 
levels—to what extent leaders at one level enjoy political leverage over actors at other levels. Insofar 
as actors at one government level have the political status or political capital to pressure, punish, or 
reward actors at other levels, this should enhance their ability both to take the initiative and to enlist 
help from other levels.49  
In the Chinese context, a province’s administrative capacity should relate to several specific 
factors. First, patterns of resource dependency between different levels should matter. The 
provincial level should be stronger vis-à-vis localities beneath it when localities depend heavily on 
higher-level fiscal resources, state investment, and policy benefits. By the same token, provincial 
units should have more autonomy and bargaining leverage relative to central authorities when they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 This concept comes from Mann (1984). Ziblatt (2004) uses the concept in his theory of intergovernmental bargaining.  
49 Even when a given level of government does not itself possess the resources or formal authority to carry out a 
particular policy, political leverage over other levels may allow it to mobilize the requisite support.  
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depend less on central fiscal or economic support for their development and livelihood (Li 1997; 
Falleti 2005). Relations between different levels should also depend on how policy-making authority 
is structured. Provincial leaders’ ability to dominate policymaking may be constrained when localities 
have higher administrative status and greater autonomy in economic policy matters (Luo and Shen 
2008).50 On the other hand, in provinces that have a tradition of greater administrative autonomy 
vis-à-vis Beijing, it should be easier for provincial governments to pursue their own priorities.51 
The political leverage provincial governments have relative to other levels should depend in 
large part on the characteristics of top leaders. The presence of politically well-connected and/or 
individually dynamic leaders should strengthen the provincial level’s bargaining position. Proactive 
leadership and political clout are needed to mobilize state resource, launch major policy initiatives, 
and defend provincial-level priorities in the face of pressure from other levels (Chung 2000). When 
provincial leaders have privileged ties with high-level Party or state leaders in Beijing that provide 
them with political cover and special access to central decision-making processes, provincial 
governments should enjoy more policy latitude and a greater ability to extract central resources 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Shih 2008). Furthermore, because provincial leaders with patrons 
in high places have less need to please all constituencies, they are in a better position to pursue 
policies that run counter to preferences of central ministries or local governments.  
Beyond leadership factors, it is possible that the symbolic power of provincial units and the 
strength of subnational identities also affect intergovernmental politics. For historical reasons, some 
territorial units are more ideologically “salient” or inspire more loyalty from elites and the public 
than others (Whitney 1970; Singh 2011; Kennedy 2014). Provinces that are more cohesive as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 One such situation is when city-level leaders hold seats on provincial Party standing committees. 
51 Beijing maintains close supervision and control over regions that serve as key sources of fiscal revenue or key 
economic centers, but other areas may remain less carefully watched and less penetrated by the central state. See Sheng 
(2010); Donaldson (2011).  
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subnational communities may have an easier time securing compliance and sacrifice from localities, 
and may enjoy greater administrative autonomy vis-à-vis Beijing, than less cohesive provinces. 
 In sum, the intergovernmental power balance is likely to vary across provincial cases, and 
this should affect development policy outcomes. In cases of high provincial government strength, 
provincial preferences should have relatively greater weight in the policy process, and we should 
thus expect to see more metropolitan bias. Conversely, when the provincial level is weak relative to 
other government tiers in terms of administrative capacity and political clout, we can expect central 
and local government preferences to factor more heavily in policymaking. In these cases, we should 
see less metropolitan bias in development policies. Figure 1.6 below illustrates these different 
scenarios. Holding different levels’ preferences constant, an increase in the strength of the provincial 
level relative to other tiers should be associated with greater metropolitan bias. 
      Figure 1.6: The intergovernmental power balance and metropolitan bias outcomes 
  
Main hypotheses  
Building on the above discussion, it is possible to lay out the empirically testable hypotheses 
about the correlates of metropolitan bias. First, we should expect a negative relationship between the 
relative economic performance of a province and the degree of metropolitan bias. Other things 
equal, there should be greater metropolitan bias in provinces that have experienced slower economic 
growth and upgrading than their peers over an extended prior period, and less metropolitan bias in 
provinces that have been leaders in development. Empirically, provinces whose economic growth 
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rate has lagged behind the national or regional average should display greater metropolitan bias. 
Above-average growth in a prior period should be associated with less metropolitan bias. 
 Second, we should expect to find a positive relationship between provincial government 
strength and metropolitan bias in policies. When provincial governments have higher administrative 
capacity and political strength relative to other tiers, policies should slant more strongly in favor of 
leading metropolitan areas. Empirically, we should be able to observe a positive relationship between 
provincial government strength and greater metropolitan bias both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally. “Strong” provinces should show greater metropolitan bias over an extended period of 
time than their counterparts, and metropolitan bias should fluctuate over time within a given 
province as provincial-level strength changes (as occurs, for example, with the turnover of leaders). 
 Third, these two explanatory variables can be expected to influence metropolitan bias 
outcomes in a largely additive fashion.52 Metropolitan bias should be greatest in cases of both lagging 
economic performance and high provincial strength. Under these circumstances, each government 
level’s preferences should be relatively pro-metropolitan, and provincial preferences (the most pro-
metropolitan of all) should be weighted relatively heavily. We can also expect to see above-average – 
albeit less extreme – metropolitan bias in cases in which there is lagging economic performance or 
high provincial strength, and an intermediate value on the other explanatory variable. Insofar as 
lagging economic performance produces a greater preference for metropolitan-oriented 
development at each level, lagging performance should be associated with above-average 
metropolitan bias even if the provincial tier is only moderately strong (and provincial preferences do 
not fully dominate policymaking). Meanwhile, insofar as provincial governments have a general 
preference for metropolitan-oriented development, high provincial strength may be associated with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 It is most straightforward to conceptualize the relationship between the two main explanatory variables as additive, 
but it is of course possible that a more complicated interaction exists, such that the relationship between each 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable depends on the level of the other explanatory variable. 
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above-average metropolitan bias even when economic performance is average. We can expect to see 
the lowest levels of metropolitan bias in cases of both leading performance and low strength, where 
both the configuration of policy preferences and the balance of power work against metropolitan 
bias. In short, we can expect to find an empirical relationship between relative economic 
performance, the intergovernmental power balance, and metropolitan bias that looks something like 
Figure 1.7 below. (Here, the dashed diagonal lines represent constant levels of metropolitan bias.)  
           Figure 1.7: Hypothesized outcomes with different values on explanatory variables 
 
Alternative explanations 
Of course, other factors may also contribute to patterns of metropolitan bias in China. Past 
research has highlighted a number of economic-structural variables, national-level policy factors, and 
city-level policy variables that affect urban and regional development outcomes. By emphasizing the 
provincial-level explanatory variables above, I do not mean to deny the importance of other causal 
factors. In line with past findings, we can expect to see greater metropolitan concentration of 
economic resources in poorer, less urbanized, and less open provinces. We might also expect to see 
greater state support given to cities that have performed well and grown rapidly in prior periods, 
insofar as booming cities have major infrastructure and public service needs. And, given that 
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national-level policies in China have become more permissive of metropolitan growth in recent years, 
we can expect to see an increasing metropolitan concentration of economic activity over time.  
By themselves, however, alternative explanations have difficulty accounting for observed 
policy outcomes and patterns of development. As I will show in Chapter 2, even after we control for 
alternative explanatory factors, there is puzzling residual variation over time and across units in 
spatial patterns of investment and economic growth. At the same time, there are theoretical reasons 
to doubt whether alternative explanations provide a satisfactory account of provincial outcomes.  
Local conditions and broad national policies may constrain provincial development 
approaches in important ways, but these factors are not deterministic. Both the development 
problems policymakers confront, and the alternatives available to them, are affected by the basic 
structural conditions and resource endowments of a province. But underlying provincial conditions 
do not determine specific policy outcomes so much as constrain the realm of possibilities.53 Nor, in 
a country experiencing rapid economic transformation, are structural factors – such as infrastructure 
quality and the level of human capital – as immutable as they might seem. Much the same can be 
said of national policies and institutions. Basic national policies and institutions set important 
parameters for subnational policy choices, but China’s governance system is internally diverse and 
flexible. Moreover, national policies and institutions often change in accordance with historical 
exigencies or under the influence of subnational pressure. As such, national policies can neither be 
seen as fully determinative of local policy approaches, nor regarded as fully exogenous to them. 
The question of to what extent the metropolitan orientation of development reflects city-
level policies and initiatives is more challenging to address. China’s multilevel policy process often 
makes it difficult to tell where particular ideas and initiatives originate. Undoubtedly, China’s city 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 See Donaldson (2011) on this point. 
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governments have become very important economic and political actors in their own right. 
Scholarship by Chung (1999), Xu (2008), and others highlights the ways in which city governments 
themselves can mobilize capital and create the conditions for rapid growth. My assumption, however, 
is that provincial governments, being higher-ranked than city governments and presiding over much 
larger units, have a greater political capacity to mobilize state resources and policy support than city 
governments themselves. At the same time, I conceptualize and measure provincial government 
strength in a way that takes into account the clout of city-level governments within each province.54  
 
Research design and methodology 
This section discusses the approach I take in the dissertation to develop and test the 
argument outlined above. I first explain the project’s overall empirical strategy and describe the 
temporal and geographic scope of research. Next, I give an overview of the project’s quantitative 
component, discussing the types of data and methods used. Finally, I describe the qualitative work at 
the core of the dissertation, explaining my approach for analyzing national policies and institutions 
as well as for selecting and analyzing provincial cases, and detailing the data sources I draw on. 
 
Empirical strategy and scope of analysis 
 This project combines qualitative and quantitative methods, and draws on observations from 
different levels of analysis. My empirical strategy takes cues from the “nested” research design 
advocated by Lieberman (2003; 2005) and the subnational comparative approaches of Donaldson 
(2011) and Murali (2011). The empirical work proceeds in four main steps: I begin by examining 
outcomes of interest, charting variation over time and across a sample of 20 Chinese provinces in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 I code provincial governments as weaker in cases where municipal governments are politically strong and control a 
large share of fiscal expenditure. 
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the top-city concentration of GDP growth and investment, and using regression analysis to identify 
variation in investment outcomes that is not readily explained by basic structural and economic 
factors. The next two components of my research comprise “model-building” qualitative analysis. 
To gain a clearer picture of how national-level policy factors contribute to variation in metropolitan 
bias outcomes, I examine the historical evolution of China’s development policies and take a closer 
look at the workings of governance institutions in four key policy areas. Next, in order to help clarify 
how development approaches have evolved over time in different provinces, and identify key factors 
contributing to different metropolitan bias outcomes, I carry out comparative case studies of three 
Chinese provinces. The final step of the empirical work is to test the generalizability of the main 
claims developed in the model-building stages: I carry out statistical analysis of both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal variation in metropolitan bias outcomes to check whether the provincial-level 
variables I highlight show the expected relationships with metropolitan bias. Insofar as the research 
design includes analysis of economic variables, national-level policies, and city-level dynamics, it 
builds in opportunities to evaluate alternative explanations of metropolitan bias outcomes. 
I focus on describing and explaining metropolitan bias outcomes during the years from 
1996-2010, a period of fast-paced urban development and intense policy debate. I organize the 
historical analysis presented in qualitative chapters by periods corresponding to China’s Five-Year 
Plans (FYPs), insofar as central and provincial FYPs set the overall tone for policymaking. For 
regression analysis, I focus on the period from 2001-2010 because the data is relatively complete and 
comparable, and because this period represents the high tide of urban and industrial growth in China. 
Geographically, I examine outcomes in a sample of 20 Chinese provinces that are broadly 
comparable with one another in terms of population size, geography, economic structure, and other 
variables. The sample includes China’s more populous, Han-dominated provinces, while excluding 
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the smallest province-level units and China’s sparsely populated western regions.55 The provinces in 
the sample vary between 26.8 million and 94.9 million in population (2000), and range from 102,000 
square kilometers to 485,000 square kilometers in land area (China Data Online). Though the 20 
provinces represent only 43 percent of China’s vast land area, they were home to roughly 1.1 billion 
people, or 86 percent of the national population, in 2000. From this pool of 20 provinces, I select 
three provinces – Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi – for in-depth case analysis, as discussed below. The 
full sample of 20 provinces and the three case-study provinces are indicated in Figure 1.8 below. 
                    Figure 1.8: Full sample of 20 provinces and the three main cases 
 
                    Sources: Figure by author; Shape file obtained from worldmap.harvard.edu/chinamap.   
 
Quantitative analysis of metropolitan bias outcomes 
I use regression analysis both to assess metropolitan bias outcomes upfront, and also to test 
the relationship between metropolitan bias and different explanatory variables over time and across 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 I exclude from the sample China’s four centrally controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing) as 
well as Hainan, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau. These units are not 
readily comparable with mainstream provinces in terms of size, development level, and/or governing arrangements.  
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provinces. I provide a brief overview of my approach here, while more detailed descriptions of the 
statistical data and methods used are given in Chapter 2, Chapter 6, and the Statistical Appendix. 
The initial analysis of development outcomes in Chapter 2 examines the concentration of 
economic activity and resources in leading cities. I use national-, provincial-, and city-level 
quantitative data to chart urban and regional development outcomes in China during the 1990s and 
2000s, and to measure the main dependent variable, metropolitan bias. I examine patterns in the 
concentration of economic activity, people, and developmental resources in the leading urban areas 
of different provinces. After describing basic trends in urban growth, I turn to the question of how 
FAI is distributed between top cities and outlying areas across different provinces. As will be 
explained in Chapter 2, I use the top-city share of overall provincial FAI (for individual years or 
multi-year periods) as a key indicator of the degree of metropolitan orientation in development. I use 
regression analysis to explore how well basic structural and economic variables such as development 
level, urbanization rate, economic openness, and prior growth trends explain the concentration of 
FAI in provinces’ top cities between 2001-2010. I treat regression residuals – unexplained variation 
in top-city FAI share – as measures of metropolitan bias in investment.56  
I carry out a second round of statistical analysis in Chapter 6 to examine how well the main 
claims developed in my qualitative research hold across the full sample of provinces. In particular, 
this analysis tests the relationship between metropolitan bias and provinces’ relative economic 
performance and provincial government strength. First, to test whether the expected relationship 
between metropolitan bias and the explanatory variables holds across provinces for the period 2001-
2010 as a whole, I carry out cross-sectional regression analysis (n=20) and simulate different !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Baseline variables do appear to have considerable explanatory power, but also leave an important piece of variation in 
the metropolitan concentration of investment unexplained. I treat the variation left over after controlling for baseline 
economic variables as an indicator of metropolitan bias, distinguishing cases of high, low, and intermediate metropolitan 
bias by inspection of regression residuals and outliers. In this way, and by looking at trends over time in top-city 
investment concentration across 20 provinces, I zero in on outcomes (and particular cases) of interest for exploring the 
role of political factors in urban and regional development. 
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quantities of interest. Second, to explore the relationship between metropolitan bias and explanatory 
variables over time within provinces, I use panel analysis with provincial fixed-effects (n=220). 
While not exhaustive, this statistical analysis provides at least a preliminary test of how well the 
variables I highlight explain metropolitan bias patterns in China. 
 
Case studies and qualitative analysis 
The bulk of the dissertation consists of qualitative analysis of development policy outcomes 
and the political processes through which these outcomes emerge. I look both at the broad national 
context of policymaking in China and at several specific provincial cases. 
Both to assess how national-level policies have contributed to metropolitan bias outcomes 
and to provide a background for the provincial case studies that follow, Chapter 3 examines the 
evolving framework of national policies and institutions that govern urban and regional growth in 
China. I trace changes in national-level development policy over recent decades, looking at whether 
shifts in central policies have preceded or followed subnational trends. I also look more closely at 
evolving policy institutions in several domains related to urban and regional development, including 
regional planning, land governance, investment policy, and fiscal and financial policy. My goal is 
twofold: to assess the extent to which evolving national policies and institutions have favored 
metropolitan-oriented development, and to gain a clearer picture of the amount of subnational 
variation and discretion allowed by national policy frameworks.57 
Comparative case studies of urban and regional governance in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi 
provinces form the core of the dissertation. These case studies trace the evolution of urban and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 What emerges from this analysis of national-level institutions is the recognition that national institutions matter 
substantially for urban outcomes, but that they are not cleanly separated from subnational processes and forces: state 
agencies in China operate in conjunction with – through rather than over – local agencies. Urban and regional 
governance is inherently multilevel, with continual interaction and mutual influence between center and locality. To 
understand evolving national-level policy approaches, it is necessary to take into account what is happening locally, and 
vice versa. 
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regional policies since the late 1990s in each province to explore how background conditions and 
interactions between national, local, and provincial institutions have shaped policy approaches. They 
illustrate in greater detail the varying outcomes and causal factors present in the different cases, and 
develop explanations for why policy approaches have varied across units and over time.  
My case-study approach builds on earlier subnational comparative work by China scholars 
(Chung 2000; Donaldson 2011) and comparativists (Snyder 2001; Sinha 2005). Like these authors, I 
use case studies to get a richer picture of provincial outcomes and the multilevel political processes 
through which outcomes emerge. In addition to providing a clearer sense of historical context and 
progression, theory-guided process tracing can yield important insights into causal relationships 
among key variables (Lieberman 2003; Gerring 2004; Anckar 2008; Hall 2008).  
The case studies here exploit both within-case temporal variation and cross-case variation in 
metropolitan bias outcomes. By tracing the making of urban and regional policies over time as local 
conditions change within different provinces, it is possible to gain insight into case-specific causal 
patterns. Meanwhile, comparing the politics of policymaking across both similarly and differently 
situated provinces helps to distinguish unit-specific patterns from more general tendencies, and 
makes it possible to generate broader hypotheses about how structural conditions, economic 
circumstances, and political conditions affect policy outcomes.58 Case studies also provide an 
opportunity to gather causal-process observations from lower levels of analysis. 
 My selection of provincial cases reflects both theoretical and practical considerations. On the 
one hand, aiming to use a controlled comparison of cases to help isolate key causal factors, I sought 
similarly situated provinces that displayed diverging metropolitan bias outcomes.59 On the other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 By focusing in on particular variables, and tracing the sources of divergent policy outcomes in similarly situated 
provinces through what Hall (2008) calls “systematic process analysis,” it is possible to better isolate key causal variables. 
59 To identify cases of relatively high and low metropolitan bias, I initially looked at trends in top-city GDP and FAI 
share. I later used inspection of residuals from regression analysis to ensure that apparent cases of metropolitan bias held 
up after controlling for economic and structural variables. 
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hand, given China’s stark coastal-inland differences60 and a theoretical interest in how units’ relative 
economic circumstances affect their policy approaches, it was similarly important to include cases 
from both the wealthy eastern seaboard and the less-developed interior. In the end, the specific 
choice of cases also reflected more idiosyncratic factors, such as existing research contacts.!
These considerations led me to select Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi as the main cases for study. 
The Jiangsu case provides a look at urban and regional policy in a relatively developed province with 
a dynamic, outward-oriented economy. In contrast, the Hunan case study offers a glimpse of 
development policy and politics in less-developed central China. By examining the paired case of 
Jiangxi, which resembles Hunan in most respects but displays contrasting metropolitan bias 
outcomes, I am able to approximate a “most-similar systems design” and more readily identify key 
explanatory factors.61 Background information on these three provinces is given in the next chapter. 
Both the case studies and the research on national-level policies and institutions draw on a 
wide range of sources, including many gathered during 12 months of fieldwork in various locations 
in China. Fieldwork provided the opportunity to conduct over 100 research interviews with 
government policymakers and experts, academic researchers, urban and regional planners, 
businesspeople, and journalists in Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi. This time 
in China was also used to gather written and statistical materials from public libraries, bookstores, 
publishing houses, and individuals. My research also exploits a wide variety of Chinese- and English-
language primary and secondary sources from university libraries in the United States and China, and 
from digital sources, including government documents and reports, official yearbooks and gazetteers, 
Chinese and Western academic research, newspaper articles, promotional materials, and official and 
unofficial datasets. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See Shirk (1993); Goodman, ed. (1997). 
61 For discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of “most similar systems”-style paired comparisons, see Anckar 
(2008). Donaldson (2011) exemplifies the application of this method to the study of provincial development in China.  
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Plan of the dissertation and key contributions 
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 describes variation over time and 
across provinces in China’s urban and regional development outcomes, and uses a novel approach 
to measure the degree of metropolitan bias in different provinces’ development. The chapter further 
elaborates the main empirical puzzles to be addressed in the dissertation. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution of basic national policies and institutions related to urban 
and regional development in China. I discuss how changes in policies and governance institutions 
have contributed to a metropolitan turn in development, but also show how the ambivalence of 
national policies and the multilevel nature of policymaking make provincial-level variables important. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present provincial case studies. Chapter 4 traces the shifting politics of 
urban and regional policy in Jiangsu during the past two decades. The case study illustrates how 
Jiangsu’s leading development position, on the one hand, and relative weakness as a provincial unit, 
on the other hand, have limited metropolitan bias. Chapter 5 looks at the politics surrounding urban 
and regional development in inland China, where lagging economic performance has shaped 
policymaking in important ways. The chapter traces how varying development approaches emerged 
in the otherwise similar provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi. The case study links dramatic metropolitan 
bias in Hunan to the strength of provincial institutions and the initiative of provincial leaders. I trace 
Jiangxi’s more variable and rural-oriented development approach to greater central and local 
influence in the policy process, and to Jiangxi’s less-stubborn economic difficulties.  
Chapter 6 tests how well key claims hold across the broader sample of 20 provinces. Cross-
sectional regression analysis shows that lagging economic performance and provincial government 
strength are associated with metropolitan bias more broadly. Panel analysis finds that metropolitan-
oriented development is more common during the tenures of “rising star” provincial leaders. 
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The concluding chapter reviews the main empirical findings of the dissertation and 
highlights the project’s contributions to the Chinese politics, political economy of development, and 
urban studies literatures. I also discuss how the argument may travel to other national contexts. 
Overall, the dissertation makes three main theoretical and substantive contributions. First, I 
document patterns of metropolitan bias in China’s development, and propose an explanation of why 
we see greater metropolitan bias in some provinces and at some times than others. By focusing on 
the intergovernmental politics of development, my argument goes beyond and complements existing 
explanations of policy outcomes that stress structural factors, state-society dynamics, and leader 
personalities. Second, and related, I provide new insights into the nature and workings of China’s 
multilevel governance system. I call attention to variation across provinces and over time in the 
intergovernmental dynamics of policymaking, and show how the combination of provincial initiative 
and central resources can give rise to powerful state interventions. Third, I contribute to our 
understanding of the policy logics and politics of state-led development in China and beyond, 
emphasizing the importance of spatial policies in broader development strategies, and examining the 
politics surrounding a new generation of urban and regional development initiatives. 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 2 
 56 
II: Metropolitan Development in China: Patterns and Puzzles 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the urban and regional development outcomes of 
interest in this dissertation. It describes both basic trends and puzzling variation across provinces 
and over time in the extent to which growth and investment are centered in metropolitan cities.  
The chapter is broken into three main parts. I first examine the phenomenon of 
metropolitan-oriented development across China as a whole and for the main sample of 20 
provinces. I highlight an overall trend of rapid economic growth and heavier investment in China’s 
large metropolitan centers relative to other areas, but also call attention to marked variation in spatial 
development patterns across regions and over time.  
Continuing to look at the sample of 20 provinces, I examine the degree of metropolitan bias 
in development in different units. To measure metropolitan bias quantitatively, I compare the actual 
shares of investment absorbed by different provinces’ top cities with the shares one would expect 
given past trends and basic structural and economic variables. Using regression analysis and 
inspection of residuals, I am able to identify cases in which the distribution of investment is skewed 
in favor of or away from top cities. I highlight variation in the top-city concentration of investment 
that is not readily explained by past trends or economic variables, and call attention to puzzling 
variation in the degree of metropolitan bias across otherwise similar provinces. 
The remainder of the chapter takes a closer look at the main provincial cases of Jiangsu, 
Hunan, and Jiangxi. I begin by describing in more detail the striking cross-case and within-case 
variation in these provinces’ development outcomes. I then discuss why these outcomes remain 
puzzling even after taking into account the provinces’ pre-existing growth trends, industrial 
structures, economic geography, and other baseline factors. It is necessary, I argue, to look at how 
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more explicitly political variables, in addition to structural conditions and economic trends, shape 
provinces’ development trajectories and contribute to patterns of metropolitan bias.  
 
Metropolitan-oriented development in China 
Since the late 1990s, large cities have grown explosively across much of China. After many 
years in which the growth of medium-sized and smaller cities kept pace with or exceeded that of 
large cities, metropolitan centers with core urban populations over a million have taken a leading 
position in economic and urban development. Growth trends have been far from uniform, however. 
Disaggregating outcomes across space and over time, we find puzzling variation in the extent to 
which population, GDP, investment, and public resources have concentrated in metropolitan cities. 
While there are some broad differences in development outcomes between coastal and 
inland China, the most striking variation is found across individual provinces and over time within 
provinces. It is not surprising to find higher metropolitan concentration of development in inland 
areas on average. Inland provinces are generally poorer and less urbanized than coastal areas, and 
tend to have more state-dominated economies. Because inland provinces generally have fewer major 
cities and higher urban concentration than coastal areas to begin with, they are particularly prone to 
spatial polarization in development. Yet, broad inland-coastal differences cannot account for 
variation in outcomes across similarly situated provinces or within provinces over time. As I show, 
baseline factors such as development level, geographic location, and prior trends do not fully explain 
why development is more metropolitan-oriented in some cases than others. 
 
Rising concentration of people and economic activity in large cities 
The stunning pace of urbanization in China during the past three decades can obscure 
change over time in the nature of urban growth. Urbanization, Henderson and Wang (2007) point 
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out, involves distinct processes, including growth in overall urban population but also change in the 
number of cities and shifts in the size distribution of cities. The character of urban and regional 
development may vary considerably depending on the precise combination of these processes. 
During the 1980s and into the 1990s, urbanization in China featured particularly rapid growth of 
small and medium-sized cities as well as rapid growth in the number of urban settlement. The 
emergence – often by administrative designation – of many new cities, and the fast growth of 
smaller cities (those with an urban population less than 500,000) relative to larger ones, led to a 
flattening of China’s urban hierarchy (Fan 1999; Anderson and Ge 2005).1  
Since the late-1990s on, however, China’s urban growth has changed track, with major 
metropolitan centers growing very rapidly and reclaiming a dominant role in the urban economy. 
After the mid-1990s, large cities grew faster relative to smaller cities not only in terms of population 
(Wang and Zhu 2013), but also in terms of economic and physical size. The emerging urban growth 
model featured rapid physical expansion of large cities and dramatic enhancement of cities’ built 
environments, often in the form of planned new districts that combined large-scale real estate and 
industrial development (Lin 2007; Hsing 2010). After over a decade in which the development of 
large cities had lagged behind that of smaller cities, major metropolitan centers increased sharply in 
number, size, and economic centrality.  
Some basic calculations capture these underlying trends. In the seven years between 2000 
and 2007 alone, the share of total urban population located in “large” (0.5-one million-person) and 
“very large” (one-million-plus-person) cities rose from 53.2 percent to 58.5 percent (Xie 2012). 
Between 2000 and 2010, the spatial Gini coefficient of city-level GDP in China rose from 0.447 to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Some geographers attributed this transformation of China’s urban structure to the process of “state disarticulation” and 
economic reform and opening: loosening of restrictions on migration from rural areas to nearby urban centers and the 
rapid growth of smaller manufacturing centers as light industry boomed weakened the position of large cities closely tied 
to the state-owned economy (Lin 1999). The relatively fast growth of smaller urban centers was also linked to state 
policies that explicitly favored smaller cities and sought to limit rapid growth of major metropolises (Fan 1999). 
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0.470, indicating rising concentration of economic activity in larger centers.2 Most striking, perhaps, 
has been the rapid proliferation of “super-large” (two million-person plus) and “very large” (one 
million-person plus) cities between 2000 and 2010, which contrasts with slower growth in these 
categories during the preceding decade. Whereas the number of cities with urban populations over 
two million and one million had climbed from nine to 13 and from 31 to 40, respectively, in the 
1990s, the number of two million-person-plus and one million-person-plus person cities rose to 24 
and 61 respectively in the 2000s. The margin of growth in the number of cities in the 0.5-one 
million-person range, meanwhile, was only slightly larger (28 versus 25) than in the previous decade. 
      Table 2.1: Number of Chinese cities in each size class for various years*  
              
 
 
   
  
 
            Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; China Data Online; Xie (2012); author’s calculations.  
                       *Totals are based on non-agricultural population in urban districts.  
 
In many instances, the leading urban areas of different provinces also have become more 
economically dominant within their respective units. I identify provincial “top cities” based on their 
initial GDP size; in most cases, they are provincial capitals.3 Across the 20 provinces in my sample, 
top cities’ average share of (official) provincial non-agricultural population generally has held steady 
or increased slightly between 2000 and 2010.4 Meanwhile, the economic dominance of top cities has 
risen across the 20-province sample. The largest cities generally saw their regional economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Author’s calculations in R using city-level data from National Bureau of Statistics. 
3 I use 1996 city-level GDP data from China Data Online to identify the top city of each of the 20 provinces in my 
sample. The top cities for all provinces except Jiangsu and Shandong are provincial capitals. For Jiangsu, the top city by 
GDP size is Suzhou, but I also examine outcomes for Nanjing, the provincial capital and largest city by urban district 
population. For Shandong, the largest city by GDP size is Qingdao, but I also examine outcomes for Jinan, the capital. 
4 Between 2000 and 2010, the average share of urban population located in the leading city (here defined in GDP terms) 
held constant at 0.15 in coastal provinces, while rising from 0.18 to 0.19 in inland regions (China Data Online; author’s 
calculations.) These figures are based on official “non-agricultural” population, and thus almost certainly understate 
actual concentration of people in top cities. 
Year Total cities >1mn 
 (>2mn) 
0.5-1mn <0.5mn 
1949 136 5  8 123 
1978 192 13 27 152 
1990 461 31 (9) 28 402 
2000 663 40 (13) 53 570 
2010 657 61 (24) 81 515 
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dominance increase, with top cities’ average share of provincial GDP rising from 22 percent in 1996 
to 25 percent in 2010. This broad trend was largely driven by outcomes in inland China: in the 13 
interior provinces in the sample, average top-city share of total GDP rose from 23 percent in 1996 
to over 27 percent in 2010 (China Data Online; author’s calculations).5 Thus, top-city population 
and economic shares not only started out higher in inland provinces than in coastal regions, but also 
tended to increase more. 
 
Rising metropolitan concentration of investment 
Although geographers and urban economists often focus on changes in the distribution of 
GDP and population across different cities and regions, the spatial distribution of investment 
arguably offers a clearer picture of where economic development is taking place during a given 
period. In China, fixed-asset investment (FAI), which includes investment in industrial plant and 
equipment, real estate, and infrastructure, among other categories, is a key indicator of economic 
development—and urban development in particular (Barnett and Brooks 2006; Geng and N’Diaye 
2012).6 Over the past two decades, fixed-asset investment has represented a very large share of 
economic activity in China and has been a leading driver of economic growth. Between 1996 and 
2010, China saw average annual growth in FAI of 16 percent, five percentage points faster than its 
rate of GDP growth. The ratio of FAI to GDP climbed sharply during the 2000s, rising from 0.33 in 
2000, to 0.46 in 2005, and then to 0.60 in 2010 (China Data Online; author’s calculations).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In coastal provinces, the average capital city share dropped slightly, from 19.1 percent to 18.8 percent. This is not 
surprising in light of the fact that most coastal provinces are home to more than one large metropolitan center.  
6 According to the China Statistical Yearbook (2000), “The statistics of the investment in fixed assets cover the investment 
in capital construction, the investment in innovation, the investment in real estate development, the investment in other 
state-owned fixed assets, the investment in fixed assets by urban collective units, the investment in fixed assets by rural 
collective units, the housing investment by urban individuals and the investment in fixed assets by rural individuals. 
Starting from 1999, investment statistics also include investment in fixed assets by urban private units and individuals” 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2001). Fixed-asset investment differs from the more commonly used gross fixed capital 
formation indicator in that it includes expenditures on existing assets as well as new assets (Knight and Ding 1999). 
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Subnational investment outcomes reflect a mix of factors, but are determined in part by the 
amount of direct and indirect state support a given locality receives. Where investment goes is 
obviously extremely important as an economic outcome, and, to the extent that the location of 
investment activity is directly or indirectly shaped by administrative factors, it also represents an 
important outcome of policymaking and distributive politics. As Wei (2000) notes, “regional 
allocation of fixed investment…is considered a key instrument in China’s industrialization and 
regional development policy” (67-68). State agencies, or actors with close ties to the state, are 
directly responsible for, or help finance, a considerable share of investment in China—especially 
large-scale industrial and infrastructure investment. State actors also exercise considerable influence 
over private and foreign investment in China, because investment projects require approval 
bureaucratic agencies at different levels, and also because investment decisions are heavily influenced 
by tax policies, subsidies, and administrative guidance (Huang 1996; Barnett and Brooks 2006; 
McKinsey 2009; Geng and N’Diaye 2012).  
In addition to the broad category of FAI, there are several more specific forms of 
developmental investment or policy support that matter significantly for urban development and 
which also reflect trends in the distribution of state resources and policy support. Hard and soft 
urban infrastructure – including items such as urban roads, health facilities, and higher education 
institutions – is crucial to cities’ development and is largely state-provided. Other important 
indicators of developmental support include expansion of urban land area and cities’ fiscal 
expenditures, which in part reflect the allocation of quotas or resources by higher-level actors.  
Whether it comes to overall FAI outcomes or more specific categories of development 
investment and public goods provision, there has been a tendency across much of China for 
resources to become more concentrated in the largest urban centers. Unsurprisingly, a large share of 
FAI across China over the past decade has taken place in urban centers with close ties to the state. 
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China’s four province-level municipalities enjoyed extremely fast investment-led growth during the 
1990s and 2000s, and this has been well documented.7 But more broadly, the leading metropolitan 
cities in China’s provinces – usually provincial capitals but also in some cases non-capital deputy-
provincial (fu sheng ji) cities – have recorded huge quantities of infrastructure and industrial 
investment. These provincial “top cities,” which I identify based on municipal GDP, have accounted 
for a growing share of FAI in their respective areas, as shown in Table 2.2 below. Especially in 
inland areas, top cities’ share of FAI rose dramatically in the 2000s, to the extent that such cities 
accounted for 30 percent of provincial FAI on average—far above their typical population shares. 
                Table 2.2: Top-city share of provincial FAI – averages by region and period 
Year Overall Coastal Inland 
1996-2000 0.22 0.18 0.24 
2001-2005 0.27 0.22 0.30 
2006-2010 0.27 0.21 0.31 
                      Sources: China Data Online; National Bureau of Statistics; provincial yearbooks; author’s calculations 
Major metropolitan centers’ advantage in securing developmental resources has not been 
limited to FAI broadly. Across various categories of urban resources, amenities, and services, top 
cities have tended to maintain or widen their already considerable advantages over other urban 
centers, as shown in Table 2.3. Top cities’ share of hard resources such as urban roads, built-up 
urban land (a scarce resource following the introduction of stricter controls on land development in 
the late 1990s), and “soft” resources such as higher education facilities remained high or climbed 
further. Not surprisingly, however, metropolitan centers in inland areas tended to enjoy greater 
benefits in resource allocation than the top cities of coastal provinces.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The four centrally controlled (province-level) municipalities include Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. From 
the explosive growth of Shanghai’s Pudong New Area after 1990, to the rapid expansion of suburban districts in Beijing, 
to the more recent build-ups of huge skylines and new districts in Chongqing and Tianjin, the four municipalities have 
seen rapid economic and demographic growth supported by heavy state investment over the past two decades. See Wu 
(2003); Sanderson and Forsythe (2012).  
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   Table 2.3: Average top-city share of selected developmental resources, 2000 and 2010 
Variable Year Overall Coastal provinces Inland provinces 
Urban road area 2000 0.22 0.16 0.25 
2010 0.25 0.17 0.30 
     
Urban built-up 
area 
2000 0.20 0.15 0.22 
2010 0.23 0.16 0.28 
     
Hospital beds 2000 0.20 0.17 0.21 
2010 0.21 0.18 0.22 
     
Higher-education 
enrollment 
2000 0.51 0.38 0.59 
2010 0.52 0.36 0.60 
                                                   Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations 
 
Disaggregating outcomes: Metropolitan GDP growth and investment outcomes across provinces and over time 
While there has been a general trend of metropolitan-oriented urban growth and 
development, there has also been marked variation over time and across units in the extent to which 
investment and state resources are concentrated in provincial top cities. The top-city share of 
provincial GDP has increased sharply over the past 15 or so years in some cases, while remaining 
fairly steady or even declining elsewhere. In some instances, otherwise similar provinces have 
displayed very different outcomes. Such variation can be seen in Figure 2.4 below, which charts 
change in the top-city share of provincial GDP between 1996 and 2010. The 45-degree line indicates 
where an observation would have fallen had economic primacy remained constant, and thus 
provides a baseline against which to assess outcomes. Vertical distance from this line shows the 
increment by which top-city GDP share in 2010 exceeded or fell short of the share in 1996.  
As the chart makes clear, top-city GDP share increased in the majority of cases. Provinces 
such as Anhui and Hunan stand out, however, for having especially dramatic increases in 
metropolitan concentration of GDP between 1996 and 2010. Meanwhile, in provinces such as Hebei 
and Shanxi top-city share of provincial GDP remained stable or even dropped during this period. 
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The economic performance of top cities relative to larger provincial economies thus varied quite a 
bit during the period in question.  
 Figure 2.4: Top-city share of GDP by province, 1996 and 2010 
 
                               Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations 
To help clarify whether rising top-city GDP share is a result of relatively fast metropolitan 
growth, slow provincial growth, or some combination of these, Table 2.5 below provides a 
breakdown of city-level and provincial-level compound annual growth rates (CAGR) during the 
period 2000-2010. The table also provides data on several city-level variables which one might 
expect to be associated with urban growth outcomes. These include a proxy for economic openness 
(the ratio of foreign investment to city GDP), an indicator of business climate (2005 World Bank 
rankings of the city’s investment climate for domestic and foreign firms, respectively), and a baseline 
growth trend (city growth from the preceding period, 1996-2000). Taking into account these other 
variables makes it easier to identify cities with surprisingly fast or slow growth during the 2000s. 
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                           Table 2.5: Economic growth of 20 top cities, 2000-2010 
Province (top city) Top city 
CAGR  
2000-
2010 
Province 
CAGR  
2000-
2010 
Top city 
2000 FDI/ 
GDP 
2005 World Bank ranking 
of city’s investment climate, 
domestic/foreign (out of the 
20 cities on the list here) 
Top city 
CAGR 
1996-
2000 
Anhui (Hefei) 21% 13% 0.03 7th/10th 11% 
Hunan (Changsha) 19% 13% 0.03 16th/20th 12% 
Guangxi (Nanning) 17% 14% 0.03 19th/15th 11% 
Jiangsu (Suzhou) 16% 15% 0.16 2nd/1st 11%  
Shanxi (Taiyuan) 16% 17% 0.02 20th/19th 3% 
Henan (Zhengzhou) 16% 13% 0.01 14th/13th 11% 
Shandong (Qingdao) 15% 14% 0.09  4th/2nd 13% 
Guangdong (Guangzhou) 15% 15% 0.11 3rd/3rd 13% 
Jiangxi (Nanchang) 15% 15% 0.01 10th/6th 8% 
Zhejiang (Hangzhou) 14% 15% 0.03 1st/4th 10% 
Liaoning (Shenyang) 14% 13% 0.05 8th/8th 9% 
Shaanxi (Xi'an) 14% 17% 0.02 12th/16th 14% 
Hubei (Wuhan) 14% 12% 0.05 6th/12th 12% 
Sichuan (Chengdu) 13% 13% 0.02 5th/14th 10% 
Guizhou (Guiyang) 13% 14% 0.02 17th/17th 11% 
Heilongjiang (Haerbin) 12% 10% 0.02 11th/18th 12% 
Jilin (Changchun) 12% 15% 0.02 13th/11th 15% 
Hebei (Shijiazhuang) 11% 13% 0.01 15th/7th 11% 
Fujian (Fuzhou) 10% 12% 0.07 9th/5rd 11% 
Yunnan (Kunming) 10% 11% 0.00 18th/9th 9% 
Yunnan (Kunming) 10% 11% 0.00 18th/9th 9% 
AVERAGE OF 20 14% 14% 0.04 N.A. 11% 
                                    Sources: China Data Online; World Bank (2006); author’s calculations 
The table reveals several puzzling growth outcomes. First, it shows that growth in several 
cities departed considerably from regional and historical baselines. Growth in provincial capitals 
such as Changsha and Hefei was impressive not only relative to the provincial rate of growth, but 
also exceptional in absolute terms. Changsha averaged 19 percent growth during the 2000s, while 
Hunan as a whole had below-average growth of 13 percent. Hefei, for its part, achieved 21 percent 
average annual growth, while Anhui saw only 13 percent growth.8 At the other end of the spectrum, 
top-city GDP growth lagged behind overall provincial growth rates in provinces including Hebei, 
Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Guizhou. Similarly puzzling are the sharp breaks 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The fact that Changsha and Hefei are located in a geographic belt which economic geographers have recognized as an 
area of relatively slow urban growth overall makes their standout performance even more striking (Chen et al 2011). 
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with historical growth trends seen in several cities. Many of the fastest-growing cities of the 2000s 
had not stood out in the late 1990s.  
 Also surprising, some of the fastest-growing capital cities during the 2000s – a period of 
rapid internationalization and export-led growth – were not cities with particularly open economies 
or attractive business environments. Past studies of city growth in China have emphasized economic 
openness as a key determinant of growth rates (Demurger et al 2004; Xu and Zhu 2008). Yet some 
of the cities with the most open economies circa 2000, including Fuzhou and Hangzhou, saw 
relatively slow or at least unexceptional growth over the following decade. Meanwhile, several cities 
with relatively closed economies, including Changsha, Nanning, and Zhengzhou, saw extremely 
rapid growth. It is also hard to attribute the rapid growth of these star performers to their business-
friendly institutional climates: Changsha, Nanning, and Zhengzhou ranked poorly among China’s 
provincial capitals in the quality of their investment climates for both domestic and foreign firms 
(World Bank 2006). That many of the best-performing metropolitan centers were cities that enjoyed 
few apparent advantages in terms of regional setting, business environment, economic openness, or 
historical trajectory suggests that factors other than historical path dependence and market 
advantage shaped the performance of cities during the 2000s.  
We also find considerable variation across units and over time in top cities’ share of 
investment and public resources. Figure 2.6 below shows how the top-city share of provincial FAI 
between 1996-2010 compared to initial top-city share of provincial GDP across 20 provinces. 
Overall, coastal, and inland average values are also plotted. Data points are colored dark gray for 
coastal provinces and black for inland provinces.  
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Figure 2.6: Top-city FAI share (1996-2010) versus initial GDP share with region indicated 
 
                                           Sources: National Bureau of Statistics; China Data Online; author’s calculations 
 
While top-city FAI share (1996-2010) generally exceeded initial 1996 top-city GDP share, 
there was wide variation from province to province. In some provinces, the top city’s share of 
investment far exceeded its initial share of the provincial economy, while in other cases top cities 
received shares of investment smaller than their initial shares of GDP. Overall, top-city FAI share 
was significantly higher in inland areas than in coastal areas—both in absolute terms and also relative 
to initial top-city GDP share. Once again, provinces such as Anhui and Hunan stand out for having 
disproportionately high concentration of economic resources in their capital cities. In both 
provinces, top-city FAI share between 1996-2010 exceeded 1996 GDP share by over 10 percentage 
points. In other cases, such as Shanxi and Jiangxi, the top city’s FAI share was very similar to or 
even fell below its initial share of provincial GDP, showing that investment was far less 
concentrated in top cities.   
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 Just as striking as variation across provinces in the top-city concentration of investment for 
the period from 1996-2010 as a whole is the marked variation over time in the top-city share of 
economic activity seen in many provinces. Using province-level and city-level time series data, I 
examine year-by-year patterns in top cities’ share of provincial GDP and FAI. Time-trend plots for 
all 20 provinces are provided in Figure A.5 of the Statistical Appendix.  
Beyond some basic trends in the data, there is sharp variation over time within cases as well 
as divergence in overall trajectories across cases. Many provinces saw a surge in top-city FAI share 
during the early 2000s, only to see top-city FAI shares dip again slightly thereafter. Whereas few 
coastal provinces saw sustained increases in top-city FAI share across the full period, while a 
number of inland provinces saw fairly large and sustained increases. Stark province-to-province 
differences in outcomes again stand out, as do sharp fluctuations over time within provinces. Anhui 
and Hunan again stand apart for the dramatic and sustained increases they experienced in both top-
city GDP share and top-city FAI share. In both provinces, moreover, top-city FAI share 
substantially exceeded concurrent GDP share for long stretches of time. Outcomes in Shandong and 
Guangdong look strikingly different: top-city FAI share steadily declined over time, and GDP share 
remained flat or dipped slightly. In several provinces, including Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Sichuan, 
there was considerable fluctuation over time in top-city FAI share, with sharp rises and drops seen. 
At some moments, top-city FAI share in these provinces rose above concurrent top-city GDP share, 
while at other points, it remained far below it.  
 These considerable cross-province discrepancies and sharp fluctuation over time within 
cases suggest that policy factors may have influenced metropolitan development outcomes in 
important ways. In order to get a clearer picture of how policies may have influenced outcomes, the 
next section uses a novel method to gauge the degree of metropolitan bias in different provinces. 
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Measuring metropolitan bias  
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the geographic distribution of policy support and state resources 
may significantly affect the development opportunities of different cities and regions. Depending on 
how it is targeted, provision of infrastructure, preferential policies, and economic resources may 
reinforce the advantages of core urban areas or may lead to more dispersed patterns of development 
(Henderson 2002; Glaeser 2008). I use the idea of “metropolitan bias” as a shorthand for the degree 
to which policy support and state resources are disproportionately concentrated in the leading 
metropolitan center of a province, rather than being distributed across different cities and regions in 
proportion to their economic weight and pre-existing growth trajectory. “High” metropolitan bias, 
as I mean it, signifies proactive state support for, and concentration of resources in, leading urban 
centers. “Low” metropolitan bias indicates the opposite—the absence of favoritism toward top 
cities, or state efforts to steer resources to secondary cities and outlying areas of provinces. Because 
higher-level governments and state institutions play a key role in allocating many of the resources 
crucial for urban development – land, financing, fiscal monies, strategic industry projects, and 
infrastructure – policies may significantly influence where investment and economic growth occurs. 
 Insofar as spatial bias in development policies represents an important distributional 
outcome in its own right and also affects longer-term urban and regional development patterns, it is 
important to know where metropolitan bias in development has been greatest, and to explore why 
there is greater metropolitan bias in development policies in some instances than others. The task 
for this section is to gauge where metropolitan bias has been strong and where, conversely, there has 
been little favoritism toward, or even bias away from, top cities. The rest of the dissertation explores 
why metropolitan bias is greater in some cases than others. 
Of course, metropolitan bias is not straightforward to observe or easy to summarize. Policy 
support and the allocation of development resources takes various forms and entails both more- and 
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less-visible dimensions. Later in the dissertation, I use in-depth case studies to examine some of the 
specific kinds of policy measures central and local government actors and state entities in China use 
to promote development in particular locations. In order to summarize outcomes in different 
provinces and compare outcomes across a larger number of units here, I use a simpler means of 
summarizing the spatial slant of development policies. Such an approach is necessarily reductive, but 
has the benefit of enabling crisper comparison across units. 
To assess the level of metropolitan bias, I look at the extent to which top-city concentration 
of FAI in a province during the 2000s deviates from what we might expect given past trends and 
basic economic or structural factors. There are several underlying conditions that should affect the 
spatial concentration of urban economic activity and/or population in a territorial unit. First, the 
metropolitan concentration of urban development activity during a given period should bear a 
strong relationship to the existing distribution of economic activity and ex ante growth trends. Past 
research suggests that cities in an urban system tend to grow in parallel, with the relative dominance 
of different cities changing fairly little over time (Eaton and Eckstein 1997; Wang and Zhu 2013). 
Cities that already account for a large share of provincial economic activity, or which have previously 
been growing at an above-average rate, can be expected to account for higher levels of economic 
activity in following years. Second, we should expect the spatial concentration (or any increase 
therein) of urban development to be negatively related to the population size of a given province, as 
more populous provinces should typically contain a larger number of urban centers (Davis and 
Henderson 2003). Third, we should expect the development level of a given unit to affect the 
concentration of economic activity, with activity more concentrated in poorer or less-urbanized 
units than in relatively prosperous areas (Ibid.; Williamson 1965). Beyond this, we may also expect 
the economic openness or market-orientation of a provincial economy to affect the spatial 
concentration of development, insofar as the freer play of market forces may serve either to 
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undermine or promote concentration of economic activity in particular places (Krugman and 
Elizondo 1996; Davis and Henderson 2003). Together, these variables should provide a baseline 
expectation for the top-city concentration of investment.  
Regression analysis of the top-city share of FAI in different provinces using these “baseline” 
economic and structural variables can give us a clearer picture of where, and to what extent, actual 
metropolitan concentration of investment diverges from expectations. My approach is to first 
regress top-city FAI shares for the period 2001-2010 on the above baseline economic and structural 
variables, and then to look at regression residuals to identify whether observed values fall above, 
below, or close to fitted values. Higher-than-expected top-city FAI share or top-city FAI totals 
during the decade between 2001-2010 (positive regression residuals) suggest greater metropolitan 
bias in development policies, while lower-than-expected top-city FAI shares (negative residuals) can 
be taken to indicate a low degree of metropolitan bias—or even a bias away from top cities. 
To operationalize the baseline variables above, I include in the regression models the 
following covariates: 2000 top-city share of provincial GDP  (to indicate the ex ante metropolitan 
concentration of economic activity); change in the top-city’s share of provincial GDP between 1996-
2000 (to indicate whether a top city has outperformed the province as a whole during a prior 
period); 2000 provincial population; 2000 provincial per capita GDP (to indicate development level); 
and a “coastal” dummy variable (to account for systematic differences between coastal and inland 
provinces). I also try out alternate specifications for this baseline model, including one with a lagged 
measure of the dependent variables (1996-2000 top-city FAI share), and one that includes indicators 
for provincial-level marketization, urbanization, and openness levels. All regressions use ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation. 
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                Table 2.7: Regression results – top-city FAI share and baseline covariates 
 
                             Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
These baseline specifications achieve r2 values between 0.77 and 0.80 (adjusted r2 ranges 
from 0.64 to 0.71), indicating that the sets of covariates used are indeed good predictors of top-city 
FAI share. The covariates in these specifications have high joint significance (F statistics range from 
5.8 to 10.2), and, as would be expected, 2000 top-city GDP share is a consistently positive and 
significant predictor of 2001-2010 top-city FAI share. The coastal dummy and the lagged DV 
measure have the expected signs (negative and positive, respectively) and approach statistical 
significance as well. Other covariates, however, appear to have limited predictive power for 
2 REGRESSION RESULTS – BASELINE MODELS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.559⇤⇤ 0.209 0.630⇤⇤
(0.204) (0.370) (0.218)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.587 1.022 0.418
(0.642) (0.744) (0.724)
population  0.0001  0.001 0.00002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log GDPpc  0.013  0.002  0.031
(0.036) (0.037) (0.065)
coastal dummy  0.042  0.042
(0.033) (0.033)
top-city faishare9600 0.337
(0.299)
marketization  0.002
(0.019)
urbanization 0.001
(0.002)
log openness  0.016
(0.027)
Constant 0.264 0.201 0.330
(0.290) (0.292) (0.490)
Observations 20 20 20
R2 0.785 0.804 0.772
Adjusted R2 0.708 0.714 0.639
Residual Std. Error 0.045(df = 14) 0.045(df = 13) 0.050(df = 12)
F statistic 10.210⇤⇤⇤(df = 5; 14) 8.889⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 13) 5.800⇤⇤⇤(df = 7; 12)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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explaining top-city FAI share outcomes. Indicators of economic openness, market-orientation, 
existing urbanization level, and provincial size, in particular, appear to lack much independent 
explanatory power for the 2001-2010 spatial distribution of FAI. 
While these baseline covariates together account for a large share of overall variation in top-
city FAI share outcomes, there is a considerable piece of variation that remains unexplained: several 
provinces display fairly large regression residuals. I use these residuals – which represent percentage 
points of extra or missing top-city FAI share – as my measure for the degree of metropolitan bias in 
development policies in different provinces during the 2000s. As the residuals show, the 2001-2010 
capital-city share of FAI in provinces such as Hunan, Liaoning, and Anhui is well above what would 
be expected given past trends and basic economic variables: the share of capital-city FAI in these 
three provinces exceeded the estimated values by 6.4, 6.4, and 3.7 percentage points, respectively. 
These are substantively large deviations considering that the average capital-city share of FAI was 
about 26 percent of the provincial total. Indeed, in absolute terms these deviations represent tens of 
billions of yuan worth of excess or missing investment.9 On the other hand, observations for 
provinces such as Jilin, Henan, Jiangxi, and Shanxi show large negative residuals (-8.3, -4.9, -4.8, -4.6), 
with the top-city share of FAI considerably lower than expected. Meanwhile, the baseline models do 
a very good job of predicting top-city FAI share for several provinces, including Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, and Guangxi. 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 As a point of reference, Hubei, which ranks in the middle of the pack in its provincial investment total, saw 
approximately $500 billion of FAI during the decade from 2001-2010. As such, a deviation of a few percentage points in 
top-city FAI share amounts to a difference of several billion U.S. dollars (National Bureau of Statistics; China Data 
Online; author’s calculations). 
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    Figure 2.8: Variation in metropolitan bias – top-city FAI share (2001-2010) residuals 
       
Although, as noted above, inland provinces tend to have higher top-city FAI shares, there is 
no clear-cut geographic pattern to metropolitan bias outcomes. Figure 2.9 maps how measurements 
of metropolitan bias vary across space, with darker shades denoting greater metropolitan bias. While 
most cases with high top-city FAI residuals are found in inland China, there are exceptions to this 
rule. And while there are several instances in which nearby provinces display similar outcomes, there 
are also a number of cases in which similarly situated provinces’ outcomes differ strikingly. 
                               Figure 2.9: The geography of metropolitan bias  
 
                Sources: Figure by author; Shape file obtained from worldmap.harvard.edu/chinamap 
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As the above analysis and preceding sections show, then, there has been marked and 
sometimes puzzling variation across China in the extent to which development was oriented toward 
top cities. Above, I have found marked variation across provinces in the top-city concentration of 
investment—variation that persists even after controlling for past trends and basic economic factors. 
I interpret higher-than-expected top-city shares of FAI as an indication of high metropolitan bias in 
policies, and vice versa. More generally, amid an overall trend of increasingly metropolitan-oriented 
development, there has been substantial variation across provinces and over time in the 
concentration of investment and growth in leading urban areas. 
Needless to say, looking at a large number of units in such a summary way makes it difficult 
to get a detailed picture either of development outcomes or of the case-specific factors that may be 
contributing to these outcomes. To bring the puzzle of varying provincial development trajectories 
and metropolitan bias outcomes into clearer focus, and analyze in a more context-sensitive way how 
different explanatory factors contributed to these outcomes, I carry out provincial case studies. 
 
Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi: Diverging outcomes in three Chinese provinces 
This section looks in greater detail at development outcomes and the economic-structural 
context of development in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi. As discussed in Chapter 1, I have selected 
these cases to capture a range of metropolitan bias outcomes, to contrast development dynamics in 
coastal and inland China, and to explore why similarly situated units take diverging paths.  
Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi embody striking cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in 
development outcomes. Development in Hunan showed a much stronger metropolitan slant overall 
than the other provinces, but we also see major shifts over time within cases in spatial patterns of 
development. Of course, structural legacies and economic variables help to account for the varying 
outcomes in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi. Given Jiangsu’s advanced development stage, economic 
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geography, and relatively outward-oriented economy, the limited metropolitan concentration of 
investment there is not surprising. Sharp shifts over time in the spatial slant of development in 
Jiangsu, however, are less readily explained by underlying economic factors. Hunan’s economic 
backwardness and provincial geography, meanwhile, help explain the province’s high metropolitan 
concentration of investment, yet still do not fully account for the striking speed of Changsha’s 
development. Meanwhile, the diverging trajectories of Hunan and neighboring Jiangxi are surprising 
given the similarity of starting conditions, and beg the question of how policy factors affected 
outcomes. Development indicators for the three provinces listed below show Jiangsu’s position as a 
leader in development, and underscore the basic similarities of Hunan and Jiangxi.  
                  Table 2.10: Development indicators for Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi  
Province Land 
area 
(1000 
sq. 
km) 
Pop-
ulation 
(mn 
people) 
2000 
GDP 
(bn 
yuan) 
2000 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(yuan) 
GDP 
CAGR 
1990-
2000 
(%) 
2000 
urban-
ization 
level (%) 
2000 state-
controlled 
economy 
share 
2000 
top-city 
GDP 
(bn 
yuan) 
2000 top-
city urban 
pop 
(mn people) 
Jiangsu 
(Suzhou) 
(Nanjing) 
103 73.3 855.3 11714 11.3 42.3 0.36  
154.1 
(102.1) 
 
2.46 
(3.10) 
Hunan 212 65.6 355.1 5626 7.7 27.5 0.29 65.6 1.86 
Jiangxi 167 41.5 200.3 4828 8.6 27.7 0.37 43.5 1.76 
 
20-province 
average 
208 55.2 410.5 7266 10.1 36.2 0.42 91.7 2.61 
Maximum 485 94.9 1074.3 12898 13.8 55.7 0.76 237.6 4.41 
Minimum 102 26.8 103.0 2645 6.2 23.4 0.21 26.5 1.43 
                             Source: China Data Online; National Bureau of Statistics; author’s calculations 
 
Varying development outcomes in the three main cases 
Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi display different overall levels of metropolitan bias as well as 
contrasting trends over time in top-city FAI and GDP share. For the period between 1996-2010 as a 
whole, Jiangsu represents a case of intermediate metropolitan bias. But the metropolitan slant of 
development in Jiangsu varied over time. Hunan, by contrast, is a case of strongly metropolitan-
oriented development: for virtually the entire period in question, Changsha saw a disproportionately 
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large amount of FAI (both in absolute terms and as a share of Hunan’s total). Meanwhile, Jiangxi, 
despite being similar to Hunan in many respects, saw far less metropolitan concentration of 
investment overall, and showed more striking variation over time than its neighbor to the west. 
         Figure 2.11: Top-city FAI share time trends for main provincial cases 
 
                        Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations 
Figure 2.11 above juxtaposes time trends of top-city FAI and GDP share in the three 
provinces (along with a 20-province average). As the charts show, Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi all 
experienced sharp increases in top-city FAI share during the early 2000s, with this trend tapering off 
or reversing in the late 2000s. In Jiangsu, top-city FAI share declined sharply after its spike in the 
early 2000s, dropping far below top-city GDP share by the end of the decade.10   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Using Nanjing, Jiangsu’s provincial capital, rather than Suzhou, Jiangsu’s leading economic center, as the top city, the 
time trend in top-city FAI share remains similar, though Nanjing receives a slightly higher share of provincial FAI 
relative to its GDP share than Suzhou. See Table A.5 in the Statistical Appendix. 
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In Hunan, top-city FAI share rose from 11 percent in 1996 to 18 percent the following year, 
and remained at this elevated level for several years before again jumping sharply in the early 2000s 
from 20 percent to over 30 percent. After crossing this 30 percent threshold, Changsha’s share of 
Hunan’s FAI stayed above this level for the rest of the decade. Such high and sustained top-city 
concentration of investment in Hunan differs from outcomes in Jiangsu and Jiangxi. 
The contrast between Jiangxi and Hunan is especially striking. The provinces started with 
similar capital-city shares of FAI in 1996, and followed similar trajectories before FAI share plunged 
in Jiangxi at the turn of the century. Jiangxi’s top-city FAI share rose in parallel with Hunan’s 
between 2000 and 2006, but remained significantly lower. As Jiangxi’s top-city FAI share plateaued 
and then declined in the late 2000s, the Hunan-Jiangxi gap widened further. 
Table 2.12 below breaks down metropolitan development outcomes in Jiangsu, Hunan, and 
Jiangxi by three different historical periods to further emphasize the shifts seen over time and to 
clarify how outcomes varied in absolute terms across the three provinces. 
      Table 2.12: Growth and investment outcomes in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi by period  
Province Period Top-city GDP 
CAGR during 
period 
Provincial GDP 
CAGR during 
period 
Top-city FAI share 
during five-year 
period 
Top-city GDP 
share at the 
beginning of 
period 
Jiangsu  
(Suzhou) 
1996-2000 11% 9% 0.18 0.17 
2000-2005 19% 15% 0.22 0.18 
2005-2010 15% 14% 0.17 0.22 
      
Jiangsu 
(Nanjing) 
1996-2000 11% 9% 0.10 0.11 
2000-2005 17% 15% 0.17 0.12 
2005-2010 13% 14% 0.15 0.13 
      
Hunan 
(Changsha) 
1996-2000 12% 7% 0.18 0.15 
2000-2005 16% 11% 0.30 0.18 
2005-2010 21% 16% 0.33 0.23 
      
Jiangxi 
(Nanchang) 
1996-2000 9% 9% 0.13 0.20 
2000-2005 17% 14% 0.19 0.22 
2005-2010 14% 15% 0.23 0.25 
                                                      Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations 
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The especially strong metropolitan slant of development in Hunan is also apparent when we 
look at more specific types of investment and public goods provision. Table 2.13 below reports top-
city shares of total provincial urban road area, urban built-up area, fiscal expenditure, hospital beds, 
and higher education enrollment in the three provinces for the years 2000 and 2010.  
Table 2.13: Top-city shares of GDP, urban population, and selected resources in main cases 
Province Year GDP Urban 
pop 
1. Urban 
road area 
2. Built-up 
area 
3. Fiscal 
expenditure 
4. Hospital 
beds 
5. Higher 
education 
enrollment 
Jiangsu  
(Suzhou) 
2000 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.11 
2010 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.11 
         
Jiangsu 
(Nanjing) 
2000 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.48 
2010 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.48 
         
Hunan 
(Changsha) 
2000 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.47 
2010 0.28 0.12 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.49 
         
Jiangxi 
(Nanchang) 
2000 0.22 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.53 
2010 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.60 
                                             Sources: China Data Online, author’s calculations 
Hunan had the highest top-city share of most of these types of resources relative to 
concurrent top-city GDP or population share,11 and only in Hunan did the top-city share of each 
category of resources increase between 2000 and 2010. Jiangsu and Jiangxi also showed high or 
increasing metropolitan bias in the distribution of some resources, but the pattern was less uniform 
or pronounced. In Jiangsu, Suzhou’s share of total provincial urban road area, built-up area, fiscal 
expenditure, and hospital beds rose sharply between 2000 and 2010, but these shares started from a 
relatively low base. Nanjing, meanwhile, saw increases in the first two categories but its share of total 
provincial fiscal expenditure and hospital beds decreased and its higher education enrollment 
remained constant.12 In Jiangxi, Nanchang’s share of provincial urban built-up area, higher education 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Several figures actually understate the capital-city share of resources in Hunan, insofar as they exclude resources going 
to Changsha County. Although the county is directly adjacent to the city’s center and contains Changsha’s largest 
development zone and airport, it is not formally included among urban districts. 
12 Some of the sharp growth in Nanjing’s share of Jiangsu’s urban road area and built-up area likely relates to the fact 
that several of Nanjing’s counties were converted into urban districts during the 2000s. 
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enrollment, and fiscal expenditure increased between 2000 and 2010, but the capital’s share of urban 
road area and hospital beds fell, indicating dispersal of these urban resources.  
Taken as a whole, the above data underscore the contrasting development trajectories in the 
three main provincial cases, and raise questions about the factors that have contributed to more or 
less metropolitan-oriented economic growth. In Jiangsu and Jiangxi, the distribution of FAI and 
public resources tilted in favor of metropolitan cities for several years in the early 2000s, but the 
metropolitan slant in development was comparatively limited and short-lived. In Hunan, by contrast, 
there was higher and more sustained metropolitan concentration of FAI and development resources.  
 
The insufficiency of basic economic-structural variables in explaining case outcomes 
 Geography, structural conditions, and economic trends help to make sense of outcomes in 
Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi, but these factors alone do not provide a satisfying explanation of 
variation across provinces and over time in development patterns. It is hard to account for the 
strong metropolitan slant of growth in Hunan or to explain sharp swings in top-city investment 
share in Jiangsu and Jiangxi solely in terms of baseline variables. 
 
Jiangsu  
While Jiangsu’s relatively limited overall metropolitan bias is understandable in light of the 
province’s development level, economic geography, and industrial structure, these structural factors 
do not readily explain the sharp swings over time in the spatial distribution of investment. 
Jiangsu’s relatively advanced development stage helps account for the limited metropolitan 
bias seen there. It is typical for urban concentration and regional disparities in an economy to 
decline as the level of development increases (Williamson 1965; Henderson 2002). As Table 11 
makes clear, Jiangsu is one of China’s most prosperous provinces, and is also a leader in terms of its 
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level of internationalization and urbanization. Jiangsu’s wealth of financial, physical, and human 
capital makes it less necessary to concentrate resources narrowly to carry out large-scale 
developmental investment than in poorer regions. 
The fact that Jiangsu is home to several major cities, which are scattered across different 
parts of the province, also helps explain the limited concentration of economic activity and people in 
the key metropolitan cities of Suzhou and Nanjing. Both Suzhou and Nanjing have deep 
endowments of human and institutional capital from their long histories as commercial, 
administrative, and cultural centers, and both have been major industrial centers and bases for 
foreign-oriented economic activity during the reform era. But many other cities in Jiangsu are also 
dynamic centers of urban and industrial growth. Wuxi and Changzhou, sitting along the Yangtze 
River, and Lianyungang and Xuzhou, which straddle a major rail line in northern Jiangsu, are also 
major cities with advantageous locations, well-developed industrial bases, and solid infrastructure. 
Investors thus have various attractive locations in Jiangsu from which to choose, and policymakers 
look out on multiple cities with the potential to serve as regional growth engines. 
The structure of Jiangsu’s industrial economy may also help account for the relatively limited 
concentration of economic activity in the largest urban areas. Entering the 2000s, Jiangsu’s largest 
industrial sectors included textiles, chemicals, electronics, and electrical machinery and equipment, 
and over the course of the decade, advanced manufacturing and heavy industry boomed, with the 
electronics, equipment and machinery, chemicals, and steel industries at the fore (Jiangsu Statistical 
Bureau 2001; 2011).13 With mature manufacturing sectors playing a key role in Jiangsu’s economy, 
there may have been less need for the special amenities and human capital of top metropolitan 
centers Although emerging service industries and nascent high-tech sectors concentrated in Nanjing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 During the 1990s and 2000s, Jiangsu experienced breakneck growth of manufacturing industries, propelled in large 
part by China’s WTO accession and the further expansion of the foreign sector. Suzhou continued to boom, while 
Nanjing, which had seen relatively lackluster industry growth until the late 1990s, enjoyed very rapid growth in the early 
2000s.  
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and Suzhou (along with Wuxi and Changzhou), well-located smaller cities were also able to thrive as 
centers for export-processing and heavy industry.14 
The composition of economic activity in Suzhou points to industrial competitiveness – and 
not simply generous state support – as a key factor in the city’s rapid development. Investment in 
urban infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacity contributed greatly to Suzhou’s rapid growth, 
but explosive growth in export-oriented manufacturing and related services – rooted in the 
competitiveness of Suzhou’s firms and the city’s proximity to Shanghai – was a key factor behind the 
city’s rapid growth after 2000. The city was less reliant on high levels of investment to sustain rapid 
growth than many other large cities in China. Whereas FAI averaged 35 percent of Suzhou’s GDP 
from 1996-2000, FAI rose to an average of 39 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2005, and 40 
percent of GDP from 2006-2010 (NBS and author’s calculations).15  
Higher-level policy support may have played a somewhat larger role in Nanjing’s 
development. Nanjing’s economic growth during the 2000s was more oriented toward the tertiary 
sector and more investment-driven than in the case of Suzhou. Although Nanjing’s manufacturing 
and service sectors both expanded rapidly in the early 2000s, industrial growth later slowed from its 
feverish rate, and tertiary sector growth substantially outpaced secondary activity.16 Throughout the 
2000s, FAI played a prominent role in Nanjing’s rapid growth. Whereas the ratio of FAI to GDP 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Mature manufacturing industries often thrive in medium-sized cities, whereas emerging and knowledge-intensive 
industries and service industries cluster in larger cities. See Henderson (1997); Glaeser and Ponsetto (2007). 
15 During the 2000s, Suzhou’s growth was driven in large part by advanced manufacturing, export processing, and 
logistics. The central city had considerable success in upgrading its industrial base and establishing itself as a center for 
electronics and high-technology manufacturing (Ren and Liu 2008, 101), while sub-centers such as Zhangjiagang and 
Taicang thrived as more traditional manufacturing centers and logistics bases. With extremely rapid manufacturing 
growth in the early 2000s, the secondary sector share of Suzhou’s economy rose sharply between 2000 and 2005 (from 
0.56 to 0.67), but then retreated somewhat (to 0.56) by 2010, as the service sector grew more quickly in the late 2000s 
and export-oriented industries struggled amid the global financial crisis (CDO and author’s calculations). Robust growth 
of service sectors in the late 2000s suggested that Suzhou was beginning to diversify its economy, and that the city was 
developing beyond its traditional role as a manufacturing and export-processing base for the Shanghai region. 
16 The tertiary sector’s share of GDP rose from 0.47 in 2005 to 0.52 in 2010, and secondary share declined from 0.50 to 
0.45 (Jiangsu Statistical Bureau 2001; 2011 and author’s calculations). 
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had averaged 0.29 between 1996-2000, the ratio climbed to an average of 0.51 between 2001-2005, 
and increased further to 0.60 between 2006-2010 (China Data Online and author’s calculations). 
If Jiangsu’s intermediate level of metropolitan bias makes sense in light of the province’s 
geography and industrial structure, sharp shifts in development patterns over time pose problems 
for explanations that point to slow-moving structural variables. Suzhou and Nanjing’s shares of 
provincial FAI started from a relatively low base in the late 1990s, rose sharply after the turn of the 
century, and then declined – steeply in Suzhou’s case – during the late 2000s. Such abrupt changes in 
the spatial distribution of investment over time suggest shifting patterns of policy support. 
 
Hunan  
The metropolitan concentration of investment and growth in Hunan during the 2000s 
remains striking even after one takes into account basic economic and structural variables and past 
trends. It is not unusual to see highly concentrated development in backward economies, but the 
sharp metropolitan turn in Hunan after the late 1990s was at odds with the patterns of development 
seen in earlier years. While the rapid growth of commercial activity and cultural industries in 
Changsha may have reflected basic locational advantages, the speed with which the city emerged as a 
center for manufacturing (at a time when other industrial centers in Hunan were badly struggling) 
suggests the role of strong policy support. The highly investment-driven makeup of growth in 
Changsha also points to the key role of state support in metropolitan development. 
Hunan’s highly concentrated urban and industrial development relates in part to the 
province’s poverty and structural backwardness: in an underdeveloped region, there are a limited 
number of locations able to support advanced industrial and urban functions, and it is necessary to 
economize on infrastructure and social overhead (Friedmann 1956; Henderson 2002). Located in the 
interior of south-central China, Hunan is a rich agricultural region but has remained a laggard in 
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urban, industrial, and commercial development, as Table 11 shows. Hunan’s economy had been 
oriented toward agriculture and heavy industry since the 1950s, and developed slowly during the first 
two decades of the reform era.17 With weak external economic ties and few major cities, Hunan had 
difficulty attracting or holding onto financial and human capital during the first decades of the 
reform era. Even the Xiang River corridor, Hunan’s most developed region, remained only partly 
industrialized; central, southern, and western Hunan remained overwhelmingly rural and poor.  
While it is not surprising that public agencies and private investors alike would focus on 
Hunan’s more industrialized northeast region, the fact that economic activity was dispersed across 
several urban areas at the turn of the century makes the high concentration of FAI in Changsha 
thereafter surprising. As late as the mid-1990s, Changsha remained a middling metropolis with an 
urban population of about 1.5 million people. The city had a relatively strong consumer economy 
and was home to a handful of prominent universities, research facilities, and cultural institutions, but 
it did not enjoy a huge lead in population or economic size over medium-sized industrial centers 
such as Hengyang, Yueyang, Zhuzhou, and Changde, which were also located astride major 
transport arteries.18 And, although Changsha sits in an advantageous location along the Xiang River, 
its location in the northeast region of Hunan put it far from the geographic center of the province. 
The sectoral composition of Hunan’s economy during the 1990s and 2000s also makes the 
sharp metropolitan turn in development after the late 1990s puzzling. Entering the 21st century, 
Hunan’s most important industrial sectors included agriculture (especially tobacco and food 
products) and heavy industries such as metallurgy and chemical manufacturing. There was little 
momentum in high-tech industries, and Hunan’s service sector and outward-oriented economy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Between 1990-1998, industrial FAI in Hunan grew at only 12 percent per year, five points below the national average 
(He 2001). State-owned industrial operations in Hunan struggled amid reform and opening in the 1990s, with many 
outmoded plants shuttered and many thousands of workers laid off (Zhou and Xu 2000). 
18 In 1996, the combined economic output of these four cities was over 2.4 times that of Changsha that of Changsha 
(China Data Online and author’s calculations). 
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remained weak. As the 2000s unfolded, Hunan saw faster industrial development than it had during 
the 1990s, but growth rates remained subpar in comparative terms (Li et al 2007). Even as some new 
growth areas appeared, traditional manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, machinery and 
equipment-manufacturing, non-ferrous metallurgy, and agricultural-processing industries remained 
important (Hunan Statistical Bureau 2001; 2011). Changsha, on the other hand, enjoyed a sudden 
industrial boom. After the late 1990s, the city’s equipment manufacturing sector, led by construction 
machinery makers Zhonglian and Sanyi, grew explosively, gaining a foothold in domestic and 
foreign markets (EIU 2011). Changsha’s cultural industries also surged, emblematized by Hunan 
Satellite Television’s (Hunan weishi) rise to become a key player in China’s media market (EIU 2009). 
 While Changsha’s cultural industries and construction machinery sector may have depended 
on some distinctive local strengths, it is doubtful that the city’s stellar economic performance during 
the 2000s was driven by intrinsic locational advantages alone. According to a 2006 World Bank 
report, Changsha’s investment climate for domestic and foreign firms alike was very poor compared 
with many other large cities in China (World Bank 2006). The public sector remained important in 
the city’s economy: as late as 2008, Changsha’s economy featured a lower share of private sector 
activity than Hunan’s economy overall (Zeng 2010). And Changsha’s relatively weak performance in 
foreign trade and foreign investment during the 2000s calls into question the role of 
internationalization as a growth driver (Ren and Liu 2008).  
Rather, Changsha’s boom during the 2000s was, to an even greater degree than Nanjing’s, 
driven by urban investment. Between 1996-2000, FAI amounted to 26 percent of Changsha’s GDP 
on average, but this figure rose to 49 percent between 2001-2005, and climbed to 65 percent 
between 2006-2010. Urban construction and tertiary sector growth were key driving forces in 
Changsha’s economic growth between the late 1990s and early 2000s (EIU 2002a), and large 
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amounts of FAI in urban roads, public facilities, and real estate after the turn of the century reflected 
strong government support (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2002, 82-85).  
 
Jiangxi 
Contrasting patterns of development in Jiangxi during the late 1990s and 2010 set Hunan’s 
outcomes in starker relief and raise some important questions of their own. No two provinces or 
cities in China offer a perfectly controlled comparison, but Hunan and Jiangxi and their capitals of 
Changsha and Nanchang represent a pair of “most-similar” cases. The two provinces had similar 
economic structures and faced similar development challenges heading into the 21st century. Yet 
development in Jiangxi was oriented toward secondary cities and rural areas to a much greater extent 
than in Hunan, despite the fact that Jiangxi’s structural backwardness and economic geography 
might have seemed to favor a metropolitan-oriented development model. Sharp variation over time 
in Jiangxi’s spatial development also raises questions. Why, for instance, did metropolitan 
development accelerate abruptly for a few years after 2001, before tailing off again after 2006?  
Like Hunan, Jiangxi is a verdant, mountainous, and heavily rural province and sits at margins 
of wealthier coastal provinces and the Yangtze River valley. Throughout the 1990s, Jiangxi, like 
Hunan, struggled with structural backwardness, widespread poverty, and economic marginalization. 
The province was even poorer in per capita income terms, and had an even weaker urban-industrial 
economy than Hunan’s. At the beginning of the 21st century, primary sector activity still made up 24 
percent of Jiangxi’s GDP (versus 22 percent in Hunan), and – as in Hunan – foreign investment and 
exports continued to make up under six percent of provincial GDP (Jiangxi Statistical Bureau 2001; 
China Data Online; author’s calculations). Given Jiangxi’s low development level, it would have 
been unsurprising to see highly concentrated urban and industrial development; the province had 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 2 
 87 
limited resources to spread around, and among its cities, only Nanchang and Jiujiang possessed the 
large, diverse industrial bases and urban infrastructure to compete with other leading cities in China. 
If anything, Jiangxi’s economic geography would appear to be even more conducive to 
concentrated development than Hunan’s, which makes its more dispersed investment outcomes 
more puzzling. Jiangxi’s territory compromises a large central plain and river basin ringed by 
mountainous periphery. Nanchang occupies a pivotal position in the central plain, sitting astride the 
province’s economic center of gravity and its most important rail and road junctions.19 Like 
Changsha, Nanchang was a middling metropolis at best during the 1990s.20 Compared with 
Changsha, Nanchang had a slightly smaller urban population and GDP, a slightly lower per capita 
GDP, and a more manufacturing-oriented economy as of 2000. But Nanchang had a more 
dominant position in the provincial economy, making up 22 percent of Jiangxi’s GDP and 14 
percent of Jiangxi’s urban population (compared with Changsha’s 18 percent and 11 percent). 
Despite Nanchang’s greater economic and geographic centrality at the outset, the city’s share of 
provincial FAI and GDP did not increase nearly as dramatically as Changsha’s. 
The important role of resource-based industries in Jiangxi’s development during the 2000s 
helps to explain the province’s more regionally dispersed growth pattern, but it does not explain 
sharp variation over time in the metropolitan slant of investment. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
Jiangxi’s largest industries were ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, transportation equipment 
manufacturing, and petroleum refining. Over the course of the decade, Jiangxi saw rapid growth of 
manufacturing industries and a boom in nonferrous mining and metallurgy, which grew to become 
the province’s largest industrial sector (Jiangxi Statistical Bureau 2001; 2011). Jiangxi has China’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Jiangxi’s next largest urban centers, Jiujiang and Ganzhou, are located at the northern and southern ends of Jiangxi, 
and lack the industrial resources and human capital of the capital city (even though Jiujiang, a port city situated at the 
confluence of the Gan River and the Yangtze, can claim to rival Nanchang as a commercial and logistical center.) 
20 Like Changsha, Nanchang is located along a major tributary of the Yangtze River (the Gan River) and boasts a long 
history as a commercial hub and administrative center. 
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largest deposits of copper and certain rare earth elements, and these were developed aggressively 
amid high domestic and global demand (EIU 2010). Because refining and processing industries tend 
to locate near the source of their inputs, much of this development naturally took place outside the 
metropolitan region in smaller urban centers and rural areas. At the same time, Jiangxi saw rapid 
growth in electrical-mechanical machinery and chemical industries, many of which were located in or 
near larger urban centers. Overall, the province’s secondary sector surged during the 2000s, while 
the tertiary sector’s share of the provincial economy actually fell, dropping from 37 to 33 percent of 
GDP (Jiangxi Statistical Bureau 2001, 2011). With service industries and knowledge-intensive sectors 
making slower gains than in Hunan, Jiangxi’s economy was less metropolitan-oriented.21 
More perplexing, on the other hand, is why the pace of metropolitan development in Jiangxi 
varied so much over time. After experiencing slow GDP and investment growth in the late 1990s, 
Nanchang developed rapidly in the early 2000s, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the 
province. But during the late 2000s, Nanchang grew more slowly than the province as a whole. The 
fluctuation of Nanchang’s share of provincial FAI between the late 1990s, early 2000s, and late 
2000s – first a steep decline, then a rapid increase, and finally a leveling off and decline – shows that 
investment patterns often shifted sharply from year-to-year. 
Also surprising is the fact that Nanchang’s development lagged behind that of Changsha 
during the mid- and late-2000s despite apparently having a superior environment for private and 
foreign business activity. Nanchang not only received far better marks from the World Bank for its 
business climate than Changsha, but also outperformed Changsha for much of the decade in 
securing foreign direct investment (World Bank 2006; China Data Online). Again, the discrepancy 
seems to relate to the fact that Nanchang secured far less FAI overall than Changsha, especially early 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Of course, this still begs the question of why policymakers in Jiangxi did not place heavier emphasis on service sectors 
and knowledge-intensive industries during the 2000s, as leaders in Hunan did. 
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on. In Nanchang, FAI averaged 15 percent of GDP between 1996-2000 (compared with 26 percent 
in Changsha), while making up 34 percent of GDP between 2001-2005 (compared with Changsha’s 
49 percent.)  
In sum, despite the fact that Nanchang had a more dominant position in Jiangxi’s economy 
at the outset than Changsha had in Hunan, and despite the stronger outward orientation of Jiangxi’s 
capital as compared with Changsha, development in Jiangxi was far less metropolitan-oriented. This 
contrast makes the outcomes in Hunan all the more striking, and calls for a more careful look at the 
development policies that contributed to diverging trajectories. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed patterns of metropolitan development across China broadly and 
in the three main provincial cases, highlighting several puzzling outcomes. The rapid growth of 
metropolitan cities in China since the late 1990s represents a departure from China’s preceding 
trajectory of small city-based urban development. In many provinces, top cities have captured 
growing shares of FAI and public goods, and increased their share of provincial GDP. Against the 
backdrop of this metropolitan turn in development, however, there has been striking variation in 
development patterns both across provinces and also over time within cases.  
Diverging development patterns clearly stem in part from differences in the three provinces’ 
underlying structural conditions and economic trends. Yet, as I have shown, variation across 
provinces and over time in the metropolitan slant of development is difficult to explain in terms of 
baseline factors alone. These puzzling outcomes call for a closer analysis of how policy factors and 
political dynamics are shaping development outcomes in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi, and across 
China more broadly. 
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In the three chapters that follow, I take an in-depth look at the nature and determinants of 
spatial development policies in China. The chapters examine how basic state institutions and 
targeted policy initiatives have varied over time and across provinces, exploring the consequences 
for urban and regional development. I begin in Chapter 3 by looking at national-level policy factors, 
tracing change over time in central development policies and key governance institutions. In the two 
case-study chapters that follow, I examine how national-level policies and institutions have 
interacted with provincial-level variables to shape outcomes over time in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi.  
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III. The Fragmented State of Urban and Regional Governance 
 
Introduction  
To what extent do evolving central government policies and institutions account for 
variation in metropolitan bias over time and across regions in China? In this chapter, I explore how 
national-level policy factors have contributed to the puzzling outcomes discussed in Chapter 2. The 
first half of the chapter traces how China’s development policies – and urban and regional policies, 
in particular – have evolved over different historical periods. The second half of the chapter looks in 
greater detail at governance institutions in four policy areas with important implications for how 
economic resources and state support get distributed in space—regional planning, land governance, 
investment policy, and fiscal and financial policy.  
I show that while shifts in central policies and the rebuilding of central state capacity may 
contribute to greater metropolitan bias overall, national-level factors do not determine provincial 
outcomes in a straightforward or uniform way. During the past two decades, Beijing has eased curbs 
on the growth of large cities, and increasingly recognized the development role of metropolitan areas. 
Yet, intense debate among central policymakers over the proper approach to urban and regional 
development has persisted, and Beijing has continued to emphasize the need for coordinating top 
cities’ growth with the development of rural areas and lagging regions. And, since the 1990s, national 
leaders have rebuilt state capacity and reasserted hierarchical control in various areas of development 
policy, often with the goal of promoting more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable growth. But in 
practice stronger state guidance of development has in some ways worked in favor of larger cities. 
More generally, I emphasize the fragmented nature of developmental governance in China, 
and the importance of intergovernmental politics in shaping policy outcomes. Because the size and 
diversity of China’s economy make it hard to design policies on a national scale, and because 
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coordination among central bureaucracies is often difficult, provinces have remained key units for 
governance. Indeed, Beijing’s efforts to tighten top-down control in areas such as regional planning, 
land governance, and investment have often involved strengthening provincial governments and 
province-ministry coordination. And, in a system where central actors control many key resources 
but subnational governments enjoy considerable operational autonomy, the relations between 
different government levels significantly shape development policy outcomes. Depending on which 
actors take the initiative in policymaking, and how effectively they can mobilize support across the 
larger state apparatus, results may vary significantly.  
 
The evolution of national-level development policies  
China’s central leaders have not entirely lost their predecessors’ wariness of big cities, but in 
recent decades they have come to embrace urbanization as an engine for development, and have 
allowed more policy latitude for metropolitan-centered growth. For much of the Maoist era, Beijing 
worked to repress urban growth as the state directed industrialization and social development. But 
China’s first-generation leaders also showed a capacity for flexible governance—tailoring policies in 
to different regional conditions. Since the onset of reform and opening, and especially since the mid-
1990s, this pragmatic tendency has prevailed. Though initially in favor of a gradualist, small city-
based approach to urban development, national leaders have come to accept that China’s ambitious 
economic agenda requires rapid urbanization and dynamic big cities. 
Of course, urban governance in post-Deng China has involved much more than a relaxation 
of state controls over economic activity and city growth. Higher-level government have deployed 
state authority and resources to mold the structure of industrial and urban development in line with 
their policy goals. While central policymakers have in many instances offered state support for the 
development and integration of core economic regions such as the Yangtze River Delta, policies 
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since the late 1990s have also sought to better coordinate development across regions and sectors. 
In different places and at different times, national-level policies have ranged from strong support of 
large metropolitan centers to preferential treatment of rural areas and smaller cities. Indeed, different 
parts of China’s central government have favored different development approaches, sometimes 
butting heads. The tensions within central government policy were especially striking after Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao came to power in the early 2000s. While China’s top leaders often struck a populist 
note and expressed concern for hinterland areas, some central state agencies proved more than 
willing in practice to support a more elitist and metropolitan-oriented growth model.   
 
Conflicting Maoist-era legacies 
In development policy, as in many other areas of Chinese politics, the legacy of the Maoist 
period still looms over contemporary debates and practices. Where urban and regional policy is 
concerned, the Maoist-era legacy is a complex, even contradictory one. On the one hand, the Maoist 
period instilled a wariness on the part of national leaders toward large cities, a mentality that has 
persisted ever since. On the other hand, the Maoist era saw the creation of a statist economic order 
that ingrained practices such as development planning, administrative allocation of resources, and 
the building of “growth poles” (zengzhang ji). Just as significant for reform-era China, the Maoist 
period created precedents for regionally varied economic governance. 
Development policies during much of the Maoist period promoted dispersed urban and 
industrial development and explicitly curbed development of large commercial cities. For a regime 
that had come to power through rural revolution and campaigned against the decadence of capitalist 
cities and China’s outward-oriented economy, there were important ideological reasons for 
suppressing the growth of metropolitan cities and the economic activities they abetted. But as 
China’s leaders sought to consolidate control over a vast territory and prepare for the possibility of 
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great-power war, their approach to industrial and spatial development was also driven by practical 
necessities. Mao argued against focusing development efforts on large cities in part because highly 
concentrated population and industry would make China more vulnerable in case of nuclear war 
(McGee 2007, 33).  
Even though many large and medium-sized cities were built up as centers for industry and 
administration, policymakers sought to limit the amount of urban population growth and to stifle 
the urban character of cities (Ibid., 33; Yeh et al 2011). China’s First Five-Year Plan (FYP) report 
insisted that “our task in municipal construction at present is not to develop big coastal cities but 
medium and small cities in the interior, at the same time duly restricting the development of big 
cities” (Harvard Center for International Affairs 1962, 60). Geostrategic and ideological 
considerations factored even more heavily in development after the 1960s, as international tensions 
mounted and Mao rekindled revolution at home. Under the “Third Front” (san xian) policies of the 
1960s and early 1970s, Beijing dispersed industry, infrastructure, and talent across small cities and 
rural areas in the interior (Yang 1990; Naughton 1988). 
At the same time, of course, the Maoist era also saw the creation of a command economy 
and an industrialization approach that concentrated investment in strategic industrial sectors and 
regional centers. Starting with the First FYP, China’s leaders took cues from the Soviet development 
model, prioritizing the development of heavy industry and large-scale infrastructure. They built 
regional “growth poles” (zengzhang ji)—urban-industrial centers in strategic locations across the 
country where investment would be concentrated to support the development of surrounding areas 
(Harvard Center for International Affairs 1962, 47-49, 60; Larsen 1992, 106-109).1 The First FYP 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As the Report on the First FYP explained, “Socialism cannot be built on the basis of a small-peasant economy; it must 
have a foundation of large-scale industry and large-scale collective farming” (Harvard Center for International Affairs 
1962, 47). The First FYP named 156 key state projects, including several major highways and railways linking important 
regional cities. The plan especially emphasized development of inland regions, calling for the correction of China’s 
“irrational distribution” of economic activity between coast and interior (Ibid., 47-49, 52, 60). 
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established a lasting precedent for an activist state role in shaping urban and regional growth, 
promoting development of China’s interior and the creation of new industrial cities across the 
country. In practice, heavy state investment in key industrial centers contributed to the growth of 
large and medium-sized cities in spite of Beijing’s anti-urban ideology (Sit 1985, 23, 33). 
Even as it entrenched a statist economic order, however, the Maoist-era created precedents 
for administrative flexibility under a politically strong center. As Heilmann and Perry (2011) explain, 
Communist Party tactics of “adaptive governance” and locally variegated governance that had 
emerged in the pre-1949 period survived – and indeed thrived – after 1949. Beijing supported 
“experimentation under hierarchy,” allowing or encouraging particular localities or regions to try out 
new economic or social governance techniques before adopting new practices more broadly 
(Heilmann 2011). Devolution of greater economic and social policymaking authority to the 
provinces after 1958, and especially during the Cultural Revolution period, helped institutionalize 
these tendencies.2  
 
The early years of reform (1978-1995) 
 In many respects, the first 15 years of the reform period showed a radical break from the 
development policy approaches of the Maoist era. Beginning in 1978, but especially after 1984, the 
national leadership under Deng Xiaoping pushed forward an agenda of market-oriented reform and 
economic liberalization. During the Sixth (1981-1985) and Seventh (1986-1990) FYP plan periods, 
central and provincial policymakers reduced the use of planning and direct intervention in the 
economy, and tried to foster new market linkages across localities and economic sectors. Seeking to 
make the most of China’s existing economic strengths, Beijing gave development priority to coastal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 After 1958, many formerly centrally controlled SOEs were put under provincial control, and provinces were given a 
larger role in planning and fiscal policy. And, after the early 1970s, many provinces were allowed to retain more revenues 
and play a larger role in economic administration (Yin 2011, 110-111). 
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regions, allowing localities freer rein to try out new policies. Yet, even as the state retreated in many 
areas, Beijing continued efforts to counteract overly rapid and concentrated urban growth.     
Development policy during the first 15 years of the reform period shifted to place more 
emphasis on light and export-oriented industries, even as central ministries continued to support 
heavy and extractive industry development in inland regions. To make better use of China’s huge 
labor force and improve popular livelihood, central policymakers supported the rapid growth of 
labor-intensive, consumer-oriented industries. And, by incrementally dismantling the rural and urban 
economic planning systems, cutting back state subsidies, and giving greater latitude to local 
governments to pursue development on their own terms, central and provincial policies enabled a 
boom of non-state industry and commercial activity across the country (Shirk 1993; Naughton 1995). 
The early reform years also saw a major reorientation of China’s regional policy. In contrast 
with a Maoist-era agenda that had emphasized inland development, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
FYPs prioritized development of China’s coastal provinces. These areas had the advantageous 
conditions – location, human capital, economic resources, market institutions, and industrial 
structure – to achieve rapid growth and accumulate wealth in short order. One way Beijing 
supported coastal provinces’ development was by cutting back the redistribution of fiscal revenue 
and economic resources to interior areas (Yang 1990). Fiscal decentralization allowed provinces such 
as Guangdong and Fujian to retain and reinvest large amounts of revenue locally. But the central 
government also supported the development of coastal provinces in more proactive ways. The 
designation of four Special Economic Zones and, later, of 14 Coastal Open Cities and other priority 
areas, gave greater policy autonomy to these locations and brought more state investment and 
subsidies (Solinger 1993, 158). Coastal development gained even stronger central backing in the early 
1990s, as a new state-level Pudong New Area was established in Shanghai and new preferential 
policies were extended to the YRD region and other key economic centers (Wu 2003). 
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While China’s regional policy in the early part of the reform era reinforced the economic 
advantages of coastal provinces, urban development policies were conducive to the growth of small- 
and medium-sized cities. The early years of the reform era saw the emergence of new urban 
planning and development approaches aimed at promoting stronger market networks, absorbing 
displaced agricultural labor, and overcoming the urban-rural dualism that had taken hold during the 
Maoist era. On the one hand, the scaling back of the planned economy held out benefits for smaller 
cities. Whereas urban development in the Maoist era had been very hierarchical, with cities’ 
administrative status significantly affecting their ability to obtain economic resources and gain 
approval for new construction, there was less overt policy favoritism toward big cities with close ties 
to the state during the 1980s and early 1990s. Retrenchment of the state-centered economy also 
created space for local initiative and market forces to play a larger role in shaping urban growth. In 
many provinces, smaller and medium-sized cities thrived on this more level, market-driven playing 
field, while large cities – subject to stricter controls – grew less quickly (Lin 1999).3   
On the other hand, the relatively rapid growth of smaller cities also reflected state efforts to 
regulate urbanization. In 1980, the central government convened a National Urban Planning Work 
Meeting that endorsed small city-based urban growth. A new Urban Planning Law, discussed for 
years and formally adopted in 1989, stipulated that “the state shall guide itself by the principle of 
strictly controlling the size of large cities and developing medium-sized and small cities and towns 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Despite the fact that larger cities in many places showed economic dynamism and attracted migrants during this period, 
state investment remained limited (Wei 1994). While the central government in the 1980s did adopt new policies to 
empower administratively and economically a handful of key regional centers across the country – Wuhan, Xi’an, 
Guangzhou, Shenyang, etc. – it do so with the aim of breaking down administrative barriers to economic cooperation 
and fostering greater horizontal market relations across provincial boundaries. And many of these efforts ran into 
political pushback. In the early and mid-1980s, the central government embarked on new efforts at interprovincial 
regional planning and cooperation efforts. Zhao Ziyang tried to cultivate stronger urban economic networks around 
regional central cities that had traditionally anchored multi-provincial economic areas. To help these cities develop more 
autonomously, several were granted line-item status in the state plan and given preferential policies. In practice, however, 
it proved difficult to build up these cities as planned and to foster cross-provincial regions. Some provincial governments 
cut back their support for cities that had become more economically autonomous, and local protectionism remained 
rampant (Solinger 1993, 160-164, 208-212, 217). 
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[…]” (Gu et al 2012a; National People’s Congress 1989). Such policies led to the adoption of 
restrictive population and land area growth targets for provincial capitals and other larger cities. 
The more market-oriented, horizontally structured development model that emerged in the 
1980s began to undergo important adjustments in the early 1990s. Following the upheaval of the late 
1980s – severe inflation, protest movements, and the events of Tiananmen – Beijing reasserted a 
guiding state role in economic development as part of broader efforts to enhance stability and boost 
growth (Yang 2004, 7-13). While the Eighth FYP resembled its predecessors in prioritizing coastal 
development, industrial and spatial policy under the plan replaced the bottom-up ethos of the 1980s 
with a stronger state role in driving and orchestrating development. The 1992 14th Party Congress 
set an agenda of faster state-led economic opening and construction of a socialist market economy, 
but also stressed the importance of enhancing state capacity for “macro-level adjustments and 
control” (hongguan tiaokong) (Saich 1992). During the early 1990s, larger amounts of state support 
were channeled to leading regions such as the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and central policymakers 
stepped up efforts to guide industrial and regional development in line with strategic priorities.4 
After 1993, China’s national leaders worked to revive economic and regional planning, taking a new 
approach of “planning with and for markets” (Heilmann 2011; Heilmann and Melton 2013). 
Perhaps most significant, a politically strengthened central leadership succeeded in pressing through 
a dramatic recentralization of China’s fiscal system between 1993-1994 (Yang 2004, 74; Wong 2002).  
 
State-orchestrated reform and opening (1996-2000) 
 During the mid- and late 1990s, the central government pushed forward administrative 
centralization and major economic reforms as it tried to build an economic order that combined 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 After 1992, the central government extended support to a wide range of newly designated or upgraded development 
zones, including many in larger cities such as Suzhou, Guangzhou, and Dalian. 
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targeted state intervention with greater market-based competition. Though reining in the local 
investment fever of the mid-1990s proved a challenge for Beijing, the central government more 
successfully flexed its muscle as the decade wore on. The Ninth FYP outlined an active state role in 
promoting economic restructuring and liberalization, but also called for “coordinated regional 
development” (quyu xietiao fazhan) and efforts to preserve economic and social stability amid rapid 
change. Jiang Zemin’s consolidation of political authority enabled a burst of administrative and 
economic reforms in the late 1990s, but Beijing also rolled out major state initiatives to assist the 
losers of reform and help China weather the Asian Financial Crisis. While policymakers recognized 
the need for faster urbanization and greater investment in cities, urban development became a highly 
contested subject—caught between the dual imperatives of boosting competitiveness and preserving 
stability. As the national leadership held to conservative urban policies, some bureaucracies and 
subnational governments took advantage of economic upheaval to explore new urban strategies.  
The ambitious agenda of the Ninth FYP – rapid economic development and upgrading, 
SOE reform, opening up, and improved regional coordination of growth – called for a stronger yet 
nimbler administrative apparatus and state industrial sector (Yang 2010, 54). In the late 1990s, 
premier Zhu Rongji oversaw a wave of administrative restructuring aimed at creating more 
authoritative and responsive central agencies in policy realms such as land, investment, and finance. 
A new Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLAR) was created, China’s economic planning authority 
was reformed, and the People’s Bank of China and commercial banks underwent recentralization 
and restructuring. By pooling more authority and resources in key agencies, the central government 
created the administrative tools for major reform and development efforts.  
In the late 1990s, Beijing aggressively pushed reform and opening measures to restructure 
China’s economy, while also adopting more targeted state efforts to address the gaps between 
winners and losers. Under Zhu Rongji, the central government pressed forward sweeping reforms of 
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state-owned industry in line with the principle of “grasp the large, release the small” (zhua da fang 
xiao). Beijing worked to restructure SOEs as modern market enterprises, and divested itself of 
smaller, struggling SOEs while building up and tightening control over large firms in strategic 
sectors (Yang 2004, 25-33, 44-45, 78-99). Beijing also pushed forward the commercialization of 
housing, ending allocation through work units (Yang 2004, 25-33; Yeh et al 2011). In 1999, central 
leaders cleared the way for China’s 2001 WTO accession, which would further reduce barriers to 
trade and outside investment but also expose localities across the country to intense foreign and 
domestic competition.  
At the same, Beijing drew on strengthened central fiscal and planning capacity to promote 
economic integration of the country and to assist the losers of reform and opening. “Coordinated 
regional development” under the Ninth FYP involved an expansion of state fiscal and investment 
support to lagging regions. China’s 1999 Central Economic Work Meeting announced a new 
Western Development program as its top priority for the coming year. Formally launched in 2000, 
Western Development was the first and most ambitious of a series of new mega-regional initiatives.5 
Although the central government did not go as far in efforts to balance development as under old 
Mao-era policies, Beijing used infrastructural investment and preferential policies to help western 
provinces develop as economic growth centers in their own right, and to better integrate these areas 
into the national and global economy. At the end of the 1990s, the central government also scaled 
up social assistance to impoverished rural regions and to the old industry centers hardest hit by SOE 
reform and restructuring (Bao 2009, 29-30, 93-95). In these ways, Beijing endeavored to make faster 
restructuring and opening-up compatible with economic and political stability. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The Western Development program, publicly unveiled in Xi’an in 1999, involved major infrastructure improvements, 
environmental protection work, preferential investment and lending policies, preferential land and mining policies, and 
scaled-up poverty relief for poor areas (Bao 2009, 93-95; Goodman 2004; Yin 2011, 65). In the following years, 
additional mega-regional programs targeting China’s northeast and lagging central provinces would also be launched.  
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Beijing’s concern for maintaining stability amid rapid economic restructuring was also 
apparent in the conservative approach taken to urban policy. During the mid-1990s, China’s Agenda 
21, a report drafted by the State Planning Commission and State Science and Technology 
Commission and endorsed by the State Council, had called for development policies to support 
medium-sized and smaller cities. The Ninth FYP maintained this emphasis on dispersed urban 
growth, and through the end of the decade, top national leaders as well as officials from key urban 
policy agencies such as the Ministry of Construction (MOC) refrained from endorsing a more 
metropolitan-oriented approach (Gu et al 2012a; Interviews BJ081206a; NJ081205a).6 Meanwhile, 
several prominent academic researchers, including Liu Jiaqiang and Zheng Hongyi, argued for 
continuing to focus on the development of small and medium-sized cities (Gu et al 2012a). 
By the late 1990s, however, a growing chorus of academics and bureaucrats in China had 
begun calling for an adjustment of urban policies, stressing the efficiency advantages of large cities. 
As China’s State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
began planning work for the 10th FYP period, they engaged experts from the World Bank and other 
organizations to help launch new research on urbanization and outline a more aggressive urban 
development agenda. Bureaucratic elites such as Lou Jiwei of the MOF and Zhu Baozhi of the 
SDPC argued that there should be greater latitude and policy support for the growth of major cities, 
even as China continued emphasizing the development of smaller cities (Gu et al 2012a).7 
As differences of opinion in Beijing provided subnational actors with more political space to 
try out new urban development policies, the economic circumstances of the late 1990s gave them 
stronger motivation to do so. Just as it contributed to China’s economic restructuring more broadly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 According to one urban policy expert, this “big-city urbanization” versus “small-city urbanization” debate was largely a 
question about which areas would be prioritized in development policy and given the most state support (Interview 
BJ131301a). 
7 In May 2000, for example, the SDPC, MOF, and World Bank convened an International Seminar on Chinese 
Urbanization that advocated an approach of ‘reasonably develop [sic] large cities, actively developing medium-sized and 
small cities, greatly promoting the development of carefully chosen towns’ (Gu et al 2012a). 
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the Asian Financial Crisis fueled interest across the country in faster urban development and urban 
policy reforms (Yang 2004, 84-85; Gu et al 2012a; Tong 2011). To limit spillover from the crisis, 
Beijing launched a major stimulus effort, sharply scaling up fiscal spending and bank lending. 
Provincial and municipal leaders recognized that accelerated construction of urban infrastructure 
and real estate could help revive economic growth while also enhancing the business environment 
and living conditions of their cities. The availability of stimulus funding and general loosening of 
economic policies in the late 1990s gave subnational governments greater room to experiment with 
bolder urban development approaches. Several provinces, including Guangdong and Zhejiang, 
moved ahead with new initiatives to build up large cities and metropolitan regions (Zou 2006; Fan 
2010). In adopting metropolitan-oriented development strategies, however, provincial leaders had to 
take the initiative: if not exactly defying Beijing, they were venturing beyond the central policy line. 
 
The embrace of urbanization (2001-2005) 
 During the early 2000s, China’s national economic policies prioritized fast growth and 
internationalization. Urbanization (chengzhenhua) was elevated to the status of a national development 
strategy, and there was greater acceptance of the role of major cities in China’s development. But 
different central government actors continued to clash over the proper approach to urban 
development, and Beijing maintained its emphasis on coordinated regional and urban development.  
Under the 10th (2001-2005) FYP plan, central policymakers stressed rapid growth, reform, 
and opening-up. Following China’s 2001 WTO accession, policymakers at each level worked to 
increase industrial and regional competitiveness. Beijing continued promoting SOE reforms in the 
early 2000s, and supported the growth of larger-scale, more capital- and knowledge-intensive 
industry (Yang 2010, 54). In line with the broader elitist turn in economic policy, the 10th FYP put 
more weight on developing “key points” (zhongdian), strategic locations that could serve as engines of 
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growth and reform for larger regions (news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu). Meanwhile, relaxation of 
policy controls over municipal finance, real estate, and urban construction enabled fast development 
in cities with ready access to local, foreign, or state capital (Lin 2007; Wong 2013).  
For the first time, urbanization was designated as a national development strategy, setting the 
stage for expanded investment in cities but also giving rise to sharper bureaucratic conflict over the 
content and control of urban policy (Gu et al 2012a; Xu 2008). Whereas urban and regional planning 
had for many years been the domain of the MOC, officials from China’s planning commission now 
began to play a larger role. Oriented toward physical planning and responsible for overseeing 
construction of smaller urban settlements as well as major centers, the MOC continued to advocate 
a more balanced and inclusive approach to urban development (Interview BJ081206a; 
www.mhurd.gov.cn). Indeed, during the mid-2000s, construction minister Wang Guangtao would 
decry what he saw as blind growth of large cities and excessive spending on urban vanity projects 
(McGee et al 2007, 207). Compared with MOC officials such as Wang, technocrats from the SDPC 
and its successor agency, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), laid more 
stress on efficiency and scale in urban growth, and thus were more sympathetic to metropolitan 
development (Interview BJ081206a). From the early 2000s on, the NDRC would remain a champion 
for rapid urbanization and for development and integration of China’s large metropolitan regions.8 
 As debates between big-city and small-city urbanization advocates continued, top national 
leaders stopped short of endorsing a metropolitan-oriented growth model. While granting larger 
cities freer rein to develop, the 10th FYP called for a mixed and gradual urbanization process (Gu et 
al 2012a). Meanwhile, discussions on urban policy at the 2001 Fifth Plenum of the 15th Central 
Committee called for correcting imbalance in China’s urban growth. Party leaders at the meeting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The NDRC’s predecessor agency highlighted various urbanization-related topics when it launched research for the 10th 
Five-Year Plan in 1998. In 2001, the agency published a report entitled “Urbanization: The Mainstream of 
Modernization in China.” See Gu et al (2012a). 
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reiterated the need to build up medium-sized and smaller cities, noting that high concentration of 
people in large cities was bad for the stability of the urban system (Zhongguo jianshe bao 5/29/2001).9  
The center underscored its concern for coordinated and inclusive development in other ways 
as well. During the early 2000s, China’s national leadership continued to give strong organizational 
and material support to the Western Development initiative,10 and also approved new strategies 
targeting other lagging regions of the country. In 2003, Beijing officially launched a new Revive the 
Old Northeast Industrial Base (zhenxing dongbei lao gongye jidi) strategy. And, in early 2004, premier 
Wen Jiabao mentioned a new Central China Rising (zhongbu jueqi) strategy that would take aim at 
economically struggling central provinces (Lai 2007).11  
Administrative reforms also continued after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office. In 2003, 
the central government created an upgraded NDRC meant to serve as a super-ministry for economic 
planning and regulation (Yang 2004, 59-64).12 The new leadership also called for stronger state 
guidance of development, emphasizing from 2003 on “the five comprehensive coordinations” (wuge 
tongchou), which included coordinated urban and rural development, regional development, economic 
and social development, human and natural development, and domestic development and 
international opening (Heilmann and Melton 2013). Leaders also pushed for a more strategic and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The meeting called for stronger urban system management at different administrative levels, and for regionally varied 
approaches to urbanization. It was argued that very large cities, with urban populations over three million people, should 
have their growth curbed, while smaller cities should be developed more actively. The meeting noted that controlling the 
size of large cities was not the same as halting their development; it was appropriate for cities to continue upgrading their 
urban environment and industry, but efforts to avoid sprawl and conserve green space were necessary (Zhongguo jianshe 
bao 5/29/2011). While the 2002 16th Party Congress report struck a slightly more permissive tone, calling for balanced 
development of cities of different sizes, it was hardly an endorsement of metropolitan-oriented growth (Gu et al 2012a). 
10 In 2000, the central government established a Western Development Leading office (Li and Wu 2012), and in the 
following years Beijing channeled huge quantities of fiscal spending, preferential policies, and infrastructure investment 
to the western provinces targeted under the initiative (Yin 2011, 65; Goodman 2004). 
11 The Northeast and Central China strategies would involve smaller amounts of resources than Western Development, 
but they lent policy support for faster development in these respective regions, and offered aid for basic and heavy 
industry, regional infrastructure development, and agriculture. The northeast and central regions had experienced 
economic and social upheaval during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Yin 2011, 65-66; Lai 2007).  
12 A new Ministry of Commerce and a new State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
were established at the same time (Yang 2004, 59-64). 
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implementation-oriented approach to development planning: Wen Jiabao shifted the official 
planning parlance from “jihua,” which connotes short-term, quantitative planning, to “guihua,” which 
suggests a longer-term, more spatial, and strategic planning mode (Ibid.; Heilmann 2011).  
Confronted with runaway industrial investment and urban growth in the early and mid-2000s, 
Wen’s government also put in place stronger regulatory systems to rein in local governments. By 
strengthening the NDRC system and institutions for financial regulation and land governance, 
national leaders expanded state capacity for steering industrial and urban development. Ma Kai, 
appointed NDRC director in 2003, presided over efforts in the mid-2000s to clamp down on 
excessive local investment through stricter planning and oversight. The fact that these campaigns 
produced great resentment and pushback from subnational authorities suggests they achieved some 
success (Naughton 2008; Li 2010).13  
But close central oversight of local governments was costly and difficult to sustain. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, Beijing often settled for “soft centralization” in its efforts to bolster 
higher-level control over economic development, vesting greater de facto authority at the provincial 
tier (Mertha 2005; Yang 2004, 100; Hsing 2010).  
 
Rescaling and rebalancing state-led development (2006-2010) 
In the second half of the 2000s, the Hu-Wen leadership stepped up efforts to rebalance 
China’s development and address problems that had emerged over the course of several years of 
extremely rapid urban and industrial growth. Under the 11th FYP, Hu and Wen advanced a more 
comprehensive development agenda, stressing rural development, inter-regional coordination, 
resource conservation, and environmental sustainability. To achieve this, the national leadership 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Indeed, observers have attributed Ma Kai’s failure to secure promotion to the Politburo in 2007 to opposition from 
provincial and local interests resentful of the NDRC’s economic clampdown. See Naughton (2008); Li (2010).  
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promoted new modes of planning and governance. While Beijing gave its support to a variety of 
new urban and regional development initiatives in the late 2000s, however, these initiatives were not 
entirely under the control of the center or fully aligned with central priorities. 
By the mid-2000s, problems with China’s increasingly urban-oriented and resource-intensive 
growth model had become clear to central leaders. Despite Beijing’s efforts to cool local land and 
industry development, rapid, investment-driven growth of major cities posed various risks. Urban 
expansion threatened China’s stock of arable land. Insufficient land compensation and job 
opportunities for displaced farmers were creating substantial social hardships and instability risks. 
Large – and growing – development gaps separated major cities, on the one hand, from rural areas 
and smaller urban centers, on the other (Xie 2005). With strict residency registration (hukou) systems 
still in place in most large and medium-sized cities, migrants could find short-term employment 
opportunities in metropolitan areas but often lacked access to public services such as education and 
healthcare, presenting social risks (Tao 2011, 20). Public intellectuals appealed to central leaders to 
manage urbanization more cautiously, and to address more forcefully the economic and social crisis 
facing China’s rural dwellers (Fan 2006; Day 2008).14    
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao proved more receptive to these concerns than their predecessors 
had been. The 11th FYP, the first prepared under the Hu-Wen administration, gave high priority to 
rural development, social service provision, and sustainable urbanization. The “scientific 
development outlook” (kexue fazhan guan) and “taking people as the root” (yi ren wei ben) philosophies 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 One prominent urban expert, Zhou Yixing, warned top leaders against overly optimistic appraisals of the country’s 
urbanization progress, and urged a more gradual and balanced approach to urbanization during the 11th FYP period (Fan 
2006). Meanwhile, high-profile rural experts such as Wen Tiejun and Li Yuanxing continued to advocate loudly for 
stronger policies to address China’s “three rural problems” (san nong wenti). Wen, Li, and other “new rural reconstruction” 
(xin xiangcun jianshe) proponents had mobilized from the late 1990s on to emphasize the worsening plight of China’s 
peasants and call for a more comprehensive state approach to economic and social development of rural areas. In 
particular, public intellectuals called for better coordination of urban and rural development, noting that China’s model 
of globally oriented development had marginalized the countryside and those with rural status (Day 2008).  
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championed by Hu and Wen took a broader view of China’s development challenges, emphasizing 
social welfare, environmental sustainability, urban-rural coordination, and regional integration in 
addition to more technocratic concerns of industrial competitiveness and innovation capacity (Fan 
2006; Yang 2010, 18-19). The 11th FYP called for rebalancing China’s economy toward social 
development and more sustainable growth drivers—rural modernization, domestic consumption, 
service and knowledge-based industries, and energy-conserving, environmentally friendly 
technologies and management methods (Yang 2010, 19-20, 54).  
Spatial development issues featured prominently in the Hu-Wen policy agenda. Central 
policymakers viewed improved regional and urban-rural coordination of growth as crucial for 
achieving more inclusive and sustainable development. From the mid-2000s on, the central 
leadership championed efforts to build “a socialist new countryside” (shehuizhuyi xin nongcun) through 
renovation of villages across the country and better public service provision (Looney 2012, 204-213). 
After 2004,the Hu-Wen leadership devoted each year’s Number One Document to rural work, and 
they backed up their rhetoric with stronger policies to support rural economic development and 
social welfare, such as the abolition of China’s agricultural tax (Li and Wu 2012). And, in late 2007, 
the National People’s Congress passed a new Urban and Rural Planning Law to guide urban-rural 
integration efforts (Yeh et al 2011). Meanwhile, Beijing continued to provide planning and policy 
support for the mega-regional initiatives launched in previous years (Yin 2011, 265; Tang 2011, 158), 
and also endorsed new, more implementation-oriented modes of regional development planning. 
Beijing designated several new “comprehensive reform pilot zones” (zonghe peitao gaige shiyan qu) and 
strategic “economic areas” (jingji qu) across the country, and preparatory work for a new “principal 
function area” (zhuti gongneng qu) planning scheme began (Li and Wu 2012).  
Greater attention to sustainability concerns and rural issues did not mean less emphasis on 
urbanization, but central leaders called for more socially and environmentally minded urban 
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development. After the mid-2000s, Wen Jiabao and NDRC director Ma Kai actively supported 
efforts to comprehensively plan and develop “urban clusters” (chengshi qun) and strategic economic 
regions across China (Wu 2007, 130-131). While such strategies were in part geared toward boosting 
economic efficiency through regional integration and industrial restructuring, central policymakers 
also promoted regional planning as a means to rationalize development across space and achieve 
more sustainable development.15 At the same time, top leaders and central government planners 
remained concerned about the overcrowding and overdevelopment of large cities (Saich 2008; Yang 
2010, 30-31).16 At a September 2005 Politburo session, for example, Hu Jintao called for a Chinese-
style urbanization model that would balance development of cities of different sizes, conserve land 
resources, follow an intensive rather than extensive growth model, protect the environment, and 
prioritize social harmony as well as economic efficiency (Gu et al 2012a).17 And, under the 11th FYP, 
Beijing called for gradualism in urban residency status reforms and continued working to steer rural 
migrants to smaller cities and towns (Fan 2006). 
While the Hu-Wen leadership called for stronger administrative guidance of economic and 
spatial development, however, much of the work of designing and implementing new strategies fell 
to provincial authorities. Provinces enjoyed considerable policymaking latitude under the 11th FYP 
as the central government slashed the number of binding development targets (Yin 2011, 128). 
Beijing’s emphasis on coordination and integration of economic regions made provinces – China’s 
closest thing to regional entities – crucial as units for planning and administration (Gu et al 2012b). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The 11th FYP endorsed the development of tightly linked urban agglomerations whereby smaller cities and rural areas 
could form dense linkages to major centers. Large central cities were to serve as growth and innovation engines, vehicles 
for denser, more resource-efficient development, and drivers of regional economic integration (Shi and Zhuang 2007, 7; 
Gu et al 2012a). 
16 Planners worried about the tendency for major cities to be built up simultaneously as administrative, economic, 
logistical, and cultural centers. This resulted in concentration of urban amenities, overcrowding, resource strains, and 
price inflation—threats to economic, social, and environmental sustainability (Yang 2010, 30-31). 
17 According to Hu, China should increase the economic strength of larger cities and urban clusters, but urban growth 
should be carefully planned (Gu et al 2012a). 
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The economic circumstances of the late 2000s created even more space for provincial 
initiative. As part of the economic stimulus mounted in response to the Global Financial Crisis, 
Beijing opened the floodgates for a subnational investment spree.18 Between late 2008 and 2010, 
Beijing and provincial governments jointly launched a large number of urban and regional 
development initiatives such as the Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Area in Shaanxi and the 
Wanjiang Urban Belt in Anhui, many of which were to be financed by state bank lending rather than 
through the central government’s budget (Li and Wu 2012; Wong 2013 ). Approving more programs 
than it could easily oversee, Beijing gave provinces significant discretion in crafting and carrying out 
such initiatives. 
 
The importance but insufficiency of national-level policies in explaining metropolitan bias 
 From this overview of the evolution of China’s development policies, we can see an increase 
over time in central permissiveness toward and support for metropolitan development. Beijing’s 
promotion of an outward-oriented growth strategy and emphasis on capital- and knowledge-
intensive industry since the 1990s has implicitly favored larger urban centers with the market scale, 
factor endowments, and amenities to serve as hubs for advanced industrial and commercial activity. 
And the central government’s more explicit embrace of urbanization and metropolitan-regional 
development as economic strategies since the early 2000s has facilitated growth of large cities.  
But central leaders have been slow to jettison their longstanding policy of curbing growth in 
big cities and favoring smaller urban centers. Debates within the central government over the proper 
approach to urban and regional development have not relented. As such, Beijing’s policies since the 
turn of the century have featured an uneasy – and sometimes contradictory – mix of pro-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Central leaders announced in November 2008 that four trillion yuan (over $580 billion) would be made available for 
the stimulus efforts (The New York Times 11/9/2008).  
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metropolitan and pro-hinterland tendencies. In addition to policies that help the development of 
infrastructure, real estate, and industry in major cities, Beijing over the past two decades also has 
adopted stronger policies to support lagging regions and rural areas, and called for stronger efforts 
to coordinate development and mitigate economic dualism. Indeed, central support for the recent 
wave of metropolitan-regional strategies has been justified in large part as a way to promote more 
integrated regional and urban-rural development. Over the last two decades, provincial policies have 
consistently been earlier and more overt in showing metropolitan bias, and realignments of central 
policy have been preceded by changes at the subnational level. 
 If central policies per se are too broad and indeterminate to fully explain variation in 
metropolitan bias over time and across provinces, the strengthening since the 1990s of higher-level 
urban and regional governance capacity has no doubt created the potential for stronger and more 
spatially targeted state interventions in the economy. Where higher-level state capacity is used to 
support central objectives such as regional coordination, urban-rural integration, and environmental 
sustainability, it may tend to dampen metropolitan growth. But, to the extent that pro-growth actors 
such as provincial governments are able to mobilize central authority and resources on behalf of 
their own development priorities, urban and regional governance institutions can work to favor large 
metropolitan centers. By looking at the architecture and operating mode of the institutions that 
govern different facets of urban and regional development, we can see how – and under what 
conditions – metropolitan bias arises. In the following sections, I explore how changing regional 
planning, land governance, investment, and fiscal and financial policy institutions may enable 
metropolitan bias in practice. 
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The rise of regional development planning 
Regional planning is one key area of governance in which the central government has 
created new hierarchical institutions to guide and coordinate development, yet has not exercised full 
control over these institutions in practice. As China’s growing economic complexity and openness 
have reduced the effectiveness of traditional forms of economic coordination, Beijing has come to 
rely more heavily on regional planning as a means of both broad economic regulation and more 
targeted state intervention (Wu 2007, 129-140). Regional development planning became especially 
important after the mid-2000s, when Wen Jiabao and NDRC director Ma Kai supported the 
emergence of new, more implementation-oriented planning approaches (Wu 2007, 9).  
 Economic and spatial planning processes in China not only produce overall frameworks and 
blueprints for development, but also serve important policy communication functions. Planning 
processes bring together different levels of government, different agencies, and government and 
non-government experts. By providing a forum for “information gathering, consultation, analysis, 
document-drafting, implementation, experimentation, and revision,” planning processes enable 
greater alignment and cooperation across what is otherwise a highly segmented and stove-piped 
policymaking system (Heilmann and Melton 2013). Especially with Beijing’s shift in the mid-2000s 
from “short-term, technical planning” (jihua) to “strategic, comprehensive planning” (guihua), 
planning processes have further emphasized holistic, coordinated, and action-oriented ways of 
achieving long-term policy goals (Yang 2010, 4; Heilmann 2011).  
 Plans, and the shared understandings that arise from the planning process, facilitate 
particular distributions of development resources. By highlighting particular development goals and 
designating high-priority programs, projects, and locations, plans open up policy space for 
subnational governments to launch related initiatives, and create channels through which 
subnational governments can tap into state resources. Indeed, inclusion in development plans is 
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often important for moving major investment projects forward. Under Wen Jiabao, the central 
government clamped down on projects which had not been approved as part of larger plans 
(Interview XA101203a). Moreover, strategic “designations” (dingwei) in higher-level plans often bring 
concrete policy benefits for the localities or sectors that receive them, including increased land-use 
quotas, tax policy benefits, easier access to financing, and major state-backed investment projects 
(Interview BJ061202a). At the same time, plans serve an important publicity and legitimation 
function in the development process. As authoritative policy statements, plans serve as costly signals 
about which areas are to receive priority state backing—and thus may also stimulate interest from 
private investors (Vogel et al 2010). And, by virtue of their technocratic veneer, development plans 
help to legitimize the concentration of state support in particular areas or sectors. 
 
Implementation-oriented regional plans 
 The new regional plans that have emerged in China since the turn of the century provide 
more effective frameworks for spatial policy interventions than earlier types of plans. Since the 
1980s, subnational governments and the departments under them have prepared a variety of local 
economic, spatial, and sectoral plans, including five-year development plans, urban master plans, 
urban system plans, land-use plans, and transportation plans, among others.19 Traditionally, plans 
have been produced and implemented in a unit-by-unit, level-by-level, and sector-by-sector fashion. 
Such plans function as important statements of policy intent, and they may list key development 
indicators. Yet, plans produced in this fragmented manner often have weak implementation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For urban master plans, provincial governments and Beijing review and approve plans drawn up at the municipal level. 
The central government reviews master plans for 108 major cities in China, and there is an inter-ministerial mechanism 
whereby different central ministries discuss and decide on which functional designations to assign to different cities. In 
practice, however, central control and oversight remains weak. Planning and approval processes lag behind 
developments on the ground, and the central government has limited enforcement capacity (Interview BJ131301a). 
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prospects, insofar as intergovernmental and interagency cooperation – critical in practice –remains 
an afterthought (Wu 2007, 141-142; Xu 2008).20   
 The new regional development planning efforts that have taken shape since the turn of the 
century have been more explicitly designed to facilitate concrete results by enhancing cooperation 
among different government levels, functional systems, and jurisdictions.21 Since 2000, regional 
development planning has been backed by stronger central state capacity – including an upgraded 
NDRC system and a much larger fiscal base – and a range of supporting economic policies (Wu 
2007, 115-121; Yang 2010, 87-92). Planning processes have involved more intensive central-
provincial and inter-agency consultation and cooperation.22 The central government has provided 
policy authority, material resources, and strategic guidance, while subnational governments – 
working in concert with relevant central agencies – have often taken the lead in designing and 
implementing development plans (Zhang 2011). In this way, local knowledge and initiative have 
been paired with the vast resource base of the center. 
 On the one hand, Beijing and provincial governments have launched a series of mega-
regional initiatives to accelerate development and opening-up in parts of the country that were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For instance, the population and land-area targets assigned in municipal master plans can serve as important guidelines 
for urban development. But the concrete spatial arrangements envisioned by such plans may be disregarded or quickly 
modified in practice (Interview XA101203).  
21 Although Beijing pursued regional economic planning schemes at different scales during the 1980s and 1990s, these 
efforts typically lacked much higher-level coordinating capacity or resource support, and were not well harmonized with 
China’s overall economic development strategies. During the early and mid-1980s, the national leadership sought to 
promote regional economic integration across the country, and launched cross-provincial planning efforts such as a plan 
for the Shanghai region. After 1992, Beijing introduced major reforms to the planning system, emphasizing regionally 
coordinated development and creation of market connections across mega-regions. Seven mega-regional plans followed, 
including plans for the northwest region in 1993, the YRD region in 1995, and the northeast region in 1996. The Ninth 
FYP called for developing these mega-regions through integration around key central cities and transport corridors. In 
most cases, however, regions were not well defined, cooperation across administrative boundaries proved difficult, and 
concrete central support remained limited (Wu 2007, 115-121; Yang 2010 87-92). 
22 The post-2000 regional development system has involved intensive central-local consultation and bargaining, with the 
NDRC system serving as a key bridge across different state tiers and as a coordinating entity for different departments. 
Local leaders actively take part in central policy discussions and push for favorable central policies, while central agencies 
send out ‘fact-finding’ trips to the provinces and give guidance to provincial planners. In addition, a variety of regional 
meetings of central and subnational officials have been held in different parts of the country (Heilmann and Melton 
2013). 
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passed over by the Coastal Development policies of the 1980s and early 1990s: the 2000 Western 
Development program, the 2003 Revive the Old Northeast Industrial Base campaign, and the 2004 
Central China Rising strategy. The Western Development program, the largest of the initiatives, has 
promoted central policy goals such as regional economic integration, environmental restoration, and 
poverty alleviation while also addressing provincial priorities of economic development and 
industrial upgrading. Under the program, Beijing has channeled various forms of higher-level policy 
support and resources to provinces and localities in the west: preferential investment policies, major 
regional infrastructure improvement projects, fiscal aid, social spending, and environmental 
construction. But given that Western Development spanned multiple provinces, it has been 
necessary for much policymaking and implementation to be managed at the provincial level (Yang 
2010, 87-92; Goodman 2004; Interview XA101206b).  
Provincial authorities have played an even bigger role in the launch and implementation of 
the Revive the Northeast and Central China Rising initiatives. Beijing’s announcement of each 
program came after aggressive provincial lobbying, and provincial governments have drawn up and 
overseen many of the projects and policy experiments launched under the programs (Chung et al 
2009; Lai 2007; Li 2004).23 In the case of the Central China Rising initiative, Beijing has offered 
provincial governments relatively modest material aid compared with what was given to western 
provinces. At the same time, however, Beijing has allowed provinces freer rein to experiment with 
new economic policies and shape the development of major urban regions (Lai 2007).  
 In recent years, Beijing and provincial governments have also teamed up to launch a new 
wave of urban-regional development initiatives aimed at fostering economic regions around major 
urban centers. While provincial governments in several provinces – Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hunan, etc. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For example, Chung et al (2009) note how after the announcement of the Revive the Northeast program, the central 
government gave prompt approval to 100 major projects proposed by provincial governments. 
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– had been drawing up and putting into practice provincial-level “urban cluster” or “metropolitan 
circle” (dushi quan) plans since the 1990s,24 growing central government support for urban-regional 
planning under Wen Jiabao made possible a dramatic scaling-up of these initiatives.25 The geographic 
areas of these new urban-regional plans have usually fallen within the territory of a single province 
but encompass multiple (prefectural-level) cities, and the plans have sought to promote greater 
economic integration and improved spatial ordering of extended urban regions.  
In embracing urban-regional planning, central and provincial officials have stressed the need 
for stronger higher-level guidance of development to prevent vicious local competition and wasteful 
duplication of infrastructure, respond to regional-scale governance challenges such as pollution and 
inequality, and reassert higher-level control over runaway urbanization (Xu 2008). In practice, 
though, it is clear that – at least from the perspective of provinces – urban-regional planning is also 
very much about promoting local development and competitiveness (Ibid; Zou 2006).26 Many of the 
more than two dozen state-level urban-regional initiatives that emerged after the mid-2000s have laid 
out ambitious targets for urban growth as well as sustainable development goals. 
Administratively, the new urban-regional initiatives – from Hunan’s Changsha-Zhuzhou-
Xiangtan zone to Jiangsu’s Coastal Development area – fall under two headings: “comprehensive 
reform pilot zones” and strategic “economic areas.” The former explicitly emphasize both 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Guangdong province was a frontrunner when it came to metropolitan-regional planning. The Guangdong leadership 
in November 1994 launched an economic planning process for the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region that included city 
group planning as a major topic. The provincial construction commission took the lead in formulating a PRD urban 
cluster plan. The plan envisioned a polycentric, more integrated metropolitan region with Guangzhou at its core, and 
emphasized the need for higher-level government coordination of development. In practice, however, the plan was not 
effectively implemented as a framework for metropolitan development: many cities continued to act on their own (Wu 
2007, 125-126). 
25 After 2003, the central government increasingly endorsed intra- and cross-provincial plans that encompassed multiple 
cities (Interview BJ061202a). In a 2005 State Council opinion on regional planning, the central government laid 
particular stress on the role of urban cluster planning as a means of achieving more efficient and sustainable urban and 
industrial development (Wu 2007, 132). 
26 As Zou Bing notes, “In reality, the fundamental starting point for each locality in drafting an urban cluster plan is still 
the consolidation of regional resources, upgrading of regional competitiveness, acceleration of development; it’s nothing 
more than the elevation of this theme to an ever-higher level” (Zou 2006). 
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development and policy experimentation and are overseen by the NDRC’s Institutional Reform 
Department (tigai si), while the latter are oriented mainly toward development and fall under the 
supervision of the NDRC’s Regional Department (diqu si). With few exceptions, state-level status 
has brought major benefits in terms of preferential policies, access to key development-related 
resources, and major state investment projects (Interview BJ061202a).27 These urban-regional 
strategies have thus served as a powerful mode for spatially selective promotion of development and 
reform under the guidance of higher-level governments. 
 
Bureaucratic fragmentation and political initiative in the planning process 
The new regional planning approaches that have emerged during the 2000s have made the 
province an increasingly important scale or unit of governance, even as the central state’s role in 
development has expanded. Because mega-regional programs such as Western Development and 
Central China Rising are too broad in scope and too complex to be administered entirely from the 
center, provincial governments in practice play important roles in carrying out large infrastructure 
projects and allocating investment and policy resources within their territories (Yang 2010 87-92; 
Goodman 2004). The provincial unit has been especially important when it comes to urban-regional 
initiatives, as most of these initiatives involve the development and integration of urban regions 
within, rather than across, provincial boundaries, and are closely linked with overall provincial 
economic strategies (Luo and Shen 2008; Zhang 2011).28 Provinces are already responsible for 
making economic policy and handling cross-jurisdictional issues within their territories, and central 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 However, following a huge spate of special area approvals in 2009 in connection with China’s stimulus effort (Li and 
Wu 2012), the frontrunner advantage of special area status has been diluted somewhat. 
28 Indeed, Zhang (2011), Xu (2008), and others have interpreted urban-regional initiatives as a rescaling of regional 
competitiveness policy to the provincial level in what amounts to an inter-provincial economic “arms race.”  
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recognition of provinces’ urban-regional plans often further increases the maneuvering room and 
resources at their disposal (Gu et al 2012b, 29).29  
Beyond making the provincial scale more important, new planning approaches often allow 
provincial governments to take the initiative in their dealings with a fragmented central government 
and shape new initiatives around their own priorities. According to a central government researcher, 
urban-regional initiatives have often originated as provincial-level plans before undergoing modest 
revisions and obtaining central-level backing. Provincial officials tend to view urban-regional 
initiatives primarily as development opportunities, and press central ministries hard for growth-
oriented policy benefits and material support (Interview BJ061307b).30 As they do so, provincial 
leaders may be able to take advantage of the stove-piped character of the central bureaucracy to 
bargain separately with different ministries and offices for support (Yang 2010, 41-48). And, in any 
case, key central agencies such as the NDRC have limited organizational capacity for overseeing 
implementation of urban-regional initiatives once approval has been granted (Interview BJ061202a; 
Heilmann and Melton 2013).31  
 
Land-use policies 
 Land-use policy is another crucial area of multilevel governance shaping urban and regional 
development in contemporary China. Land is an enormously valuable resource for localities, 
functioning both as physical space for urban and industrial expansion, and also as a fungible asset 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 More broadly, efforts by Beijing after 2005 to refine a “three-level, three-type” planning system have relied on 
provinces to serve a key intermediary role and integrative function in development planning (Yang 2010, 112-123). 
30 Subnational leaders may be able to take advantage of the varying preferences and competitive relationships of different 
central bureaucracies, reaching out to whichever is more supportive of their own agenda. The NDRC has been known as 
a stronger supporter of metropolitan-oriented development than the Ministry of Construction (Interview BJ081206a). 
31 The NDRC offices that oversee urban and regional policies have only several dozen staff members apiece (Interview 
BJ061202a). According to Heilmann and Melton (2013), “In 2006, four overworked officials in the 
NDRC’s 27-person-strong planning department [guihua si] were charged with checking on the provincial-level plans.” 
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whose leasing, mortgaging, or cheap provision can bring in large quantities of fiscal revenue, bank 
lending, and capital investment (Naughton 2007; Tao 2011, 33-35; Jiang et al 2010, 5-6).32  
Local governments – municipal, county, and township-level – have the most immediate 
control over land resources, and are closely involved in developing and leasing out urban land. After 
the 1990s, local governments across China turned to a new, land-driven urban growth model. 
Taking advantage of their control over state-owned land, local governments have prepared and 
leased out large land parcels to promote industrial investment, raise fiscal revenue, and borrow from 
banks (Lin 2007; Hsing 2010; Rithmire 2013).33 Local officials, dependent on this growth model, 
have coveted land resources as a key developmental input, a source of competitive advantage, and as 
a means of meeting fiscal obligations and servicing local debts. 
During the past 15 years, however, access to land resources for urban expansion – especially 
the large parcels on the urban periphery most coveted by developers and industrialists – has become 
much tighter. Expanding cities have rapidly consumed surrounding land, leaving themselves less 
space for future growth. Meanwhile, the central government since the late 1990s has stepped up 
efforts to protect China’s reserves of farmland to ensure food security and rural livelihood. Beijing 
has enacted major institutional changes and put many measures in place to prevent local 
governments’ haphazard rezoning and development of farmland.  
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32 As Naughton (2007) explains, “Land became a primary source of local governments’ patronage and wealth. Moreover, 
urban land became a resource for local development strategy. Development-oriented local officials regularly offered land 
for free, or at reduced prices, to attract foreign investors or local developers.” Land is also essential as means of 
obtaining revenue and financing. As Jiang et al (2010) explain, “The more land a government requisitions and sells, the 
more local disposable income increases; the more land a government can gain control of, the lower the cost of city 
expansion; the more convenient investment attraction becomes, the more government revenue sources increase” (5-6). 
33 Local governments have often resorted to “pseudo-urbanization,” whereby development of urban land to carry out 
prestige projects and obtain revenue far outpaces the bottom-up demand for new real estate (Yew 2012). The key to this 
system is the ability to requisition land resources cheaply from village collectives on the urban periphery; municipal 
governments compensate villagers for land primarily on the basis of its ex ante value as rural land (Lichtenberg and Ding 
2007). 
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Though stricter state regulation of land-use has not been entirely effective, it has contributed 
to a tightening of land supply, making access to and discretion over land resources increasingly 
valuable to local governments. Because quotas for rezoning and developing land are granted through 
a hierarchical administrative system, land-resource allocation has become a key mode of spatially 
targeted development support and a highly politicized process. And, while Beijing has strengthened 
higher-level planning and regulation of land use, provinces in many ways have become key 
governance units under China’s new land policy regime. 
 
Increasingly strict state regulation of land-use 
 The central government has for decades worked to establish mechanisms for land-use 
planning and regulation, but strong political and institutional backing for such efforts has only come 
since the late 1990s. Confronted with China’s rapid loss of farmland amid accelerated urbanization 
and development zone growth after the mid-1990s, Beijing between 1997 and 1998 strengthened its 
Land Management Law and created a new Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLAR) (Jiang et al 
2010, 12; Xu and Yeh 2009; Li and Wu 2012). These reforms aimed at better protecting arable land 
and curbing wasteful land development efforts through stronger hierarchical planning and oversight.  
  Several features of the new land governance regime enhanced higher-level authority, even if 
important gaps in central control remained. To protect China’s arable land stock while also ensuring 
a supply of land for development, the MOLAR system was empowered to regulate the amounts and 
types of land used in different areas of the country (Interview BJ141307a). After its creation, the 
ministry led a new round of overall land-use planning (tudi liyong zongti guihua), whereby governments 
at each level plotted out long-term land-use quotas for different categories of land and for their 
administrative sub-units (Wu 2007, 123). A new system of “dynamic balance” (zhanbu pingheng) was 
established at the provincial level and below, whereby any loss of farmland beyond the assigned 
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quota had to be replenished by a reduction in land-use or reclamation of new farmland elsewhere 
(Interview BJ141307a). And, whereas land conversion and development had gone through various 
channels in the mid-1990s, the revised Land Management Law required that land parcels be 
transferred to municipal governments before being leased to developers (Hsing 2010, 39-41).  
In practice, higher-level enforcement capacity remained relatively weak, and new rules 
favored rapidly developing urban centers. Municipal governments, both empowered and 
incentivized by their monopoly on land conversion, urbanized farmland at a much faster pace than 
expected (Ibid.; Jiang et al 2010). With the national economy again growing rapidly and large cities 
booming by the early 2000s, China saw an explosion of land development in thousands of 
development zones and suburban “new districts” (xin cheng) (Hsing 2010, 99-104).  
Facing this new burst of land development, Beijing took further steps after 2003 to constrain 
land-hungry municipal governments, imposing stricter and more targeted controls on land-use 
approval. In 2003, the central government deemed land policy a new instrument for macroeconomic 
regulation, and began requiring provincial approval for farmland conversion as well as for personnel 
appointments to local land bureaus. The following year, Beijing imposed stricter controls on the 
development of arable land and conducted nationwide audits that resulted in the recovery of large 
amounts of land illegally occupied by development zones (Ibid., 101-102).  
With Beijing and the provinces still struggling to rein in localities’ land development, the 
center adopted more stringent land policies in 2006. For the first time, the central government 
stipulated in the 11th FYP a formal “red line” (hong xian) of 1.8bn mu below which China’s stock of 
arable land would not be allowed to fall (Chen 2014).34 To enhance central oversight capacity, the 
State Council No. 31 document created a national land superintendency that would operate outside 
of the normal administrative hierarchy. Beijing also made provincial governments more accountable 
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34 One Chinese mu equals approximately one-sixth of an acre. 
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for land outcomes. Although provinces would continue to oversee localities’ annual land-use plans 
(niandu jihua), land regulation would become a key criterion for evaluating leaders (Naughton 2007).  
 
Provinces and the multilevel politics of land-quota allocation 
 The strengthening since the late 1990s of China’s land policy institutions has made top-down 
allocation of land resources and privileges an important part of the development process, and has 
made provinces key units for land governance. This hierarchical system has some bias toward larger 
cities, but higher-level control over the distribution of land resources can also be used to curb 
development in big cities. Most important, perhaps, is the intergovernmental politics of land 
allocation that has emerged under stricter control—a politics in which the provincial level is pivotal. 
 Changes in land governance have generally worked in favor of large cities’ development. 
Stricter land-use approval processes for investment projects, crackdowns on unauthorized land use, 
and efforts to maximize land-based revenues give precedence to larger projects and higher-ranking 
development zones. Large cities, home to most key industrial zones and new district-style 
developments, and better positioned than small cities to capture large-scale investment projects, thus 
stand to benefit from a land system that emphasizes scale and formality (Hsing 2010, 103-105, 211).  
At the same time, from an administrative standpoint, China’s land governance reforms have 
strengthened provincial and central authorities. While there have been efforts to standardize and 
professionalize land-use plans and decisions,35 higher-level governments retain considerable 
discretion in allocating the land-use quotas localities need for urban and industrial expansion. Key 
decisions over the allocation among different localities of construction land quotas are made in 
Beijing and provincial capitals, according to a tiered system in which higher-level governments 
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35 In determining how to allocate land across different cities, land authorities take into account such factors as local 
growth rates, local environmental conditions, and local land quality (Interview NJ051204a). 
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review the land-use needs of lower levels and assign quotas downward. Beijing assigns annual 
construction land (jianshe yongdi) quotas to each province, and provincial governments divide this 
quota among the different prefectural level cities under them. Although the allocation of land quotas 
factors in several technical criteria, central and provincial policymakers have room at the margins for 
giving “preferential treatment” (qingxie) to particular localities or pet projects (Interviews CS061203b; 
BJ141307a). In particular, it is typical for central and provincial authorities to assign extra land 
quotas to locations prioritized under their development strategies (Interview NJ051204a).36 
Unsurprising, the quotas different localities receive are considered too politically sensitive to be 
made public (Interviews BJ141307a). 
 Stronger top-down control has made the provincial scale particularly important where land 
governance is concerned. Because provincial governments allocate land-use quotas among different 
cities, and because provinces are the largest scale for implementing dynamic balance and related 
policies, provinces function as key units for the distribution and redistribution of land resources. 
China’s quota-based land-use system makes it possible for annual quotas and actual land 
development to become disproportionately skewed toward the top urban areas in a province, while 
other cities and outlying areas serve as net-suppliers of land-use quotas and as sites for replenishing 
arable land (so as to enable more conversion of farmland on the fringe of metropolitan centers).37 
The hierarchical character of China’s land system makes land-use quota allocation a very 
politicized process in which intergovernmental lobbying is rife. Most allocation of land-use quotas 
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36 For example, certain localities obtained expanded land quotas under Jiangsu’s provincial-level Riverside Development 
program in the mid-2000s (Interview NJ051204a). Similarly, Hunan gained preferential access to land and more flexible 
land policies under the state-level Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Reform Pilot Zone initiative (Interview CS061203a). 
37 Depending on how tightly provincial governments regulate the transfer of land-use quotas between different 
municipalities, quotas may be transferred either through a top-down administrative process or through market 
mechanisms. In some provinces, provincial governments have allowed for the emergence of land-quota exchange 
systems, whereby different localities can buy and sell land-use quotas in accordance with local market demand. 
Traditionally, however, provinces have exerted some degree of top-down administrative control over transfers of land-
use quotas across cities (Interview NJ051204a). 
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occurs through annual land-use plans in a low-transparency fashion, which enables Beijing and 
provincial governments to adjust each year the precise distribution of quotas among subordinate 
units. With different provinces and different sub-provincial units often engaged in zero-sum 
competition for land quotas, there is fierce lobbying: provincial leaders press Beijing for increased 
land-use quotas, while provinces in turn face prodding from municipal authorities (Interviews 
BJ141307a; CS061203b; XA011202c). Under these arrangements, both the development priorities of 
higher-level authorities and the political pressure lower levels can muster may influence the 
distribution of valuable land quotas. 
 
Investment policies 
 The institutions that govern industrial and infrastructural investment represent another, 
closely related means by which higher-level actors influence the spatial form of development. In 
contemporary China, municipal governments play a key role in promoting investment in industry, 
urban infrastructure, and real estate (Hsing 2010; Interview BJ051112a).38 At the same time, however, 
higher-level policies continue to affect the ease of investment and availability of space, and Beijing 
and provincial authorities continue to play a major part in the provision of economic infrastructure.   
Even when they are not explicitly spatial, central and provincial-level economic policies may 
have important effects on urban and regional development patterns. Interventionist industrial 
policies and foreign economic policies enacted by Beijing and provincial governments implicitly help 
the locations that are home to (or at a competitive advantage for developing) priority sectors. There 
has been much greater liberalization of trade and foreign investment following WTO accession, but 
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38 Municipal governments often are closely involved with local industries, and take the lead in developing land, managing 
development zones, recruiting investment, and arranging supporting policies for investment (Hsing 2010; Interview 
BJ051112a). According to an executive from a foreign business association in China, the prefectural level is critical in an 
operational sense because municipal authorities have “both the authority to do things and the means to do things.” 
When outside investors are considering different locations for investment projects, they typically think in terms of 
municipal units and interface mainly with city- and county-level officials (Interview BJ051112a) 
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China has seen “fragmented liberalization,” whereby some provinces open up particular sectors to 
foreign competition more than others (Oh 2013). Meanwhile, even though WTO rules have placed 
some constraints on the use of industrial policy by Beijing, provincial governments across China 
have continued actively to use such policies, subsidizing investment in some industries while 
restricting it in others (Yin 2011, 127-128; Interview XA111307c).  
 But Beijing and provincial governments also have more direct, spatially targeted means for 
shaping the spatial distribution of industrial and infrastructural investment. On the one hand, higher-
level actors are involved in the establishment and support of the development zones and urban new 
districts that have been the focus of industry and real estate development since the early 2000s. On 
the other hand, central and provincial state actors play a direct role in the development of large-scale 
urban and regional infrastructure cities need to accommodate growth and enhance competitiveness. 
 
The role of higher-level governments in zone-based development 
 Special development zones, usually under the management of municipal governments, have 
been at the forefront of liberalization, industrialization, and urbanization throughout much of the 
reform era. With advanced infrastructure and easy access to capital, development zones embody the 
philosophy of “concentrating resources to do big things” (jizhong ziyuan ban da shi) (Yin 2011, 67; 
Interview XA071202a).39 And, as the sites where new reform and opening policies are rolled out, 
development zones have played a key role in the “segmented deregulation” of China’s economy 
(Zweig 2002, 50).  
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39 The Economic and Technology Development Zones (EDTZ), High and New Technology Industries Development 
Zones (HTDZ), and other types of special zones that have been established at different administrative levels have 
enjoyed preferential tax policies, special economic administrative powers, and preferential land use, among other benefits. 
Most state-level development zones have city-level powers for fiscal policy, tax policy, industry and commerce, and other 
areas, which means they can liaise with provincial authorities (Yin 2011, 67,143). 
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While the 1990s and early 2000s saw the rapid, bottom-up proliferation of development 
zones, Beijing and provincial governments since the turn of the century have regulated zones more 
tightly, cracking down on unauthorized development. Higher-level authorities have increasingly 
favored large-scale, planned development zones that fit the mantras of “new-type industrialization” 
(xinxing gongyehua) and “new-type urbanization” (xinxing chengzhenhua). Cities have expanded through 
the construction of real estate mega-blocks, huge industrial parks, and major infrastructure projects 
in suburban new districts. Policy favoritism toward high-end zones and mega-projects has benefited 
larger cities, which are best equipped to manage large-scale development (Hsing 2010, 105-110, 214). 
Major development zones are typically managed as specialized, semi-autonomous organs of 
municipal-level government, with city officials appointed to oversee management committees and 
zone investment companies that in turn report and remit revenues or profits to the municipal 
government. At the same time, however, higher-level governments play an important role in shaping 
the tangible and intangible “development space” (fazhan kongjian) development zones enjoy.  
Designation as a national-level (guojia ji) zone or provincial-level (sheng ji) zone, which brings 
improved policy treatment in matters such as land-use, tax reduction, and administrative fees, 
requires approval from the corresponding level of government. In addition, city governments 
typically need higher-level approval to alter the administrative configuration of development zones, 
or to expand the land area of zones  (Interviews XA111206b; XA021202c; XA031202c; CS171205a; 
Yew 2012).40 More generally, because urban and industrial growth increasingly follows the “new 
district” model, localities have a greater need to work through, rather than around, the state 
hierarchy. To develop these huge zones, cities have to secure huge allotments of land and financing 
in short order. This often requires provincial or central support.  
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40 Higher-level support has been especially important since 2003, when the central government instituted stronger 
regulation of development zones, carrying out more stringent reviews of urban master plans and approval procedures, 
and eliminating many unauthorized zones. By late 2004, a new development zone oversight system that tracked the land 
area of different zones had been set up other MOLAR and other agencies (Yew 2012). 
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State-supported infrastructure and industry mega-projects 
A shift toward megaproject-driven development has also increased the importance of 
higher-level state actors in development. Just as urban growth in China has increasingly taken the 
form of huge, planned new districts, industrial and infrastructural development increasingly has 
consisted of megaprojects—huge, capital-intensive industrial campuses, and large-scale, state-of-the-
art urban infrastructure. Moreover, since 2000, there has been a dramatic acceleration in the 
development of highways and other regional infrastructure networks that connect cities and provide 
logistical support for urban development (Lin 2012). Central and provincial authorities play a large 
role in planning and building many forms of urban and regional transportation and utilities 
investment. And when it comes to the real estate and industry mega-projects local governments rely 
on to generate GDP growth and fiscal revenue and to anchor their new urban districts, higher-level 
actors play important supporting roles.  
 Central and provincial governments oversee the development of regional transportation and 
utilities infrastructure that spans multiple jurisdictions, including rail, highway, and water 
infrastructure projects. For inter-provincial infrastructure, relevant central ministries typically work 
with provincial governments, SOEs, and state banks to plan, finance, and build projects (Interview 
CS091205b; Vermeer 2004; Lin 2012).41 When it comes to highways, for example, Beijing and 
provincial governments work jointly to develop national expressways, while provinces take the lead 
in building and financing intra-provincial highways (Lin 2012).42 For major urban infrastructure 
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41 For transportation projects, agencies such as the NDRC, the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Transportation, the 
Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Finance are typically involved (Interview CS091205b; Lin 2012). 
42 According to Lin (2012), provincial governments must provide 35 percent of financing for subnational highways out 
of their own revenue streams. Since the 1990s, Beijing has set basic targets for highway development, but there has been 
little effective central regulation or oversight. In practice, provincial governments have done much of the organization of 
highway development and arrangement of financing. Since the 1997 Highway Law, a variety of funding sources for 
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projects such as subways and airports, central and provincial-level planning and administrative 
approval is necessary, and specific arrangements for financing and construction can take various 
forms.43 Localities compete to obtain central approvals for projects such as subways, which are 
granted selectively (Interview XA101206b). In the process of securing administrative approvals from 
Beijing for large projects, and the subsequent work of mobilizing financing and policy support from 
central ministries, provincial authorities often serve as key intermediaries between localities and the 
center (Interview XA021112b).  
Although ministries, banks, and provincial governments play a major role in infrastructure 
development, there is limited central coordination of these different actors. Lin (2012), for instance, 
notes severe “bureaucratic fragmentation” in China’s recent highway-building boom, with different 
state actors pursuing their own interests as much as following an overall scheme. Provincial 
governments in particular have exhibited “a short-term fiscal opportunistic calculus,” and Beijing 
has struggled to rein in the construction of highways and regulate management of roads (Ibid.).44 
 Direct or indirect support from higher-level actors is also important as localities work to 
attract and carry out industry and real estate megaprojects in their jurisdictions. While local 
governments serve as the front line for investment recruiting efforts, provincial leaders, like 
governors in the United States, may play a very active role in wooing investors for high-profile 
projects (Interview XA031202c; Cheung et al, eds. 1998). Beijing and provincial governments may 
use their influence to steer major foreign investment projects to favored locations, even when this 
runs contrary to the plans of investors themselves (Xu 2008). And central and provincial leaders may 
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highway development have been used, including commercial banks, international financial institutions, and local 
investment companies, in addition to central and local fiscal funds and policy bank loans.  
43 More generally, Vermeer (2004) explains, “The degree of involvement of provincial and local governments in project 
proposal and preparation, application for funds and implementation differs between sectors and regions, depending on 
existing planning and implementation procedures, the strength of local government organizations, and past experience.”  
44 Lin (2012) notes that “provincial governments have played a key intermediating role in the financing, construction, 
and redistributive aspects of highway and rural road expansions, for which they sought rewards in charging tolls 
irrespective of the legality and economic welfare consequences.” 
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instruct the SOEs and state investment companies they oversee to locate major industrial projects in 
favored locations (Interview NJ071205a). Finally, as mentioned above, it has become more difficult 
for local governments to find funding, land, and administrative clearances for projects not included 
in development plans approved by higher levels (Interview XA101203a), so central and provincial 
leaders can use the planning process to shape different localities’ investment prospects.  
   
Fiscal and financial institutions  
 Central and provincial fiscal and financial policies can also significantly influence patterns of 
urban and regional development. As rapidly growing cities have sought to expand public services, 
build up infrastructure and industry, and recruit outside investment, they have had an enormous 
appetite for funding. Administrative decentralization during the 1980s and 1990s left local sub-
provincial governments in China responsible for the lion’s share of social service provision and a 
growing portion of basic capital investment (Wong 2013, 275-82). At the same time, increased 
economic competition among localities from the early 1990s on has placed pressure on localities to 
improve local economic infrastructure and to offer an array of tax, export, and land subsidies (Tao 
2011, 33-35; Zweig 2002, 50-63). And with many municipal governments deeply involved in industry 
and real estate through local investment companies, local officials also seek large amounts of 
financing for business ventures (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012).  
Yet many local governments are chronically short on funding, both because their needs have 
grown so rapidly, and also because of the basic design of fiscal institutions. Recentralization of many 
types of fiscal revenue after 1994, along with central control over tax rates, has produced a drastic 
mismatch between local government expenditures and local fiscal income. China’s mid-1990s fiscal 
reforms sharply increased the central share of fiscal revenue and kept the provincial share roughly 
steady but gave little consideration to municipal- and county-level finances (Yang 2004, 74-79; Wong 
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2013, 283-287).45 Following the reforms, many local governments were left in fiscal distress, relying 
on transfers from higher government levels as well as local administrative fees, bank loans, and 
extra-budgetary resources such as land-leasing revenue to help finance local public services and 
investment (Wong 2002, 288-290). Over the past two decades, local fiscal revenue has grown rapidly 
along with urban and industrial expansion, but expenditures have also grown rapidly, and new 
challenges have arisen. Following efforts by Beijing to reduce the collection of administrative fees, 
localities have relied increasingly on land revenues and on bank loans and bond issuances. Much 
funding for capital investments, in particular, has been carried out through the local investment 
companies (LICs) that have proliferated across China since the late 1990s (Wong 2013, 300-303).  
But these new forms of municipal finance also suffer from sustainability problems. Land-
transfer revenues have generated enormous amounts of income for local governments, but rapid 
consumption of land resources and displacement of farmers has created major social and 
environmental problems, and local governments’ access to cheap land resources has declined 
significantly. Moreover, as localities have accumulated debt from bank lending, they have faced 
increasingly onerous debt-servicing burdens and thus needed to bring in additional investment and 
loans (Tao 2011; Interview BJ131301a). Thus, many localities have remained on a precarious fiscal 
footing, relying heavily on fast-paced land development, downward fiscal transfers, and the 
provision of inexpensive credit by state banks to cover shortfalls.  
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45 In 1994, China introduced a more centralized fiscal system. The central government took over collection of designated 
“central revenues,” while subnational governments’ revenue offices collected “local revenues” under central supervision. 
Provincial governments created vertical administration of local taxation bureaus to supervise and manage sub-provincial 
levels. There was further expansion of central tax collection capacity under the Tax Collection and Administration Law 
adopted in May 2001. And the central government announced in 2000 that granting of tax rebates was a central 
prerogative. The upshot of these fiscal reforms was to strengthen the central government’s oversight, and give it direct 
control over a much larger share of revenues (Yang 2004, 74-79; Wong 2012, 287-287). 
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Higher-level discretion and intergovernmental bargaining under the post-1994 fiscal regime 
 In a context where many city and county governments struggle to meet their financing needs, 
higher-level fiscal policies can significantly affect localities’ economic and social development 
prospects. Because of the lack of standardization of sub-provincial fiscal policies and of China’s 
fiscal transfer system, Beijing and provincial governments in practice have considerable discretion 
over the allocation of fiscal resources. As in the other policy areas discussed above, the possibility 
for adjustment in policies over time and for differentiated policy arrangements across space makes 
for intense intergovernmental bargaining in which political considerations loom large. Some basic 
features of the fiscal system privilege larger metropolitan centers, but perhaps most striking is how 
much scope the system leaves for central-provincial and provincial-local bargaining to shape the 
distribution of fiscal resources. 
Provinces have remained key units for fiscal policy and for decisions about the allocation of 
fiscal resources. While the 1994 fiscal recentralization and subsequent fiscal policy reforms instituted 
a more unified tax-collection system and stipulated how different revenue streams would be divided 
between Beijing and provincial governments, they did not clarify sub-provincial fiscal arrangements 
or fully standardize central-provincial (or sub-provincial) fiscal transfers. It falls to the provinces to 
determine how different types of fiscal revenue and expenditure will be split between the provincial 
level and different cities (Wong 2002, ii).46 The specific breakdown of revenue and expenditure 
sharing between provincial governments and the cities under them reflects provincial discretion and 
province-city negotiation (Interview SZ011307a). As such, there can be significant variation in 
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46 As Wong (2002) notes, despite a putative recentralization of China’s fiscal system, and “[…] although China has a 
unitary system of government, the inter-governmental fiscal arrangements give it a strong federalist character” ( ii). 
Alongside Beijing’s re-assertion of power, she notes, there was a “parallel centralizing trend” at the subnational level, 
with the provincial level growing stronger (ii-iii). Beijing’s decision to designate 15 major cities as deputy-provincial (fu 
shengji) cities has enabled these cities to retain more fiscal revenue and contract directly with the center (rather than going 
through the provincial level) (Chung 2010, 115-119).  
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province-city fiscal relations over time, across provinces, and even across cities within a given 
province (Wong 2002, 26-28).  
Such a system does not always promote greater fiscal equalization within provinces. Wong 
(2002) and others have noted greater disparities in public service provision levels across sub-
provincial units in the same province than across provinces. While fiscal policies in some provinces 
have promoted redistribution from wealthier to poorer districts, policies elsewhere have kept more 
resources in well-off areas. Provincial decisions about the downward allocation of fiscal transfers 
from Beijing are especially important in this regard. In many cases, such transfers end up bringing 
money back to a province’s wealthier localities (Wong 2002, ii-iii, 22-28; Zhou 2011, 205).47  
Fiscal transfers from Beijing to provincial governments have also become highly politicized 
in the absence of clear rules. Although Beijing collects most categories of tax revenue from each 
province at the same rate, there is limited standardization of the various “fiscal transfer payments” 
(zhuanyi zhifu) Beijing makes to redistribute resources to provinces—transfers which make up a large 
share of many provinces’ fiscal income. Only “ordinary” (yibanxing) fiscal transfers are distributed 
evenly among provinces; for other categories, such as “special project transfers” (zhuanxiang zhuanyi 
zhifu), the distribution of fiscal monies is less even and less progressive. Central fiscal subsidies to 
provinces may fluctuate considerably from year to year, with limited transparency in the decision-
making process. Such a system incentivizes provincial authorities to lobby the central government 
continually for larger transfer payments (Tang 2011, 87, 206-209). As with the allocation of land 
quotas, both central government priorities and provinces’ bargaining power may affect the ultimate 
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47 Zhou (2011) finds that provincial fiscal transfers are less likely to be associated with inter-locality equalization of fiscal 
spending than transfers done by Beijing, but also finds variation across provinces. Provinces such as Henan and Jiangsu 
evince some degree of intra-provincial redistribution, while provinces such as Hunan show a more regressive tendency 
in fiscal policy (193-194). Wong (2002) notes trends of worsening intra-provincial fiscal inequality in places such as 
Hunan and Jiangsu in the late 1990s (iii, 22).  
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distribution of transfers. Past research has noted, for instance, that provinces with more Communist 
Party Central Committee members are likely to get larger transfers (Fan 2011, 440, 454-456). 
 
The developmental symbiosis of state banks and subnational governments  
 Just as local governments have become highly dependent on fiscal transfers from higher 
levels of government to meet their public service obligations, they have come to rely heavily on 
lending from state-owned banks to support major capital investments. Since the late 1990s, 
municipalities across China have established various types of local investment corporations (LICs) as 
platforms for promoting, managing, and financing for infrastructure and industry development. 
Though under the de facto control of local governments, these entities exist in a regulatory gray area. 
They have been used to take out huge bank loans and to issue corporate bonds, thereby skirting 
Beijing’s ban on debt issuance by local governments.48 While LICs may raise some of their funds 
from foreign or private investors, they rely heavily state banks. Among the financial institutions that 
have lent to LICs, the China Development Bank (CDB), China’s flagship policy bank, has played a 
particularly important role—especially in inland provinces where the financial sector is less 
developed and market-oriented (Wong 2013, 300-303; Sanderson and Forsythe 2012; Interviews 
XA031202c; XA111206b). While lending from the CDB and other state banks has financed much of 
China’s urban build-up over the past decade, such lending has been done in an uncoordinated 
manner, with little central government oversight (Wong 2013, 301). Even following Beijing’s 
restructuring and recentralization of the banking sector in the late 1990s, it has been difficult for the 
central government to control the behavior of financial institutions such as the CDB.49  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 It is estimated that LICs took on three trillion yuan in debt in 2009 alone (Wong 2013, 300-303). 
49 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Beijing oversaw efforts to restructure and recentralize key state financial institutions, 
including China’s major commercial banks as well as policy banks such as the CDB (Yang 2004, 81-99).49 
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The CDB is emblematic of both the bureaucratic strength and the fragmented nature of 
China’s state financial sector. Though the CDB has very strong ties to China’s Party-state, it 
possessed a degree of institutional autonomy during the 2000s that enabled it to pursue its own 
organizational interests and support its preferred policy agenda. On the one hand, the CDB has 
enjoyed very high-profile leadership: in 1998, Chen Yuan, one of China’s leading “princelings” and 
an experienced financial official, was appointed governor of the Bank, bringing both strong political 
capital and an intense patriotic drive to his work.50 On the other hand, CDB enjoyed exceptional 
institutional power. Originally created in 1994, the Bank held ministerial-level status, and had the 
special prerogative of being able to raise capital by issuing long-term debt with de facto sovereign 
status (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012, 66-67).  
In 1998, around the time Chen joined the CDB, the Bank was restructured to function as a 
more self-sufficient enterprise (and less as a financial arm of the central government). As part of the 
reorganization, the CDB absorbed the regional branches of the erstwhile China Investment Bank 
(zhongguo touzi yinhang), giving it a presence in provincial capitals across the country. Chen and his 
leadership team were very activist, asserting CDB’s role as a leader in financing urban and regional 
infrastructure and strategic, large-scale industry. After studying the practices of international 
development banks, they broadened the Bank’s financial services and overhauled its planning and 
risk management approaches (Interview BJ121206a).51 An early and ardent champion of state-led 
urbanization, Chen from the late 1990s on carved out a distinctive niche for the CDB in financing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Chen Yuan is the son of Chen Yun. The elder Chen, a contemporary of Deng Xiaoping, was one of China’s foremost 
economic policymakers during the Maoist period and one of its most influential political figures during the early years of 
the reform era (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012, 39-50). 
51 Chen’s writings and public statements made clear his strongly statist development philosophy. In a 2004 publication, 
for instance, Chen argued for a model of “new-style industrialization” that stressed building indigenous knowledge- and 
capital-intensive industry instead of welcoming MNCs into China. Chen also strongly advocated the use of state-
supported urbanization as a growth driver. He argued, however, that urbanization must be based on the creation of 
large-scale industry clusters that could provide employment and an economic basis for urban growth (Chen 2004, 1-5, 18, 
123-124). 
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large-scale urban infrastructure. The CDB worked with subnational governments to set up LICs that 
could serve as fundraising and management platforms for urban modernization projects (Ibid.; 
Sanderson and Forsythe 2012).52 
 Since the late 1990s, the CDB has come to work closely with provincial governments, in a 
potent developmental symbiosis. Since the CDB’s restructuring in 1998, the Bank has been 
organized largely along provincial lines and has had strong institutional linkages with provincial 
governments. Most of the Bank’s regional branches are based in provincial capitals, and it is 
standard practice for branch officials to set up joint offices with host provincial governments, 
typically through provinces’ economic planning commissions (Interview BJ121206a). Beginning in 
the late 1990s, the CDB worked to arrange financial support for provincial leaders’ high-priority 
projects. Over time, cooperation between the CDB and host provincial governments deepened. 
After the early 2000s, CDB began to conduct more holistic evaluations of different provinces’ 
borrowing capacity, and worked with provincial governments as an equal partner to finance 
coordinated bundles of infrastructure and industry projects.53 And, from the late 2000s on, CDB 
further enhanced its partnership with provinces, shifting to an approach of working closely with 
provincial governments through both its regional branches and central office to formulate 
coordinated investment and financing plans for entire provinces or metropolitan areas. By closely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 The classic early example of this was the CDB’s cooperation with the city of Wuhu in Anhui to launch a major urban 
development initiative that included major industry and infrastructure projects (Interview BJ121206a; Sanderson and 
Forsythe 2012, 4-9). 
53 One example of this approach was the Bank’s engagement with Yunnan province from 2003 on to launch a major 
program of coordinated development fundraising and investment. In August 2003, Chen Yuan and Yunnan’s governor 
signed an agreement on development finance cooperation whereby the Bank would provide financing for several of 
Yunnan’s priority projects, including four railway lines, 13 highways, three airports, and power transmission capacity. In 
exchange, Yunnan promised that it would devote a considerable share of its fiscal income to servicing the debt it 
incurred (China Development Bank and People’s University 2007, 3-10). Another example of the scale of CDB’s 
engagement with provincial governments is the Bank’s support for transportation development in Hunan. According to 
2011 bond prospectuses, CDB had given out 73.1 billion yuan in loans to Hunan’s Provincial Expressway Construction 
Group (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012, 31). 
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linking regional development planning with financial planning, the CDB helped provinces improve 
the implementation prospects for their development strategies (Ibid.).  
The CDB is thus emblematic of both the great power and the disjointed character of China’s 
developmental state. The tight nexus between the CDB and provincial governments has empowered 
both sides, but may also make the central leadership uneasy. Cooperation with the CDB has 
bolstered provincial authorities by giving them the financial resources to carry out priority projects 
and broader development initiatives. At the same time, cooperation has benefited the CDB, giving it 
an important foothold in urban and regional planning and development finance across the country, 
and helping the CDB secure choice lending opportunities at a time of increasing competition among 
state financial institutions. It is less clear, however, whether the central government has appreciated 
CDB’s aggressive and somewhat autonomous engagement with subnational governments. Indeed, 
until the 2008 financial crisis created the need for an all-out stimulus response, Wen Jiabao was 
reportedly seeking to rein in the CDB and restructure it along the lines of a commercial bank 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2012, 74).  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
 To better understand how national-level policy factors influence metropolitan bias outcomes, 
this chapter has traced the historical evolution of central development policies and explored the 
workings of state institutions in four key policy areas. I have called attention to shifts over time in 
basic policies and institutions that may work in favor of larger cities, but also to continued efforts by 
Beijing to promote a dispersed form of urban development. Just as important, I have highlighted the 
fragmented character of urban and regional governance in China and, by extension, the importance 
of subnational variables and intergovernmental politics in shaping policy outcomes. 
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Since the turn of the century, national development policies in China have become more 
favorable to development in and around large urban centers. Central policymakers have given more 
rhetorical and material support to the development of extended metropolitan regions. Some central 
actors, such as the NDRC, have trumpeted the economic potential of big cities. Indeed, the type of 
state-led industrial and urban development the NDRC has promoted often privileges large urban 
areas, insofar as these locations have the infrastructure to support advanced economic activity and 
the ‘administrative capital’ to plan and manage large-scale projects (Fan 1995; Xu 2008).54  
Yet one should not overstate Beijing’s role in driving the shift toward a more metropolitan-
oriented development model. Debates and conflicts among central officials and policy intellectuals 
about what form of urban growth to pursue persisted through the 2000s and beyond. Many central 
policymakers have continued to call for developing smaller urban centers and better coordinating 
development between different regions and between city and countryside. Indeed, top national 
leaders such as Hu Jintao proved reluctant to embrace a development approach focused heavily on 
major cities. And some of the most ambitious initiatives to build up large metropolitan areas 
originated at the subnational level, gaining Beijing’s blessing after the fact. 
 Of course, it is the character of governance institutions as much as the official central line 
that shapes concrete policy outcomes. Across several key policy areas, China has seen a rebuilding of 
hierarchical governance institutions and a resurgent state role in development. Since the mid-1990s, 
the central government, state agencies, and provincial authorities have tried to assert more 
administrative authority and control over resources in realms such as regional planning, land-use, 
infrastructure investment, and public finance. Policymakers have justified stronger top-down 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Large cities – with their advantageous local conditions and greater political clout – have an easier time bringing these 
projects to their jurisdictions. Indeed, there is a perception among many policy observers in China that development 
policy institutions are systematically biased in favor of big cities in the allocation of resources (Interview BJ131301a). 
Especially with the growing importance in urban development of state banks and major real estate conglomerates, which 
are primarily interested in large-scale, politically secure development projects, cities’ size and political rank may affect 
their ability to secure financing and investment (Hsing 2010, 214; Interview XA111307c). 
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interventions as necessary for coordinating development across regions and sectors, and for dealing 
with the negative externalities of local economic competition and breakneck urban growth. 
Especially during the Hu-Wen period, national leaders have prioritized helping poor inland regions, 
rural areas, and industrial rustbelts. But higher-level state capacity in and of itself does not ensure 
that the national leadership’s priorities always win out in the policy process. 
In reality, it is hard to coordinate the making and implementation of development policies 
from the center. The fragmented nature of the central government – with stove-piped ministries and 
state agencies that compete for influence – limits Beijing’s ability to orchestrate policy initiatives. 
Being of a more manageable size and having strong executives, provinces are an easier scale at which 
administer urban and regional development. In practice, Beijing’s efforts to increase hierarchical 
oversight of development have reinforced the importance of provinces as governance units. As 
Mertha (2005) notes, recentralization of regulatory institutions has often stopped at the provincial 
level. Provinces have played a major role in staging the large-scale regional initiatives China has 
relied on to pursue spatial development goals since the late 1990s (Gu et al 2012b). And, in many 
cases, provincial authorities have been able to take the initiative in their dealings with a divided 
central state—in much the same way Sinha (2005) describes in the Indian case.55  
In the context of a strong but fragmented state, intergovernmental politics crucially shapes 
outcomes on the ground. Central ministries, agencies, and financial institutions have enormous 
resources at their disposal, and localities’ development prospects depend on extracting state 
resources and policy benefits. But to mount effective development strategies, policymakers must 
overcome inertia and political resistance and mobilize support across different government levels 
and agencies. Depending on which actors are able to take the lead in the policy process, outcomes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Because provincial governments can bargain separately with various ministries, and because ministries and state 
institutions are in many cases eager to have territorial platforms for their own policy agendas, provincial leaders may be 
able to drive policy-making processes and extract concessions from central actors (Sinha 2005).  
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may vary considerably. When provincial governments, the NDRC system, and other relatively elitist, 
growth-oriented actors have sway over policy planning and implementation, there is likely to be a 
stronger metropolitan slant to policies. When central actors that more strongly prioritize inclusive 
and sustainable development (i.e., top national leaders, the Construction system, the rural policy 
establishment) and non-metropolitan cities have greater influence over policymaking, there should 
be less metropolitan bias.  
Multiple factors may affect the balance of power among different government tiers and 
between pro-metropolitan interests and advocates of more balanced development. The relative 
influence of different actors in the policy process may vary with different economic circumstances, 
as particular policy imperatives come to the fore.56 Institutional legacies may matter: particular 
government tiers and state agencies have traditionally played a bigger development policy role in 
some provinces than others.57 And the balance of power may be shaped by more fluid political 
factors, such as the presence of particularly strong leaders at one level of government or another.58  
 In the following two chapters, I analyze the cases of Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi to explore 
how these kinds of subnational and intergovernmental variables have interacted with China’s 
national-level policy context to shape urban and regional development approaches. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 For example, the circumstances of the Global Financial Crisis worked to empower the CDB. The CDB was able to 
take advantage of its indispensable role in China’s economic stimulus efforts to expand its influence in regional 
development and to defend its organizational autonomy (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012, 72-75). 
57 For instance, according to one urban planning expert who has been involved in planning programs across China, the 
NDRC system tends to play a greater role in development planning in inland China than in certain coastal provinces, 
such as Jiangsu, where the Construction system has traditionally taken the lead in urban and regional planning work 
(Interview NJ011204b). Similarly, the CDB has stronger institutional roots and has played a more prominent role in 
development finance in China’s inland provinces than in coastal regions (Interview BJ121206a). 
58 There are many well-documented cases in which the presence of politically well-connected provincial leaders has been 
associated with greater ability to launch policy initiatives and extract central support. See, for instance, Yusuf and Wu 
(1997) on the role of provincial leaders in Guangdong’s ability to obtain special policies in the 1980s (116). 
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IV. Jiangsu: Shifting Tides of Development Policy in Eastern China  
 
 
Introduction  
To gain a clearer picture of how provincial-level economic and political conditions affect 
metropolitan bias outcomes, this chapter traces the evolution of spatial development policies in 
Jiangsu province between the late 1990s and 2010. Understanding how policymaking has unfolded 
in the Jiangsu case is important for a number of reasons. Jiangsu is a significant economic and 
political entity in its own right, with an official population close to Germany’s and a GDP similar to 
that of Turkey.1 As one of China’s leaders in economic growth, reform, and globalization, Jiangsu 
often has been studied to gain insights about the nature and direction of development across the 
country more broadly.2  
The case of Jiangsu is also important insofar as it offers a baseline for comparison with 
outcomes in other provinces.3 As discussed in Chapter 2, Jiangsu represents a case of intermediate 
metropolitan bias during the period of interest. Regardless of whether one uses Suzhou or Nanjing 
as the top city for calculations, the metropolitan concentration of investment was neither 
surprisingly high nor surprisingly low in light of past trends and basic economic-structural variables. 
That is, there is no prima facie evidence to suggest that development policies in Jiangsu either 
strongly favored top metropolitan centers or discriminated against them. Indeed, Jiangsu is a 
province where market forces as well as government interventions heavily influence growth patterns, 
and where local and foreign capital, along with state resources, drive investment.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jiangsu’s official population in 2010 was 78.7 million, while its GDP in 2010 was 4.14 trillion yuan. (China Data 
Online). 
2 See, for example, Luo and Shen (2008); Wei (2000); Zweig (2002).  
3 Hunan and Jiangxi, which I look at in the next chapter, are less-developed inland provinces and show more extreme 
metropolitan bias outcomes. 
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                    Figure 4.1: Map of Jiangsu province and major cities 
 
                    Source: Figure by author; Shape files obtained from China Historical GIS (www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis) 
Yet, there is much that remains uncertain about the case. It is unclear, for instance, how 
exactly to interpret Jiangsu’s moderate level of metropolitan bias in the decade from 2001 to 2010. 
The lack of an overall spatial bias in development could indicate that policy factors played little role 
in shaping the distribution of investment within Jiangsu, but could also mean that shifting policies 
have washed out one another’s effects over time. It is also unclear to what extent the sharp variation 
over time in the spatial distribution of investment and growth in Jiangsu was a product of targeted 
state interventions, as opposed to shifting market winds and more general policy shifts. By tracing 
variation in policies and development patterns over different periods, I hope to adjudicate among 
different ways of interpreting these outcomes.  
Over the course of the chapter, I advance three main claims. First, I show that even in one 
of China’s most developed and market-oriented provinces, higher-level policies had important 
consequences for the distribution of investment and for patterns of urban and regional growth. With 
policy approaches changing frequently, however, state interventions did not exert a consistent 
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influence on growth in Jiangsu. During the latter half of the 1990s, regional policies favored 
coordinated development of northern and southern Jiangsu, and the province kept in place a fairly 
conservative urban development policy. Whereas small and medium-sized cities in the prosperous 
south of the province grew rapidly, the largest urban centers saw relatively subdued growth during 
this period. After 2000, however, and especially between 2002-2005, policies in Jiangsu shifted to 
more strongly promote the development of top metropolitan centers and the urban-industrial belts 
around them. Under more favorable policies, Suzhou and Nanjing grew explosively in the early and 
mid-2000s. After 2006, however, development policies in Jiangsu shifted again, placing more 
emphasis on regional balance. State support was directed to coastal areas, while investment growth 
slowed in the largest urban centers. Although both Suzhou and Nanjing saw very fast growth overall 
between the late 1990s and 2010, neither city became dramatically more dominant in the provincial 
economy. Meanwhile, several other large- and medium-sized cities in Jiangsu also grew rapidly.  
 
       Table 4.2: City-level and province-level development outcomes in Jiangsu, 1996-2010 
City 
PROVINCE 
1996-
2010 
GDP 
growth
*,% 
1996-
2010 
share 
of prov. 
FAI, 
% 
 
 Per capita 
GDP, 
10,000 
yuan 
Per capita 
road area 
in urban 
districts, 
m2 per 
person 
Per capita 
fiscal 
expend., 
10,000 
yuan per 
person 
Per capita 
hospital 
capacity, 
beds per 
10,000 
people 
Per capita 
university 
enrollment, 
students/ 
10,000 
people 
Provincial 
rural per 
capita 
income, 
yuan 
Suzhou 
Nanjing 
(JIANGSU) 
 
 
15.4 
13.8 
(13.0) 
 
 
18.2 
15.0 
(100) 
1996 
 
1.75 
1.28 
(0.87) 
5.32 
5.07 
(7.37) 
0.05 
0.08 
(0.05) 
30 
39 
(23) 
45 
213 
(32) 
 
3,029.3 
2010 14.5 
8.11 
(5.55) 
24.45 
17.46 
(14.23) 
1.30 
0.86 
(0.66) 
58 
42 
(33) 
279 
1254 
(221) 
 
9,118.2 
 Sources: China Data Online; Jiangsu Statistical Bureau (various years); author’s calculations. *I calculate the compound annual growth rate. 
 
Second, I show that Jiangsu’s economic situation as a leader in development often undercut 
the policy rationale and political basis for focusing policy support and resources on leading urban 
areas. On the one hand, the province’s economic success softened the sense of crisis accompanying 
opening-up and structural reform. On the other hand, the lagging development of northern Jiangsu 
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and growing congestion in southern Jiangsu made spatial disparities in development as salient as 
concerns about outward economic competitiveness. Continual tension between the goals of 
efficiency and equity in development, and between different regional interests, contributed to 
frequent conflicts over and shifts in policy. As such, the relative priority attached to economic 
competitiveness and regional balance varied over time along with changing economic circumstances.  
Third, I argue that the degree of metropolitan bias has also varied over time with changes in 
provincial government strength. Despite its economic dynamism, Jiangsu is not a strong province in 
an institutional sense. The provincial government lacks firm control over economic resources or 
policymaking authority in a province that contains many economically powerful and politically well-
connected localities. And while Beijing’s close attention to Jiangsu brings policy benefits to the 
province it also limits the scope for bold provincial-level initiatives. However, during the tenures of 
stronger provincial leaders such as Li Yuanchao and Hui Liangyu, Jiangsu pursued more 
metropolitan-oriented policies.  
In what follows, I first provide background on key explanatory variables, describing Jiangsu’s 
situation as a leader in development but also a politically divided province. The main body of the 
chapter traces variation over time in Jiangsu’s urban and regional development approaches, focusing 
on changing policy treatment of the province’s most important urban centers—Suzhou and Nanjing. 
I describe and contrast the policies in place during three different five-year plan (FYP) periods, 
showing how provincial economic circumstances and political variables shaped policymaking and 
implementation at different moments. In the chapter’s conclusion, I consider alternative readings of 
Jiangsu’s development path and review the evidence consistent with my argument. 
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A leading region  
Jiangsu was among the provinces at the forefront of China’s development heading into the 
21st century. Bordering Shanghai and straddling the Yangtze River, Jiangsu is home to a long 
commercial and industrial tradition and encompasses several dynamic urban centers. Jiangsu’s rich 
factor endowments and advantageous geography enabled what had been an economic backwater 
under the planned economy to thrive after the launch of reform and opening. Jiangsu saw swift 
industrial growth from the 1980s on and a boom in its foreign economic activity after the early 
1990s. The province, like China more broadly, faced challenges of economic restructuring and 
industrial upgrading in the late 1990s, but it was better equipped than most to handle these 
difficulties. Indeed, many of Jiangsu’s quandaries and challenges – including how to coordinate 
urban and regional growth – were products of its rapid development. 
                       Table 4.3: Basic development indicators for Jiangsu circa 2000 
PROVINCE 
Top city 
 
2000  
pop-
ulation 
(mn) 
2000  
GDP 
(bn 
yuan) 
2000  
GDP per 
capita 
(yuan) 
2000 
urban-
ization 
rate (%) 
1990-2000 
provincial 
CAGR (%) 
(difference 
from natl. 
avg)** 
2000 
openness 
(FDI and 
exports 
share of 
GDP) 
(%) 
2000 top 
cities’ urban 
population* 
(mn) 
2000 top 
cities’  
GDP 
share  
JIANGSU 
(Suzhou) 
(Nanjing) 
73.3 855.4 11714 42.3 11.3 (1.2) 31.1  
2.46 
3.10 
 
0.18 
0.12 
Avg. of 20 
provinces  
55.1 410.5 7266 36.2 9.2 15.3 2.61 0.24 
     Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations. *This records non-agricultural population. **Compound annual growth rate.  
 
 Jiangsu has for several centuries been among China’s leading areas in terms of 
socioeconomic development, and despite mid-20th century setbacks, this legacy remains intact. For 
most of the past millennium, the greater Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region has remained China’s 
most important hub for industrial, commercial, and cultural activity4 (Zheng 2007, 117-118). With 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 After the Song and Yuan, Jiangsu was one of China’s most commercialized provinces. During the Qing, 
commercialized handicraft industries grew rapidly. Modern industry began to take root in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, and by 1949, Jiangsu had 3,000 enterprises with over 25 workers (Zheng 2007, 117-118). 
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the rapid growth of China’s treaty port economy in the late 19th and early 20th century, the YRD 
region – and especially Shanghai – also emerged as an important center for trade and foreign 
investment. Jiangsu’s modern economic and cultural development was closely linked with that of 
Shanghai, which until the 20th century was part of a prefecture in Jiangsu. Shanghai’s rapid economic 
rise and urban growth drew in many people and economic resources, and in turn helped propel 
social and economic modernization in nearby areas of Jiangsu. After 1928, Jiangsu, Shanghai (hived 
off from the province), and Zhejiang served as the political and economic base of Chiang Kaishek’s 
Nanjing-based Nationalist regime.  
 After suffering a heavy human and economic toll during the war years of the 1930s and 
1940s, Jiangsu found itself somewhat marginalized under the new Communist regime. The 
establishment of a planned economy geared toward heavy and defense industries did not bode well 
for a coastal province with a capitalist economy and ties to the old political order. Jiangsu received 
little large-scale industrial and infrastructure investment during the Maoist era5; only a few major 
cities, including Nanjing, Wuxi, and Xuzhou, became important centers in the state-owned economy 
(Wei 2000, 147-148). Suzhou, historically the most important economic and cultural center in the 
province, was largely bypassed in China’s efforts to build up a planned economy.  
Yet, decades of economic neglect and political turbulence did not negate Jiangsu’s underlying 
strengths—advantageous geography, agricultural fertility, and rich human capital. Prior to 1949, a 
capitalist economy had already taken root, and dynamic local industry in Jiangsu persisted through 
the Maoist period even as ownership forms changed (Zheng 2007, 119-124). Jiangsu’s agricultural 
bounty helped insulate it during the famine years at the end of the Great Leap. And during the 1960s 
and 1970s, rural communities in southern Jiangsu quietly nurtured local industry despite national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For example, Jiangsu did not receive any of the 156 key investment projects carried out under the PRC’s First (1953-
1957) Five-Year Plan, and was not an area of high emphasis during the following two decades (Wei 2000, 147-148). 
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campaigns emphasizing agriculture (Marton 1995). When economic policies shifted at the end of the 
Cultural Revolution period, these advantages helped Jiangsu develop quickly.6  
In the two decades between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, Jiangsu again emerged as an 
economic powerhouse as localities seized on the opportunities of reform and opening. National 
development policies became more favorable to coastal provinces during the mid-1970s (Wei 2000, 
151), and the increased emphasis on collective industry and start of rural reforms in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s enabled rapid growth in Jiangsu. During the 1980s, township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) engaged in processing and labor-intensive manufacturing boomed across the countryside of 
southeastern Jiangsu, stimulated by proximity to the markets of Shanghai and other major YRD 
cities. Large numbers of erstwhile farmers streamed into thriving local enterprises, “leaving the soil 
but not leaving the village” (li tu bu li xiang) (Ma and Fan 1994; Yao et al 2010, 254). The TVE boom 
allowed for rapid accumulation of wealth and the rise of local industrial and commercial networks 
around Suzhou and neighboring cities. 
Larger urban centers saw new opportunities, too. Under the central government’s Coastal 
Development strategy of the mid- and late 1980s, multiple cities in Jiangsu were singled out as sites 
for preferential reform and economic opening policies. 7 And after 1990, when Beijing approved the 
establishment of the Pudong New Area and Shanghai entered a period of dramatic growth and 
internationalization, large-scale export-oriented manufacturing and foreign direct investment in 
Jiangsu also took off. Jiangsu’s Party committee in August 1990 announced it would pursue a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Indeed, even during the 1960s and 1970s, commune-level rural industry development had proceeded quickly in Jiangsu, 
as local leaders had the latitude to invest surplus resources in local industry (Zheng 2007, 122-124). 
7 During the 1980s, Beijing began to promote the development of Jiangsu, and the broader YRD region, as a key center 
for trade and foreign investment. Between 1984-1985, the State Council conducted research and organized meetings in 
the area to promote new opening-up measures. In 1984, Beijing designated Nantong and Lianyungang as coastal open 
cities, and the following year Jiangsu was successful in securing this status for Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou as well 
(Zheng 2007, 128-129). Later in the decade, Beijing continued to emphasize the development of Jiangsu as a foreign-
oriented economy with visits to the YRD region by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1987 and 1988. Jiangsu’s 
leadership came under criticism for being insufficiently proactive in promoting opening up, which led to the province’s 
adoption of stronger policies to help its localities increase trade and foreign investment (Ibid., 142-148). 
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foreign-oriented economic strategy (Song 2011, 325-326), and, following Deng’s 1992 Southern 
Tour, provincial authorities endorsed the creation of new development zones by localities.8 
As local governments in southern Jiangsu set up development zones at a frenzied speed in 
the 1990s, manufacturing and foreign economic activity grew dramatically and urbanization 
accelerated (Song 2011, 332). During the 1990s, Jiangsu recorded a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 11 percent, ahead of the overall national rate of 10 percent (China Data Online; author’s 
calculations).9 Southern Jiangsu, including Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nanjing, and other urban 
areas, developed faster still. By the second half of the 1990s Suzhou – with several rapidly expanding 
development zones – had emerged as one of China’s key centers for foreign direct investment. 
 Economic success during the first two decades of the reform period made policymakers 
relatively confident about Jiangsu’s ability to compete in a more open economy. Besides achieving 
fast GDP growth during the 1980s and 1990s, Jiangsu was also a leader in economic reform and 
restructuring—aided by the fact that the province was less closely tied to the erstwhile planned 
economy than most. From the early 1990s on, cities in Jiangsu had actively pursued industrial reform 
and upgrading. Given the progress they had made by the end of the 1990s, policymakers in Jiangsu 
saw China’s plans for WTO accession as less of a threat and more of an opportunity than provincial 
officials in some provinces. 
If they were optimistic about Jiangsu’s overall economic outlook, however, policymakers 
were very concerned about the spatial unevenness of development by the mid-1990s. Devolution of 
administrative powers and resources to the city level had helped southern cities thrive, but the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In 1992, the provincial leadership endorsed the Kunshan model of “building the nest to attract the phoenix” (Song 
2011, 325-326). Kunshan, a county-level city under Suzhou that directly borders Shanghai, had gone out on a limb, 
establishing its own development zone, and then seeking funding and lobbying for provincial and central-level 
recognition. Jiangsu Party secretary Shen Daren in July 1992 signaled his support for this approach (Ibid., 325-326). 
Though central or provincial actors would often provide recognition and policy support for development zones, local 
governments took the lead in building and managing the spaces. 
9 During the first half of the 1990s, Jiangsu’s economy grew at roughly 14 percent per year, more than two percentage 
points faster than China’s economy as a whole (China Data Online; author’s calculations).   
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prefectures of central and northern Jiangsu, poorer to begin with, had lagged even further behind 
during the 1980s and early 1990s (Zhao 2009, 24). These spatial disparities posed a variety of risks. 
Beyond basic problems of slow economic development, limited employment, and stubborn rural 
poverty in northern Jiangsu, policymakers worried about over-concentration of people in southern 
cities and resulting strains on public services and social stability (Wei and Fan 2000; Interview 
NJ071205a). Southern Jiangsu’s economic boom during the 1990s attracted large numbers of 
migrants from the north and from outside the province. Rising congestion placed a heavy burden on 
the urban infrastructure and public service capacity of the south, as well as a severe strain on its 
natural resources and ecology (Interview NJ081205a). Uneven development also placed centripetal 
pressures on Jiangsu as a political unit. As Shen Liren, an economist at the Provincial Academy of 
Social Sciences noted in a 2003 newspaper interview, the severity of Jiangsu’s north-south divide 
even led some to discuss the possibility of breaking up or reorganizing the province administratively 
(Jingji guancha bao 7/28/2003).  
 While regional disparities made it harder to justify focusing policy attention and support on 
the province’s top cities (Interview NJ021204a), provincial authorities still had important reasons to 
prioritize metropolitan development. Although Jiangsu’s performance in the 1980s and 1990s 
compared well with that of China as a whole, the province faced real economic competition from 
rival coastal heavyweights such as Guangdong and from neighboring Shanghai and Zhejiang. 
Jiangsu’s top cities lacked the industrial strength and urban amenities of cities like Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen—let alone Shanghai.10 Breaking out of Shanghai’s shadow and increasing Jiangsu’s long-
term economic competitiveness would require grooming more advanced industries and bigger cities 
with better amenities. Jiangsu’s goal of strengthening its role as a key base for foreign trade and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Several provinces, including Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang, grew more quickly than Jiangsu in the 1990s (China 
Data Online; author’s calculations).  
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investment and upgrading its economy out of labor- and resource-intensive export-processing 
industries and low-end manufacturing made the strength of metropolitan regions especially 
important. The problem of enhancing outward competitiveness loomed especially large at the turn 
of the century, as Jiangsu worked to recover from the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis and 
prepared for the opportunities and challenges of WTO accession. 
 
Limited provincial government strength 
 In addition to its economic circumstances, Jiangsu’s limited administrative strength and 
political cohesion reduced the potential for spatial bias in development policies. It is more difficult 
in the first place for government actors to shape the distribution of resources in economically open 
and market-oriented provinces such as Jiangsu than in more closed, state-dominated provinces.11 
But the political constraints on policymaking in Jiangsu arguably were as great as the structural ones. 
As of the late 1990s, Jiangsu’s provincial establishment was relatively weak, with limited resources 
and administrative capacity of its own. Provincial authorities lacked much bargaining power vis-à-vis 
wealthy, administratively strong cities. The central government closely watched and frequently 
involved itself in the affairs of Jiangsu and the wider YRD region. At the same time, Jiangsu’s 
fragmented geography and the lack of a common political identity also made it hard to justify 
concentrating policy support and resources narrowly in space. Despite these institutional weaknesses, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Jiangsu’s relatively high levels of economic openness and marketization limit the potential for higher-level state actors 
to guide industrial and spatial development. With high mobility of production factors across localities, and private, local, 
and foreign capital playing an important role in supporting investment (Wei and Fan 2000), provincial and central state 
actors have less influence over the spatial or sectoral configuration of development in Jiangsu than in some provinces. 
Exports and foreign investment amounted to 31 percent of Jiangsu’s provincial GDP in 2000, making the province one 
of China’s most open (China Data Online and author’s calculation). The province also has a stronger market orientation 
than many regions of China: Fan et al (2001) ranked Jiangsu above all but Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian in terms of 
“marketization.” State-owned enterprises and central planning never played as large a role in Jiangsu’s economy as in 
some provinces, and there was further “state disarticulation” after the 1980s with the advance of local and market actors 
(Naughton 1995; Lin 1999). Even in Jiangsu, however, state actors at different levels intervene extensively in 
development, and investment and the operation of factor markets are heavily subject to administrative interventions.  
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however, the presence of stronger leaders in the early 2000s would galvanize the provincial 
establishment, making possible more aggressive efforts to promote metropolitan development. 
On the one hand, the provincial level in Jiangsu has limited institutional capacity. Describing 
1990s Jiangsu, Jacobs (1999) notes that, “although Jiangsu clearly ranks as an important province, 
paradoxically the province itself appears weak,” while “leadership at the sub-provincial level seems 
more relevant” (139-140). According to Wei (2000), meanwhile, Jiangsu is “relatively weak in 
adjusting investment allocation across sectors and regions” (173-177).  The administrative weakness 
of the provincial level in Jiangsu relates in part to fiscal arrangements. With Jiangsu as a whole 
transferring a large amount of revenue to the central government and wealthy areas in the province 
retaining much revenue locally, the provincial level often has been squeezed fiscally (Zheng 2007, 
126-127). Indeed, compared with other provinces, fiscal resources in Jiangsu were highly 
concentrated at the municipal level in the late 1990s (Ibid., 139-140; Wong 2002, 25). Jiangsu 
contains several cities – Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuxi, and Changzhou, among others – that have dynamic 
local economies, strong fiscal bases, and deeply entrenched local bureaucratic establishments. 
Because provincial authorities rely on the fiscal strength and administrative capacity of key cities to 
achieve Jiangsu’s broader development goals, these cities enjoy special  “speaking rights” (fayan quan) 
in provincial affairs (Jacobs 1999, 118; Interview NJ031204a).  
The relative weakness of the provincial government and strength of cities in Jiangsu is in 
part a legacy of governance arrangements during the first 15 years of the reform period. In its efforts 
to stimulate local governments’ enthusiasm for economic growth and reform during the 1980s, 
Jiangsu took many steps that administratively empowered localities. The province devolved many 
enterprise management functions to lower-level governments, allowed more retention of fiscal 
revenue and cultivation of extra-budgetary revenue at the local level, reduced the number of 
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mandatory planning targets, and expanded cities’ foreign economic policy powers.12 Jiangsu’s early 
adoption in 1983 of a “city manages county” (shi guan xian) policy throughout the province, and 
promotion of horizontal market links among localities inside and outside the province, also 
expanded the economic governance role of municipal governments (Wei 2000, 151, 169-174; Zheng 
2007, 26-127, 142-148, 159-161). The rise of locally managed development zones in the early 1990s 
further strengthened city governments’ economic powers (Zweig 2002, 82-86).13  
 Provincial policymaking autonomy was also constrained by central state oversight of and 
intervention in Jiangsu’s affairs. For centuries, the YRD region has had close links to central 
authorities and high levels of state penetration. Both historically and in the post-1949 period, Jiangsu 
has shouldered an outsize piece of China’s fiscal burden (Whitney 1970).14 During the reform era, 
Beijing has maintained close political and economic ties with the YRD region, supporting the region 
but also placing high demands on it. Beijing has collected large amounts of fiscal revenue from the 
Jiangsu, flexing political muscle when necessary to ensure contribution of a large share of its 
resources.15 During the early years of the reform period, Jiangsu’s rates of revenue remittance 
remained among the highest in the country (Zheng 2007, 117-118).16 At the same time, the central 
government has worked in recent decades to promote the development and economic integration of 
Jiangsu and the greater YRD region (Li 1997; Sheng 2007; Interview NJ081205a). Beijing has 
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12 Some legacies are older. Since the 1950s, Jiangsu has had an industrial management system that gave municipal and 
county governments a larger role in industrial management than in many places (Zheng 2007, 126-127). 
13 The provincial government’s support during the 1980s and early 1990s of development and opening-up in county-
level cities such as Zhangjiagang and Kunshan (both of which belonged to the larger Suzhou municipality) are 
emblematic of the promotion of smaller urban centers and of the devolution of many economic policy powers to 
subprovincial governments in Jiangsu (Zweig 2002, 82-86).  
14 During the Maoist period, Jiangsu was consistently a large net contributor of fiscal revenue to Beijing: between 1949-
1985, the province contributed nearly 60 percent of the revenue it collected to central coffers (Zheng 2007, 117-118). 
15 Disagreements between Jiangsu’s leaders and the central government over fiscal recentralization policies were 
reportedly the reason for Party secretary Shen Daren’s being forced from office in October 1993 (Yang 1997, 103). 
16 While Jiangsu’s total fiscal revenue during the 1980s was similar to that of Guangdong, the former contributed four 
times as much to Beijing as the latter (Zheng 2007, 117-118). 
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invested heavily in the area, and extended many preferential policies to Shanghai, Jiangsu, and 
Zhejiang. Though Jiangsu certainly has enjoyed economic benefits from central state preferential 
policies and central investment in the cities of southern Jiangsu, Beijing’s close attention to the area 
and efforts to coordinate its development limit Jiangsu’s policymaking autonomy.  
There is also a more political side to the intergovernmental power balance in Jiangsu. 
Jiangsu’s lack of cohesion and common identity as an economic, cultural, and political unit militates 
against provincial-level policy initiatives. Although few provinces in China line up neatly with 
economic or cultural regions,17 Jiangsu’s geography is especially fragmented. In addition to the 
geographic differences and economic-structural disparities that divide the north, central, and south 
parts of the province, cultural and linguistic cleavages run through Jiangsu. Different urban centers 
in Jiangsu are oriented toward different economic regions, many of them cross-provincial, and local 
identities often outweigh provincial attachments. Suzhou and the neighboring cities of Wuxi and 
Changzhou belong to the Wu cultural region and Shanghai economic orbit. They identify strongly 
with the YRD’s tradition as a national center of high culture, commerce, and industry. Though less 
important than Nanjing as a political center, Suzhou historically was a more important economic 
hub, and served for much of the Qing Dynasty as Jiangsu’s capital (Jacobs 1999, 114, 141). Despite 
its status as Jiangsu’s contemporary provincial capital and largest city by core urban population, 
Nanjing is hardly the undisputed economic or cultural center of the province (Interview NJ071205a). 
Meanwhile, heavily rural northern Jiangsu has little in common with the south economically or 
culturally: it more closely resembles neighboring areas across the border in Anhui and Shandong. 
Such sharp regional differences make it difficult to define, justify, and implement a development 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 For the classic discussion of the mismatch between administrative, economic, and natural geography in China, see 
Skinner (1977). 
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agenda for Jiangsu as a whole, and have given rise to much debate over possible administrative 
reorganization of the province (Jingji guancha bao 7/28/2003).18 
At the same time, Jiangsu’s municipalities are strong political actors in their own right. One 
important indicator of the strength of local governments in Jiangsu is the fact that multiple city 
leaders hold positions on Jiangsu’s Communist Party standing committee. While in many provinces 
only the Party secretary of the provincial capital holds a standing committee seat, it has been typical 
in recent years for Nanjing, Suzhou, and Wuxi each to hold a seat in Jiangsu’s top political body 
(Interview NJ021204b; China Directory 2001, 2006). The presence of municipal leaders in this body 
means that sub-provincial voices have influence and leverage at the highest levels of provincial 
policymaking—and that provincial decision-making is not insulated from local interests.19 Provincial 
policymakers are hesitant to intervene in local affairs because there are local interests that may not 
only resist policies at the implementation stage but also push back politically (Interview NJ071205a). 
The strength of Jiangsu’s major cities also creates anxiety about the province’s ability to 
control key parts of its territory. Special administrative arrangements give Suzhou and Nanjing – not 
to mention some other cities – a higher measure of economic or fiscal policy autonomy than 
ordinary prefectural-level cities.20 Suzhou’s close links to Shanghai, and its limited identification with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For example, rumors circulated in early 2003 about the possibility of splitting Jiangsu up by elevating Nanjing special 
municipality status, designating a new provincial capital, and transferring Kunshan to Shanghai. An official from China’s 
Ministry of Civil Affairs acknowledged that such changes might be necessary (Jingji guancha bao 2003/7/28). 
19 Beyond this, different localities from across the province, from Suzhou to cities of northern Jiangsu, have been well 
represented among the ranks of provincial government officials, giving city governments backchannels for exerting 
pressure and extracting policy concessions (Interview NJ031204a; Jacobs 1999, 142-143). The institutional power and 
connections Jiangsu’s cities enjoy emboldens them in policymaking. One central government researcher who has been 
involved in many regional planning efforts likened Jiangsu’s major cities to grown-up children who do not listen carefully 
to their provincial parents (Interview BJ061307b). Furthermore, biographical ties of several current and former central 
Party leaders to cities in Jiangsu are sometimes seen as enhancing the political clout of localities in the province. Central 
Jiangsu was the birthplace of such senior Party leaders as Zhou Enlai, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao (China Vitae). 
20 Cities such as Suzhou, Wuxi, and Nanjing that have direct links to and obtain policy benefits from the central 
government can gain greater developmental autonomy, as they are more self-sufficient in terms of resources and policy 
privileges (Interviews NJ021204b; NJ031204a). In the case of Suzhou and Nanjing, special administrative arrangements 
and close ties to the central government further augment municipal policymaking autonomy. In the 1990s, Beijing 
granted the Suzhou Industrial Park project-approval and foreign economic powers that exceeded even those of 
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the rest of the province, has made the provincial government wary of Suzhou’s aspirations for 
greater administrative autonomy (Interview SZ011307a).21 Jiangsu’s control over Suzhou is also 
hampered by the fact that local government officials in Suzhou have political ties outside the 
province and relatively little regard for the provincial government (Interview SZ031307a).22 Though 
it is easier for the provincial government to supervise and maintain influence over Nanjing, Jiangsu’s 
grip there is also somewhat tenuous, given the provincial capital’s geography, history, and deputy-
provincial administrative status (Ye 2011, 109; Jingji guancha bao 7/28/2003). 23 With limited control 
over top cities, it is hard to orchestrate major policy initiatives, and provincial leaders may be 
hesitant to concentrate too much investment in places that could break away. 
If the provincial government in Jiangsu is weak in an institutional sense, provincial-level 
strength in a multilevel policy process also depends on the political capital and dynamism of top 
provincial leaders. The presence of politically well-connected and well-traveled top leaders in Jiangsu 
during the early and mid-2000s enhanced the provincial level’s capacity for action. In particular, the 
appointment in 2002 of Li Yuanchao as provincial Party secretary put in place a rising star with the 
political capital and ambition to launch bold policy initiatives and mobilize state resources behind 
these programs. During other periods, however, the provincial establishment lacked such high-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
provinces. The municipal officials in charge of zone management had urban planning autonomy, project approval 
powers, and could approve use of large parcels of land (Interview SZ031307a). Meanwhile, Nanjing’s deputy-provincial 
status gives the municipal government considerable economic policymaking autonomy and enables it to liaise directly 
with Beijing in some matters. 
21 The fact that Shanghai historically has annexed counties from Suzhou and continues to covet parts of Suzhou’s 
territory, makes provincial authorities defensive about Suzhou and anxious about giving it greater autonomy. In the 
words of a former government researcher from Suzhou, the city is like “a piece of fatty meat” (yi pian fei rou) coveted by 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, and municipal authorities alike (Interview SZ011307a). 
22 Jiangsu’s control over Suzhou is also hampered by the fact that many local government officials in Suzhou have strong 
outside ties and little regard for, or desire to go work in, the provincial government (Interview SZ031307a). According to 
one urban planner from Suzhou, Suzhou cadres pride themselves on the city’s high all-around level of development and 
its privileged ties to the central government and global economy. Many prefer the idea of remaining in Suzhou to the 
prospect of working for the provincial government (Interview SZ031307a). 
23 Nanjing historically has had close ties to China’s central state, and, after serving as the capital of Chiang Kaishek’s 
Nationalist regime, the province briefly held central municipality rank after the founding of the PRC. Though Nanjing 
has been Jiangsu’s capital since 1953, its location in the southwest of the province and economic and cultural links to 
neighboring parts of Anhui province make for an awkward administrative situation (Ye 2011, 109). 
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profile leaders. Chen Huanyou, who served as Party secretary in the late 1990s, and Liang Baohua, 
who held the post in the late 2000s, had less political clout with which to advance provincial-level 
development interests. Having advanced their careers within Jiangsu, neither appeared to possess 
strong outside political ties like Li’s. Both, moreover, were nearing retirement age at the time of their 
appointments. 
 
Dispersing development, 1996-2000  
The bottom-up economic development and decentralized governance arrangements that 
emerged in Jiangsu during the 1980s and early 1990s produced lasting dynamism but also major 
governance challenges. Accumulating problems from Jiangsu’s development model and the 
appearance of new economic challenges on the horizon triggered new efforts by policymakers to 
rebalance and restructure the provincial economy. From the mid-1990s on, the provincial 
government adopted new measures to address the worsening north-south development gap, and 
Jiangsu began to promote large-scale, capital-intensive industry. Under a relatively low-profile and 
cautious provincial leadership team, however, the province continued to limit emphasis on large 
central cities in development through the end of the 1990s—even as other coastal provinces were 
adopting more metropolitan-oriented policies. As the decade neared its end, however, development 
bottlenecks and an economic slowdown associated with the Asian Financial Crisis led policy elites in 
Jiangsu to rethink development policies. Following a leadership change in 2000, Jiangsu began to 
place more emphasis on the agenda of urban competitiveness. 
 
Coordinated regional development in the mid and late 1990s 
Though Jiangsu continued to grow rapidly in the mid-1990s, the problems of its bottom-up 
development model had become clear. Decentralized governance and policy support for the TVE 
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economy had helped southern cities generate rapid growth, transfer large amounts of labor out of 
agriculture, and accumulate wealth, know-how, and market infrastructure. But regional disparities 
between southern and northern Jiangsu had grown stark, and overheated development in the south 
was creating problems. Amid these changing circumstances, provincial elites began to question 
status quo urban and regional policies.  
Since the early 1980s, Jiangsu had exemplified China’s national urban strategy of promoting 
development in smaller cities while controlling the growth of large centers. Provincial policies had 
contributed to dispersal of economic activity and people across towns and smaller cities, while larger 
cities had received less support and grown more slowly (Tian 2011, 483).24 By the mid-1990s, 
however, dispersed industrial and urban development was coming to be viewed as an inefficient use 
of land and infrastructure, and prospects for further expansion of the TVE sector looked dim given 
intense competition in low-end industrial sectors. On the other hand, with China’s economy rapidly 
opening up there were new opportunities for knowledge- and capital-intensive industry. Some policy 
experts began to call for the build-up of larger cities that would economize on social overhead and 
achieve the necessary market scale and infrastructure for advanced industry. 
But other policy priorities were also coming to the fore. With Beijing shifting course under 
the Ninth (1996-2000) FYP to lay greater stress on “coordinated regional development,” there was 
mounting pressure on provincial policymakers to address disparities within Jiangsu. Although the 
provincial government had long provided development aid to northern cities, regional policy had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 There was debate over the proper urbanization model in Jiangsu during the 1980s, but the small city and township 
‘dispersed’ urbanization approach advocated by Fei Xiaotong and others prevailed for many years (Marton 1995). 
Because of its widely publicized success at shifting large amounts of surplus labor out of agricultural into productive 
employment, and facilitating rapid capital accumulation while minimizing disruptions to the preexisting social fabric, the 
development path taken in southern Jiangsu became an important template for regional and urban development more 
broadly. As one provincial policy expert explained looking back, “[…] the method of using township and village 
enterprises as the driving force, putting township and village urbanization in the leading role, and taking vigorous 
development of small towns and small cities as the emphasis has evolved into the ‘standard’ Chinese-style urbanization 
path” (Tian 2011, 502). 
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remained fairly limited in scope through the early 1990s. Decentralized governance and industrial 
policies had implicitly helped southern Jiangsu. 
In Jiangsu, at least, the coordinated regional development agenda prevailed during the late 
1990s. Indeed, the leaders in charge of Jiangsu during the mid- and late 1990s were not the type to 
step too far out of line with central government priorities. Chen Huanyou had served as provincial 
Party secretary since 1993 and by the late 1990s was nearing the age of mandatory retirement.25 
Originally appointed as Party secretary after Shen Daren was removed from the position for 
resisting Beijing’s fiscal recentralization efforts, Chen was perceived as someone deferential to the 
center’s wishes (Chung 1995). Chen had previously served as governor and held other high offices in 
the province, but he had very little career experience outside of Jiangsu (Liu 2014; China Vitae; 
baike.baidu.com). Although Zheng Silin, who served as Jiangsu’s governor between 1995 and 1998, 
was younger than Chen and brought more out-of-province experience, he too lacked the résumé of 
a rising star.26  
Under Chen, Jiangsu undertook stronger efforts to support development in lagging parts of 
the province while keeping in place status quo urban policies. In 1994, Jiangsu had launched a “joint 
regional development” (quyu gongtong fazhan) strategy aimed at addressing the growing income and 
openness gap between the north and south of the province. Over the following years, the provincial 
government took several concrete steps to support this agenda, promoting development along the 
Longhai railway corridor between Xuzhou and Lianyungang, unveiling a “maritime eastern Jiangsu” 
(haishang sudong) strategy, and launching a program to fight poverty in the Huaibei region. During the 
late 1990s, the provincial government also increased the share of major investment projects and 
fiscal spending going to the north, and worked to develop stronger cooperation between northern 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In fact, Chen was China’s oldest provincial leader when he left the post in early 2000 at age 66 (Liu 2014). 
26 Fifty-five years old when appointed governor in Jiangsu, Zheng was of average age. Previously, he had worked on 
economic and trade policy issues in Shaanxi and Liaoning (China Vitae; baike.baidu.com). 
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and southern areas of the province in cadre development and other realms (Jiangsu Yearbook 
Commission 1996, 18-26; Zhao 2009, 23, 240-241; 267; Interview NJ071205a).27 At the same time, 
Jiangsu used administrative adjustments to promote development in the north, elevating Taizhou 
and Suqian to prefectural-level-city status (Ren and Liu 2008, 66). Enjoying provincial support, Subei 
saw faster growth: its 11.8 percent annual GDP growth rate between 1996-2000 exceeded that of 
Jiangsu as a whole (Song et al 2005, 321-323).  
Meanwhile, Jiangsu’s leaders made major changes in urban policy during the late 1990s. 
Whereas development policies in some provinces had become more focused on building up core 
metropolitan centers, Jiangsu continued pursuing small-city based urban development and placed 
less emphasis on metropolitan development. In 1997, Jiangsu’s Provincial Party Congress outlined 
plans for structural adjustment and upgrading, faster tertiary-sector growth, ownership reforms, and 
major infrastructure improvements, but big urban centers still faced serious development constraints 
(Song 2011, 326-328). Lacking adequate urban infrastructure and burdened by the task of reforming 
state-owned enterprises, central city areas of Suzhou, Nanjing, and Wuxi continued to grow more 
slowly than smaller cities (Tian 2011, 484). Suzhou as a whole enjoyed rapid growth between 1996-
2000, and was second only to Shanghai in the amount of FDI recorded during this period (Song et 
al 2005, 305). And, following the creation of the Suzhou Industrial Park and the Suzhou High and 
New Technology Development Zone (HTDZ), Suzhou’s central-city area expanded more quickly. 
But core urban districts still accounted for a minority of the city’s economic output, while sub-
centers such as Kunshan and Zhangjiagang (which were home to labor-intensive manufacturing and 
port-facing industries) generated much of Suzhou’s economic growth (Interview NJ111307a). 
Nanjing’s economic development, too, lagged behind growth of smaller cities in the southeast until 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 In 1998, the province adopted the strategy of “fight a hard war for five years, win a decisive victory in Subei,” using 
major infrastructure projects, such as highway, bridge, and power plant construction to promote development 
breakthroughs in the north (Song et al 2005, 321-323). 
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the end of the 1990s. Transportation infrastructure and urban amenities remained spotty in Nanjing, 
and the central city faced serious traffic congestion problems (Song 2011, 249-251).28  
 
Jiangsu’s increasing embrace of big city-centered development 
After 1998, fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis and the looming prospect of China’s 
WTO accession made concerns over economic competitiveness increasingly salient in Jiangsu. By 
disrupting export markets, foreign investment, and bank lending across Asia, the Crisis threatened 
the economic lifeblood of outward-oriented provinces like Jiangsu. Although capital controls 
insulated China’s economy from financial spillovers and central stimulus measures helped to combat 
a severe slowdown, Jiangsu saw its run of rapid development come to an end. Jiangsu’s growth rate 
dropped off sharply between 1997 and 1999, and its economy ceased to dramatically outperform the 
country as a whole as it had done in years prior.29 At the same time, breakthroughs in China’s WTO 
accession negotiations during the late 1990s paved the way for faster liberalization. Accession to the 
WTO, planned for 2001, would bring improved access to export markets and foreign capital and 
expertise, but would also mean more intense domestic and international competition. To safeguard 
Jiangsu’s position as an economic leader amid these shocks and changes, policy elites called for 
stronger efforts to upgrade industry and improve the province’s business environment. 
Shifting economic concerns had important implications for urban and regional policy. As 
policymakers in Jiangsu – and across China more broadly – confronted a slowdown of the foreign 
economic sector, they saw accelerated investment in urban infrastructure, real estate, and capital-
intensive industry as an important means of maintaining high levels of economic demand and output 
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28 The city’s leadership had begun outlining plans for major infrastructure development and urban beautification, but 
despite work on a ring road, a new airport, and a second Yangtze river bridge during the mid- and late-1990s, financing 
problems and other resource bottlenecks continued to hinder urban development during this period (Ye Nanke 2011, 
146-147). 
29 Between 1997-1999, Jiangsu’s economy grew at an annual rate of roughly 8 percent, substantially slower than in 
previous years, and only slightly faster than the country as a whole (China Data Online; author’s calculations). 
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(Interview NJ071205a). Moreover, from the standpoint of policymakers trying to build up advanced 
manufacturing and technology industries, the smaller cities and towns that had anchored the TVE 
economy appeared seriously lacking in terms of infrastructure, market scale, and institutional quality. 
While Jiangsu’s small-city urbanization model had worked well as a transitional approach, large, 
diversified urban areas with more advanced amenities were necessary to ensure local competitiveness 
as China entered the WTO (Tian 2011, 484, 502-519; Interview NJ071205a).30 One provincial expert, 
Tian Boping, lamented the low “modernization” level of Jiangsu’s cities in terms of urban 
infrastructure, expressing concern over the fact that Nanjing ranked only 10th out of the 13 very 
large cities in China across most economic indicators (Tian 2011, 484). At the same time, policy 
elites increasingly came to see development of large cities as crucial for achieving economic 
restructuring and boosting economic efficiency more generally.31  
While some policy experts in Jiangsu defended status quo urban policies and expressed 
concerns about deviating from the central line,32 advocates of faster urbanization grew more 
numerous by the late 1990s. City-level actors in Jiangsu, in particular, were quick to adjust their 
development approaches in line with changing economic imperatives. Suzhou and neighboring cities 
in southern Jiangsu quickly built up high-end development zones to attract investment from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Tian advocated building up three metropolitan circles, with particular emphasis on the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou 
region and the Nanjing metropolitan area (Tian 2011, 502-519). As Tian noted in an article written during these years, 
“Carrying out the strategy of great expansion of urbanization, further spurring along Jiangsu’s economic and social 
development and accelerating Jiangsu’s modernization process by comprehensively pushing forward urban 
modernization, is good for increasing the international competitiveness of Jiangsu as a whole, resisting the impact force 
of the international market, and reducing the turbulence of WTO accession” (Tian 2011, 509).  
31 For example, Fan Chaoli, a prominent provincial expert, argued that a big city-centered urbanization model could 
enhance development of the tertiary sector, advanced industry, and outward-oriented sectors. Fan expressed concern 
that Jiangsu’s urbanization was lagging behind that of Shandong and Zhejiang, where officials had adopted a “big-city 
urbanization” strategy between 1998 and 1999 (Fan 2010, 16-23). 
32 One expert who called for adhering more closely to the central line on urban policy and maintaining Jiangsu’s 
traditional emphasis on town and small-city development was Shen Liren. In a piece written at the turn of the century, 
Shen noted that the fifth plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee had called for a small city-based 
urbanization approach while discussing plans for China’s national 10th Five-Year Plan, and advocated conforming to this 
approach (Shen 2010, 166-169). 
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American, European, and Japanese firms (Ren and Liu 2008, 24-26, 133-135). Provincial-level policy 
elites, too, moved to embrace a big-city centered development paradigm. 
The arrival of a new leadership team in Jiangsu at the end of the decade created the political 
opportunity for a change of direction in development policies. Hui Liangyu, appointed Party 
secretary in 2000, was a decade younger than the man he replaced and brought far-ranging 
experience in provincial leadership.33 Under Hui and governor Ji Yunshi, who had been appointed in 
1998, Jiangsu adopted a more competitiveness-oriented approach to economic and urban 
development. While the provincial government continued to put rhetorical stress on northern 
Jiangsu’s development, there was less policy support in practice. And, whereas Jiangsu’s Ninth FYP 
agenda had focused on modernization and building a moderately well-off society across the province, 
the new 10th (2001-2005) FYP played up the themes of regional competitiveness and economic 
restructuring (Zhao 2009, 23, 240-241).  
One of the most striking departures in Hui’s development approach was its emphasis on 
building up Jiangsu’s largest cities and the metropolitan regions around them. In July 2000, Jiangsu 
convened a major provincial meeting on urbanization work. The meeting put forward a new strategy 
for urban development, calling for “strengthening, enlarging, optimizing, and beautifying” (zuo da, 
zuo qiang, zuo you, zuo mei) Jiangsu’s cities, and focusing to a greater extent on central cities such as 
Suzhou, Nanjing, and Xuzhou (Jiangsu Provincial Research Office 2010, 245-247). The explicit 
emphasis of the meeting on supporting large cities was a novelty in a province that had deliberately 
moderated the growth of large cities and promoted smaller centers’ development since early in the 
reform period (Interview NJ081205a). And, while other provinces had already moved in this 
direction, Jiangsu’s new approach preceded a shift in China’s official urban policy. 
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33 Hui Liangyu was originally from Jilin and had spent the early part of his career there before holding high provincial 
posts in Hubei and, more recently, serving as governor and Party secretary of Anhui. Ji was in his mid-50s when he took 
over as governor, and had advanced his career within Jiangsu province, most recently having held high-level provincial 
government posts during the mid-1990s (China Vitae; baike.baidu.com). 
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Several concrete steps were taken to begin implementing this new vision for urban 
development. Consistent with the importance of administrative units in defining the contours of 
China’s economy, one of the province’s first steps was to alter the boundaries of many cities and 
towns in Jiangsu, consolidating different units and annexing more territory and resources to large 
cities and key towns. In cities such as Nanjing and Wuxi, counties were changed into districts, and 
administrative boundaries were redrawn to enlarge central cities and give them access to more land. 
Suzhou saw an expansion of its central urban area with rapid extension of the large development 
zones on its eastern and western flanks (Yao et al 2010, 255-263).34 The provincial leadership also 
placed more emphasis on construction in and around top cities. After the turn of the century, 
Nanjing saw an accelerated build-up of urban infrastructure as well as rapid development of new 
highways and expressways linking the capital to other parts of the province (Tian 2011, 591-597). 
And, in 2000, Hui instituted a special annual meeting of the provincial leadership devoted to 
discussing ways to promote Nanjing’s development (Interview NJ081205a). 
 In short, the end of the 20th century saw Jiangsu shift away from the erstwhile model of 
dispersed, small-scale industrial and urban development to embrace a more elitist industrial and 
urban development paradigm. While the change in development approach was significant and 
certainly required provincial-level political support, it was not entirely a matter of top-down state 
leadership. In Jiangsu, the strategic shift was also driven by existing trends and on-the-ground 
necessities. The province’s traditional growth model had begun to run out of steam, lack of urban 
infrastructure in key cities was creating problems, and the province – like China more broadly – 
faced an increasingly competitive domestic and international economic environment. 
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34 Changzhou, meanwhile, annexed neighboring Wujin County in 2002, with support from the province (Zhang and Wu 
2006). Many town-level mergers were also carried out across the province after 1999 (Ren and Liu 2008, 134-136). 
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Taking a metropolitan turn, 2001-2005  
 As China emerged from the economic turbulence of the late 1990s and acceded to the WTO 
in the early 2000s, rapid economic growth and internationalization resumed. Against this backdrop, 
metropolitan-oriented development thinking continued to gain ground across much of the country. 
Simultaneously, a more permissive, growth-oriented central line toward urban investment and 
population growth under the national 10th Five-Year Plan framework facilitated faster growth of 
large metropolitan areas. Still, much of the initiative came from subnational policymakers, who saw 
the rapid build-up of industry, infrastructure, and real estate in large cities not just as a huge growth 
opportunity but also as an essential investment in local competitiveness. Jiangsu was no exception to 
this broader trend. Following the shift in urban policy under Hui Liangyu in 2000, Jiangsu moved 
quickly with metropolitan-scale development thinking, egged on by fierce competition with 
neighboring provinces for mobile capital, state resources, and political recognition. 
If provincial leaders showed strong interest in metropolitan-oriented development during 
the first half of the 2000s, however, crafting and implementing focused development policies proved 
a challenge. The Three Metropolitan Circles strategy launched by Hui Liangyu in 2001 suffered from 
a shortage of political consensus and organizational capacity, and the effort was largely shelved 
within a couple years of its launch. Li Yuanchao, Hui’s successor, put in motion a bolder and more 
unified urban and regional development strategy over the following years. Bolstered by Li’s political 
standing as one of the Party’s rising stars, the 2003 Riverside Development scheme produced 
significant results within its first couple years, and served as a framework for the province to 
advance its goal of developing core urban and industrial areas. By mid-decade, however, this strategy 
too encountered stiff opposition inside and outside the province. 
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The Three Metropolitan Circles strategy 
 National and provincial circumstances at the start of the 21st century created an opening for 
more activist regional and urban policy in Jiangsu. The bolder urbanization approach adopted by 
Hui Liangyu and his counterparts in other provinces was at least partially vindicated when the 
National 10th FYP made urbanization a national economic strategy, and recognized a strategic role 
for larger cities in China’s development. Many localities in Jiangsu were again growing at full tilt, but 
policymakers worried that without improved coordination, urban and industrial growth across the 
province might result in vicious local competition rather than a rational division of labor and 
structural upgrading. Jiangsu’s leadership thus sought a spatial development strategy that would 
coordinate urban and industrial growth across the province while also promoting outward 
competitiveness. 
 In 2001, Jiangsu’s Construction Department put forward a development plan meant to 
address these goals. The Three Metropolitan Circles Plan laid out a strategic framework for 
developing Jiangsu’s urban system based around the build-up and economic integration of the 
province’s three largest urban areas—the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou region, the Nanjing 
metropolitan area, and the Xuzhou area in northern Jiangsu. Compared with previous regional and 
urban planning approaches, the Three Metropolitan Circles scheme put more emphasis on the 
planning and development of large, internationally competitive urban regions as the foundation of 
economic growth, and envisioned a larger provincial-level role in planning and facilitating this 
development.35 Yet, insofar as the plan conceived of the province in terms of discrete economic 
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35 For the SWC region, officials said, the province’s main goal would be to improve coordination of development across 
Suzhou and its neighbors, to mold the region into an economic region greater than the sum of its parts. For the Nanjing 
metropolitan region, emphasis would fall both on building up the central city’s size and economic strength and 
promoting better infrastructural and economic integration. For Xuzhou, the least developed of the circles, the near-term 
focus would be on fostering a stronger economic base (Xinhua ribao 1/16/2003). 
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areas and named multiple focal points for investment, it also represented a compromise with 
different local interests in Jiangsu. 
 The provincial government’s first order of business under the new development strategy was 
to draw up and start implementing plans for the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou (SWC) Metropolitan 
Circle. Jiangsu’s Construction Department led a planning process that involved provincial 
bureaucrats as well as academic experts from Nanjing University, and the provincial government 
approved the resulting plan in 2002. Aimed at coordinating the development of infrastructure across 
the SWC urban belt, the plan was touted by some as the first comprehensive regional and urban 
development plan of its type in China (Luo 2011, 99-100, 106-115). According to Jiangsu 
Construction Department director Huang Wei, the main motive behind the SWC Metropolitan 
Circle Plan was to better orchestrate the resources and economic strength of the cities for 
competitive advantage (Xinhua ribao 1/16/2003).36 While not solely geared toward economic growth, 
the plan was strongly pro-development, calling for several major new regional infrastructure projects, 
including a new Southern Jiangsu international airport, a new logistics center in Wuxi, and various 
rail and road transit projects (Luo and Shen 2008). In addition to its economic objectives, the SWC 
Metropolitan Circle plan was also seen by some as having a more political motive: it could help the 
provincial government better tether Suzhou to the rest of the provincial economy, and expand 
provincial planning authority over the city’s growth (Interview NJ111307a).  
 The SWC Metropolitan Circle scheme had problems from the outset, however. The 
province-led planning approach proved to be at odds with the actual balance of power between 
Jiangsu and the municipalities. While the province took control over the planning process, Jiangsu 
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36 By combining forces, Huang noted, Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou could hold their own against Shanghai: the cities 
had three times as much land area as Shanghai, were home to a comparable population, and attracted more foreign 
investment (Xinhua ribao 1/16/2003). A July 2002 article entitled “strengthen the big city development idea” called for 
strengthening transportation and water and gas utilities infrastructure, local policy innovation, and real estate 
development so as to bolster urbanization, and laid out ambitious quantitative and qualitative urban growth targets for 
Suzhou (Jiangsu jingjibao 7/24/2002). 
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would have to rely on municipal governments, which had more operational capacity and financial 
resources available, to carry out most implementation of major projects (Luo and Shen 2008). But 
the scheme underestimated the difficulties of development coordination in a polycentric urban 
region in which city governments were fiercely guarding their economic turf and interests. Suzhou, 
Wuxi, and Changzhou had similar industrial structures and very competitive economic relations, and 
proved more interested in forging tighter links with Shanghai than in integrating with one another 
(Ibid.).37 Making matters worse, the limited administrative status of the SWC Plan – it was issued by 
an ordinary provincial department – made it vulnerable to obstruction by lower levels of 
government and other agencies (Interview NJ031204a). 
 Concrete implementation of the plan was plagued by many difficulties. In several instances, 
city governments did not comply with provincial plans for infrastructure projects and economic 
coordination (Luo and Shen 2008). One well-known dispute concerned the question of where to 
locate a new regional airport. While the province favored building an airport on the western side of 
the Metropolitan Circle in Changzhou, Wuxi and Suzhou resisted this idea, pushing forward plans 
for their own airports. As a result, plans for a new Southern Jiangsu airport had to be put on hold 
(Wong et al 2008; Luo and Shen 2008). Jiangsu also had to contend with efforts by city governments 
to draw up their own, conflicting metropolitan region plans (Luo 2011, 106-115). To smooth 
implementation, the province resorted to such measures as rotating municipal leaders between 
Suzhou and Wuxi, but even this failed to bring localities fully into line (Luo and Shen 2008). While 
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37 The cities’ prioritization of closer ties to Shanghai was shown, for example, by the decision in 2002 of Suzhou, Wuxi, 
and Changzhou to withdraw from participation in a major Nanjing economic and trade forum. Given their orientation 
toward Shanghai, the cities viewed the Nanjing-centered promotional event as increasingly irrelevant (Zhongguo jingying bao 
10/10/2002). According to a former government researcher from Suzhou, city officials from Suzhou and Wuxi had 
remained skeptical during the planning phase of the provincial government’s approach. Experts from both cities saw 
that the misalignment between Suzhou’s status as the economic center of the region and Wuxi’s position as the 
geographical center would make coordinated development of the SWC belt difficult. Nevertheless, according to the 
Suzhou government researcher, the provincial government at that time showed little interest in alternate ideas floated by 
city officials, such as a proposal for a Taihu city group (Interview SZ011307a). 
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the SWC planning effort facilitated new infrastructure projects in and around Suzhou, then, it did 
not achieve its vision of building an integrated urban region (Interview SZ021307a). 
In its efforts to foster a more integrated and competitive Nanjing metropolitan region, 
Jiangsu took a less top-down and more flexible approach than in the SWC region. For the Nanjing 
region, provincial authorities used an existing foundation of metropolitan-regional planning,38 
working jointly with city officials in a more bottom-up fashion over the course of 2001 and 2002 to 
draft a Nanjing Metropolitan Circle Plan. City governments played a big role, and there was regular 
consultation between Nanjing and other cities. Jiangsu formally approved the plan in January 2003, 
and a Nanjing Metropolitan Circle Development Forum comprising government, business, and 
academia from cities in the region was created to assist with regional governance (Luo et al 2010; 
Luo 2011, 97-99, 116-125).  
In its substance, the Nanjing Metropolitan Circle plan combined growth-pole logic with 
global city-region thinking (Luo et al 2010). The plan emphasized “building up the core city” (zuoda 
hexin chengshi), and called for better integrating the markets and regional infrastructure of several 
cities in Jiangsu and Anhui around Nanjing to increase competitiveness (Nanjing Metropolitan Circle 
Yearbook Committee, 2011, 8-30).39 The planning region crossed administrative boundaries, 
extending to the Jiangsu cities of Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, and Huai’an, and also included cities from 
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38 In the early 2000s, municipal leaders in Nanjing had already begun to think regionally as they drew up plans to 
promote faster growth in the city. The city’s 10th FYP Outline (November 2000) called for efforts to strengthen 
Nanjing’s status as the central city of the surrounding region through the development of high-quality metropolitan 
infrastructure and services (Zhongguo jingji shibao, 4/3/2001). Progress at the central level, such as a State Planning 
Commission report on major metropolitan areas that discussed the possibility of linking Nanjing more closely with 
nearby cities in Anhui also offered a template to work with. On the heels of that report, Jiangsu’s Provincial Planning 
Commission in spring 2001 convened a meeting of several cities from Jiangsu and Anhui to discuss visions for 
metropolitan circle development (Jiangsu jingji bao 5/13/2002). 
39 Specifically, the document called for improving Nanjing’s industrial base and strengthening urban and regional 
infrastructure. Development of the service sector and of heavy industries such as petrochemicals and steel in and around 
Nanjing was to be accelerated, and Nanjing’s role as an education center was to be strengthened by integrating and 
consolidating university facilities. The plan called for creating a standing body comprising leaders from various provincial 
departments, as well as leaders of Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Yangzhou. Cities were to implement the plan under higher-
level guidance, with provincial departments taking the lead on matters cities could not coordinate (Nanjing Metropolitan 
Circle Yearbook Committee, 2011, 8-30). 
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Anhui province. Because the planning region was cross-provincial, however, the plan lacked 
compulsory status and could only serve as a coordinating framework. City governments would have 
to take the lead into metropolitan-regional coordination, while reporting to Jiangsu’s provincial 
government (Luo 2011, 97-99, 116-125). While this more bottom-up, consensus-based planning and 
governance helped policymakers avoid some of the inter-city and province-city interest conflicts that 
plagued the SWC Metropolitan Circle, it meant that agency was more diffuse and concrete progress 
was slower.40  
 Although Jiangsu’s metropolitan-regional planning efforts had only limited success, Suzhou 
and Nanjing experienced rapid development in the early 2000s aided by the pro-metropolitan 
outlook of the provincial government and Beijing, active efforts on the part of city-level 
governments, and Jiangsu’s advantageous economic circumstances. Suzhou’s central urban area and 
secondary centers all grew rapidly as foreign investment levels rose to new heights following WTO 
accession and investment in urban real estate and infrastructure surged under greater central and 
provincial support. With investment soaring, the Suzhou Industrial Park saw especially rapid 
economic and urban growth (Interview SZ031307a). A series of administrative mergers and 
upgrades from early 2001 on expanded the boundaries of Suzhou’s central urban area and bolstered 
development there (Xu 2010).41  
Meanwhile, Nanjing grew quickly under stronger provincial support and the energetic 
leadership of municipal Party secretary Li Yuanchao. At the October 2001 11th City Party Congress, 
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40 Although participating cities made plans for cooperation on tourism and investment promotion, there were few major 
infrastructure projects that could be quickly implemented (Luo 2011, 121-124; Interview NJ031204a). 
41 Whereas Suzhou’s central city area had remained relatively small and underdeveloped during the 1990s, the municipal 
government placed more emphasis on the central city during the 2000s. Between 2000-2007, the overall land area of 
central city districts was increased from 392 to 1650 square kilometers. Still, Suzhou’s secondary urban and industrial 
centers continued to play a major role in growth. As late as 2008, central city districts’ share of Suzhou’s GDP would be 
only 40.6 percent (Xu 2010). Much of Suzhou’s economic and urban growth during the early 2000s continued to take 
place in secondary centers such as Kunshan, Taicang, and Zhangjiagang, whose economies were closely tied to export-
processing and outward-oriented logistics. 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 4 
! 168 
Nanjing’s leadership outlined an aggressive urban development agenda to help the city’s growth 
keep pace with that of Suzhou and Wuxi. To enhance Nanjing’s competitiveness as an international 
production base, Li called for aggressively supporting modern manufacturing industries, recruiting 
large-scale FDI, and building up the city’s development zones and new urban districts. With help 
from the province and Beijing, Nanjing adjusted its administrative configuration and launched 
several major investment projects to drive development around the periphery of the city.42  
 As Suzhou, Nanjing, and Jiangsu’s other larger cities grew rapidly in the new economic and 
political climate, however, the Three Metropolitan Circle development framework proved untenable.  
Though Hui’s development approach for Jiangsu supported three distinct regions as growth poles, 
cities in central and eastern Jiangsu complained about being neglected (Interview NJ071205a). And 
although large cities were enjoying a moment of very rapid urban and economic development, there 
was little success at higher-level coordination of rapid urban growth. Provincial control over urban 
and regional development remained limited, and intense competition among different cities within 
Jiangsu threatened hopes for a more efficient economic division of labor in the province. Never 
fully successful, the Three Metropolitan Circles scheme unraveled further after Hui’s departure. 
 
Riverside Development and rapid growth of metropolitan Nanjing and Suzhou 
After Li Yuanchao replaced Hui in 2002, a new spatial development strategy took shape in 
Jiangsu. The Riverside Development (yanjiang kaifa) program launched in 2003 aimed both at 
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42 After 2000, three of Jiangsu’s counties were converted into or annexed by city districts: Jiangning was converted into 
an urban district, Jiangpu County was merged into an expanded Pukou district, and Liuhe county was combined with 
Daguang district to create a new Liuhe district. These changes created a great deal of new development space, and 
helped to advance metropolitan regional development (Ye 2011, 153). In 2001, the area of Nanjing’s High-Tech 
Development Zone (HTDZ) on the north bank of the Yangtze River was expanded from roughly five to 17.5 square 
kilometers. And, in May 2002, administrative boundaries were adjusted to align the HTDZ with Nanjing’s Pukou urban 
district (Chen 2009). Through active work of the city government and higher-level support, Nanjing landed huge new 
petrochemical industry investments and several major foreign-invested projects in its development zones (Zhongguo 
jingying bao 10/10/2002; Jingji ribao 10/29/2002).  
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enhancing Jiangsu’s economic competitiveness and at better integrating the province economically. 
Such an ambitious undertaking required strong executive support, and relied on Li’s personal clout 
and energy as a rising political star. 
Though lacking his predecessor’s résumé of provincial leadership postings, Li had extensive 
experience in Beijing and had garnered attention from political observers as a rising star in the Party 
(Li 2002). Only 52 when he took over as Jiangsu’s leader, Li had many years of active political life 
ahead of him and bright prospects. Li was originally from Jiangsu, but had spent much of his career 
in Beijing, where he had served as a leader in the Ministry of Culture and the Information Office of 
the State Council.43 His prior posts had given Li an opportunity to develop close ties to senior Party 
leaders, including Hu Jintao (Li 2002; China Vitae; baike.baidu.com). These high-level connections, 
along with Li’s prior experience in Jiangsu as Nanjing’s leader, gave him both the political capital and 
local knowledge to launch major economic and social policy initiatives. The “two take-the-leads” 
(liangge shuaxian) strategy announced by Li at the 2003 Fifth Plenum of Jiangsu’s 10th Provincial 
committee, which called for Jiangsu to lead the country in constructing a moderately well-off society 
and basically achieving modernization, made clear his ambitious aims (Song et al 2005, 308).44  
 Throughout his tenure as Jiangu’s chief, however, Li had to manage a partnership with a 
governor who had deep political roots in the province and did not always share his priorities. Liang 
Baohua, appointed at the end of 2002, originally hailed from Jiangxi but had spent several decades in 
Jiangsu, where he had risen through the ranks to serve in several key leadership posts by the end of 
the 1990s. Liang was Suzhou Party secretary and deputy Party secretary of Jiangsu between 1998-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Earlier in his career, Li had risen through the Chinese Communist Youth League system (CYLC), having headed the 
national CYLC organization and, prior to that, the Shanghai CYLC branch (Li 2002; China Vitae; baike.baidu.com). 
44 In his speech, Li laid out ambitious economic goals for Jiangsu, and put emphasis on science and education and 
cultural industry development. Li also called for achieving social harmony (including better compensating and 
supporting landless farmers), improving living conditions, and carrying out a range of market and administrative reforms. 
There was only modest emphasis on regional rebalancing: Li said Jiangsu should take a step-by-step approach to turning 
back the trend of growing industrial-rural gaps and regional gaps, but called for Subei to more strongly “fight for itself” 
(zishen fendou) (Xinhua ribao 7/23/2003). 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 4 
! 170 
2000, and his strong ties to Suzhou and experience in Jiangsu’s corridors of power made him a 
potential counterweight to Li from the outset. Unlike the relatively young Li, however, Liang was 58 
when he assumed the governorship, and thus closer to the end of his career (China Vitae; 
baidu.baike.com). Moreover, despite his status as a seasoned veteran of Jiangsu politics, Liang’s lack 
of experience and political ties outside the province also meant he had a more limited profile on the 
national stage than the younger Party chief. These factors may have made it easier for Li, a 
newcomer to Jiangsu in comparison with Liang, to quickly establish his political authority in the 
province and get a new policy agenda off the ground.  
As Li took over, Jiangsu was facing intense economic competition from its neighbors but 
also continued pressure to address regional disparities within the province. With Shanghai and 
Zhejiang announcing a slew of policies to recruit investors and upgrade their business environments 
in the early 2000s,45 Jiangsu’s leaders saw faster development of industry clusters and logistics 
infrastructure as crucial for keeping up (Interview SZ011307a). At the same time, with southern 
cities again booming and the north trailing, Jiangsu again confronted worsening regional gaps.  
During his first year in office, Li announced a major adjustment to Jiangsu’s development 
strategy, launching a new Riverside Development program that sought to address both challenges at 
once. The Riverside Development initiative was based on a plan Jiangsu’s Planning Commission had 
been preparing since summer 2002 (21 Shiji jingji baodao 9/4/2003). In contrast with the Three 
Metropolitan Circles scheme,46 the new strategy would prioritize development in the Yangtze River 
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45 Between 2002-2004, Shanghai and Zhejiang launched a new wave of efforts to boost local competitiveness following 
WTO accession. Shanghai unveiled new investment-promotion initiatives, including a “173” policy that would greatly 
expand the scope of development-zone style policies, as well as efforts to further build up its logistics infrastructure. 
Shanghai played hardball with its neighbors, shifting many logistics flights away from Hongqiao Airport, located very 
close to Suzhou, to Pudong Airport on Shanghai’s east side. This was a source of major concern for Jiangsu, as many of 
the cities in southeastern Jiangsu had major electronics industries that depended heavily on access to air logistics (Jiangsu 
jingjibao 4/28/2004). Meanwhile, Zhejiang governor Xi Jinping launched a Hangzhou Bay regional strategy with the goal 
of building up a strong industrial base around Hangzhou (Tian 2011, 390-396). 
46 Following the appearance of the new policy, discussion of the erstwhile Three Metropolitan Circles framework 
approach largely ceased (Interview NJ031204a). 
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corridor running through the middle of the province (Jingji guancha bao 2003/7/28). By stimulating 
industrial development on both banks of the Yangtze and linking the two banks more tightly with 
new infrastructure and policy initiatives, the strategy aimed to make the province more economically 
integrated and competitive while also building a stronger foundation for future growth in central and 
northern Jiangsu (21 Shiji jingji baodao 4/15/2004).  
Although Riverside Development was similar to the Three Metropolitan Circles plan in its 
emphasis on economic competitiveness, it differed from its predecessor in the more top-down, 
integrated approach to development it took. The strategy aimed to create a larger economic core for 
Jiangsu, and to fashion the province into a more organic economic entity (Wong et al 2008). In its 
specifics, Riverside Development had a clearer geographic and sectoral focus and greater 
institutional support than the Metropolitan Circles strategy. The planning area encompassed Nanjing, 
Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong, and parts of Suzhou and Wuxi adjacent to 
the Yangtze River. Smaller cities near the Yangtze would receive expanded development support, 
but policymakers also stressed the role of key metropolitan areas in building an economic region. 
“Taking the Nanjing Metropolitan Circle and Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Circle as 
vehicles,” the Riverside Development Overall Plan said, Jiangsu should “organize an integrated 
space”(Jiangsu Provincial Government 2006).47 To provide executive support for the program, the 
province created a coordinating small group, with a high-level official in charge (Ibid.). Jiangsu’s 
Planning Commission, meanwhile, was to oversee day-to-day work (Interview NJ031204a).48  
Through publicity and outreach, the provincial leadership made clear its commitment to 
Riverside Development. Li Yuanchao touted the new plan at various public meetings and political 
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47 Indeed, the plan devoted particular attention to improving Nanjing’s ports and cross-river infrastructure links, and 
emphasized development of basic- and capital-intensive industries such as autos, chemicals, metallurgy, and logistics, for 
which Nanjing was a key base (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2006). 
48 Higher-ranked than ordinary provincial departments, and better equipped to handle coordination across different 
functional areas and different city jurisdictions, the commission oversaw the preparation of the plan between 2002-2003 
and implementation work thereafter (Interview NJ031204a). 
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events. At a development forum at Nanjing University held in April 2003, Li Yuanchao stressed the 
importance of Riverside Development for Jiangsu’s economic future, calling for support from the 
whole province to help the initiative succeed (Xinhua ribao 4/21/2003). In late June 2003, provincial 
leaders convened a meeting with officials from the cities along the river corridor to discuss the new 
plan, mobilize support, and assuage local concerns about the new program. Despite such outreach 
efforts, however, the new approach was not universally welcomed. Skeptics expressed concern that 
the strategy would marginalize large parts of northern Jiangsu, including the Xuzhou area and coastal 
areas far from the river belt (Jingji guancha bao 2003/7/28). The plan was also seen as posing an 
environmental threat to downstream areas (Interview NJ071205a).  
Notwithstanding some opposition, Jiangsu’s leadership pressed forward quickly with 
implementation after 2003. The province used infrastructure construction, financial support, and 
preferential resource allocation to spur faster development along the river corridor.49 Many new 
large-scale projects – bridges, port facilities, highways, and industrial operations – sprang up along 
the Yangtze’s banks in the mid-2000s. To speed up development of central Jiangsu and better link 
northern and southern Jiangsu together, several major projects under Riverside Development 
targeted the Yangtze’s northern bank, including cities such as Jingjiang (Song et al 2005, 314-317).50  
While the Riverside Development strategy could legitimately claim to be spurring growth in 
smaller river cities and better knitting together the province, it also provided a framework for rapidly 
building up major metropolitan areas—especially Nanjing. Suzhou continued to grow rapidly 
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49 One important policy tool was the allocation of generous land-use quotas to cities, giving these cities room to grow 
and a resource they could monetize for development purposes (Interview NJ051204a). 
50 One signature undertaking was the effort to speed construction of a new port and industry zone in Jingjiang, a small 
urban area in Taizhou. Since 2001, Jingjiang had been working with Jiangyin, a sub-center of Wuxi located on the other 
side of the river, to set up a cooperatively managed zone that took advantage of Jiangyin’s administrative talent and 
Jingjiang’s land. Under Hui Liangyu, the province had approved this cooperation effort, but concrete progress had been 
slow. During an inspection visit in January 2003, however, Li Yuanchao praised the initiative and pledged provincial 
support. Jiangsu extended a raft of preferential policies, including financing, tax benefits, and preferential export rebate 
policies, and routed a new highway so that it would pass through the zone and spur its development. With this higher-
level support, development in the zone sped up dramatically (21 Shiji jingji baodao 9/4/2003; Luo and Shen 2009).  
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following the launch of the Riverside Development strategy, buoyed by its local advantages but also 
helped by quick development in Zhangjiagang and other port cities helped by the plan. Riverside 
Development came as a particular windfall for Jiangsu’s capital. With nearly 200 km of river bank 
and many large industrial zones located along the river, Nanjing stood to benefit greatly from 
Riverside Development. Riverside Development aligned well with existing plans to expand Nanjing’s 
automobile, electronics, steel, and petrochemicals industries, strengthen transportation infrastructure, 
and extend the city’s development across the Yangtze River (Zhongguo jingji shibao 8/19/2003). Under 
the program, the rapid development that had been taking place in Nanjing since the turn of the 
century accelerated further, and Nanjing’s share of provincial FAI spiked between 2003 and 2005. 
Major projects such as construction of a huge Longtan port facility, upgrading of Nanjing’s Lukou 
Airport, construction of a new train station, and the building of Nanjing’s first subway line 
proceeded rapidly. Nanjing also saw rapid development of new urban districts, including the Hexi 
area, a new Xianlin “university city,” and new districts on the north bank of the Yangtze (Wang, ed. 
2006, 131-145; Jiangsu jingji bao 6/25/2004; Ye 2011, 127-133).  
 As with previous regional strategies, Riverside Development encountered growing pushback 
inside and outside the province over time. Since its launch, some observers in Jiangsu had viewed 
Riverside Development unfavorably. New industrial zones did not always develop smoothly, and 
water pollution was indeed an issue. Locating along the Yangtze worked better for basic industries 
than for knowledge-economy sectors or time-sensitive logistics. Meanwhile, large parts of northern 
Jiangsu continued to complain of neglect, and there was mounting pressure for new policies that 
would help northern cities more directly (Interview NJ021204b). Pressure mounted from outside the 
province as well. The 2004 Tieben Incident, a major industrial corruption case involving a steel 
enterprise in Changzhou, brought nationwide negative publicity (21 Shiji jingji baodao 11/20/2006). 
Shanghai opposed the Riverside Development strategy, which aggravated pollution problems for 
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downstream areas and placed competitive pressure on the municipality (Interview NJ071205a). And 
with the central government actively promoting inter-provincial coordination in the YRD region 
after 2004, subnational programs that pitted one province against another increasingly ran against 
Beijing’s priorities as well. Even as opposition grew, and other development ideas surfaced, however, 
Li continued to champion Riverside Development and development of the greater Nanjing region.51 
By the time the program wound down in 2007, Nanjing and several other river cities had enjoyed a 
hefty catch of new infrastructure and industry investment.52  
In sum, the first few years of Li Yuanchao’s tenure in Jiangsu saw an activist provincial-level 
role in urban and regional development. While the Riverside Development program was publicized 
as a way to better link the province’s northern and southern halves and stimulate faster growth in 
the central part of the province, a more careful look at both its content and execution shows that the 
policy was in large part geared toward enhancing provincial competitiveness by creating a 
continuous industrial belt along the main axis of the province and building up the capital city. After 
this burst of developmental work between 2003-2005, however, things slowed down in Jiangsu, as 
Li’s term neared its end and a new policy approach emerged under his successor, Liang Baohua. 
 
Rebalancing development, 2006-2010  
During the latter part of the decade, Jiangsu’s development approach shifted away from the 
goal of competitive region-building and metropolitan growth to place more emphasis on balanced 
development. Some provincial elites felt that Suzhou and Nanjing still lacked the size and amenities 
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51 In Li’s report to the Provincial Party Congress in November 2006, he called for deepening Riverside Development, 
with a particular focus on the “Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Yangzhou” economic area (Yangzhou ribao 11/9/2006). 
52 A 2008 report from the Jiangsu Development Planning Commission noted that under the auspices of Riverside 
Development Jiangsu had seen over 100 billion-plus-yuan projects, and that major progress had been made in 
developing regional industry clusters for autos, shipbuilding, machine tools, and other sectors. The report also cited 
rapid growth of high-tech industry and R&D in Nanjing and major headway on key urban infrastructure projects in the 
city (Jiangsu Development Planning Commission 2/26/2008). 
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to compete effectively with China’s other leading cities,53 but after several years of rapid growth, 
opening-up, and urbanization across southern Jiangsu, localities in northern Jiangsu were lagging 
further behind and calling for more attention. Aggressive lobbying by northern cities for 
development assistance, paired with greater central emphasis on coordinated regional development 
under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, outmatched those advocating further efforts to build up 
metropolitan centers. Meanwhile, the departure of Li Yuanchao left the provincial establishment 
weaker. With local and central interests constraining provincial policies to a greater extent, Jiangsu 
adopted a Coastal Development strategy that directed more resources toward medium-sized coastal 
cities. Having more difficulty obtaining the higher-level support they sought, Suzhou and Nanjing 
looked for their own ways to boost development and outward ties. 
 
Central development priorities and a less assertive provincial leadership 
 A shifting national development agenda under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao placed new 
demands and constraints on provincial authorities, contributing to a shift in Jiangsu’s urban and 
regional policy after the mid-2000s. Since taking office, Hu and Wen had attached special priority to 
rural development and assistance for lagging regions. Under the priorities of the national 11th FYP, 
provincial leaders felt new pressure to address Jiangsu’s regional and socioeconomic inequality in a 
more head-on fashion (Interview NJ111307a). Jiangsu’s own 11th FYP took cues from Beijing and 
emphasized people-oriented and sustainable development as well as more rigorous spatial planning 
(Zhao 2009, 243). After 2005, the provincial leadership began to adopt a new set of measures to 
support development in the northern half of Jiangsu.54  
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53 Despite efforts to enhance Nanjing’s infrastructure, its competitiveness ranking had slid from 12th in 2003 to 20th in 
2006 (Ye 2011, 67-79). 
54 Li Yuanchao put in place programs to increase cadre rotation between south and north, expanded preferential 
allocation of resources to the north, and paired northern and southern cities for development cooperation (Interviews 
NJ071205a; NJ081205a). 
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 At the same time, Beijing’s efforts to play a more active role in coordinating YRD regional 
development also placed constraints on provincial development policies. Starting in the mid-2000s, 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) began work on a cross-provincial 
YRD Regional Plan, with hopes of having the new strategy included in the 11th Five-Year Plan 
agenda.55 In part a response to the recent burst of economic competition and local protectionism 
among Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang during the early 2000s, the emerging plan sought to promote 
deeper economic integration of the YRD region and better coordinate infrastructure and industry 
development (Li and Wu 2013; NDRC 2010).56 Drawn out by intergovernmental and bureaucratic 
squabbles, preparation of the YRD plan ended up taking the full latter half of the 2000s.57 With 
regional planning underway, however, Jiangsu’s government faced more pressure – and had more 
incentives – to align its own development approach with the broader YRD scheme. 
 During the late 2000s, there was also less provincial-level political clout to support an urban 
competitiveness agenda in Jiangsu. Jiangsu’s provincial government remained relatively weak in an 
institutional sense,58 and the leadership change in 2007 left Jiangsu politically weaker as well. As Li 
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55 The NDRC’s Regional Economic Development bureau took the lead in preparing the plan, and solicited help and 
input from local governments, think tanks, and academic institutions (Li and Wu 2013). 
56 The geographic scope of the final plan was very broad—spanning 16 cities in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. The 
Plan called for developing Shanghai as the “dragonhead” of the YRD region while also enhancing development and 
internationalization of sub-centers such as Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hangzhou, and Ningbo and increasing these cities’ 
linkages with Shanghai (NDRC 2010). Unsurprising in light of the complex mix of central and local interests involved, 
the planning process proved tortuous and friction-prone (Interview SH011301a). After work on the regional plan began 
in late 2004, many rounds of revisions proved necessary, and the release of the document was continually delayed (21 
Shiji jingji baodao 12/3/2007). Indeed, the final version of the plan would not be approved by the State Council until 
2010—many years later than anticipated. (Li and Wu 2013). 
57 Following leadership reshuffles in Jiangsu and neighboring units, a modified approach to YRD regional planning was 
announced in mid-2007, with the planning area expanded from the originally envisioned 16 cities to include all of 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, and plans made for stronger central guidance and consolidated regional institutions (21 
Shiji jingji baodao 12/3/2007). The YRD Plan did ultimately yield some concrete results, including major infrastructure 
projects such as an Wuxi airport and a Nanjing-Hangzhou rail line (Interview NJ031204a). 
58 Continued provincial-level weakness was apparent in the difficulties the Jiangsu leadership had in its effort to roll out 
“province manages county” (sheng guan xian) administrative reforms in 2006. Despite the fact that the provincial 
government had made this reform – which would place counties under the fiscal supervision of the provincial 
government rather than municipal authorities – a major priority under its 11th FYP, strong city-level resistance stymied 
implementation efforts (21 Shiji jingji baodao 3/29/2006). 
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Yuanchao’s term as Party secretary concluded, governor Liang Baohua rose to become Party chief. 
Despite his long experience with high-level posts in the province, Liang lacked the national political 
standing of Li, and was in his early 60s – and presumably close to the end of his career – when he 
took over. As Liang was promoted, Luo Zhijun, who had previously served as Nanjing’s Party 
secretary and mayor and had deep roots in the city, moved into the governor slot (China Vitae; 
baike.baidu.com).  
The new leadership team’s development policies placed more stress on supporting lagging 
regions and distributing investment more widely across Jiangsu’s territory, reflecting a more subdued 
provincial approach than what had come before. In 2007, Jiangsu endorsed a “four corridors” (si yan) 
spatial strategy that, in contrast to the heavy river belt emphasis in the mid-2000s, called for 
supporting four different belts of development in the province (Jiangsu Provincial Research Office 
2010, 281). Over the following three years, Jiangsu promoted regional re-balancing by fostering 
clusters of major projects across different parts of the province.59  
  
Jiangsu’s Coastal Development Strategy 
 In 2007, as Liang replaced Li, Jiangsu launched a Coastal Development (yanhai kaifa) strategy 
that shifted the spatial focus of development away from the Yangtze River corridor to the less 
urbanized and industrialized coastal prefectures of Lianyungang, Yancheng, and Nantong. Although 
it was coordinated and carried out by the provincial government, the new strategy reflected stronger 
sub-provincial and central input than Riverside Development. 
 The Coastal Development Strategy had various past precedents and had been a long time in 
the making, but municipal and central-level maneuvering contributed in an important way to its 
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59 This followed on the approach Liang had taken while governor. He had made calls on different occasions for stronger 
support of northern Jiangsu’s development, including an opinion put forward at a 2005 work meeting devoted to the 
theme of “Accelerating Northern Jiangsu’s Revitalization and Pushing Forward Regional Common Development” 
(Neikan yaowen huibian 2005). 
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launch. In prior years, provincial policymakers had called attention to the need to support 
development of the lagging coastal region at various points, and variants of the term “coastal 
development” had been used several times since the 1990s.60 Northern cities’ continued economic 
travails were harder to ignore in the mid-2000s after several years in which Jiangsu’s growth rate had 
far exceeded the national baseline.61 In early 2005, the provincial People’s Congress had taken up 
and forwarded to the provincial government a proposal for a new coastal development initiative. On 
that occasion, however, conflicting views within the provincial leadership – particularly resistance 
from policymakers who saw Jiangsu’s river corridor as the top regional priority – had stalled the 
adoption of a new program (21 Shiji jingji baodao 11/20/2006).62  
 Over the following years, however, aggressive political outreach by northern cities helped 
bring about a new wave of higher-level support for the coastal region.63 In 2006, Lianyungang’s 
leaders lobbied aggressively to persuade premier Wen Jiabao to visit Lianyungang and offer his 
endorsement of stronger development efforts there (Interview NJ111307a). This gambit succeeded, 
and Wen Jiabao made a high-profile visit to Lianyungang in early January 2007. Besides inquiring 
about agricultural issues and visiting with local peasants, Wen used the tour to call for a build-up of 
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60 During an inspection tour in 2005, then-governor Liang Baohua had called for more research on how to spur 
industrial development in the coastal region, which accounted for only one-sixth of provincial GDP. Liang had stressed 
the importance of coastal development, and advocated building up wind power, developing liquefied natural gas 
infrastructure, and enhancing agriculture in Jiangsu’s coastal region (Xinhua ribao 5/31/2005). A book commissioned on 
this topic emphasized the ample land, port development potential, and rich environmental resources of Jiangsu’s coastal 
region (Huang and Xie, eds. 2006, 1-8, 21-22). In 2005, Liang had advocated building up wind power and developing 
liquefied natural gas in Jiangsu’s coastal region (Xinhua ribao 5/31/2005). 
61 Jiangsu’s annual GDP growth between 2000 and 2005 had averaged 16 percent, substantially above the 12 percent 
growth rate of the country as a whole (China Data Online; author’s calculations).  
62 According to one report, although the provincial leadership held several meetings on this motion and originally 
planned to hold a meeting to announce a strategic policy decision in mid-2006, no such meeting occurred. Concerns 
over whether Jiangsu’s coastline – much of it shoals and marshland – was suitable for large-scale development, and 
whether investment in this area could yield strong returns had been a sticking point. Some policymakers argued that 
focusing on the river belt would be more conducive to development in the northern part of the province, and favored 
development of the Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Yangzhou area as a way to prop up the economy of central Jiangsu and, by 
extension, to stimulate faster development in the north (21 Shiji jingji baodao 11/20/2006). 
63 A port city in the northeastern corner of the province, Lianyungang had long had strategic importance as a good 
natural harbor and the eastern terminus of China’s Longhai rail line. The city had enjoyed preferential reform and 
opening policies since the 1980s, but had developed very slowly in comparison with southern Jiangsu. 
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Lianyungang’s industry and infrastructure. Wen stressed Lianyungang’s significance for China’s 
national economy as a key regional port and as the eastern end of a new Eurasian “land bridge” 
(State Council Office 2007). Responding to Wen’s guidelines, the provincial leadership held a 
meeting in early March 2007 to unveil plans for a new development drive in Lianyungang. Li 
Yuanchao, Liang Baohua, and other officials called for building up Lianyungang as the “dragonhead” 
(longtou) of northern Jiangsu, and discussed plans to extend various forms of economic support to 
the city (Xinhua ribao 3/3/2007).64  
After taking over Jiangsu’s leadership post, Liang Baohua took advantage of the political 
opportunity provided by the new Lianyungang development initiative to seek central support for a 
broader Coastal Development program. The provincial government launched new rounds of 
research and planning, and also mobilized dignitaries and respected academics to speak in favor of 
the plan (Interview NJ111307a). Finally, in 2009 Jiangsu succeeded in winning State Council 
approval for its Coastal Development strategy, and a provincial work meeting was held to make 
plans for expanding investment and policy support in the region. More concrete arrangements 
followed in the fall, as Jiangsu promulgated an opinion on Coastal Development, and formulated 13 
special plans and three implementation schemes. To provide financial and organizational support for 
the program, the provincial government created a capital-raising platform and established a Coastal 
Development enterprise group (Jiangsu Provincial Research Office 2010, 282-298). 
Implementation work for Coastal Development proceeded quickly during 2009 and 2010. 
The provincial government and the city governments of Lianyungang, Yancheng, and Nantong 
carried out a wave of investments in transportation infrastructure and regional industry clusters. 
Highway development accelerated dramatically, and investment poured into new port facilities and 
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64 Provincial leaders called for using the assignment of skilled cadres, preferential provision of financial aid and 
development resources, and construction of major investment projects to build up Lianyungang. These efforts would 
focus on port development and improvement of the city’s urban environment (Xinhua ribao 3/3/2007). 
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development zones. Particular emphasis was placed on chemicals production and other heavy 
industries (21 shiji jingji baodao 8/6/2012). Under the stimulus of these policies, development in the 
coastal region accelerated: In 2009, for instance, the region recorded GDP growth of 13.8 percent 
and urban FAI growth of 28.8 percent (Jiangsu Provincial Research Office 2010, 291-298).  
Like its predecessors, however, the Coastal Development strategy encountered criticism. The 
program faced growing scrutiny over its resource-intensive, relatively low-end development model. 
With new investment projects spread over a wide area that was not very internally integrated, the 
agglomeration benefits of the program were less clear than for Riverside Development. Indeed, 
some of the major port development projects carried out, including one in Yancheng’s Dafeng 
county, were located far from large urban centers.65 At the same time, some policy experts raised 
concerns over the environmental damage being caused by heavy industry and port-building in 
Jiangsu’s coastal wetlands (21 Shiji jingji baodao 8/6/2012; Interview NJ071205a). 
  
Limited support for main metropolitan centers 
 With the provincial government’s attention turned toward coastal cities, Jiangsu’s main 
metropolitan centers received less concerted support from higher-level policymakers. Although 
Suzhou’s red-hot growth in the first half of the 2000s had made the city Jiangsu’s undisputed 
economic leader, the provincial government treated it somewhat coolly in the latter half of the 
decade. Following the frustrating results of the early 2000s, Jiangsu had largely abandoned the 
Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Circle project, leaving the cities more to their own devices. 
During the late 2000s, Suzhou and its neighbors saw less of the concerted infrastructure investment 
and preferential policy treatment they had gotten in earlier years (Interview NJ031205b). Meanwhile, 
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65 This port development project in Yancheng’s Dafeng county was done cooperatively with Shanghai (Interview 
BJ061307b). 
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the special administrative privileges of the Suzhou Industrial Park became diluted with the passing of 
time, as the zone used up much of its allotted space and preferential policies were given out more 
broadly (Interview SZ031307a).66 In addition, Suzhou felt constrained by the limited land quotas 
Jiangsu was giving it, frustrated to have projects ready but little land available (Interview SZ021307a).  
While Jiangsu had little choice but to allow Suzhou a high level of policymaking autonomy, it 
rebuffed the city’s efforts to obtain higher administrative status and to consolidate control over its 
territory in a way that would strengthen the city government’s hand. For several years, Suzhou had 
pressed for an upgrade to deputy-provincial status, but to no avail (Interview SZ021307a). As the 
city tried to transition away from extensive industrialization and urban growth and upgrade its 
economy and urban environment, its leaders viewed the lack of deputy-provincial status and the 
trappings thereof – including higher rates of retention for local fiscal revenue, higher-quality 
infrastructure, and larger numbers of major academic institutions – as a key obstacle (Xu 2010). One 
local scholar complained about this “political binding effect,” arguing that it “makes it hard for 
Suzhou to engage in competition with Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities on a fair footing, and 
means that Suzhou has no way to join the ranks of top-tier cities” (Su 2012). Suzhou’s inability to 
obtain higher status – attributed in large part to Jiangsu’s unwillingness to part with fiscal revenues 
and administrative influence – had limited the city’s “development space” and resources.67  
Without concerted higher-level support, Suzhou nevertheless did its best to push forward 
development in the late 2000s. The city continued to enjoy good access to Beijing and the provincial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 That said, the zone did continue to enjoy relatively advantageous land-planning, foreign economic, and project-
approval policies (Interview SZ031307a). 
67 Beyond this, the fact that Suzhou remained a prefectural-level city meant that the municipal government lacked 
sufficient bargaining power vis-à-vis the county-level governments under it to pool the city’s resources and build the 
central city districts into a world-class metropolitan center (Su 2012). Unable to exert effective control over county-level 
governments, Suzhou’s municipal government had sought since 2003 to have subsidiary units such as Wujiang annexed 
to the central urban area to expand its “development space,” but Jiangsu continued to withhold its approval in the late 
2000s (Interview SZ021307a). Annexation of Wujiang city into Suzhou’s central urban area did ultimately happen—in 
2012. Around the same time, three central-city districts were merged to create a Gusu District (Interview SZ021307a).  
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government, and was in a position to lobby for various benefits (Interview NJ031204a). City-level 
policymakers adopted stronger policies to support advanced industrial and service sectors such as 
finance.68 To address land-shortage issues, Suzhou purchased land quotas from other cities through 
new market mechanisms where possible, and launched cooperation with cities in northern Jiangsu 
whereby northern cities provided land and Suzhou contributed capital and management expertise 
(Interview SZ021307a).69  
 After 2007, Nanjing too perceived a lack of strong higher-level support for its development. 
Some local policy experts saw the regional policy approach taken under Liang Baohua as a threat. As 
one wrote, “[…] to a great extent, the implementation of the Coastal Development Strategy also 
scatters Nanjing’s development resources, and may constitute a serious challenge to Nanjing’s 
development” (Huang et al 2009, 55). Despite the city’s perceived importance as provincial capital, 
its investment growth tapered off in the late 2000s, and Nanjing did not get disproportionately high 
allotments of land and other resources.70 And, when city leaders from Nanjing and neighboring cities 
organized research and planning work for a Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Yangzhou Regional Cooperation 
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68 In recent years, Suzhou has placed more emphasis on developing central-city functions such as commerce and finance, 
as well as on grooming knowledge-oriented industries and high-end residential and leisure areas (Interview SZ021307a).  
69 In recent years, a more decentralized system of land quota exchange and compensation has taken shape in Jiangsu, 
supplanting the more top-down land management system of the past. Local governments can negotiate with one another 
to transfer land-use quotas, enabling cities from southern Jiangsu that are short on land to acquire land quotas from 
cities in other parts of the province (Interview NJ051204a). More recently, Suzhou has also worked to develop tighter 
transportation links to Shanghai, including an extension of the Shanghai Metro to serve Kunshan, and the development 
of a unified transit card system for Shanghai and southeastern Jiangsu. According to a Shanghai-based policy expert, 
provincial authorities have taken part in such discussions and planning, but local governments have led the efforts 
(Interview SH011301a). 
70 According to one local land policy expert, Nanjing has not been highly favored by Jiangsu in terms of land allocation, 
though the fact that it hosts various education, research, and state institutions helps it to obtain higher quotas (Interview 
NJ051204a). Many Nanjing elites felt that the city was not getting as much support from Jiangsu province as it might. 
Jiangsu was seen as more preoccupied with helping the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou area and expanding aid to poorer parts 
of the province (Interview NJ031205b).  
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and Development Strategy and sought higher-level support between 2009 and 2011, there was little 
provincial and central aid forthcoming (Interviews NJ031204a; NJ021204b).71  
In the absence of much help from the provincial government or Beijing, city-level actors did 
what was in their power to upgrade Nanjing’s urban environment and better integrate the broader 
metropolitan region. While the province played a background role, city governments laid out new 
plans for economic cooperation. From 2004 on, construction offices from various cities in Jiangsu 
and Anhui had held meetings on project planning for the larger Nanjing region, and in 2006 they 
worked together to formulate a five-year plan for infrastructure construction. Starting in 2007, the 
cities of the larger Nanjing Metropolitan Circle region convened annual Mayors’ Summits that 
addressed different key themes on the regional integration agenda (Nanjing Metropolitan Circle 
Yearbook Committee 2011, 547-548).72 At the same time that Nanjing engaged with neighboring 
cities on regional cooperation projects, the city pushed ahead with a Cross-River Development 
Strategy, promoting large-scale urban construction on the north side of the Yangtze.73  
Despite active efforts by municipal governments, however, lack of authoritative political 
mechanisms to manage inter-city cooperation and delays in securing higher-level approvals and 
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71 In December 2009, city leaders from Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Yangzhou met to launch research on a Nanjing-
Zhenjiang-Yangzhou Regional Cooperation and Development Strategy, with the goal of strengthening the region’s 
competitiveness and attracting development support for major infrastructural projects. Nanjing mayor Ji Jianye and his 
counterparts chaired the meeting, while Nanjing University Party Secretary Hong Yinxing was tapped to serve as 
coordinator for the research (Nanjing ribao 12/9/2009). Over the following two years, the team produced a detailed 
report and reached out to higher-level actors in the province and the NDRC in hopes of winning state-level recognition 
for the plan. The province never fully threw its support behind the project, however, and the NDRC declined to offer its 
help (Interviews NJ031204a; NJ021204b). 
72 The cities also worked together to launch a yearly Large Project Investment Forum, at which city governments 
recruited investment for major projects in the region. In 2009, this meeting resulted in agreements for 169 projects 
totaling over 100bn yuan. And they worked to develop a variety of other projects to aid regional integration—such as a 
unified transit card for the region, coordination of toll stations, and efforts to jointly promote tourism in the area (Zhu 
and He 2010, 210-215). 
73 Nanjing’s strategy aimed at speeding up development on the north side of the river and building up Pukou district. 
Insufficient cross-river infrastructure and slow urban and industrial growth on the north side of the city were seen by 
city experts as holding back the city’s overall development and its ability to serve as an influential regional center (Jiangsu 
Province Urban Development Research Institute, date unknown; Huang et al 2009, 32-33, 47-48). According to one city 
government researcher, Nanjing was fairly autonomous in formulating its development plans (Interview NJ091205a). 
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resources for planned infrastructure projects meant progress remained limited through the end of 
the 2000s. The idea of building a more closely integrated Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Yangzhou region to 
serve as the leading area for the broader Nanjing economic region hit snags. Although a secretariat 
for the Nanjing Metropolitan Circle had been established earlier, there was no standing body set up 
to manage Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Yangzhou work (Interview NJ031205b). Coordination of urban, 
industrial, and logistics development in the three cities proved hard, as Nanjing’s neighbors resisted 
taking orders from Nanjing (Interview NJ021204b). As late as 2012, little headway had been made in 
building a rapid inter-city rail system between the three cities, and city governments showed limited 
coordination in their industry development, port construction, and urban spatial planning (Interview 
NJ031205b). Together, these issues hindered Nanjing’s quest to remake itself as a more competitive 
metropolis.  Though Nanjing would see some new opportunities for development after 2010,74 many 
in Jiangsu perceived the city’s development after the mid-2000s as “below expectations” (buzhengqi). 
Overall, then, the late 2000s were a period of rebalancing in Jiangsu’s urban and regional 
development. After extremely fast and somewhat chaotic growth of core urban areas during the first 
half of the decade, higher-level policymakers increasingly saw addressing regional disparities as a 
more urgent priority than strengthening the province’s leading metropolitan centers. At the same 
time, Jiangsu’s provincial government was squeezed by new central demands for regionally 
coordinated development and subprovincial political pressure to spread more wealth around. Under 
a politically weaker leader, the provincial government responded to these pressures. Liang Baohua’s 
administration worked to bring greater development to the northern part of the province, while the 
provincial government took a more passive role when it came to promoting and coordinating the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 In the early 2010s, there was discussion of the possibility of a cross-provincial regional plan for the Nanjing 
metropolitan region that might be able to win central support (Interview NJ031204a). And Nanjing’s preparations for 
hosting the 2014 Youth Olympics also offered a window of opportunity for building new infrastructure, such as 
additional subway lines (Interview NJ091205a). 
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growth of Suzhou and Nanjing. In the absence of provincial help, city-level authorities played a 
proactive role, working to forge stronger economic links to neighboring regions. Some of their more 
ambitious goals were frustrated, however, by the lack of strong material support and political 
support from the provincial government and Beijing. Neither Suzhou nor Nanjing emerged as a 
first-class metropolitan center in its own right able to compete more directly with Shanghai or 
Guangzhou. At the same time, however, Jiangsu’s polycentric development model helped several 
different urban centers across the province thrive, thereby spreading economic opportunities more 
widely and helping Jiangsu avoid some of the problems of mega-city governance. 
 
Discussion and conclusions  
Jiangsu saw marked variation in its urban and regional development policies between the 
mid-1990s and the end of the 2000s, and limited metropolitan bias overall. Whereas the provincial 
government had made way for rapid, bottom-up development across southern Jiangsu in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, higher-level government actors intervened in urban and regional development more 
forcefully thereafter. During the late 1990s, the provincial government promoted growth in the 
lagging north. Leaders adopted a more big city-focused development philosophy at the turn of the 
century, and worked to support the development of larger, more integrated metropolitan areas in the 
early 2000s. During the mid-2000s, the provincial government launched a regionally focused 
economic strategy, prioritizing development of areas along the Yangtze River in order to boost 
competitiveness and better integrate the provincial economy. Then, from 2007 on, the slant of 
development policies shifted again under a new regional strategy targeting Jiangsu’s coastal cities. 
While Suzhou and Nanjing saw rapid economic and population growth between 1996 and 
2010, the cities’ growth rates fluctuated over time and did not dramatically outpace the growth of 
Jiangsu as a whole. Except for a few years in the early and mid 2000s, investment does not appear to 
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have been disproportionately concentrated in the province’s largest cities, and neither Suzhou nor 
Nanjing became much more dominant in the provincial economy. Instead, Jiangsu’s polycentric 
economic geography became more ingrained, with several different urban areas developing rapidly.  
Of course, policymakers in Jiangsu had sound economic reasons for dispersing investment 
and policy support across different cities and regions, and for pivoting between competitiveness-
oriented and more- balanced spatial strategies at different moments in time. Because the cities of 
southern Jiangsu were growing quickly and could draw on local and foreign capital as well as state 
resources to spur growth, they were less in need of state support.75 Meanwhile, northern Jiangsu, 
which remained heavily rural and lacked adequate local capital for industrial and infrastructural 
development, had a greater need for higher-level support (Interview NJ081205a). And shifting 
macroeconomic circumstances and various exogenous shocks – from the Asian Financial Crisis, to 
WTO accession, to nationwide inflation during the mid-2000s – required a continuous rebalancing 
in Jiangsu of the priorities of rapid growth and broad-based, sustainable development.  
Yet Jiangsu’s development policies were more than mechanical responses to changing 
economic conditions. Economic realities are necessarily interpreted through a political lens, and 
governments can be proactive as well as reactive. A closer look at outcomes in Jiangsu has shown 
that strategic state interventions shaped the development of cities and regions in important ways, 
and that the making and execution of policies were in turn shaped by political considerations.  
Jiangsu’s leading position in development meant that the objective of increasing 
competitiveness did not trump all other issues. Provincial leaders as well as central leaders were 
worried about helping lagging regions, because they perceived threats to the social and political 
stability of the province, and to the sustainability of growth in Jiangsu. Jiangsu’s high population 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 And because there were several large and medium-sized cities with fairly strong industrial bases and urban 
infrastructure in the province, fostering more advanced economic sectors did not require huge, concentrated capital 
investments (Interview NJ051205b). 
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density, and the large flows of migrants to southern Jiangsu from northern Jiangsu cities and areas 
outside the province after the 1990s placed strains on southern cities’ infrastructure and 
environment, prompting concerns about social stability and ecological sustainability. The prospect 
of increasingly congested and ungovernable cities called for measures to promote more dispersed 
urban growth (Interview NJ071205a). And because leaders were not single-mindedly preoccupied 
with boosting development, they also worried about the political consequences of further 
strengthening large cities such as Suzhou that were not fully under their control. 
Even in a relatively open and market-oriented province, urban and regional development 
policy was highly politicized. In Jiangsu, urban and regional policy had important implications for 
the distribution of key development resources. While Riverside Development and other initiatives 
involved a limited amount of direct provincial-level investment in industry, these programs 
preferentially allocated land-use quotas, financing, and infrastructure investment to priority areas 
(Interview NJ111307a). Favoring one part of the province in terms of policy support and resource 
allocation necessarily affected the interests of other regions, and initiatives like the Three 
Metropolitan Circles plan, Riverside Development, and Coastal Development generated backlash 
from areas that were marginalized.  
Urban and regional policies also had important implications for elite politics and 
intergovernmental relations. Jiangsu’s top leaders saw achievements in the urban and regional 
development realm as a crucial piece of their policy legacies, and pushed planners and working-level 
bureaucrats to help craft and realize their development visions (Interview SZ021307a). Major 
initiatives were tied to the personalities of the leaders who launched them, and, accordingly, 
development policy could become a front for larger political struggles. At the same time, as Xu 
(2008) and Luo and Shen (2008) have noted, urban and regional policies had major consequences 
for intergovernmental relations, insofar as different approaches gave different administrative levels 
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larger or smaller roles in development. The Three Metropolitan Circles and Riverside Development 
programs, for instance, sought to assert greater provincial planning authority as well as enhance 
Jiangsu’s economic competitiveness.  
The weakness of the provincial establishment relative to localities, on the one hand, and the 
central government on the other, tended to limit metropolitan bias in Jiangsu. Whereas the impulse 
of provincial governments is to aggrandize the provincial unit and the key centers thereof, central 
actors are more concerned with integrating the national economic “chessboard” and building up key 
national economic centers. Beijing paid close attention and offered much support to Jiangsu, but the 
center also placed high demands on the province given its role as a leader in development and as a 
microcosm for addressing China’s regional coordination problems. At the same time, Beijing 
prioritized the economic integration and development coordination of Jiangsu with Shanghai and 
neighboring provinces. Centrally driven development schemes such as the YRD Regional Plan 
limited the scope for Jiangsu to carry out initiatives geared toward provincial competitiveness.  
 To an even greater extent, though, it was the clout of localities in Jiangsu politics that limited 
the amount of spatial bias in development policies. The fiscal and administrative strength and strong 
outward linkages of Suzhou and other large Jiangsu cities limited the provincial government’s ability 
to dictate the terms of development, and also created anxiety about partial or complete 
administrative breakaway of these cities from the province. The provincial government struggled to 
coordinate cities effectively when it inserted itself in metropolitan governance, and remained wary 
about investing resources in areas not fully under its own control. Meanwhile, the fact that Nanjing, 
Suzhou, and Wuxi all held seats on the provincial Party standing committee limited the cohesiveness 
of provincial decision-making, and made it hard to privilege one top city while excluding others 
from benefits. And the strategic positions of several Jiangsu cities in the YRD region – and in the 
national economy more generally – in some cases enabled cities to lobby Beijing directly for support. 
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Lianyungang’s outreach to the central government, and Beijing’s subsequent pressure on Jiangsu to 
aid northern cities, attest to the capacity of cities in Jiangsu to exercise sway over development policy 
not only at the implementation stage but also at the formulation stage.  
Consistent with the main hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1, the period of greatest 
metropolitan bias in Jiangsu – the early 2000s – coincided with the moment of greatest economic 
threat and the height of provincial-level strength. During the early 2000s, Jiangsu was still regaining 
its economic footing in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and was adjusting to the new 
realities of WTO membership. Because Jiangsu had not fully completed its transition out of low-
value-added manufacturing and processing industries to more advanced manufacturing and service 
industries, and lacked urban centers with amenities comparable to those offered by Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, or Shenzhen, success in the post-accession environment could not be taken for granted. 
At the opening of the 21st century, the immediate challenge of maintaining Jiangsu’s external 
competitiveness loomed large relative to the issue of unbalanced development.  
The early 2000s were also a period of strong provincial-level leadership—under Hui Liangyu 
and especially Li Yuanchao. As relatively young leaders who brought experience and ties from 
outside the province and had already established themselves as rising stars, Hui and Li enjoyed the 
political capital and career incentives to support bolder change in policies within Jiangsu. Prioritizing 
Jiangsu’s economic competitiveness, each adopted policies that more heavily concentrated policy 
support and resources in the main metropolitan areas and more developed regions of the province. 
Li displayed greater political clout than his predecessor, adopting a unified provincial development 
strategy where Hui had dealt separately with different parts of the province. Still, even Li had to 
contend with the reality of fragmented governance and limited provincial power in Jiangsu. Over 
time, both the Three Metropolitan Circles scheme and Riverside Development foundered on intra-
provincial opposition.  
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To a greater extent than some past research has acknowledged, then, provincial-level policies 
and politics have shaped Jiangsu’s urban and regional development. Development strategies have 
shifted frequently, with their effects washing out over time. But the provincial unit nevertheless has 
functioned as a key arena for developmental governance and the politics that surrounds it.  
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V. Hunan and Jiangxi: The Politics of Lagging Growth and Leading Areas 
 
Introduction  
This chapter traces the making and execution of development policies in Hunan and Jiangxi, 
neighboring provinces in central China that in recent decades have grappled with similar challenges 
of economic backwardness and marginalization. As these cases show, crises of lagging economic 
performance can provide occasion for sweeping policy changes and bold state initiatives to enhance 
competitiveness. But policy outcomes are not determined by economic circumstances alone. Similar 
underlying conditions may be framed in different ways and lead to varying policy approaches 
depending on which government actors set the agenda and dominate the making of development 
policy. In urban and regional development, political variables do not only influence which sectors 
and which locations receive state support. They also affect the extent to which development 
strategies foreground the problems and interests of particular territorial entities – the nation, the 
province, or the locality – instead of focusing on other units. Here, I show how varying 
intergovernmental power balances have led to different policy approaches in otherwise similar places: 
high metropolitan bias in Hunan and more spatially balanced development in Jiangxi.  
Given their similar starting conditions and diverging paths, the cases of Hunan and Jiangxi 
offer an excellent opportunity to parse the factors that influence development approaches. Truly 
controlled case comparisons are elusive, but social scientists continue to gain key causal insights by 
tracing how varying outcomes arise in similar units (Slater and Ziblatt 2013; Anckar 2008; George 
and Bennett 2004). Hunan and Jiangxi show many relevant similarities. The two provinces are 
located side by side in the lush but rugged interior of south-central China. Both are historically rural, 
underdeveloped, and inward-looking. Helped by their agricultural bounty, Hunan and Jiangxi saw 
improvements in living standards and fared relatively well in the Maoist period. But both provinces 
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fell far behind neighboring areas in development and opening-up after 1978, and by the 1990s faced 
crises of economic marginalization. Amid these difficulties, policy elites called for more aggressive 
efforts to enhance urban and industrial competitiveness. 
   Figure 5.1: Map of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces and major cities 
  
                             Source: Figure by author; Shape files obtained from China Historical GIS (www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis)  
Although Hunan’s and Jiangxi’s development policy approaches and outcomes during the 
1980s and early 1990s were similar, the provinces followed varying courses after the mid-1990s. 
Between the late 1990s and 2010, Hunan was earlier in adopting and more forceful in implementing 
a strategy of metropolitan-oriented, uneven development. Provincial leaders prioritized development 
in and around the capital city of Changsha. Jiangxi’s development approach, in contrast, never 
showed such pronounced metropolitan bias. Jiangxi pursued a balanced, rural-oriented strategy of 
urban and regional development in the late 1990s before shifting to a more metropolitan-oriented 
approach for several years in the early 2000s. After 2006, the province reverted to more spatially 
balanced policies, emphasizing coordinated urban-rural development and environmental issues.  
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 193 
Varying policy approaches had important consequences for development outcomes in 
Hunan and Jiangxi. Changsha grew explosively after the late 1990s, becoming one of the most 
dynamic urban areas in the country.1 The rise of Nanchang, Jiangxi’s capital, was less meteoric and 
less sustained. On the other hand, Hunan saw widening regional and urban-rural inequality, while in 
Jiangxi rural incomes grew nearly in step with urban incomes and smaller urban centers across the 
province made larger economic strides between the late 1990s and 2010.  
         Table 5.2: Top-city and full-province development outcomes for Hunan and Jiangxi     
City 
PROVINCE 
1996-
2010 
GDP 
growth
*,% 
1996-
2010 
share 
of prov. 
FAI,
% 
 
 Per capita 
GDP, 
10,000 
yuan 
Per capita 
road area 
in urban 
districts, 
m2 per 
person 
Per capita 
fiscal 
expend., 
10,000 
yuan per 
person 
Per capita 
hospital 
capacity, 
beds per 
10,000 
people 
Per capita 
university 
enrollment, 
students/ 
10,000 
people 
Provincial 
rural per 
capita 
income, 
yuan 
Changsha 
(HUNAN) 
 
 
16.6 
(11.8) 
 
 
31.0 
(100) 
1996 0.70  
(0.40) 
5.66 
(4.11) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
31 
(14) 
120  
(21) 
 
(1,792.3) 
2010 6.99  
(2.25) 
14.91 
(10.10) 
0.62 
(0.38) 
62  
(31) 
782  
(148) 
 
(5,622.0) 
Nanchang 
(JIANGXI) 
 
 
13.5 
(12.8) 
 
 
21.6 
(100) 
1996 0.75  
(0.34) 
3.15 
(5.10) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
35  
(20) 
118  
(21) 
 
(1,869.6) 
2010 4.38  
(2.01) 
10.62 
(10.25) 
0.46 
(0.41) 
35 
(24) 
976  
(174) 
 
(5,788.6) 
Sources: China Data Online; Hunan Bureau of Statistics (various years); Jiangxi Bureau of Statistics (various years); author’s calculations. 
*I calculate the compound annual growth rate of GDP. 
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I find that metropolitan-oriented development progressed faster and further in Hunan in 
large part because of greater provincial government strength. Heading into the period of interest, 
Hunan displayed greater institutional strength than Jiangxi, with administrative resources and policy 
authority more concentrated at the provincial level. At the same time, Hunan’s provincial 
establishment also enjoyed more political leverage relative to Beijing above and localities below. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In 2000, Changsha’s leadership called for using 15 years to build an “economic strong city,” and set the goal of 
achieving GDP totals of 100 billion yuan by 2005 and 280 billion yuan by 2015. By 2008, Changsha’s GDP had already 
surpassed 300 billion yuan, and Changsha ranked fifth overall among provincial capitals in terms of its overall economic 
strength by some assessments. After 2000, Changsha successively overtook Changchun, Fuzhou, Xi’an, Harbin, and 
Shijiazhuang in economic strength rankings, and in a 2008 city competitiveness report placed in the top 10 (Li 2009). 
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Both historically and more recently, Hunan has been a more cohesive political entity than Jiangxi. 
And, for much of the period, Hunan had better-connected and higher-profile leaders in place. 
Hunan’s provincial government strength enabled the framing of development strategies 
around provincial-level priorities and helped the province mobilize internal resources and external 
influence on behalf of Changsha’s development. In Jiangxi, the metropolitan agenda was not nearly 
as dominant in policy-making. Development strategies aimed to address multiple development 
priorities, and the political strength of the hinterland constrained the implementation of pro-
metropolitan initiatives in the province. With Beijing’s influence and local interests shaping the 
policy process to a greater degree, greater emphasis was given to rural problems, environmental 
issues, and inter-regional coordination. Both provinces saw high metropolitan bias during the 
tenures of “rising star” leaders, but in Hunan a succession of activist leaders – supported by strong 
provincial-level institutions – kept a metropolitan-oriented development strategy in place over time. 
Greater overall metropolitan bias in Hunan also reflected the province’s more stubborn 
economic difficulties. Whereas Jiangxi achieved relatively fast economic growth after the early 2000s, 
Hunan continued to trail much of the country in industrial growth and internationalization. While 
Jiangxi’s changing fortunes helped to erode the rationale for metropolitan-oriented development, 
policymakers in Hunan continued to view the creation of a world-class metropolis as an economic 
imperative. Still, politics mattered considerably: Even after Hunan’s growth picked up pace in the 
late 2000s, strong provincial backing kept the metropolitan agenda alive. 
In what follows, I first discuss the main explanatory factors of interest, describing the similar 
development challenges Hunan and Jiangxi faced after the 1990s and the varying intergovernmental 
power balances seen in the two provinces. The bulk of the chapter traces the evolution of urban and 
regional policies and development outcomes across three different Five-Year Plan (FYP) periods. I 
describe key features of and shifts in provincial policy approaches, and show how economic 
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circumstances and political factors affected the degree of metropolitan bias in development. The 
chapter concludes by reviewing the evidence in favor of my argument and addressing alternative 
explanations of the outcomes seen in Hunan and Jiangxi.  
 
Crises of lagging economic performance 
Heading into the 21st century, Hunan and Jiangxi, notwithstanding their agricultural bounty 
lagged behind much of the country in economic growth and internationalization. Since early in the 
reform era, policymakers in Hunan and Jiangxi had struggled to open up their economies, shift labor 
out of farming, stimulate industry, and stanch outflows of talent and capital to coastal regions. 
Experts in both provinces pointed to lagging urban growth as a key developmental bottleneck.  
              Table 5.3: Basic development indicators for Hunan and Jiangxi  
PROVINCE 
Top city 
 
2000  
pop-
ulation 
(mn) 
2000  
GDP 
(bn yuan) 
2000  
GDP per 
capita 
(yuan) 
2000 
urban-
ization 
rate (%) 
1990-2000 
provincial 
CAGR (%) 
(difference from 
natl. avg) 
2000 
openness 
(FDI and 
exports 
share of 
GDP) (%) 
2000 capital 
urban 
population* 
(mn) 
2000 
capital city  
GDP 
share 
HUNAN 
(Changsha) 
65.6 355.1 5626 27.5 7.7 (-2.4) 5.2  
1.86 
 
0.18 
JIANGXI 
(Nanchang) 
41.5 200.3 4828 
 
27.5 8.6 (-1.4) 5.9  
1.76 
 
0.22 
Avg. of 20 
provinces  
55.1 410.5 7266 36.2 9.2 (-0.9) 15.3 2.61 0.24 
 Sources: China Data Online; author’s calculations. * This records non-agricultural population. **Compound annual growth rate. 
!
Hunan and Jiangxi resemble each other considerably both in terms of geography and in 
terms of economic structure. Verdant mountains and broad river basins dominate the landscapes of 
both provinces. With fertile soil and abundant freshwater, Hunan and Jiangxi are agricultural 
heavyweights and major exporters of grain and other foodstuffs to the rest of China. Throughout 
their modern histories, however, Hunan and Jiangxi have remained comparatively poor and insular. 
During the century prior to 1949, both provinces lacked major industrial cities, and neither was 
tightly tied into China’s quickly growing maritime economy. Unlike Hubei, their neighbor to the 
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north, both provinces had remained largely closed to foreign commerce.2 Indeed, provincial elites in 
Hunan and Jiangxi were notorious for their resistance to foreign economic and cultural influence 
(McDonald 1978; Feng 1999; Platt 2007).  
In the years after the Communist takeover, both Hunan and Jiangxi experienced bursts of 
industrialization and urban development, but neither became a major center of state-owned industry. 
Under China’s First FYP, Hunan and Jiangxi secured seven and six key national investment projects, 
respectively, and industrial cities in each province grew rapidly (Feng 1999, 256; Hunan Gazetteer 
Commission 2007, 331). Urban and industrial growth slowed later in the Maoist period, however. 
Both provinces were largely bypassed in China’s Third Front (san xian) policies of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, during which industrial and defense investment was dispersed in deeper parts of the 
interior. Hunan and Jiangxi continued to serve primarily as agricultural areas, and both provinces 
experienced considerable upheaval during the Cultural Revolution period. Economic and political 
disruption in Jiangxi was especially severe (Feng 1999; 257-258).  
When post-Mao reforms were inaugurated in 1978, Hunan and Jiangxi remained heavily 
rural and politically leftist, having seen their development side-tracked by ideological concerns and 
political struggles for over a decade. Both provinces’ agricultural sectors benefited from rural 
reforms, but urban and industrial development remained comparatively slow. While foreign trade 
and investment grew rapidly in neighboring coastal provinces, Hunan and Jiangxi’s economies 
remained largely closed.3 And, as in much of inland China, market institutions and norms developed 
slowly, with government intervention in the economy and trade barriers remaining widespread.4  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The Yangtze River, historically China’s key artery for inland commerce, flows through the center of Hubei but passes 
only briefly through Hunan and Jiangxi’s territory.  
3 As of 2000, exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) still totaled only 5.2 percent of provincial GDP in Hunan and 
5.9 percent of GDP in Jiangxi (China Data Online and author’s calculations). 
4 An analysis of different provinces’ 1999 “marketization” levels by economists at China’s National Economic Research 
Institute ranked Hunan and Jiangxi in the middle of the pack. To calculate marketization indices, the study aggregated 
measures of government intervention in the economy, factor market liberalization, economic structure, inter-regional 
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Throughout the 1980s, development policies in Hunan continued to emphasize urban-rural 
and regional balance. The provincial government promoted the simultaneous development of 
agriculture and extractive industries, light industry, and more capital- and technology-intensive 
sectors (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007). Like many provinces, Hunan supported the 
development of small and medium-sized cities while curbing metropolitan growth. Policymakers 
assigned restrictive land-area and population-size targets to larger cities, and meager investment in 
urban infrastructure hindered the growth of Changsha and other urban centers (Hunan Gazetteer 
Commission 1997, 50-51). Some provincial policy elites did push an agenda of faster metropolitan-
region growth in the early 1980s. Zhang Ping, a senior expert at Hunan’s Provincial Academy of 
Social Sciences (HPASS), argued for integrating Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan economically to 
build a more dynamic metropolitan area, reviving an idea that had first surfaced in the 1950s.5 The 
proposal to build a Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan (CZX) Economic Region garnered enough interest 
to progress to the planning stage. Following a couple of years of discussion and debate, however, the 
idea encountered political opposition within Hunan in 1986 and was shelved indefinitely.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
trade, and market institution development. Whereas Guangdong, China’s most market-oriented province, scored a 
ranking of 8.33, and Jiangsu scored 7.04, Hunan and Jiangxi scored 5.99 and 5.12, respectively. See Fan et al (2001).  
5 During the 1950s, provincial leaders in Hunan had put forward the idea of merging Changsha with the nearby cities of 
Zhuzhou and Xiangtan to build a Mao Zedong City. Although the proposal ultimately failed to gain central support, it 
kindled lasting interest in Hunan (Zeng 2010, 92-93). 
6 In April 1984, Hunan commissioned a CZX Economic Regional Economic Development Direction study. By 
November, researchers were ready to present their ideas to the provincial Party standing committee, which gave the go-
ahead for further planning efforts. The Provincial Construction Commission organized work with HPASS to explore 
urban planning approaches for the cities, and this collaboration resulted in a CZX region urban system and plan 
configuration study. In late 1984, the HPASS gave the provincial committee suggestions on establishing a provincial-
level economic zone in the three cities. Provincial authorities approved the establishment of a CZX area planning office, 
which subsequently carried out functional planning studies (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 1997, 60-65). Over the next 
two years, provincial and city leaders held meetings to work on plans or preliminary steps for greater bank cooperation, 
regional industry groups, and infrastructure integration in the tri-city area, and development projects were drawn up 
(Liangxing ban 2011a; Luo 2012). During meetings of Hunan’s Provincial Party Congress and Provincial People’s 
Congress in 1985 and 1986, however, many participants complained that plans for CZX economic region would give 
further preference to what was already Hunan’s most privileged area. Amid mounting opposition, CZX plans were 
shelved indefinitely, and hopes for a greater Changsha region were again deferred (Zhu and Tong 2011, 42). 
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In Jiangxi, too, provincial policymakers emphasized the development of smaller cities, towns, 
and villages, while planners set restrictive growth targets for Nanchang (Jiangxi Construction 
Gazetteer Commission 2000, 24).7 More broadly, development policy in Jiangxi emphasized rural 
construction, agriculture, and environmental protection. During the 1980s, Jiangxi launched a 
Mountain-River-Lake Project (shan jiang hu gongcheng) for environmental management and rural 
development, and leaders further stressed green economic themes with their “paint a beautiful 
landscape picture” policy slogan (Jiangxi Government Gazetteer Commission 2002, 167).8  
During the 1990s, Hunan and Jiangxi not only remained poor in absolute terms, but also 
increasingly fell behind their counterparts, with GDP growth and industrial development lagging 
behind national baseline rates.9 From 1990-2000, Hunan and Jiangxi had inflation-adjusted 
compound annual GDP growth rates (CAGR) of 7.7 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively—2.4 and 
1.4 percentage points below China’s overall growth rate (China Data Online; author’s calculations). 
Between 1990-1998, Hunan’s industrial fixed-asset investment (FAI) grew at four percentage points 
below the average national rate. The province lacked many large industrial firms, and struggled to 
develop technologically advanced sectors (He ed. 2001, 466-467). As late as 2000, the two provinces 
remained predominantly rural, with urbanization rates of approximately 28 percent (Shen 2006). If 
Hunan’s growth was slower than Jiangxi’s, Jiangxi’s structural backwardness was more severe. The 
province had fewer viable urban centers and an even narrower industrial base than Hunan. Jiangxi 
saw its share of national industrial output plunge during the reform era, and by 1995 its per capita 
industrial output was only 40.7 percent of the national average (Feng 1999; Liu 2009,103-106 ).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Nanchang, home to an urban population just under one million by the mid-1980s, was assigned a population target of 
1.05mn for the year 2000 (Jiangxi Construction Gazetteer Commission 2000, 24). 
8 In late 1988, for instance, provincial leaders called for dedicating the following five years to consolidating Jiangxi’s 
agricultural economy. The 1986-1990 Seventh Five-Year Plan called for building up north Jiangxi as a window to the 
outside world and developing cities along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi railway in central Jiangxi, but leaders continued to lay 
heavy stress on rural development (Jiangxi Government Gazetteer Commission 2002, 13, 167). 
9 In 2000, Hunan’s per capita GDP, at 5,626 yuan, was 72 percent of the national average, while Jiangxi’s per capita 
GDP, at 4,828 yuan, was only 61 percent of the national average (China Data Online; author’s calculations). 
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After the early 1990s, policy elites in Hunan and Jiangxi grew increasingly distressed about 
their regions’ lagging performance, and came to view low rates of urbanization and the lack of 
strong economic centers as a key problem (Zhou and Xu 2000; Li et al 2007). Policymakers in 
Hunan fretted about Changsha’s inability to compete for capital and talent with the metropolitan 
regions of neighboring provinces. “We’re not as good as Wuhan to the north; we’re inferior to 
Guangzhou in the south,” was one typical lament (Interview CS061203a). With Changsha’s urban 
population having barely breached the one-million mark by the early 1990s, there was also concern 
about the lack of large, dynamic cities able to absorb Hunan’s large and increasingly mobile rural 
population (Interview CS021111a). Over the following years, a preoccupation with maintaining the 
province’s – and more specifically the capital city’s – competitiveness vis-à-vis Guangdong and 
Hubei would remain a common motif in Hunan’s development discourse. In Jiangxi, policymakers 
and experts also voiced growing concern about their province’s weak industrial growth and slow 
opening-up, and called for stronger state action (Jiangxi Government Gazetteer Commission 2002). 
Over the following years, elites in both provinces endorsed plans to invest more heavily in strategic 
growth centers so as to “spur along” (daidong) larger provincial economies (Xiong 1992; Feng 1999; 
Zhu 2011). In both provinces, new development strategies prioritizing industrial development near 
key urban centers and along major transport corridors emerged in the early 1990s.10  
As the turn of the century approached, however, efforts in Hunan and Jiangxi to promote 
urban and industrial development were complicated by turbulent markets, natural disasters, regional 
competition, and central neglect. Besides the shock of the Asian Financial Crisis, the late 1990s also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 In Hunan, a new regional development scheme unveiled in March 1992 placed greater emphasis on building up “five 
zones and one corridor”—the five major cities (and key development zones) running north to south between Hengyang 
and Yueyang along the Xiang River (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 12; Xiong 1992, 212). Soon after, work 
accelerated on Hunan’s national- and provincial-level development zones, most of them located in this corridor (Hunan 
Gazetteer Commission 2007). Meanwhile, Jiangxi’s June 1992 provincial Party Congress endorsed faster development in 
the Nanchang-Jiujiang-Jingdezhen triangle, and provincial leaders in December 1992 called for speeding up urban and 
industrial growth along Jiangxi’s main north-south and east-west rail lines. A key focus was the Nanchang-Jiujiang 
industrial corridor (Liu 2009, 15; Zhu 2011). 
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brought damaging floods to south-central China. The sense of crisis mounted as China announced 
final preparations to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Beijing launched a Western 
Development campaign that left provinces in central China feeling skipped-over. Policy experts in 
Hunan, Jiangxi, and neighboring provinces riffed darkly that “as neither East nor West, we're of no 
interest” (budong, buxi, bu shi dongxi), and warned of an impending “central region collapse” (zhongbu 
taxian) (Wang 2010, 76). Middling metropolises in an increasingly competitive landscape, cities such 
as Changsha and Nanchang were poorly positioned to attract large quantities of private investment 
or large amounts of central state aid (Luo 2002, 14-16).11  
As they entered the 21st century, then, leaders in Hunan and Jiangxi showed frustration from 
a decade of lagging development and anxiety about economic marginalization going forward. With 
limited central assistance, provincial policymakers realized they would have to devise their own 
means for making economic headway amid greater inter-provincial and international competition. 
 
Disparities in provincial administrative strength 
 While Hunan and Jiangxi confronted similar underlying challenges, political variables would 
affect which development priorities were highlighted, what strategies were adopted to address them, 
and how such strategies were implemented.  Higher-level governments tend to have greater 
policymaking authority and a larger share of resources in inland provinces than in wealthy coastal 
areas like Jiangsu. But even among inland provinces there is marked variation across units and over 
time in the relative strength of provincial governments.12 The Hunan and Jiangxi cases embody both 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 As one Chinese scholar noted, notwithstanding Changsha’s status as a center for culture and scientific research, the 
city was located in a transitional zone between coastal China and the poorer, more remote interior, and was not an area 
of special status or great national concern (Luo 2002, 14-16). 
12 As one central government researcher explained, provincial governments in inland areas such as Hunan have a much 
greater ability to exercise administrative control over cities than coastal provinces such as Jiangsu, where provincial 
authorities must contend with relatively wealthy, outward-oriented, and politically connected city governments 
(Interview BJ0613097b). 
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cross-case and within-case variation in the ability of provincial-level actors to dominate the 
formulation and implementation of development strategies. Whereas Hunan’s provincial 
establishment had the administrative capacity and political clout to orchestrate a metropolitan-
oriented development approach, institutional weakness at the provincial level in Jiangxi made it 
harder to assert provincial-level priorities. However, the presence of a rising star leader during the 
early 2000s enabled Jiangxi to take greater initiative and promote a competitiveness-oriented agenda. 
 As discussed in previous chapters, provincial government strength depends in part on the 
administrative capacity of provincial authorities relative to other tiers. Hunan is larger than Jiangxi in 
geographic, demographic, and economic terms, and is slightly wealthier on a per capita basis, which 
gives it a larger potential resource base. Notwithstanding Hunan’s greater size, the province appears 
to have been more administratively centralized than Jiangxi. At the turn of the 21st century, for 
instance, the proportion of subnational fiscal expenditures carried out at the provincial level was 
higher in Hunan than Jiangxi.13 Meanwhile, provincial authorities wielded firmer administrative 
control over prefectural-level cities in Hunan than in Jiangxi.14 Jiangxi had carried out multiple 
experiments with enhanced sub-provincial autonomy since the 1980s. The large southern prefecture 
of Ganzhou obtained provincial-level economic powers and special exemptions from provincial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 In 1999-2000, the provincial-level share of “local” fiscal expenditure in Hunan was 32 percent, compared with 24 
percent in Jiangxi (Provincial statistical yearbooks and author’s calculations). Hunan’s provincial government also 
presided over an unusually large fraction of capital construction expenditure within the province, suggesting an 
important provincial role in development work (Wong 2002, 34). 
14 According one provincial planning official, cities and counties in Hunan typically are quite fiscally dependent on higher 
levels, and the province has a strong ability to “plan as a whole” (tongchou guihua) as compared with some provinces 
(Interview CS191205a). In Jiangxi, provincial-level economic planning appears weaker, and local governments have a 
reputation for recalcitrance. Feng (1999) notes that local governments and the public have often resisted provincially 
initiated policies. For instance, Jiangxi Party Secretary Mao Zhiyong complained in 1992 that many localities were 
refusing to develop a domestic private economy or to encourage foreign investment, while provincial scholars 
complained about “an old revolutionary area mentality” among cadres (259-261). 
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planning under an experimental reform zone scheme adopted in the mid-1980s. Special policies had 
also been granted to the Yangtze River port city of Jiujiang in northern Jiangxi (Liu 2009, 9-10).15  
Hunan’s institutional strength also derives from the province’s tradition of economic self-
reliance and administrative autonomy. In late imperial times, Hunan and its elite stood more aloof 
from central state institutions than their counterparts in Jiangxi.16 During the first half of the 20th 
century, Hunan was a hotbed of provincially oriented reform and agitation, and was never brought 
tightly into the fold of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing-based Nationalist regime (McDonald 1978; 
Whitney 1970). Hunan also remained fairly marginal in China’s post-1949 planned economy, despite 
its political aura as the home province of Mao Zedong and other revolutionary leaders. 
Economically and geographically middle-of-the-pack, the province led a fairly autarkic existence, and 
relatively few major industrial projects or key state institutions were located there. During the post-
Mao era, Hunan had remained fairly self-contained and self-sufficient, neither receiving generous 
amounts of central state assistance and investment nor providing much fiscal revenue to national 
coffers (Interview CS011203b).17   
In contrast, Jiangxi both historically and in recent decades has experienced greater central 
government involvement in its affairs. As the Communist Party’s most important early bastion of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 In the mid-1980s, provincial authorities had called for Ganzhou to anchor development in the southern half of the 
province, and take the lead in linking up with special economic areas in neighboring Fujian and Guangdong (Feng 1999, 
262; Jiangxi Construction Gazetteer Commission 2000). In early 1986, the province issued a circular announcing that an 
Economic System Reform Experimental Zone would be established in Ganzhou, and supporting policies were 
promulgated in December 1987 and January 1988 (Liu 2009, 9). The province devolved preferential policies to counties 
in Ganzhou, and also told prefectural authorities that the scope of provincial-level planning in the region would be 
limited going forward so as to create more flexibility (Jiangxi Government Gazetteer Commission 2002). Though a plan 
for a special reform area in southern Hunan also surfaced in the late 1980s, it came later and was never fully 
implemented (Xiong 1992, 202). 
16 McDonald (1978) notes the limited ties between Hunan’s elite and the national elite during late imperial times: “In an 
empire that valued scholarship as the road to bureaucratic advancement, Hunan was not outstanding as a scholarly 
center during either the Ming or the Qing. It ranked thirteenth among seventeen provinces during the Ming dynasty 
(A.D. 1368-1644), and fifteenth among nineteen provinces during the Qing (A.D. 1644-1911)” (12-13). Jiangxi, by 
contrast, was disproportionately represented among successful Ming and Qing imperial exam candidates (Feng 1999, 
255-256). 
17 In recent decades, Hunan has continued to rank low in terms of state-owned industry share and fiscal yield (China 
Data Online; author’s calculations). 
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rural revolution, Jiangxi developed a strong revolutionary cultural legacy and came to occupy a key 
place in the PRC’s national imaginary (Perry 2012). After 1949, Jiangxi’s historical significance and 
its material need as one of central China’s most war-ravaged, underdeveloped areas led central 
leaders to forge a paternalistic relationship with the province, providing development aid and 
guidance (Feng 1999, 250-256). While it enjoyed close ties with Beijing and was singled out for 
special support as an old revolutionary base and model agricultural province, Jiangxi was also 
expected to maintain a steady supply of agricultural exports and to exemplify ideological orthodoxy. 
Beyond its agricultural bounty, Jiangxi’s rich endowments of minerals (Jiangxi ranks among China’s 
top provinces in its deposits of copper, uranium, gold, and various rare earth metals), forestland, and 
freshwater have made it a natural resource base of great significance. Especially during the reform 
era, central state actors have taken a strong interest in managing and developing these highly valued 
resources (Ibid.; Hua 2011, 1-2). The combination of a prominent revolutionary legacy, historical 
dependence on central assistance, and strategic natural resource endowments have bound Jiangxi 
tightly to Beijing and invited more central state intervention than in Hunan. 
Beyond administrative aspects of provincial government strength, political variables also 
affect the intergovernmental power balance and the extent to which provincial leaders are affected 
by subprovincial political pressures. While the only city-level leader on Hunan’s provincial Party 
standing committee during the 2000s was Changsha’s Party secretary, the Party secretaries of 
Ganzhou as well as Nanchang sat on Jiangxi’s standing committee after 2003 (China Directory 2001; 
2006). Hunan’s top leadership was thus more insulated from subnational interests than Jiangxi’s.  
The ease with which policymaking can be organized around the interests of a given territorial 
unit also depends on the presence or absence of a widespread sense of political community and 
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subnational cohesion.18 Although Hunan and Jiangxi have both existed in more or less their current 
shape since early in the Qing Dynasty, Hunan commands more symbolic prestige and loyalty than 
Jiangxi as a subnational unit. Several scholars of modern and contemporary China have noted 
Hunan’s lively provincial tradition and potent regional identity: the province’s “anti-outsider” (pai 
wai) currents and distinctive Xiang dialect are well known (McDonald 1978; Platt 2007; Interview 
CS161203a).19 In Hunan, moreover, Changsha’s centrality is well-established: the city and 
surrounding region have served for centuries as the political, cultural, and economic pivot of the 
province (McDonald 1971). While Hunan also contains large peripheral regions, these areas are 
themselves culturally fragmented and have been pulled into the political orbit of Changsha since at 
least the 19th century (Platt 2007, 80-86).   
Jiangxi lacks a provincial political tradition comparable to Hunan’s or a similar degree of 
subnational cohesion. Feng (1999) notes the absence of a shared identity in Jiangxi: 
Unlike many regional or provincial cultures in China, Gan culture is by no means readily 
defined. First of all, there is no dominant language or dialect in Jiangxi. While more than 
99.9 per cent of Jiangxi’s population are Han, they speak several different dialects. […] All of 
these linguistic groups have a natural tendency to identify themselves with people speaking 
the same language or dialect and sharing many other customs across the provincial borders 
(264-265).  
 
Though Nanchang anchors the province geographically and serves as its administrative and 
economic hub, Jiangxi contains other important cultural and historical centers, such as Ganzhou—a 
large prefecture in southern Jiangxi whose population is largely Hakka (Looney 2012, 287).20 Indeed, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Territorial identities make possible the framing of public issues with respect to the needs of large, artificial political 
communities, and help legitimize the deployment of power and mobilization of resources for state projects. See 
Hartshorne (1950); Gerschenkron (1962); Whitney (1970); Singh (2010). 
19 Hunan stands out among Chinese provinces for its 19th and 20th century political tradition as a key base of provincial 
military power and a hotbed of sub-national and proto-nationalist political mobilization. Provincial-level military and 
political mobilization in the 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to the emergence of a military organization and 
print culture that penetrated much of the province. Meanwhile, Hunan’s self-contained geography have left the province 
with a distinctive and relatively cohesive dialect family and culinary culture (McDonald 1978; Platt 2007). 
20 Ethnically distinct (the regional population is Hakka, and maintains cross-border ties to co-ethnic regions in Fujian 
and Guangdong), large enough to contain a quarter of Jiangxi’s territory and population, and famous as the site of the 
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Jiangxi’s lack of cohesion as a territorial entity is underscored by the fact that provincial authorities 
have gone to great lengths to forge a stronger subnational imaginary. During the early 1990s, 
governor Wu Guanzheng launched a Gan cultural campaign to promote Jiangxi identity and support 
the cause of provincial economic development. Addressing the “centrifugal” tendencies pulling 
different parts of the province into different economic and cultural orbits, the campaign sought to 
strengthen Nanchang’s role as the province’s cultural and symbolic center (Feng 1999, 263-266).21  
Finally, provincial government strength in a multilevel policy process depends on the 
characteristics of top provincial leaders. Since the 1990s, both Hunan and Jiangxi have seen stronger 
and weaker, more proactive and more reactive, provincial leaders come and go. Over the past two 
decades as a whole, however, Hunan has had a larger number of strong leaders, and has had 
dynamic leaders in place at moments when national circumstances created special opportunities for 
provincial initiative. After the departure in 1997 of Wu Guanzheng,22 Jiangxi came under the 
comparatively conservative leadership of Shu Shengyou and Shu Huiguo. Both had risen through 
the ranks within Jiangxi, and both were already nearing retirement age at the time of appointment. 
By contrast, Hunan in the late 1990s had more activist leaders in Yang Zhengwu and Chu Bo, both 
of whom had risen to high-ranked posts while still in their mid-50s, with several years of their 
political careers left. In 2001, Zhang Yunchuan, another dynamic mid-career politician, was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Chinese Communist Party’s Jiangxi Soviet, Ganzhou is something of a realm unto itself. Ganzhou ranks as one of 
China’s largest cities by area at 39,400 square km., and its population of approximately 9 million is 95 percent Hakka, a 
sub-group of Han Chinese that maintain a distinctive dialect, cultural identity, and practices (Looney 2012, 286-287). It is 
telling that in 2000 Ganzhou outranked Jiangxi’s provincial capital in the number of cultural and arts institutions and 
enterprises located within its boundaries (Jiangxi Statistical Bureau 2001). 
21 Jiangxi’s provincially led cultural campaign entailed sponsorship of new publications, creation of new educational 
institutions (such as an Institute for Gan Cultural Studies at Nanchang University), and vigorous publicity work. Some of 
the intellectuals leading this Gan culture movement went so far as to advocate separating Jiangxi’s identity from the 
province’s revolutionary past, arguing that many of the Communist Party’s early endeavors in the province had been 
neither successful nor organically connected with Jiangxi culture (Feng 1999, 263-266). 
22 Wu had served first as Jiangxi’s governor and later as Party secretary between the late 1980s and early 1990s. He 
aggressively promoted industrial development and reform, and also spearheaded a provincial campaign to promote a 
Jiangxi (Gan) cultural revival (Feng 1999, 263-264).  
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appointed governor, before Hunan local Zhou Bohua, took over in 2003 (China Directory; China 
Vitae). Jiangxi gained a more energetic top leader in 2001 when Meng Jianzhu, a rising star from 
Shanghai, was appointed. Later in the decade, however, the tables turned again as Meng was 
replaced by Su Rong, an older Party secretary who had previously served in backwater provinces. 
Meanwhile, Hunan in 2006 gained not one but two heavyweight leaders when Zhang Chunxian and 
Zhou Qiang were rotated into the province. Both were rising stars in China’s political elite, enjoying 
close ties with central leaders and state agencies that could be used on behalf of Hunan’s interests. 
 In sum, Hunan for the most part outmatched Jiangxi on both administrative and political 
dimensions of provincial government strength. Resulting differences in provincial authorities’ ability 
to dominate a multilevel policymaking process, as much as variation in underlying economic 
challenges and opportunities, would affect the urban and regional development approaches Hunan 
and Jiangxi took between the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Diverging development approaches, 1996-2000 
As of 1996, the capital cities of Hunan and Jiangxi differed little in their economic size and 
urban population. Changsha had a GDP of 40 billion yuan and an urban population of 1.67 million, 
while Nanchang had a GDP of 30 billion yuan and a population of 1.57 million. Both remained 
middling inland cities in a country where major coastal metropolises like Shenzhen, Qingdao, and 
Dalian defined the front lines of economic development. Over the following five years, however, a 
major urban build-up gained steam in Changsha, while policymakers in Jiangxi shifted the emphasis 
of development away from the Nanchang region. Spurred by a perceived crisis of competitiveness, 
top provincial leaders in Hunan adopted a new, more metropolitan-oriented development strategy in 
the late 1990s and mobilized local bureaucrats and planners behind it. By 2000, provincial 
policymakers had already made major progress with planning efforts, and major development 
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projects were getting underway in the CZX area. Jiangxi authorities moved in the opposite direction 
during the late 1990s, putting in place more balanced and rural-oriented development policies.  
While Hunan’s disappointing economic performance in the early 1990s set the stage for an 
adjustment to its development approach thereafter, the initiative of provincial leaders also 
significantly shaped policy outcomes. In Hunan, a tight nucleus of provincial policy elites engineered 
a metropolitan turn in development policy well before such an approach gained favor in Beijing. 
Jiangxi’s policy approach, on the other hand, adhered closely to national urban policies and paid 
respect to the province’s traditional designation as an agricultural region. It also showed greater 
sensitivity to local pressures from across the province to spread developmental support more 
broadly. Between 1996 and 2000, Changsha grew increasingly dominant in Hunan’s economy, and 
surged ahead of Nanchang, carrying out vastly more FAI and achieving much faster GDP growth.23  
 
Hunan 
By the mid-1990s, frustration over Hunan’s slow development and Changsha’s inability to 
keep up with competitors was mounting. Between 1990-1995, the province’s economy had grown at 
an annualized rate of 7.3 percent, well below the national benchmark of 11.7 percent and even 
behind Jiangxi’s 8.1 percent (China Data Online; author’s calculations). And while “zone fever” had 
swept the country and many major cities were booming, Changsha’s urban growth lagged behind 
(Changsha Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005).24 Guangzhou and Wuhan continued to 
tower over Changsha in population size and GDP, pulling away talent and investment. Concerned 
city-level leaders, including municipal Party secretary Qin Guangrong, had begun to push an agenda 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Between 1996-2000, Changsha made up a higher share of total provincial FAI than Nanchang (18 percent versus 13 
percent) and capital construction spending (18 percent versus 14 percent), despite the fact that Hunan was a significantly 
larger province with more major urban centers (China Data Online and author’s calculations). 
24 Macroeconomic controls in Hunan were enforced fairly strictly, and provincial policies had not yet turned fully in 
favor of the city (Changsha Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005, 5). 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 208 
of faster urban development (Ibid., 6-7).25 With Changsha lacking adequate resources of its own to 
realize bolder development goals, however, its fate depended heavily on provincial-level policies. 
Since the early 1990s, provincial policymakers in Hunan had been discussing new 
approaches for development of the metropolitan region. At an April 1993 meeting of provincial 
department heads led by deputy governors Chu Bo and Zheng Peimin, officials had decided that 
regional planning work should emphasize the “golden triangle” (jin sanjiao) of the CZX region. Soon 
after, in June 1993, Chu Bo had chaired another meeting of top government leaders at which 
officials concluded that an integrated approach to regional development should be taken, and the 
government endorsed an “unbalanced development strategy” (feijunheng fazhan zhanlüe) that would 
give priority to the CZX region in the near term (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 94-95).26  
Prominent policy intellectuals lent their backing to proposals for more aggressive 
metropolitan development approaches. Development experts from provincial research institutions 
and universities called for fostering a stronger central growth pole in Hunan, and resurrected the 
idea of an integrated CZX urban region that could serve as a counterweight to metropolitan centers 
outside Hunan. Zhang Ping, the same HPASS expert who had in the 1980s advocated building a 
CZX economic area, proved especially instrumental in laying out a new agenda of metropolitan-
regional development. Between 1995 and 1996, Zhang discussed plans for the CZX region with 
provincial and city-level leaders, and spearheaded supporting research (21 Shiji jingji baodao 
10/16/2003). At a meeting of provincial officials in 1995, city leaders from Changsha, Zhuzhou, and 
Xiangtan voiced support for new efforts at regional economic integration (Liangxing ban 2011a, 5). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Changsha’s 1994 urban work meeting called for accelerated construction in the city, and the city’s 1995 Party Congress 
meeting outlined a strategy of cross-river expansion (Changsha Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005, 6-7). 
26 Those at the meeting agreed that provincial policies should promote industrialization and urbanization in this area 
most aggressively, with the broader Xiang River industrial corridor as the area of secondary emphasis. 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 209 
The CZX development strategy found important champions among high-level provincial 
leaders. Appointed governor in 1995, Yang Zhengwu came from a rustic background but brought 
considerable high-level leadership experience.27 Despite his roots in rural western Hunan, Yang 
quickly signaled a stronger interest in metropolitan-oriented growth than his predecessor.28 Yang 
called for Hunan’s development and construction efforts in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) period 
(1996-2000) to prioritize Changsha (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007). In 1996, Yang called for 
greater emphasis on large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects and strategic development 
locations, exhorting his colleagues that “the whole province from top to bottom should firmly 
establish the mentality of big trade, big opening, and big development” (Ibid., 92).  
Under Yang, Hunan’s development approach was recast to place greater stress on Changsha 
and its immediate neighbors. Provincial leaders announced a “one point, one line” (yi dian yi xian) 
strategy, singling out Changsha as Hunan’s main growth pole and designating the corridor along 
National Highway 107 and the Beijing-Guangzhou railway as the key development axis (Ibid., 95).29 
The provincial leadership formally adopted the strategy of CZX economic integration in March 1997 
at a meeting of departmental and city leaders convened by Party secretary Wang Maolin. According 
to one official account, by 1997 “Hunan recognized more clearly that as an inland province, it would 
always remain in a passive position in [China’s] regional economic division of labor if it lacked a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Though Yang had advanced his career within Hunan, he had relatively strong political credentials, having joined 
Hunan’s provincial Party standing committee and become a member of the Communist Party Central Committee at a 
relatively young age (Xinhua Net). Yang became a Central Committee member in 1987, while only 46. See 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/25/content_2136727.htm.  Yang rose to high Party posts in Hunan early on, 
becoming a provincial Party standing committee member in 1985. See http://baike.baidu.com/view/121701.htm. 
28 While Governor Chen Bangzhu, who had served since early 1993, had supported a reform-oriented economic agenda, 
Chen’s urban strategy had continued to emphasize small city-oriented development. Provincial meetings in August 1994, 
for instance, had concluded that a rural, late-developing province such as Hunan ought to continue giving priority to 
small-town development as urbanization proceeded (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 349). 
29 Provincial policy documents stressed that  “[…] Changsha, as the highest emphasis, particularly needs accelerated 
development. We must exert effort to push forward CZX integration, and in this way to form a relatively large-sized 
economic center with greater strength and more comprehensive function”  (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 95). 
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large-scale, strongly radiating central city, and if it failed to change its ‘small horse pulling a big cart’ 
approach” (Liangxing ban 2011a, 5).  
Elevated to the provincial Party secretary post in 1998, Yang would remain in power until 
2005, backing the efforts of successive governors to promote CZX development. Chu Bo, who for 
several years served under Yang, played a similarly important role in advancing the metropolitan 
agenda. Originally from Anhui, Chu had served as a deputy governor in Hunan since the early 1990s 
(China Vitae). As deputy governor, Chu had been involved from the outset with efforts to get CZX 
plans off the ground. Promoted to governor when Yang became Party chief, Chu threw his weight 
behind an agenda of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and commercialization (Interview 
CS061203a; Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007).30 Chu argued that in order to become a “strong 
economic province,” Hunan needed to break away from its long tradition an agricultural province 
and its rural-oriented mentality. Instead, Hunan should “concentrate and consolidate limited 
resources” and “use the strength of the whole province to fuse Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan 
into a regional ‘dragonhead’ capable of spurring along Hunan’s economic development” (Jin 2001).  
Between 1997 and 1999, top provincial leaders held several meetings to lay the groundwork 
for CZX economic integration (Luo 2012). In 1997, Hunan established a leading small group to 
coordinate CZX economic integration. Headed by the governor, the membership was rounded out 
with officials from provincial departments and city-level leaders, and an administrative office for the 
small group was established in Hunan’s Planning Commission (Zeng 2010, 92-93). To promote 
economic integration, the province adopted an approach of “overall planning guides, infrastructure 
takes the lead, and major projects follow” (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 95-97). Planning 
work for CZX integration got underway during 1998 and 1999, with provincial departments drafting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 In November 2000 Chu Bo articulated a “Three –izations” strategy, of “industrialization, commercialization, and 
urbanization,” which would remain in place in following years (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 93). 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 211 
blueprints for coordination of communications, transportation, financial activity, environmental 
work, and industrial development across the three cities. In February 1999, provincial and city 
leaders at the CZX Economic Integration and Development Forum discussed creating a broader 
CZX regional plan to guide spatial development and provide an overarching framework for planning 
efforts (Liangxing ban 2011a; Luo 2012). Later that year, the provincial government approved the five 
functional plans for tri-city integration, and moved quickly toward project implementation (Hunan 
Development Planning Commission 2002, 15).  
Though the convening of several meetings of Hunan’s provincial Party standing committee 
to deal with CZX integration showed a high degree of elite political support for the project, the 
metropolitan regional strategy remained controversial. According to one Hunan official, participants 
in these meetings questioned whether further support should be given to the province’s best-off 
areas, and whether CZX could indeed function as a growth pole for the whole province (Interview 
CS191205a). But, with strong executive support, the metropolitan agenda moved forward quickly 
despite such objections. 
Progress on CZX-related initiatives at the turn of the century was bolstered by Hunan’s 
success in obtaining timely outside recognition and support. Hunan’s strategy for CZX integration 
won mention for the Changsha region as one of seven nationally highlighted urban clusters for the 
10th FYP period. Even more important, Hunan managed to get the CZX region designated as one of 
two Chinese test-point regions under a new World Bank City Development Strategy (CDS) program 
(World Bank 2004; Luo 2012).31 Over the following years, the provincial leadership was proactive in 
deepening and leveraging to its own advantage the partnership with the World Bank.32 Hunan would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Changsha had been nominated by the State Planning Commission (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 96). 
32 Hunan’s leaders had sought out Bank support, and, during a CDS team visit in May 2000, had also successfully 
pressed the World Bank to enlarge the scope of the project to include the whole CZX region rather than Changsha alone. 
Hunan had also provided institutional support for the collaboration, establishing a provincial leading group headed by 
the governor to facilitate work with the World Bank (World Bank 2004; Luo 2012). 
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benefit from several Bank-funded investment projects, and the planning documents that emerged 
from collaboration between World Bank experts and Hunan officials would provide an important 
template and a stamp of validation for CZX regional development work.  
Bolstered by outside recognition and support, Hunan’s metropolitan region strategy made 
further breakthroughs at the policy level and on the ground. A July 2000 meeting of provincial and 
city leaders in Zhuzhou adopted plans to construct a “Xiang River economic corridor,” and thereby 
push forward physical integration of the three cities. Several regional infrastructure projects were 
launched, including a renovation of Changsha’s Huanghua Airport, an upgrading of the regional 
power grid, environmental work on the Xiang River, and construction of new highways (Luo 2012).  
One key focus of provincial efforts was the build-up of the Changsha Economic and 
Technological Development Zone (ETDZ). Located in Changsha County just east of the city center, 
the ETDZ had first been established in 1992.33 After the county government moved from central 
Changsha to Xingsha new town in the ETDZ in 1996, the zone had begun to develop quickly as a 
site for large-scale industrial projects and a new urban center (China Small and Medium City Task 
Force 2013). In April 1997, the ETDZ managed to obtain special recognition from China’s Ministry 
of Science and Technology as a development zone for high-technology industry. Hunan deputy 
governor Wang Keying led a team of provincial departments and Changsha officials in promoting 
the ETDZ’s further development, highlighting its role as a “demonstration area for the whole 
province’s opening and development, a model area for investment recruiting, and an area to pull 
along leading development” (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 233-234). Later that year, 
governor Yang Zhengwu set up a leading small group and new provincial office to oversee Hunan’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The zone had originally been set up in Xingsha, on the outskirts of central Changsha, in July 1992. In 1993, the 
provincial government authorized the movement of the Changsha county government from a location in the city center 
to the new urban area in Xingsha, where the county government could operate more easily as a stand-alone entity. In 
March 1994, the provincial government approved changing the zone’s name to the “Changsha ETDZ” (Changsha 
Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005, 180). 
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development zone work. Wang was put in charge, and particular emphasis was placed on further 
building up the Changsha ETDZ (Ibid.). Infrastructure and industrial investment in the zone quickly 
picked up pace, and by 1999 the provincial government had released a revised plan for the ETDZ 
that raised its population and land area targets for 2015 to 150,000 people and 38 square kilometers 
(Changsha Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005). In 2000, the ETDZ won recognition 
as a state-level development zone, and a growing list of major firms – including LG, Philipps, 
Dannon, Coca Cola, and Bosch, as well as local champions such as Sany Heavy Industry34 – set up 
or expanded operations in the zone (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007). 
Beyond the ETDZ, Changsha more broadly saw accelerating urban and industrial 
development in the late 1990s. With promotion from city leaders such as Changsha Party secretary 
Zhang Yunchuan, growing support from the provincial level, and help from national-level stimulus 
policies, Changsha entered an investment-led boom (Changsha Urban Construction Editorial 
Commission 2005).35  After the turn of the century, this rush of growth would further accelerate. 
 
Jiangxi 
Unlike their counterparts in Hunan, Jiangxi’s authorities in the late 1990s shifted the 
emphasis of development away from major cities and advanced industries, despite new opportunities. 
The openings of the Beijing-Kowloon railroad in 1996 and the Changbei International Airport in 
1999 repositioned Nanchang as a more important domestic and international transportation hub. 
Meanwhile, new highway and bridge projects around the capital-city region also moved forward 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 During the late 1990s, Sany, a Hunanese construction equipment firm established in 1994, began to expand rapidly 
and win accolades. In following years, Sany would establish itself as one of Hunan’s most famous firms, capturing a 
growing share of China’s booming construction equipment market (Liu, ed. 2006, 17). 
35 Between 1995-1998, reforms to the urban land, housing, and real estate system had begun to usher in faster growth, 
and, with falling interest rates during the Asian Financial Crisis period, the real estate sector began to heat up in late 1998. 
The real boost came in 1999, though, when municipal and provincial authorities embarked on massive new campaigns of 
infrastructure and real estate development in the city (Changsha Urban Construction Editorial Commission 2005, 5-6). 
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(Wang, ed. 2006, 30). However, even as these improvements in regional infrastructure opened up 
new possibilities for Nanchang, the provincial government pursued a balanced urban and regional 
development approach under Party secretary Shu Huiguo and governor Shu Shengyou. 
The two Shus were Jiangxi natives who had risen through the ranks within the province, 
holding various local and provincial leadership posts. Their lack of experience outside Jiangxi 
suggested that they did not enjoy close personal ties with central Party and state leaders. 
Furthermore, because both men were 60 years of age or older upon taking office, they had limited 
prospects for promotion to higher office (China Vitae; baike.baidu.com). The Shus thus had neither 
the political capital nor the motives to launch ambitious development initiatives while in office.  
In contrast with the more industry- and urban-oriented development approach pursued 
under Jiangxi’s previous Party chief, Wu Guanzheng, provincial policies in the late 1990s focused on 
boosting rural incomes and building up smaller cities and towns. At a time when Hunan and several 
other provinces had explicitly shifted toward metropolitan-oriented strategies of urban and industrial 
development, Jiangxi’s leaders put less emphasis on economic competitiveness and more on 
balanced growth. The 2000 Provincial People’s Congress, for example, called for “taking the 
people’s prosperity and strong counties as the goals,” indicating a rural slant to policy (Liu 2009, 17).  
Jiangxi’s spatial development strategy during this period hewed closely to central guidelines 
that prioritized smaller cities and regionally coordinated development. Echoing Beijing’s calls at the 
turn of the century for accelerating the growth of small towns, Jiangxi’s provincial leadership in July 
2000 issued a joint Party-Government decision on small town development. The document called 
for building urban networks around medium and small cities, investing in county towns to stimulate 
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the rural economy, and speeding up hukou reforms to enable more peasants to move into towns. 
The decision instructed officials at all levels to give priority to this work (Cao and Zhu 2010, 200).36  
Under the combined influence of these policies and outside economic shocks, Jiangxi saw 
relatively slow metropolitan development and urbanization of its population between 1996-2000. 
Nanchang received a disproportionately small share of capital construction in the province and saw 
little improvement of its urban amenities during this period, while the secondary urban centers of 
Jiujiang and Ganzhou saw an uptick in investment (China Data Online and author’s calculations).37 
Fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis, and crippling floods that struck Jiangxi in 1998-1999, were 
partly responsible for disrupting the province’s economic growth and industrialization efforts during 
the late 1990s. Still, many analysts identified provincial policies as a crucial factor behind Jiangxi’s 
weak industrial growth and slow urbanization (Cao and Zhu, ed. 2010, 194-197; Wang, ed. 2006, 13). 
 
Metropolitan moment, 2001-2005 
 The first years of the 21st century were a heady time across China, as the country emerged 
from the Asian Financial Crisis, joined the WTO, and entered a new boom phase of investment- and 
export-fueled growth. Central policies favored rapid economic growth and were gradually becoming 
more supportive toward the development of major cities, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although 
China’s top leaders continued to call for gradualism and balance in urbanization, rhetorical shifts and 
positive signals from some central actors made subnational policymakers bolder. 
During the early 2000s, both Hunan and Jiangxi, along with many provinces across China, 
adopted development strategies that gave pride of place to top urban centers. Hunan’s development 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 According to one provincial policy researcher, leaders at this time prioritized medium-sized cities with populations in 
the 200,000-500,000 range, while the province also drew up plans for 200 key towns (Interview NC041301a). 
37 Jiujiang and Ganzhou saw large amounts of fiscal expenditure relative to their revenue contributions during this period, 
suggesting greater favoritism from the provincial level (China Data Online and author’s calculations). 
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approach showed overt bias toward Changsha and the surrounding region in the distribution of 
policy support and state resources. Building on the foundation laid in the late 1990s, Hunan 
accelerated its metropolitan build-up and pushed ahead with CZX integration. Jiangxi, meanwhile, 
saw a dramatic reorientation in its development strategy after a leadership change brought Shanghai-
transplant Meng Jianzhu in as Party secretary in 2001. Under Meng’s activist leadership, Jiangxi’s 
government placed more stress on urbanization, industrialization, and internationalization. 
Even as it charted a new course, however, Jiangxi did not approach the degree of 
metropolitan bias in Hunan. Between 2001-2005, Changsha would absorb 30 percent of FAI in 
Hunan and 33 percent of capital construction in the province, while Nanchang accounted for 19 
percent of Jiangxi’s FAI and 20 percent of capital construction (China Data Online; Hunan 
Statistical Bureau; Jiangxi Statistical Bureau; author’s calculations). Changsha’s GDP surged from 
65.6 billion yuan in 2000 (18 percent of the provincial total) to 152 billion yuan in 2005 (23 percent 
of the provincial total), while Nanchang’s GDP rose from 43.5 billion yuan in 2000 (22 percent of 
the provincial total) to 100.7 billion yuan in 2005 (25 percent of the provincial total).  
 
Hunan 
 In the early 2000s, under Party secretary Yang Zhengwu and two different governors, Hunan 
put in place bolder metropolitan-oriented policies as the province’s broader economic difficulties 
continued. Despite the help of stimulus policies, Hunan’s growth had continued to lag behind the 
national average between 1996-2000 (China Data Online; author’s calculations). In public statements 
and policy documents, leaders focused on the task of building Changsha into a stronger growth 
engine and more attractive showcase—one that could invigorate a lagging provincial economy.  
In a January 2001 report on Hunan’s 10th FYP outline, governor Chu Bo called for rapid 
urbanization that would give full play to large cities’ strength. An aggressive urban development 
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approach could increase Hunan’s productivity, consumption, and fiscal revenue generation, and help 
Hunan reach an average level of urbanization by mid-decade. Changsha, Chu said, should quickly 
grow into a city of three million people (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 351). Meanwhile, a 
10th Five-Year Plan for CZX Economic Integration drawn up by Hunan’s Development Planning 
Commission stressed the need to build up the metropolitan region to respond to 21st-century 
challenges of globalization and technological change. According to the plan, the CZX region should 
urbanize at the ambitious pace of two percentage points per year and achieve GDP growth two 
percentage points faster than the province as a whole between 2001-2005. Underscoring Hunan’s 
eagerness to catch up to nearby provinces, it called for raising the CZX region’s per capita GDP to 
the average level of China’s coastal provinces. “Changsha,” the plan stipulated, “should achieve leap-
over development, lead in basically achieving modernization, and gradually build itself into a regional 
central city.” To support this, Hunan should prioritize urban infrastructure projects such as a 
renovation of Changsha’s Huanghua Airport, upgrading of Zhuzhou’s transport facilities, and new 
highway construction around the capital (Hunan Development Planning Commission 2002, 16-17). 
Other statements also made clear provincial elites’ relentless comparison of Changsha with 
competitors outside the province, and heavy focus on quantitative benchmarks. A 2001 article by 
deputy governor Pan Guiyu entitled “Lift up the whole province’s strength to build Changsha” 
pointed to Changsha’s existing advantages as an education, science, and technology center, and its 
strategic role in Hunan as the city with the best factor endowments. Changsha’s primacy in Hunan’s 
economy, however, lagged far behind that of rival provincial capitals such as Xi’an and Wuhan. By 
leveraging Hunan’s huge “economic hinterland,” Changsha could – and should – increase its share 
of the provincial economy from the current one-sixth to one-third. Without achieving this economic 
scale, however, Changsha would lack adequate “radiating power” (fusheli) to drive growth in the rest 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 218 
of Hunan (Pan 2001, 893-894). Other provincial policy elites echoed this call to build Changsha into 
a “very strong growth pole” able to compete more directly with Guangzhou and Wuhan.38  
Advocates of competitiveness-oriented policies found an eager and able champion in Zhang 
Yunchuan, who was elevated from Changsha Party secretary to become provincial governor in 2001. 
Zhang laid heavy emphasis on the goal of “new-style industrialization” (xinxing gongyehua), favoring 
clustered development of high value-added industrial sectors and efforts to build up major firms and 
industry groups that could compete in broader domestic and global markets.39 Under Zhang, the 
provincial government continued efforts to groom local industrial champions that had gained speed 
during Chu’s tenure. In 2000, Hunan had established a major provincially owned media 
conglomerate, the Hunan Broadcast and Television Group, along with three provincial-level 
publishing, newspaper, and film industry groups (Ouyang and Yu 2010). Over the following years, 
Hunan singled out 10 leading industries for preferential treatment, supporting sectors such as 
construction equipment manufacturing, steel, and electronics, and key firms such as Sany Heavy 
Industry and Valin Steel (Zhongguo Jingji Shibao 3/15/2005; Liu, ed. 2006).40  
This pursuit of faster industrial growth was closely intertwined with Hunan’s spatial 
development strategy. During the two years of his tenure, Zhang aggressively promoted the build-up 
of Changsha and the CZX urban cluster as Hunan’s main platform for new-style industrialization. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 For instance, Zhu Xiang, a Changsha-based scholar and provincial government advisor, voiced concern about 
Changsha’s small size and strongly advocated an “unbalanced” development approach. Zhu suggested that “Hunan 
should construct an extra-large central city on a scale comparable to that of Wuhan and Guangzhou; it should build a 
very strong growth pole that can radiate through and spur along the whole province. The suitable approach is to push 
forward the integrated construction of Chang-Zhu-Tan, and then to construct a high-level modernized metropolitan city 
area” (Zhu and He 2004, 27). 
39 At a meeting of the Hunan leadership in October 2001, Zhang outlined his approach, calling for strong but 
discriminating government support for industry. Hunan should more forcefully guide and rationalize its industrial 
development, he argued, promoting some industries while also limiting or eliminating others. It should also take a 
comprehensive approach to supporting industrial development, ensuring the availability of financing, human resources, 
and technical support (Hunan ribao 10/26/2001). 
40 Sany’s star rose especially fast. The firm, based in the Changsha County state-level EDTZ, became a provincial 
champion and gained increasing prominence outside Hunan. Though privately owned, the firm enjoyed strong 
government support, and achieved growth of over 50 percent each year in the early 2000s. By 2003, when the firm was 
publicly listed, it had an annual income of over 2 billion yuan (Liu, ed. 2006, 17). 
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Accordingly, the campaign of investment in Changsha’s urban infrastructure and real estate that had 
started in 1999 accelerated further after 2001, with numerous road, bridge, and urban construction 
projects underway. Changsha launched work on a new urban district on the west bank of the Xiang 
River, a new port-facing zone, a new University Town in the Yuelu Mountain area, as well as many 
new conference, cultural, athletic, and tourism facilities (Wang 2010, 73-75; Hunan Gazetteer 
Commission 2002, 82-85).  
With massive improvements to Changsha’s built environment underway, the provincial 
leadership continued to push forward CZX integration. At a 2001 work meeting, Party secretary 
Yang Zhengwu called for completing several urban and regional planning tasks by 2002 and using 
major projects to accelerate the pace of metropolitan integration (Yang 2002; Luo 2012). Delivering 
on these demands, Hunan in June 2002 released the CZX Urban Cluster Industrial Integration Plan, 
which laid out a scheme for government promotion and coordination of industrial development, 
envisioning greater economic integration and division of labor among Changsha and its neighbors 
(Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2002). Hunan’s collaboration with the World Bank on city-region 
planning moved forward, and in March 2002 the World Bank’s expert team released the final report 
of its CZX City Development Strategy (CDS) project. This paved the way for the launch in 
following years of World Bank-funded projects such as an inter-city flood control system and scenic 
highway route, a modern logistics center, new bridges for Xiangtan, and a clean coal facility in 
Zhuzhou (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 95-96; Chen, ed. 2003). And, while not a binding 
policy document, the Bank’s CDS plan influenced subsequent provincial planning work, especially in 
its emphasis on environmental aspects of city development (Interview CS191205a). Incorporating 
content from the CDS study, the provincial leadership in late 2003 approved a Xiang River 
Ecological Economy Belt Construction Plan to guide the implementation of inter-city infrastructure 
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projects (Liangxing ban 2011 b, 5).41 Work on a broader CZX Urban Cluster Regional Plan also 
moved forward quickly, culminating in a 2004 final product that became the first formal city-cluster 
plan drawn up by an inland province (Zhongguo jianshe bao 10/25/2004).  
Despite the large amount of regional planning work accomplished in the early 2000s, 
practical CZX integration efforts hit some roadblocks. Between 2000 and 2002, the tri-city region 
took steps to integrate mobile telephone networks and link highway and electricity infrastructure, 
but progress on issues such as industrial policy coordination and inter-city transportation service 
remained spotty as city governments aggressively defended their economic turf and local industries. 
Some of the difficulties in integration work related to a diminishing sense of urgency on Changsha 
officials’ part amid the city’s rapid growth. Progress was also hindered by local protectionism, as 
Zhuzhou and Xiangtan became increasingly worried about being stuck in Changsha’s shadow and 
losing investment and talent to the capital (Zhang, ed. 2007b; Changsha Development and Reform 
Commission 2010; 21 Shiji jingji baodao 10/16/2003). A further obstacle to regional integration was 
the lack of an authoritative bureaucratic entity to supervise inter-city cooperation. Because the 
administrative office established to handle integration work was subordinate to Hunan’s 
Development Planning Commission and of the same political rank as the three cities, its writ could 
not resolve inter-agency or inter-city conflicts (Liangxing ban 2011a, 11-12). Other local observers 
attributed the continuing CZX integration problems and delays in plan approvals between 2003 and 
2004 to the less energetic and forward-thinking leadership style of governor Zhou Bohua, a Hunan 
local who replaced Zhang Yunchuan in 2003 (Interview CS011203b). 
Between 2004 and 2005, however, provincial moves – both physical and institutional – 
helped to renew momentum for the CZX integration project. In October 2004, following many 
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41 Provincial leaders had reviewed the Xiang River Ecological Economy Belt plan along with a draft of the CZX Urban 
Cluster Regional Plan outline at a third CZX integration work meeting held in August 2003 (Luo 2012). 
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months of preparation, Hunan relocated the provincial government and related institutions to a 
huge new campus 15 kilometers south of Changsha’s old city center. This massive construction 
project was meant to promote urban growth in Changsha’s southern districts and thereby promote 
closer physical integration of the city with Zhuzhou and Xiangtan (Interview CS061203a, Liangxing 
ban 2011a). The next year, the long-gestating CZX Urban Cluster Regional Plan won government 
approval and was issued as Hunan’s Number 16 Document in August 2005.42 Formal adoption of 
the plan brought a lengthy process full circle, clearing the way for specific development projects and 
positioning Hunan to move forward quickly with CZX integration work at the beginning of the 11th 
FYP period.43 Meanwhile, the provincial leadership took steps to improve the institutional 
framework for CZX integration work, putting forward a document that spelled out the division of 
responsibility for CZX integration work and mandated annual governor-led meetings of the CZX 
economic integration leading small group from 2006 on (Liangxing ban 2011a, 7).  
With strong provincial support, Changsha boomed even as much of Hunan saw weak 
economic performance.44 While Changsha outpaced neighboring Zhuzhou and Xiangtan in GDP 
growth, it left most other cities in Hunan far behind. Southern Hunan, despite its proximity to 
Guangdong and locational advantages for outward-oriented development, received relatively little 
attention from provincial policymakers in the first half of the 2000s. Hengyang, a major industrial 
and transportation hub and Hunan’s second-largest urban center, grew much more slowly than the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Minor adjustments had been made to the 2004 version before the plan was passed by the provincial People’s Congress 
(Interview CS021203b). 
43 Over the eight years between 1997 and 2005, a report from the provincial Development and Reform Commission 
noted, “the provincial committee, and provincial government used planning arrangements, project configurations, capital 
investment and other methods to expand the scope of support to CZX, and guided production factors and capital to 
become more concentrated in CZX, pushed forward CZX regional industrial agglomeration, and arranged the 
construction of a set of infrastructure projects […]” (Luo 2012). 
44 During the early 2000s, Hunan’s overall economic performance remained middling, even among the central provinces. 
And Hunan continued to see millions of young people – unskilled and skilled alike – leave the province to work in 
neighboring regions, especially Guangdong (Zhongguo jingji shibao 3/15/2005). 
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CZX region.45 While many of Hengyang’s problems related to the city’s longstanding poverty and its 
difficult transition out of the planned economy (the city faced major fiscal shortfalls and mass 
unemployment issues as uncompetitive state-owned firms failed), a relative lack of support from 
provincial policymakers also factored into its weak economic performance (Wang 2010, 78-83; 
Interview CS061203a). Other southern and central cities, such as Yongzhou and Shaoyang, saw even 
slower growth (China Data Online; author’s calculations). Provincial leaders did show concern in the 
early 2000s for the fortunes of western Hunan, the province’s least developed region.46 Following 
the designation in 2001 of much of western Hunan as eligible for expanded central assistance under 
the Western Development program, however, provincial leaders had to bear only part of the burden. 
 
Jiangxi 
As Hunan pressed forward with the project of building up and integrating the Changsha 
region, Jiangxi, under a new leadership, embarked on a major change of course. The 2001 
replacement of Party secretary Shu Huiguo by Meng Jianzhu, freshly rotated in from Shanghai and 
nearly a decade younger than Shu, led to a major overhaul of politics and development policy in 
Jiangxi. Meng had established a reputation as a talented administrator in Shanghai, where he had 
most recently served as deputy Party secretary. But his rise also appears to have been bolstered by 
close ties with Jiang Zemin and Jiang-ally Zeng Qinghong (South China Morning Post 10/29/2007). 
Such links gave him political cover to adopt bold policies after arriving in Jiangxi. 
During the late spring and summer of 2001, Meng shook up political life and policy 
discourse in the province, launching a major “thought liberation” campaign to drive home to cadres 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Hengyang’s share of provincial GDP slid from 10 percent in 2000 to 9 percent in 2005 (China Data Online and 
author’s calculations.) 
46 During the early 2000s, Hunan established a provincial leading group to oversee and promote development work in 
western Hunan (Hunan Gazetteer Commission 2007, 97). 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 5 
!
 223 
and the public a new approach to development and governance. Over the course of several public 
statements and meetings, Meng appealed for radical efforts to promote industrialization, 
commercialization, and a more urban-oriented outlook mode in each sphere of development.47 
Holding high-profile meetings, Meng brought in a roster of rising stars from outside the province 
that included figures like Bo Xilai and Huang Qifan. Meanwhile, a series of study tours took Jiangxi 
cadres to observe policy work in nearby provinces (Liu 2009, 45-48).  
In early August 2001, the mobilization exercise hit its peak as Meng convened an expanded 
meeting of Jiangxi’s provincial Party committee in Jinggangshan, a famous early base area of the 
Communist revolution. Invoking a “new Jinggangshan spirit” of bold developmentalism, Meng 
outlined a “three bases, one back garden” (sange jidi yige houhuayuan) strategy for Jiangxi’s 
development. Jiangxi, Meng stressed, should exploit its basic endowments but take a far more 
entrepreneurial governance approach, turning the province into a base for relocating industry, 
commercial agriculture, and labor-outsourcing, and rebranding it as an eco-tourism destination. To 
achieve a “great opening” of Jiangxi’s economy, the province should emphasize central city 
construction and industrial development. A few months later, at Jiangxi’s December 2001 11th Party 
Congress, Meng further highlighted the imperative of inter-provincial competition, asking delegates 
to help “achieve Jiangxi’s rise in the central region.” This task would require more ambitious 
urbanization, industrialization, and opening up, and efforts to enhance not only the province’s hard 
infrastructure and outward links, but also the ‘soft environment’ of its top cities (Liu 2009, 22). In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Speaking before the provincial People’s Congress in May, for instance, Meng exhorted the province to “confidently 
shake off backwardness,” telling delegates that “to accelerate Jiangxi’s development, we must make forceful promotion 
of progress in industrialization the strategic emphasis of the whole province’s economic development.” Even in rural 
work, which had been prioritized under Meng’s predecessors, industrialization, commercialization, and opening would 
be emphasized (Jiangxi ribao 5/18/2001). 
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the following months and years, Meng’s high-flying mobilization and publicity work continued, and 
a new development policy approach took shape.48 
Jiangxi’s 2001-2005 10th Five-Year Plan program placed greater emphasis on the size and 
competitiveness of the province’s industrial and urban economy, and particularly on Nanchang’s 
status. In the early 2000s, Jiangxi showed greater attention to capital- and knowledge-intensive parts 
of the economy, adopting new policies to support designated pillar industries such as autos, aviation, 
precision manufacturing, special metallurgy, medicines, electronics and IT, food products, and high-
grade chemicals (Liu 2009, 118). At the same time, provincial policies emphasized the need for faster 
metropolitan development. 
After Meng’s arrival, Jiangxi’s previous small-city emphasis was set aside and new stress was 
laid on “strengthening and building up Nanchang as a breakthrough point” (Jiangxi Development 
Research Center 2006).49 Meng presided over a literal leap in Nanchang’s urban development, as the 
city launched construction of the Honggutan new district across the Gan River from Nanchang’s old 
center (Chen 2010). In the following years, the provincial government placed heavy emphasis on 
urban and regional infrastructure and development zone construction around Nanchang, building 
new highways, railway facilities, and airport improvements. With greater provincial support, 
Nanchang’s population swelled, with the urban district population breaching the two-million mark 
in 2004 (Jiangxi Development Research Center 2006, 214-215). Meng also worked to strengthen 
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48 During a March 2002 interview with the People’s Daily, Meng touted Jiangxi’s new development momentum, 
asserting “Jiangxi has full confidence of achieving a rise in the central China region. In the following five years, per 
capita GDP in central China will move forward in the rankings, and we will strive to enter the front lines, achieving basic 
industrialization by 2010” (Renmin ribao 3/7/2002). Later, at a provincial committee meeting in July 2003, Meng called 
for stronger efforts to promote the globalization of Jiangxi’s economy (Jiangxi Development Research Center 2006). 
49 The extent to which Meng’s early 2000s vision of city-centered development differed from Jiangxi’s traditional 
approach was clear in his comments from an interview with the People’s Daily in 2004. In that interview, Meng noted 
the importance of rural problems in Jiangxi, but emphasized that coordinated development of cities and countryside 
would be the key for dealing with them. Rural commercialization and development would be needed, but 
industrialization and urbanization (chengshihua) would also be key parts of the solution to the “three rural problems” 
(Renmin ribao 3/8/ 2004). 
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Nanchang’s position as an education center. By 2007, when Meng left Jiangxi, the capital city was 
home to 70 percent of higher education institutions in the province (Liu 2009, 133). These 
aggressive efforts to improve Nanchang’s urban environment garnered outside recognition. In the 
mid-2000s, Nanchang earned high marks in a World Bank analysis of 120 Chinese cities and jumped 
upward in domestic ratings of urban competitiveness (World Bank 2006; Ni 2006).  
Of course, Jiangxi’s provincial development strategy under Meng was never single-mindedly 
focused on urban-industrial development, and secondary policy motifs of environmental protection, 
rural development, and regional coordination became more salient over time. Looking back to the 
early 2000s, one provincial policy researcher noted that despite the strong rhetorical emphasis on 
large city development, there were still a fairly limited number of concrete policies to promote 
metropolitan-region development (Interview NC041301a). And, over time, environmental themes 
became more prominent in Meng’s public statements. In 2003, for instance, Meng told an 
interviewer that “we don’t only want mountains of gold and silver; we want green water and verdant 
hills even more,” and explained that Jiangxi was being selective in choosing investment projects and 
sectors to develop, ruling out activity that would harm the environment, public health, or public 
values (Renmin ribao 3/5/2003). In a province as overwhelmingly rural as Jiangxi, it was not 
surprising that the leadership continued devoting considerable attention to rural development issues 
during the early 2000s. Nevertheless, Meng’s rhetoric between 2001 and 2004 continued to subsume 
the issue of rural development under his broader strategy of commercialization and urbanization.50  
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50 In 2003, for instance, Meng explained to an interviewer that “only by accelerating industrialization can Jiangxi 
fundamentally address the ‘three rural problems” (Zhongguo gongye bao 12/23/2003). And during a visit to rural counties in 
Ganzhou in January 2004, Meng stressed the need to keep developing a more outward-oriented economy, building 
industry parks and infrastructure, and expanding cities. Meng said Ganzhou more broadly should strive to improve its 
investment climate and serve as a vanguard in opening-up, taking advantage of its location adjacent to Guangdong and 
Fujian. The pace of city construction should be accelerated, and urbanization should be used to spur along the 
countryside, and emphasized rural industrialization and an export-oriented economy as a way to solve rural problems 
(Jiangxi ribao 1/19/2004). Meng’s response to the call in China’s 2004 Central Document Number One for prioritizing 
“three rural problems” (san nong wenti) was to advocate emulating Zhejiang, pushing forward more small and medium-
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As Meng continued to push a metropolitan-centered, outward-oriented growth model in the 
mid-2000s, however, a new policy approach was germinating in southern Jiangxi. Between 2004 and 
2005, the Construct a New Socialist Countryside (NSC) rural development program pioneered in 
Ganzhou under municipal Party secretary Pan Yiyang gained a high political profile and came to 
influence development policies across Jiangxi and China more broadly. Appointed as Ganzhou’s 
chief in 2003, Pan had attracted attention for writing a doctoral dissertation on ‘peasant-centered’ 
development, and was also noteworthy for his past experience as a leader in China’s Communist 
Youth League system (Li 2006; China Vitae; Looney 2012, 293). Since the early 2000s, Pan had 
served as a member of Jiangxi’s Party standing committee, working under Meng and holding the 
agricultural policy portfolio.51 After taking over as the leader of Jiangxi’s sprawling southern 
prefecture, Pan embarked on a series of bold experiments in rural development. Under the banner 
of a 2004 city-level “Decision on Strengthening Efforts to Build a New Socialist Countryside,” he 
aggressively pushed village reconstruction and rural public service initiatives. 
The NSC program, closely coordinated by Pan and his Ganzhou colleagues, echoed the pro-
rural thrust of the new central development policies that had appeared in 2003 and 2004 under the 
new Hu-Wen leadership. Pan displayed strong ties with Beijing,52 as the campaign in Ganzhou 
attracted praise and support from several high-ranking central government and Party leaders. 
Construction Minister Wang Guangtao, for one, offered a particularly strong endorsement of 
Ganzhou’s experiments, choosing the city as the site for China’s national conference on village 
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sized enterprise development, and solving rural problems through “industrialization, urbanization, and rural 
commercialization” (Zhengquan ribao 9/19/2004). 
51 In this role, Pan advocated innovation in rural work, but had also called for rural policy to serve the larger strategy of 
“three bases, one back garden” laid out by Meng (Nongmin ribao, 8/8/2002). 
52 As Looney (2012) notes, “[…] Pan may have had privileged access to central leaders, allowing him to anticipate central 
policy and take action to make Ganzhou and national model for the NSC” (296). In particular, it is possible that Pan’s 
background in the Communist Youth League leadership may have given him personal links to the leadership faction 
surrounding Hu Jintao (Li 2006; China Vitae). 
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construction work in late 2005.53 With central backing, Pan gained an unusually high political profile 
for a municipal leader, even publishing articles about his Ganzhou model in key central Party outlets 
such as The People’s Daily and Seeking Truth (qiu shi) magazine in 2005 (Looney 2012, 292-295).  
With Pan Yiyang mobilizing central support for his reform experiments and cultivating a 
national-level political persona, the Ganzhou campaign represented a striking counterpoint to the 
developmental vision Meng Jianzhu had promoted since arriving in Jiangxi. The presence of so well-
connected and high-profile a city-level leader may have made it more difficult for Meng to shape 
Jiangxi’s development policy agenda as he saw fit. Whether Meng was won over by Pan’s ideas over 
time, or whether he simply faced mounting pressure from above and below to signal stronger 
provincial endorsement for a more rural-oriented, populist development model, is hard to ascertain. 
Soon after the Ganzhou development experiment began, however, the tone of development policies 
in Jiangxi again changed abruptly. 
 
Scaling up different development models, 2006-2010 
 During the latter half of the 2000s, development approaches in Hunan and Jiangxi again 
diverged as new leadership teams came onto the scene in both provinces. Under the leadership of 
Zhang Chunxian and Zhou Qiang, Hunan further intensified its metropolitan-oriented development 
push and CZX regional integration efforts, and obtained growing central support for its projects. 
Jiangxi’s leadership, meanwhile, downgraded the metropolitan growth agenda to promote a more 
balanced and ecologically oriented development model. Even during the later years of Meng 
Jianzhu’s tenure, an adjustment of policy priorities became clear. After Su Rong replaced Meng as 
Party secretary in Jiangxi, environmental and urban-rural coordination goals gained an even higher 
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53 Wang also called publicly for urban planning and construction departments nationwide to place their support behind 
the NSC program (Zhongguo jianshebao 8/9/2005). 
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profile. Under the influence of these policies, investment and growth trends in the two provinces 
varied considerably. Between 2006-2010, Changsha accounted for 33 percent of Hunan’s FAI and 
29 percent of capital construction. Nanchang, meanwhile, secured 23 percent of  FAI and 25 
percent of capital construction in Jiangxi.54 In Hunan, Changsha’s boom reached new heights, with 
growth dramatically outpacing the rest of the province and most other large Chinese cities. Jiangxi as 
a whole experienced surging FAI and rapid economic growth, and outlying cities and rural areas 
tended to grow quickly. Nanchang’s position, however, slid considerably not only relative to nearby 
provincial capitals but also within the province. Whereas Changsha’s GDP climbed from 152 billion 
yuan in 2005 (23 percent of Hunan’s total) to 454.7 billion yuan in 2010 (28 percent of Hunan’s 
total), Nanchang’s rose from 100.7 billion yuan in 2005 (25 percent of Jiangxi’s total) to 220 billion 
yuan in 2010 (23 percent of Jiangxi’s total). Nanchang’s economy, once three-fourths the size of 
Changsha’s, was by 2010 less than half as large (China Data Online; author’s calculations). 
 
Hunan 
 During the 11th (2006-2010) FYP period, changing national policies placed new demands on 
central provinces, but also created new openings for provincial-level initiative. Under the heading of 
the “scientific development outlook” (kexue fazhan guan), the center stressed economic restructuring, 
spatial and sectoral coordination of development, and environmental protection. Particular emphasis 
was placed on rural welfare, with NSC construction elevated to the status of a key national strategy.55 
But the 11th FYP framework also laid stress on regional planning, including urban cluster 
development, economic innovation, and industrial upgrading. Beijing’s endorsement of top-down 
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54 See Chapter 2. Data are from Hunan and Jiangxi statistical yearbooks; China Data Online; author’s calculations. 
55 For a description of the top policy priorities and programs listed under the Plan, see 
http://english.gov.cn/special/115y_index.htm.  
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coordination of development created scope for provincial governments to take more active roles in 
industrial policy roles and urban-regional planning and development (Yin 2011, 128; Gu et al 2012b).  
 Beyond the broad 11th FYP framework, the State Council’s formal rollout in 2006 of a 
“Central China Rising” (zhongbu jueqi) strategy held out new opportunities for Hunan, Jiangxi, and 
other heartland provinces.56 Outlined in the 2006 No. 10 Central Document, Central China Rising 
affirmed the need for faster development in central provinces, acknowledging that this region had 
been left behind as coastal provinces had boomed and central assistance had gone to China’s 
western and northeastern provinces. The strategy aimed to shore up grain production and 
supporting infrastructure, but also showed a shift away from Beijing’s traditional treatment of the six 
central provinces as bases for agriculture and resource extraction. Endorsing efforts already 
underway in the central provinces, the No. 10 Document called for large urban clusters to play a key 
role in regional development,57 and named four specific areas (Hubei’s Wuhan City Circle, Henan’s 
Central Plains Urban Cluster, Anhui’s Wanjiang Urban Belt, and Hunan’s CZX Urban Cluster) as 
points of emphasis. For greater Changsha and other listed urban clusters, gaining mention in a 
central strategic document was seen as a breakthrough in efforts to win more state support 
(Liangxing ban 2011b, Tong 2011, 85).  
While the amount of concrete state support distributed under Central China Rising looked 
likely to be smaller than what had been given out under the earlier Western Development and 
Revive the Old Northeast Industrial Base strategies, there would be other perks. The NDRC, 
Ministry of Finance, and other central ministries announced a handful of new measures to support 
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56 These policies were first announced by Wen Jiabao in March 2004, but the policy program was laid out more clearly 
over the next two years. The Central China strategy appears to have been prompted in part by persistent pressure by 
provincial leaders from China’s six central provinces for greater state support (Lai 2007). 
57 Among other objectives, the document called for “[…] creating a structurally optimal urban system with coordinated 
development of large, medium, and small cities and small towns, taking provincial capitals and central cities with 
relatively strong resource and environmental carrying capacity as supports, and accelerate the development of economic 
belts along backbone railways and along the Yangtze”  (Liangxing ban 2011 b, 42) 
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grain production, urban cluster development, industrial renovation, opening up, and education in 
central provinces. For the most part, though, Central China Rising would be about “giving policy 
privileges rather than giving money” (gei zhengce er bu gei qian) (Lai 2007, Yin 2011, 103). Instead of 
guaranteeing specific forms of central support, the new program would function largely as an 
umbrella under which provinces could launch new policies or initiatives and then reach out to 
various central state entities for approvals or resources.  
 If the unveiling of Central China Rising helped Hunan’s development prospects, so did the 
appointment in early 2006 of a younger, more dynamic provincial leadership duo. Fifty-three years 
old when he took over as Party secretary, Zhang Chunxian had already amassed an impressive 
resume, having previously served as China’s Minister of Transportation. Zhang had built a 
reputation for efficiency and public relations savvy in that role, but the high-level personal 
connections he brought were seen as a particular boon (21 Shiji jingji baodao 3/17/2006).58 Zhou 
Qiang, only 46 years old when he became Hunan’s governor later in 2006, had risen through the 
ranks even faster, navigating the central state and Party establishment and gaining extensive 
experience in China’s law and order system.59 Both leaders brought with them inside knowledge of 
central politics, personal connections in Beijing, as well as the hunger for achievement common to 
mid-career politicians. They arrived at a moment of high potential, and also wasted little time in 
setting new development efforts in motion. 
Upon his arrival, Zhang Chunxian not only embraced, but further accelerated CZX 
integration and the build-up of Changsha. Zhang declared that Hunan had to confront three urgent 
challenges—a lingering rural orientation and huge rural population, lagging urbanization, and a 
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58 In 2006, Zhang himself told reporters that “There are indeed some people who are familiar with me, some major 
companies that have been in touch with Hunan province. They all want to come to Hunan and have a look around, and 
they are willing to help Hunan” (21 Shiji jingji baodao 3/17/2006). 
59 Zhou reputedly enjoyed close ties to senior national Party and government leader as former first secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League and his long experience in the Ministry of Justice establishment (Li 2010). 
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relatively low level of industrialization. Acknowledging a central policy agenda that emphasized rural 
work and welfare, Zhang said public service provision and NSC work would be a key priority of his 
administration. Yet Zhang’s comments suggested that radical progress in the countryside could not 
be expected right away; it would be necessary to focus on urban infrastructure and basic industry 
development in the near term (21 Shiji jingji baodao 3/17/2006).60 The main stress of provincial work 
should continue to fall on industrialization and urbanization.  
Zhang quickly took up recommendations from veteran provincial experts such as Zhang 
Ping and Tong Zhongxian who advocated increasing the scale and scope of CZX plans and creating 
stronger administrative mechanisms to lead and coordinate metropolitan development.61 In a May 
2006 forum about the Central China Rising agenda, Zhang endorsed the idea of expanding the CZX 
initiative beyond the original three cities (Hunan Ribao 8/18/2006; Zhongguo gaige bao 11/20/2006). In 
line with this “3+5” strategy, Hunan’s 11th FYP for CZX Economic Integration broadened the 
planning region to include five medium and large cities located within a one-hour radius of 
Changsha (Yueyang, Hengyang, Changde, Yiyang, and Loudi). Even as more of Hunan was brought 
into the fold, however, the new leadership made clear that Changsha would remain the focal point 
for development. Hunan’s 11th FYP Outline called for the economy of Changsha and the core CZX 
region to grow at a rate three percentage points faster than the province overall (Chen, ed. 2006). 
The arrival of new leaders lent new impetus to CZX integration efforts. Hunan’s 
government had been preparing to move forward with a variety of related infrastructure and 
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60 In early 2006, Zhang highlighted NSC work with a discussion meeting and an inspection of rural areas shortly after 
taking office. He took a measured approach, however, noting that “NSC construction is a historical process, and we 
must both feel a sense of urgency but we should not overeagerly seek achievements, and cannot excessively go beyond 
the current conditions […]” (Hunan ribao 2/13/2006). 
61 Many of the points raised by Zhang Ping in a report sent to top provincial leaders in July 2006 made their way into 
Zhang Chunxian’s policy agenda. Zhang had argued for using economic integration to push forward greater 
administrative coordination and integration in the CZX region down the line, and he called for creating stronger 
provincial and inter-city mechanisms to promote coordination. In particular, Zhang called for an upgraded provincially 
led planning and construction committee for CZX (Zhang 2007, 14). It was Tong who originated the idea of a “3+5” 
approach that would integrate CZX development more tightly with that of nearby cities (Tong 2011, 81). 
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industrial projects since the approval of the CZX regional plan in 2005, but progress had remained 
limited. During 2006, Hunan rolled out a multi-city environmental plan and a plan for harmonizing 
industry entry rules, and the provincial environmental bureau organized a joint inspection team and 
common environmental evaluation indicators for the three cities (Changsha Development and 
Reform Commission 2010, 5). In June 2006, at the first joint meeting of city leaders under the new 
CZX regional plan framework, Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan signed a cooperation framework 
agreement, inked agreements on industry, science and technology, and environmental cooperation, 
and launched several joint infrastructure projects (Liangxing ban 2011a, 7-8). 
 Zhang Chunxian’s commitment to building advanced, large-scale industry and infrastructure 
meant a continued focus on the capital-city region. Over the course of 2006, Zhang used major 
government and Party events such as Hunan’s Ninth Provincial Party Congress to elaborate a new 
development mantra of “new-style industrialization and three basics” (yi hua san ji).62 Emphasizing 
the need for “leap-over” (kuayue) economic growth and upgrading in Hunan, Zhang called for the 
coordinated build-up of transportation infrastructure, development zones, and clusters for advanced 
industries such as equipment manufacturing, automobiles, electronics, bio-medicine, and new 
materials (Wu 2009; Zhang 2009; Wu et al 2011). Hunan should also continue investing in cultural, 
media, and entertainment industries, which had become strategic sectors in their own right, growing 
rapidly since the early 2000s and gaining nationwide attention.63  
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62 In May 2006, the provincial government convened a Forum on Accelerating and Pushing Forward New-Style 
Industrialization. Zhang continued to emphasize his new development strategy at the November 2006 Ninth Provincial 
Party Congress (Wu 2009; Zhang 2009). 
63 The Ninth Provincial Party Congress adopted a slogan of “develop modern culture, construct a cultural strong 
province,” and Zhang called for using the 11-5 plan period to build a nationally and internationally competitive cultural 
industry. In the following months and years, new cultural industry bases were designated, and an investment guide for 
cultural industries was issued (Ouyang and Yu 2010). Further policies would later follow as part of the CZX 
development and integration strategy, such as plans for eight cultural industry zones around greater Changsha. By 2009, 
annual cultural industry output in Hunan would reach 76.22 billion yuan (Luo 2011, 55-56). Though many small private 
firms had been entering the industry, Hunan’s cultural, media, and entertainment industries remained largely publicly 
controlled through the late 2000s: only about one-third of cultural industry added value came from privately owned 
firms (Ouyang and Yu 2010, 20). 
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The CZX region, and particularly top-flight development zones such as Changsha’s EDTZ, 
stood to benefit greatly from an economic agenda focused on capital- and knowledge-intensive 
industries. These locations housed leading firms and also were home to much of the best talent and 
urban infrastructure. Indeed, Zhang explicitly called for strengthening the advantages of  leading 
areas. In a 2008 article that outlined his development philosophy, Zhang called for “Using the law of 
uneven development, firmly upholding priority for the advantageously placed, […] and making the 
CZX urban cluster into the leading zone for new-style industrialization” (Zhang 2009, 9).  
The new leadership team, experienced in navigating China’s central bureaucracy, also worked 
to obtain greater support and resources from Beijing to bolster CZX development. Since 2004, 
when provincial officials in Hunan learned that Shanghai and Shenzhen were seeking special central 
designation as “Comprehensive Reform Pilot Zones” (zonghe peitao gaige shiyanqu), researchers in the 
provincial Development and Reform Commission had begun exploring the possibility of winning 
similar status for the CZX region. Following a year of research, the provincial government had by 
late 2005 come up with a preliminary vision for a pilot zone based on the existing foundations of the 
CZX plan. This framework went through review and revision in early 2006, and the new provincial 
Party secretary and governor quickly got behind the effort to win pilot zone status for the CZX 
region. In June 2006, Hunan made a formal bid to the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), soon afterward, the NDRC sent a team from its Institutional Reform Office 
(tizhi gaige si) to conduct a related fact-finding visit.  
Over the following year, Hunan’s top leaders devoted considerable effort to advancing their 
plan (Liangxin ban 2011a, 6-11). It is the job of provincial leaders in China to obtain policy benefits 
for their regions, but Zhang Chunxian and Zhou Qiang worked overtime to line up central support 
for Hunan’s pilot zone plan. According to one NDRC expert who took part in central-provincial 
negotiations over plans for the CZX pilot zone, Hunan’s top leaders showed special “proactiveness” 
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(jijixing) in proposing and lobbying for the zone. They pressed hard and effectively used their 
connections in Beijing to win the central designation (Interview BJ061307b). In March 2007, Zhang 
Chunxian and Zhou Qiang met with NDRC chief Ma Kai, and settled on a substantive theme of 
“energy-conserving and environmentally friendly society construction” for the CZX zone. Hunan 
had initially proposed a pilot zone with an urbanization-related theme, but over the course of 
central-provincial discussions, the “two-type society construction” (liangxing shehui jianshe) title was 
selected as a compromise between the development interests of the province and the policy goals of 
the central government (Liangxing ban 2011a, 139-140; Interview BJ061307b). The next month, 
Hunan’s leaders sent a special letter of application for State Council recognition of the CZX pilot 
zone to Premier Wen Jiabao.  
As they sought more central support, Zhang and Zhou ensured that there was fast CZX 
progress on the home front. In early 2007, new road links, such as the Changsha-Xiangtan 
expressway, were opening between the three cities, and work was also getting underway on a new 
Changsha-Zhuzhou highway. Later that year, in September, the standing committee of the 
provincial People’s Congress passed measures on the CZX Urban Cluster Regional Plan, further 
raising the profile and binding power of the plan (Liangxing ban 2011a, 7-8; 135-136).  
Years of advance work by provincial bureaucrats and energetic promotion by Hunan’s top 
leaders paid off when, in December 2007, the CZX urban cluster – along with the Wuhan region in 
Hubei – formally won State Council authorization to launch a comprehensive reform pilot zone.64 
After getting the green light from Beijing, Hunan sprinted into action, rolling out infrastructure and 
industry projects under the CZX banner and launching work on an updated strategic framework and 
regional plan (21 Shiji jiingji baodao 6/25/2008). As one of the first provinces approved to host a pilot 
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64 This simultaneous approval of zones in the neighboring provinces ensured that the decades-old rivalry between 
Hunan and Hubei would continue, further stoking provincial boosterism (Liangxing ban 2011a). 
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zone (only Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Chongqing had come before), Hunan sought to 
exploit its special designation to the fullest. Instead of providing a clearly defined set of preferential 
policies or material resources, pilot zone status gave Hunan an important “sign” (paizi) to hang and a 
great deal of space to innovate (Interview CS191205a). And, with Beijing’s imprimatur on what 
remained essentially a Hunan initiative, the provincial government would have an easier time 
breaking through city-level resistance to CZX integration and accessing central state resources.  
On the ground in Hunan, major breakthroughs quickly followed. During 2009, 25 toll 
stations between the three cities were shuttered, simplifying road transport (Changsha Development 
and Reform Commission 2010, 8). Urban megaprojects moved rapidly between 2008 and 2010, as 
Hunan launched work on a major renovation to Changsha’s airport, a new Changsha subway system, 
a Xiang River Comprehensive Hub Project, and additional roads and expressways in the CZX region 
(Liangxing ban 2011b).65 Zhang Chunxian, with his sectoral experience and connections from his time 
as transport minister, was credited by local observers with playing a key role in bringing 
transportation projects to the CZX region (Interview CS061203a).  
Just as significant as this series of megaprojects were efforts to upgrade CZX region’s 
development plans and strengthen regional governance mechanisms. Between 2008-2010, Hunan’s 
leadership hastened to formulate new and even bolder plans for the capital-city region, retaining 
much content from the previous plans but also boosting growth targets and adding new features. In 
December 2007, the leadership brought in outside planners and experts to kick off a new round of 
planning work. A second meeting of top provincial leaders in May 2008 focused on the CZX zone’s 
overall approach and reviewed relevant experiences from other special zones and leading areas 
(Liangxing ban 2011a, 30).66 Over several months, provincial officials, in consultation with Beijing, 
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65 Among the projects was extension of Furong Road to run 61km south along the Xiang River and connect the cities. 
66 This discussion involved  provincial departments as well as experts from the China Urban Planning and Design 
Institute and the China Reform and Development Institute (Liangxing ban 2011a, 75). 
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city governments, and outside consultants, drew up both an CZX Overall Scheme and an updated – 
and upgraded – CZX Urban Cluster Regional Plan. The 2008 CZX Overall Scheme laid out basic 
goals and approaches for the development of the Reform Experimental Zone, breaking work into 
three phases. Beteen 2008-2010, Hunan was to focus on institution-building, infrastructure-
development, and initial 3+5 work. The period from 2011-2015 would be crucial for completing key 
urban and regional infrastructure, deepening reforms and shifting to greater market orientation, and 
pushing forward environmental protection and resource conservation policies. Finally, between 
2015-2020, Hunan should conclude key reforms and policy tasks. It also called for an approach of 
“the province coordinates as a whole, cities take the lead in implementation, reform tasks get divided 
by level and relevant department” (Liangxing ban 2011a, b). During the first phases of pilot zone 
work, government leadership and policy support were to play a key role, giving way over time to 
more work by market and societal actors (Interview CS091203a). In this way, the scheme 
frontloaded large infrastructure projects and development zone work, while leaving many of the 
more nuanced policy and reform tasks to future periods. 
Hunan got basic central approval for the CZX Overall Scheme as well as for an updated 
CZX Regional Plan in 2008, and the provincial government formally promulgated the new Plan, 
along with a CZX Overall Scheme, in February 2009. The new regional plan retained much content 
from the CZX Regional Plan approved in 2005, but represented an upgrade in terms of scope and 
scale. The document set bold development targets, including raising the population of the CZX area 
from 13.25 million in 2007 to 18 million by 2020. Unlike its 2005 precursor, the 2008 regional plan 
included the full “3+5” region, and emphasized environmental and energy-conservation goals as 
well as development targets. The new plan was also more implementation-oriented, with specific 
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projects such as the Changsha subway, a new inter-city rail system, and new development zones 
plotted out in detail (Interview CS021203b; Liangxing ban 2011a, b).67  
The overall spatial strategy of the regional plan boiled down to the phrase “have the core 
[the CZX central urban area] spur the other areas along; push forward leap-over development” 
(Hunan Provincial Government 2009; Liangxing ban 2011a, 118).68 Changsha continued to enjoy 
pride of place as the designated center for science and technology, business services, advanced 
manufacturing, emerging industries, and long-distance passenger travel.69 Five new demonstration 
zones (shifan qu) in the CZX core region would serve as hubs for development, with Changsha’s 
huge River West (da hexi) zone as the centerpiece.70  
As it rolled out the new plans, Hunan also built stronger institutional mechanisms for 
coordinating CZX development. Central state backing and resources made Hunan’s task of 
coordinating relations among different cities easier, but squabbling between localities remained an 
obstacle.71 Provincial leaders thus sought to strengthen hierarchical mechanisms for making and 
implementing CZX policies. With Beijing’s approval, the provincial leadership overhauled the 
existing CZX integration leading small group and its standing office, creating a higher-profile leading 
small group and a stand-alone Two-type Society Construction Office, or Liangxing ban. Unlike its 
predecessor, the new organ would be headed by a vice-governor, and would report directly to the 
provincial leadership. These changes boosted both the prestige and power of the office, expanding 
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67 In line with shifting national trends, the plan placed more emphasis on spatial-functional planning, designating 
different zone areas to serve different development functions and abide by different regulations (Liangxing ban 2011 a, b). 
68 In the core CZX region, the plan called for a central development corridor running north-south along the Xiang River 
as well as two lateral development belts spanning Changsha and the Zhuzhou-Xiangtan built-up area, respectively. 
69 Meanwhile, the plan emphasized Zhuzhou’s industrial and logistics role, and tapped Xiangtan to specialize in urban-
rural linkages, social service provision, and rural business services (Liangxing ban 2011 a, 118-122). 
70 The five demonstration areas were later subdivided into 18 smaller sections to facilitate administration. 
71 With even higher stakes at play, the three cities competed to secure the choicest investment projects and build industry 
clusters within their boundaries, and to shift the more onerous policy tasks that came with CZX plans (Interviews 
CS181205a; CS191205a). 
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its jurisdiction to include the full 3+5 region and giving it the same rank as Hunan’s Development 
and Reform Commission (Interview CS061203a).72 Beyond setting up the office, Hunan adopted 
new laws and regulations to bolster regional planning, implementation, and oversight work. During 
2008, the province approved new planning system regulations and Zhou Qiang pushed new Hunan 
Province Administrative Process Rules. Later, in September 2009, the Hunan Provincial People’s 
Congress passed the Hunan CZX Urban Cluster Regional Plan Measures (Liangxing ban 2011 a, b, 
16-28, 80).73 These and other institutional changes vested new planning  and regulatory authority in 
provincial government organs, strengthening tools for top-down metropolitan governance. 
With these various plans and governance institutions in place, Hunan was ready to embark 
on more concrete policy, infrastructure, and industrial development programs after 2009. As top 
provincial leaders continued to convene high-level meetings,74 provincial and city departments 
moved ahead with work in the five CZX demonstration zones. Officials set up new management 
committees and financing platforms, launched infrastructure, industry, and urban construction work, 
and began investment recruitment (Interview CS081203b).  
As more detailed plans for development of the CZX region surfaced, the privileged position 
of the metropolitan core was clear. According to an April 2010 provincial government circular, 
Changsha’s River West demonstration zone would have 230 square kilometers of construction land 
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72 The revamped Liangxing ban was charged with four main functions: research, advising top leaders, coordinating policy 
implementation, and providing support services for relevant actors. Under the guidance of the provincial office, each 
city would implement relevant projects and design local plans, while the province set strategic designations for different 
places, approved major projects and policies, and handled inter-jurisdictional issues. According to a provincial 
government official, once it was made independent of the provincial Development and Reform Commission the new 
office was better able to maintain balance in its policy priorities between economic objectives and portfolios such as 
social development, environmental policy, and administrative coordination (Interview CS181205a). 
73 Entering into force in January 2010, these provisions created a stronger legal basis for zone development and planning, 
and stipulated that departmental plans and city-level plans must take the provincial-level regional plan as their basis 
(Liangxing ban 2011 a, b, 16-28, 80). 
74 In June 2009, provincial leaders met to review major CZX zone work to date, and to finalize plans for 2009-2010. A 
March 2010 meeting called for accelerating project work, and a special meeting was convened at the party secretary’s 
request in 2010 review work on key reform areas (Liangxing ban 2011 a). 
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available for near-term development, vastly more than the 10 square kilometers or so earmarked for 
other zones (Liangxing ban 2011b, 83-86).75 The provincial government and Changsha also worked to 
drive the expansion of Changsha’s urban area to the east and south, using airport construction and a 
new high-speed rail station to spur the growth of new city centers (Interview CS061203b). In 
particular, the Changsha ETDZ in Changsha County directly east of the central city districts saw 
very rapid development continue under the CZX pilot zone scheme.76 Hunan succeeded in getting 
four provincial-level development zones, including the CZX region’s Xiangtan HTDZ and 
Ningxiang County ETDZ, elevated to state-level status (Liangxing ban 2011b, 16).  Areas adjacent to 
central Changsha were also slated for massive development projects and rapid urban growth under 
the CZX scheme. Zhuzhou’s urban districts, located within easy driving distance of Changsha’s 
south side and airport, saw an accelerated build-up after 2008 (Interview CS191205a).  
Hunan’s leaders successfully tapped into central state resources as pilot zone efforts gained 
speed. By 2010, the provincial government and the CZX zone officials had signed cooperation 
agreements with 34 central ministries or agencies and 71 financial institutions or central SOEs to 
launch policy initiatives, construction projects, and business investments in the pilot zone. Among 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 The total planned area of the River West (da hexi) zone is 1200km, with one-third slated to become construction-use 
land. The creation of this vast “leading zone” (xiandao qu) was one very concrete way in which Hunan took advantage of 
the CZX region’s Pilot Zone status. This Rivers West area, which encompasses the Changsha HTDZ as well as the 
newly anointed Ningxiang ETDZ on the western side of Changsha, was to serve as a spatial “platform” for many of the 
key construction projects and policy initiatives envisioned under the Two-Type Society Construction agenda. Changsha’s 
city government relocated to the west side of the Xiang River in 2001, and had for several years been working to spur 
development westward. The management committee for the River West Zone was established as a field office of the city 
government but was to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in the economic policy realm (Interview CS081203b). 
76 Under Zhang Chunxian’s aggressive industrialization drive, the construction equipment industry in the zone continued 
to thrive (by 2011, it would reach a total production value of 90.4bn yuan, three-fifths of Hunan’s total), and efforts to 
build an automotive industry cluster also moved forward quickly. Changsha County, and especially Xingsha new town, 
was also a key focus for urban development work. New projects to link the county more tightly to central Changsha and 
build key transport and development corridors between central Changsha, Huanghua Airport, and a new high-speed rail 
station, respectively, quickly entered the implementation stage. Spatial planning for Xingsha city was closely integrated 
with that of the overall CZX zone, and the city grew to 350,000 people and 53 square kilometers as new mega-blocks 
sprouted upward. Through local efforts and support from higher-levels, Changsha County recorded blistering GDP 
growth and would manage to raise its ranking among China’s county-level economies from 47th in 2007 to 15th in 2012 
(China Small and Medium City Task Force 2013, 1-4, 53, 85-89). 
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the largest-scale and most important of these province-ministry agreements was an accord between 
Hunan and the Ministry of Railways to establish a 3+5 Inter-City Rail Transport Company that 
would fund, construct, manage, and operate the massive inter-city rail transport system envisioned in 
the CZX regional plan (Liangxing ban 2011a). Efforts to raise capital for zone construction also took 
off, as provincial leaders established a new financial platform for the pilot zone called the Hunan 
Investment Development Company. In short order, this entity signed contracts for 300 billion yuan 
in planned investment with the China Development Bank (CDB) and 20 other financial institutions, 
and with government entities from various levels. Hunan and CDB also drew up a CZX Capital-
Raising Plan for 2009-2020, and by 2010 financial platforms operating under the CZX zone had 
issued more than 10 billion yuan in debt (Changsha Development and Reform Commission 2010).   
Beyond the construction boom, new preferential or experimental policies – especially in the 
realm of finance and land management – also fueled rapid economic growth in the CZX region. 
Taking advantage of its latitude under pilot zone policies, Hunan experimented with new financial 
arrangements to raise capital (Interview CS191205a) and introduced new land policies to facilitate 
growth in the CZX core region and promote high-density growth.77 Hunan also experimented with 
new urban migration and environmental policies. In 2009-2010, efforts were rolled out to streamline 
hukou conversion, ID card management, and social integration with the CZX region (Changsha 
Development and Reform Commission 2010). On the environmental side, with new funding and 
compensation policies, cities launched major efforts to improve water treatment and to clean up and 
rehabilitate highly polluted industrial sites such as Qingshuitang and Pingtan town along the Xiang 
River corridor between Zhuzhou and Changsha (Interview CS081203b).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 On the one hand, Hunan used its policy privileges to reduce (hejian) the amount of basic farmland in core regions, thus 
facilitating further land development there. The province also experimented with a system for market-based transfers of 
construction land quotas among different cities in the province so as to enable rapidly growing core cities to boost their 
land reserves while also ensuring compensation to the peripheral locations giving up land-development quotas 
(Interview CS061203a). 
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As the decade drew to a close, Hunan’s developmental energies remained focused on the 
CZX region. With Changsha tapped to serve as Hunan’s main growth pole and to increase its core 
urban population to 6 million people by 2030, development prospects continued to look bright 
(Interview CS081203b). And with governor Zhou Qiang taking over from Zhang Chunxian as Party 
secretary in 2010, Hunan’s development policy orientation seemed unlikely to change drastically in 
the short run.78 At the same time, there were signs that greater emphasis might be placed on lagging 
areas of the province in the future, as the provincial government began to devote more attention to 
southern and western Hunan (Zhang 2009).79 Following improvements to regional infrastructure in 
these parts of the province, new economic opportunities had begun to emerge. There was also 
growing recognition among policy elites that the CZX region alone could not drive development 
across the province (Interview CS021111a).80 Nevertheless, as the 2000s wound down, Changsha’s 
long moment in the sun continued. 
 
Jiangxi 
The development approach taken by Jiangxi during the latter half of the 2000s displayed 
much less metropolitan bias than policies in Hunan. During the later years of Meng Jianzhu’s tenure 
as Party secretary, the provincial government evinced a very different development philosophy than 
the competitiveness-first outlook of the early 2000s. As Jiangxi moved into the 11th FYP period, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 At a provincial leadership meeting ahead of the 12th Five-Year Plan period, Zhou called for continued emphasis on 
Zhang’s “new-style industrialization, three basics” policy goals (Luo 2011). Zhou’s own “four –izations, two-type” (sihua 
liangxing) economic strategy continued to emphasize industrialization and called for using urbanization as more of an 
economic engine in its own right, and better coordinating urban development with rural modernization. 
Notwithstanding minor policy adjustments, Hunan would continue to focus on the CZX area (Wu et al 2011). 
79 Zhang Chunxian called for creating a “southern Hunan industry-relocation economic circle” and supporting the 
emergence of a “resource-industry economic circle” in Western Hunan (Zhang 2009).  
80 A new Western Hunan plan for 2011-2020 being developed by provincial officials and researchers placed more 
emphasis on stimulating endogenous development in the region, and also envisioned major new infrastructure 
improvements (Interview CS091205b). Meanwhile, Hunan’s 12th Five-Year Plan plan policies put more stress on 
improving the economic position in the province of border cities such as Changde, Chenzhou, Huaihua, and Yongzhou, 
and on strengthening economic links with neighboring provinces (Zhu 2011). 
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leaders placed less emphasis on the Nanchang-Jiujiang corridor and laid more stress on rural and 
environmental work. Following a leadership change, Jiangxi’s new Party secretary Su Rong further 
played up rural issues, environmental protection, and coordinated regional development, making 
such themes central to his Poyang Lake Ecological Economy Zone initiative. Jiangxi thus devoted 
more attention to the policy priorities espoused by the central government and localities, to the 
chagrin of several provincial-level policy elites. 
The adjustment of Jiangxi’s development strategy after the mid-2000s can be understood in 
part as a reaction to multiple years of strong economic performance. After Meng’s arrival, Jiangxi 
had experienced a boom: between 2000 and 2005, its economy grew at an annual rate of 13.9 
percent, well ahead of not only Hunan, which achieved 11.3 percent, but also the national pace of 
11.7 percent (China Data Online; author’s calculations). With economic momentum finally 
established, policymakers could afford to give more attention to coordinating development across 
space and making it more sustainable. Still, with Jiangxi remaining very poor and economically 
marginal in relative terms, the realignment of the provincial development strategy away from a 
competitiveness agenda was surprising.  
At least in his development-policy rhetoric, Meng Jianzhu circa 2006 sounded like a different 
leader than Meng circa 2003. His statements echoed Beijing’s 11th FYP agenda, no longer placing the 
goal of provincial economic competitiveness front and center.81 In a media interview at the 2006 
National People’s Congress meeting, Meng announced that he would place utmost priority on New 
Socialist Countryside construction work, and played up the NSC campaign’s potential for addressing 
Jiangxi’s development problems (Renmin ribao, 3/8/2006). “Jiangxi,” he promised, “will continue to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Meng may have found himself in a weaker political position vis-a-vis Beijing as Hu Jintao consolidated power in the 
years after 2003 and the influence of Jiang Zemin, a key patron, receded. Indeed, the fact that Meng, despite major 
achievements, was not promoted out of Jiangxi within a few years to a more noteworthy province or an influential 
central post suggests that his previously rapid political ascent may have run into obstacles. In the end, Meng spent over 
six years in Jiangxi. 
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take developing the rural economy as the central task […]” In another interview the following 
month, Meng noted that Jiangxi had emphasized industrialization and opening up during the early 
2000s, but that it was now time for heavy emphasis on rural issues. It was unacceptable, he said, that 
“cities develop dramatically from day to day while the countryside continues to look the same as 
always.” He also cautioned against unsustainable growth that would “eat the food of our ancestors 
or cut off the road for our descendants” (Renmin ribao 4/18/2006). In late April 2006, Meng, 
accompanied by Pan Yiyang and other leaders, paid a high-profile visit to Ganzhou to inspect 
progress on rural development. During the visit, he reiterated the province’s commitment to NSC 
work and people-oriented rural development, and called for integrating NSC work with 
industrialization and county-level economic development (Jiangxi ribao 4/30/2006).  
Whereas in previous years Meng had referred to Jiangxi’s urbanization efforts using the term 
chengshihua (“big-city-based urbanization”), he – and the provincial government more broadly – now 
used the term preferred by Beijing, chengzhenhua (“small-city-based urbanization”). Indeed, the urban 
development strategy Jiangxi outlined in 2006 and further elaborated in 2007 called for placing 
greater emphasis on smaller cities and regionally balanced development, and for promoting urban 
cluster development in three different parts of the province (Liu 2009; Cao and Zhu 2010). In 
making these rhetorical and policy shifts, Meng aligned Jiangxi’s development program more closely 
with the approach favored by China’s top leaders. 
While Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao had begun to place emphasis on addressing  rural problems 
soon after coming into power in the early 2000s, rural-focused rhetoric and action from the top 
leadership intensified during the 11th FYP period. After using the 2004 No. 1 Central Document to 
plug rural priorities, the top leadership placed rural issues – and, in particular, “building a New 
Socialist Countryside” – atop the agenda in the national 11-5 Plan. Hu, emphasizing the need to 
forestall threats to China’s food security and social stability, had further stressed these rural priorities 
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in a meeting with provincial leaders in February 2006 (Looney 2012, 204-213). During their visits to 
Jiangxi in the late 2000s, central leaders not only played up rural development themes but also 
emphasized environmental protection work. When Wen Jiabao visited Jiangxi in April 2007, for 
instance, he said that environmental work and building up an ecologically oriented economy in the 
Poyang Lake region were of the essence. Hu Jintao, on a later visit in 2009, called for a resource-
conserving, environmentally friendly development approach (Hua 2011). Thus, there was central 
pressure on the Jiangxi government to shift away from a metropolitan-oriented development 
approach as well as pressure within the province from the ongoing NSC campaign.  
After Su Rong replaced Meng in late 2007, Jiangxi shifted even further away from a 
metropolitan-oriented development model. Su, 59 years old at the time of his appointment, was a 
native of the rustbelt province of Jilin and had previously served as Party secretary in the poor, arid 
northwestern provinces of Qinghai and Gansu. Low-key verging on bland, Su cut a very different 
figure than Meng. After a much quieter arrival in Jiangxi than Meng’s, Su Rong became well known 
for preaching environmental protection and balanced regional development (Liu 2009; Zhongguo 
jingying bao 3/9/2013).  
Under Su, Jiangxi continued stressing the NSC agenda in the late 2000s (Looney 2012), and 
moved forward with a Poyang Lake Ecological Economy Zone initiative that resembled Hunan’s 
CZX program in its broad form but differed in terms of its substance. After spending the beginning 
of his time in Jiangxi preoccupied with fallout from the winter storms that struck southern China in 
late 2007 and early 2008, Su Rong in March 2008 launched efforts to win for Jiangxi a special 
national-level designation similar to the pilot zone mantle Hunan had recently secured. Working 
with governor Wu Xinxiong, Su announced plans for a Poyang Lake Ecological Economy Zone 
(EEZ) that would encompass much of northern Jiangxi and combine environmental protection and 
economic development themes. 
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Obtaining central approval for the EEZ plan proved to be a laborious process. In the 
months after Su’s proposal surfaced, Jiangxi’s Development and Reform Commission worked to 
refine the details of the plan, engaging in frequent back-and-forth with the NDRC. During the 
summer of 2008, top provincial leaders appealed to central leaders such as vice premier Li Keqiang 
for help in moving the initiative forward. Li, for one, showed interest in the proposed zone – 
particularly its environmental protection components –  but called for further revisions, saying the 
plan required a clearer geographic and thematic focus. In September 2008, the Jiangxi government 
approved a modified version of plan and submitted it to the State Council. Provincial leaders 
followed up by briefing central leaders in early 2009, and central-provincial consultations continued 
in the following months. Jiangxi’s leaders failed to win approval by their target date of June 2009, as 
several further rounds of revisions proved necessary. By the end of 2009, however, Jiangxi finally 
succeeded in winning NDRC and State Council endorsement for the plan (Hua 2011, 47-51). 
 As with Hunan’s CZX plan, winning a central-level strategic designation helped Jiangxi 
obtain many policy benefits and more state resources. However, the EEZ plan differed in several 
important respects from the CZX plan and thus had different consequences on the ground. First, 
the Zone’s geographic scope was much broader than the CZX core region, spanning 51,200 square 
kilometers and encompassing Nanchang, Yingtan, Jingdezhen, counties from Jiujiang and four other 
cities. In addition, the substantive emphasis of Jiangxi’s plan on environmental work, and, more 
specifically, protection of Poyang Lake and its watershed, made the plan less conducive to urban-
industrial development than Hunan’s (Du 2011; Interview BJ061307b).82 Finally, because Jiangxi’s 
plan was approved at a time when a large number of provinces were gaining approval for state-level 
regional development plans, it had a lower political profile than the earlier CZX initiative.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 One important reason for the focus of Jiangxi’s regional initiative on environmental, and specifically water-treatment, 
issues, was the large amount of pollution associated with rare-earth and copper mining activities in the province 
(Interview BJ061307b). 
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Nonetheless, many investment projects were developed in conjunction with the Ecological 
Economy Zone strategy. Following the Zone’s approval in late 2009, the province launched 
mobilization meetings, set up a leading group under Governor Wu Xinxiong, and established a 
standing body in the provincial Development and Reform Commission. Over 400 investment 
projects were drawn up under the plan, but many of these – such as water supply and water 
treatment works, two nuclear power plants, a natural gas plant, and an urban water treatment facility 
– were oriented toward environmental construction and energy infrastructure rather than geared 
toward a metropolitan build-up. Jiangxi also unveiled new efforts to promote coordinated urban-
rural development, with 26 town-development demonstration zone projects launched (Zhongguo 
jingying bao 3/9/2013; Du 2011).  
If Nanchang continued to grow briskly in absolute terms during the late 2000s, metropolitan 
development efforts slackened considerably compared with the preceding years. Important advances 
in Nanchang’s urban infrastructure during the late 2000s included upgrades to the Changbei Airport, 
initial work on a first subway line, and a new rail station built on the city’s west side (Nanchang 
Development and Reform Commission 2011, 44). But Nanchang’s economic growth slowed down 
in the late 2000s even as Jiangxi saw extremely rapid overall FAI and GDP growth. One government 
report noted that Nanchang had missed several of the 11th FYP period development targets laid out 
for the city. The capital’s services sector grew especially sluggishly – tourism, for instance, grew at 
0.1 percent annually rather than the intended 6 percent – and Nanchang’s share of provincial GDP 
fell from 25 percent to 23.6 percent. Meanwhile, Nanchang saw setbacks in municipal planning work 
(Nanchang Development and Reform Commission 2011).  
Some provincial policy elites blamed Jiangxi’s shift of development strategy for causing 
Nanchang to lag further behind its competitors in the central region, and counseled a return to a 
more metropolitan-oriented strategy. Chen Xinhua, a provincial policy advisor, sent a letter to 
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provincial leaders in November 2006 urging them to reconsider the change in urban strategy and 
resume a big-city-based development approach. In the letter, he pointed out that  
After leaping into the new century (or to be precise, since Secretary Meng took over), Jiangxi 
has come out with several new things as far as development concepts and approach are 
concerned; the loud and clear promotion of big-city-based urbanization has been one of 
them. […] Perhaps some will say that small-city-based urbanization is the center’s 
formulation, and we in Jiangxi should not break with orthodoxy. Nonsense! It’s not the case 
that if the center puts out some slogan every province and city across the country should all 
completely imitate it; if this were the case, would each locality still have any creativity? […] 
On the contrary, each place should completely put forward its own slogan in accordance 
with local realities according to its own situation. Otherwise, it is just ossification; it will just 
be a return to the old situation of unliberated thinking Jiangxi was in before, when it didn’t 
dare to think this, and didn’t dare to do that” (Chen 2010, 219-221). 
 
It was essential, Chen argued, for a backward province such as Jiangxi to promote urbanization 
more aggressively. Jiangxi alone among its central neighbors had failed to gain recognition under the 
Central China Rising document for its metropolitan-region plans. Only by proactively building a 
greater Nanchang and rejecting the recent “small city, big strategy” approach could Jiangxi ensure 
greater success in urban competition and bring in more central resources (Chen 2010).  
Along similar lines, Yao Mugen, former head of Jiangxi’s Development and Reform 
Commission, decried the return to a more dispersed urban and industrial development model, 
noting in a 2010 book that new policies were holding back Nanchang and Jiujiang’s growth. Yao 
argued that Jiangxi should use a full complement of preferential policies to build up Nanchang to 
one-third of provincial GDP (Yao, ed. 2010, 150-152). And later, during Su Rong’s tenure, other 
critics derided Jiangxi’s development approach as “chopping the big and planting the small, planting 
trees in water fields” (Zhongguo jingying bao 3/9/2013). Over time, persistent complaints such as these, 
combined with mounting evidence of Nanchang’s slipping competitive position, would prompt 
further reevaluation of Jiangxi’s urban development approach.83  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 There was a further shift in Jiangxi’s urban policy early in the 12-5 period, shortly before Su Rong departed. In 2012, 
Su called for utilizing Jiangxi’s full provincial strength to help build up Nanchang. According to a provincial policy 
researcher, a variety of financial, tax, land, investment, and other preferential policies were rolled out between 2012-2013 
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While Nanchang dropped out of the limelight, however, Jiangxi did an enviable job with its 
environmental work and in maintaining rapid rural-income growth. During the 11th FYP period, 
Jiangxi carried out heavy investment in the rural sector, energy production and distribution, and 
manufacturing. Provincial authorities worked to strengthen county-level finances, even though this 
meant shifting more fiscal resources down the administrative ladder and discontinuing upward 
transfer of certain tax revenues to provincial coffers. The province also made efforts to connect all 
administrative villages in the province to cement roads (Du 2011). As a result, Jiangxi as a whole 
experienced more regionally balanced growth and higher rural incomes than virtually all nearby 
provinces (Li et al, eds. 2007). Although Jiangxi’s urban incomes in 2009 had reached only 82 
percent of China’s average, its rural incomes were 98 percent of national average (Zhu 2011). In 
Ganzhou, meanwhile, Pan Yiyang could claim significant rural development achievements for the 
NSC campaign. The campaign had curbed urban-rural income gaps, improved the living 
environment of rural residents, and facilitated movement of peasants into the denser, better-serviced 
settlements of rebuilt villages and county towns (Zhongguo jingji zhoukan, 3/7/2010). In short, Jiangxi 
had managed a very different kind of developmental success, akin in some ways to the “micro-
oriented” model of Guizhou discussed by Donaldson (2011), even as it fell further behind Hubei, 
Hunan, and even Anhui in terms of metropolitan competitiveness. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Despite sharing similar economic structures and facing similar developmental challenges as 
they entered the 21st century, Hunan and Jiangxi took surprisingly different approaches to urban and 
regional development. Policies in Hunan clearly and consistently prioritized development of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in support of this goal. There was even speculative talk of the possibility of adjustments to the size of Nanchang’s 
administrative area to boost its competitive profile down the line (Xinhua Net Jiangxi 11/5/2012; Interview NC041301a). 
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Changsha metropolitan region over other areas of the province. Fueled by huge quantities of 
investment, Changsha experienced explosive economic, demographic, and physical growth between 
the late 1990s and 2010. Even as other parts of the province lagged behind, Hunan’s capital city 
raised its profile both domestically and internationally. Jiangxi’s development policies showed much 
less metropolitan bias. Spatial and industrial development strategies in Jiangxi fluctuated a great deal 
over time, and adhered more closely than Hunan’s to the more regionally balanced and rural-
oriented development approach both provinces had historically followed and to Beijing’s policy line. 
State support and investment were more dispersed across space in Jiangxi, and metropolitan 
development efforts came in fits and starts. While state actors played a decisive role in shaping urban 
and regional development in both provinces, the greater clout of Hunan’s provincial government 
meant more state support and resources were directed toward the metropolitan development agenda. 
The meteoric rise of greater Changsha was not preordained by economic geography but 
depended, rather, on concerted higher-level policy interventions. Changsha only half fits the image 
of an outward-oriented, entrepreneurial city. During the 2000s, Changsha’s environment for private 
and foreign investment got decidedly mixed marks, and the city’s economy was never heavily 
oriented toward international trade or FDI (World Bank 2006; Luo 2011). Hunan’s private sector 
may be better developed than those of some inland provinces, but it was not the principal engine for 
Changsha’s development. Indeed, as late as 2008, the non-state share of Changsha’s economy was 
55.3 percent, lower than for Hunan overall (Zeng 2010, 107). Meanwhile, Changsha had a thinner 
industrial base than other central Chinese metropolises such as Wuhan or Zhengzhou (Luo 2011). 
On the other hand, FAI, much of it directed toward urban infrastructure and real estate, was crucial 
for Changsha’s economic rise. By one estimate, FAI accounted for more than 60 percent of 
Changsha’s growth during the crucial five years between 2001-2005 (Wang 2010, 143). In Jiangxi, as 
in Hunan, periods of especially rapid growth in the capital-city region – first in the mid-1990s and 
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then again in early 2000s – were associated with major investment drives and higher-level policies to 
promote urban competitiveness and growth. When provincial support faded, however, Nanchang’s 
growth rate slowed. Thus, to understand variation in urban and regional growth outcomes across 
these two provinces and over time, it is necessary to clarify the conditions that enabled mobilization 
of policy support and state resources behind metropolitan development.  
As I have shown, crises of lagging development in both provinces galvanized support for 
metropolitan-oriented strategies. Hunan’s worsening economic marginalization and slow progress in 
grooming advanced industries and foreign-oriented sectors over the 15 years between the early 
1990s and the mid-2000s fed demand for strong measures to boost competitiveness. In Jiangxi, 
which started out even poorer than Hunan and also recorded subpar growth rates during the 1990s, 
many policy elites viewed metropolitan development with a similar urgency. However, following 
Jiangxi’s relatively strong growth performance during the first half of the decade, higher-level 
support for metropolitan development dropped off in the late 2000s (notwithstanding the fact that 
several provincial-level policy elites called for continued efforts to build up Nanchang).  
Of course, economic circumstances alone did not determine policy outcomes. The balance 
of power among different levels of government proved crucial in shaping Hunan and Jiangxi’s 
development approaches. In both cases, the provincial establishment’s ability to define the policy 
agenda and shape the allocation of resources and policy benefits affected the degree of metropolitan 
bias. For much of the period in question, provincial-level actors and interests dominated the 
formulation of policies to a greater extent in Hunan than in Jiangxi. In Hunan, the provincial 
establishment – provincial leaders and agencies as well as policy intellectuals closely linked to the 
provincial government – mobilized behind a metropolitan-oriented development strategy even 
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before central policymakers had fully embraced new urban policies.84 The provincial government 
loudly publicized its metropolitan strategy within the province, tapping into Hunanese pride, and 
began to secure backing from Beijing early on through active preparation and outreach. Over the 
following years, the provincial government sustained, and further escalated, its CZX strategy even as 
intra-provincial development gaps grew more pronounced and Beijing placed greater emphasis rural 
development problems. Even though some localities marginalized by provincial CZX policies voiced 
opposition, provincial-level priorities prevailed.  
In Jiangxi, a politically weaker provincial unit than Hunan, both local interests and central 
priorities influenced provincial policy approaches between the late 1990s and 2010. In the late 1990s, 
rural development priorities won out over capital-city interests, and Jiangxi adhered to the small city-
oriented central policy line on urban development. Though the province joined the nationwide 
urbanization and industrialization policy wave of the early 2000s, Jiangxi again changed tack in the 
mid-2000s. After 2004, development strategy took a more populist turn as a result of changing 
central policies and sub-provincial influences. Even though a vocal group of provincial policy elites 
continued to advocate a metropolitan-oriented strategy, local initiatives such as Ganzhou’s NSC 
campaign and pressure from central leaders reshaped Jiangxi’s development approach. The pursuit 
in the late 2000s of more regionally balanced, rural-oriented, and environmentally sustainable growth 
model marked a return to Jiangxi’s green development tradition, but also caused many local 
observers to fear a decline in provincial economic competitiveness. 
Hunan’s more metropolitan-oriented development also reflected greater provincial capacity 
for and control over policy implementation. Beginning in the late 1990s, provincial authorities 
orchestrated a series of spatial and functional planning efforts for the CZX region, and overhauled 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 In this process, the regular involvement and support of a broader provincial policy-making establishment, centered 
around organizations such as HPASS and local universities, was crucial. Policy intellectuals such as Zhang Ping, Zhu 
Xiang, and Tong Zhongxian who identified closely with the provincial cause served as policy entrepreneurs and 
provided important guidance and research support to provincial leaders. 
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the regulatory framework and administrative institutions for metropolitan governance. Throughout 
this process, Hunan’s provincial government proved adept at interfacing with Beijing to obtain 
special policies and resources that could be used in support of provincial objectives. Provincial 
authorities could not always compel city-level cooperation, but the Hunan government did prove 
able to shape the allocation of resources and policy benefits across different locations and sectors. 
Rapid growth of provincially prioritized industries (e.g., construction equipment) and locations (e.g., 
Xingsha new town) reflected heavy doses of state support and preferential policy treatment in 
addition to underlying resource endowments and management skill.85  
By comparison, Jiangxi evinced less capacity for drafting and implementing plans in short 
order or using provincial policies to focus resources in priority areas. In the early 2000s, Jiangxi 
called for greater emphasis on Nanchang’s development, but a limited number of concrete policies 
followed (Interview NC041301a). Throughout the 2000s, investment and urban infrastructure 
development were distributed relatively evenly across different areas in Jiangxi, rather than being 
heavily concentrated in leading cities. The numerous environmental construction projects launched 
under the auspices of the Poyang Lake Zone initiative in the late 2000s reflected central policy 
priorities and sub-provincial demands as much as a competitiveness-oriented metropolitan agenda. 
For better or worse, Jiangxi did not “concentrate strength to do big things” as much as Hunan.  
In both provinces, the characteristics of top provincial leaders also appear to have had a 
large impact on metropolitan bias outcomes.86 While it is very likely that the past experiences, 
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85 Many local policy scholars and experts interviewed mentioned the wide range of administrative means the provincial 
government deployed to promote CZX region development. These included preferential land allocation, transportation 
and urban infrastructure development, and tax and financial policies, as well as special policy designations that conferred 
greater visibility or regulatory flexibility (Interviews CS181205a; CS171205a; CS061203b). 
86 Party secretaries outrank governors, but both provincial Party secretaries and governors played important roles in 
Hunan and Jiangxi’s development politics. Provincial Party secretaries, as the top political figures in provinces, play a 
major role in creating the political room and mobilizing the resources for major development undertakings. In some 
cases, as in that of Meng Jianzhu, they played highly visible policy-making roles, while in other cases, such as that of 
Yang Zhengwu, they played a lower-key role and let governors play active roles. Governors, meanwhile, played a key 
role in coordinating the design and execution of development strategies and related policies, even though it is less clear 
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personal styles, and individual worldviews of China’s provincial leaders influenced the policy 
approaches they took (Donaldson 2011), I have particularly emphasized the importance of 
provincial leaders’ dynamism and political strength. In both Hunan and Jiangxi, metropolitan bias in 
development was greatest during the tenures of relatively young and politically well-connected 
leaders. At the turn of the century, non-native, mid-career governors pushed forward CZX regional 
development in Hunan.87 Across the border in Jiangxi, older locals held the top provincial leadership 
posts and more conservative urban policies prevailed (China Directory; China Vitae). In both Hunan 
and Jiangxi, major breakthroughs in metropolitan development occurred shortly after the arrival of 
relatively young Party secretaries who had gained important administrative experience and made key 
political or bureaucratic contacts while in their previous posts. Both Meng Jianzhu and Zhang 
Chunxian oversaw dramatic development breakthroughs, with economic growth, urbanization rates, 
and industrialization levels rising sharply during their tenures. Both leaders, like many of their 
counterparts elsewhere, played the game of provincial boosterism with zeal, working to improve 
their provinces’ and top cities’ economic rankings and positions in the competition among inland 
regions to attract investment and policy benefits. While Meng was replaced by an older and lower-
profile leader, Zhang’s role was taken over in 2010 by another rising star who had been serving as 
governor, Zhou Qiang. Zhou’s promotion to Hunan’s top post meant continued provincial-level 
clout, and continued emphasis on CZX development. Insofar as metropolitan bias grew out of 
provincial initiatives, then, the nature of top leaders was key. 
One might question whether the build-up and integration of the Changsha region was 
primarily a provincial project enabled by the strength of Hunan’s provincial government, and point 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
to what extent they can be credited with creating the political conditions for major provincial initiatives. For more 
discussion of the respective roles of party secretaries and governors, see Tan (2004).  
87 Though Zhou Bohua, governor between 2003 and 2005, showed less flair than his predecessors, there was continuity 
at the top, with Yang Zhengwu continuing in the role of Party chief. Because Hunan’s metropolitan agenda had already 
built up considerable momentum in the previous few years, and China as a whole continued to experience a major 
economic boom, growth prospects remained strong. 
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instead to the role central policies or city-level efforts played in the emergence of a metropolitan-
oriented development approach. While the CZX regional initiative has over time increasingly 
dovetailed with national-level urban and regional policies, and while it is clear that central actors 
gave major support to CZX development at critical moments, it is hard to construe the Changsha 
region’s build-up as a centrally led project. Metropolitan bias and CZX integration efforts in Hunan 
took shape before Beijing had endorsed the development of urban clusters or even shifted away 
from a small city-oriented urban policy.88 Unlike Guangzhou and Wuhan, which were also pioneers 
for metropolitan-regional policies, Changsha had not previously been a key regional center or 
industrial hub. Indeed, at the time CZX efforts got off the ground in the late 1990s, local policy 
elites were lamenting the limited amount of central attention Hunan was receiving. It was not really 
until the mid-2000s, when the CZX region was named as a key urban region under Beijing’s Central 
China Rising strategy, and when China’s 11th FYP endorsed the idea of city-cluster development, 
that central policy unambiguously turned in favor of CZX development. Even then, central leaders 
did not instruct Hunan to go all-out with a policy of unbalanced development or pursue 
astronomical urban growth targets.89  
Meanwhile, the development approach taken in the CZX region was no simple reflection of 
city-level preferences or policies. Although Changsha was the direct beneficiary of metropolitan-
oriented policies, the urban development approach for CZX was designed to serve provincial 
objectives as much as to advance city-level interests. The spatial arrangement of urban development 
in the CZX area, for instance, was steered from above to serve provincial priorities. Efforts to weave 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 It is unclear, however, whether Premier Zhu Rongji – himself a Hunan native – might have encouraged or supported 
CZX development efforts from the late 1990s on.  
89 Central leaders appear to have called for more modest and balanced development targets in Hunan. While meeting 
with Hunan’s delegation to the National People’s Congress in March 2007, Hu Jintao expressed support for Hunan’s 
new-style industrialization agenda, but placed particular emphasis on the need for Hunan to expand support for 
agricultural development and village programs (Liangxing ban 2011 a, 134). And, according to one Changsha official, the 
increasingly ambitious urban growth targets set for Changsha were driven mainly by city and provincial leaders rather 
than by central bureaucrats (Interview CS081203b). 
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Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan’s urban areas together along the Xiang River corridor ensured 
that provincial authorities would play a key coordinating role. And within Changsha, the parceling 
out of many new urban and industrial development projects to areas beyond the city’s central 
districts meant Changsha’s overall “economic strength” (jingji shili) could be increased without 
proportionate growth in the resource base or power of the municipal government.90 Indeed, despite 
the city government’s efforts to convert Changsha County, the area east of central Changsha that 
contained the metropolitan area’s airport and most important industrial development zone, into an 
urban district, the county remained a separate entity—and hence administratively closer to the 
provincial government. Thus, by promoting a sprawling, polycentric urban form for both Changsha 
and the larger metropolitan region, and playing up inter-city infrastructural and policy initiatives, 
provincial authorities guaranteed themselves a key role in metropolitan development even as 
Changsha became more powerful in its own right.  
In Jiangxi, on the other hand, the imprint of provincial-level priorities on the form of urban 
and regional development was fainter. After four years of aggressive metropolitan-oriented growth 
under Meng Jianzhu, central priorities such as environmental protection and coordinated urban-rural 
development featured more prominently in Jiangxi’s policy approach from the mid-2000s on. With 
support and attention from the central government, the New Socialist Countryside construction 
policy piloted in Ganzhou grew in scope and status to influence Jiangxi’s overall strategy. Jiangxi’s 
abrupt shift of development model in the mid-2000s can be understood as the response of a 
politically constrained provincial government to growing central and sub-provincial pressure for a 
more balanced, populist, and environmentally sustainable development approach.91 The push and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Under the CZX scheme, Changsha’s outlying counties of Ningxiang and Liuyang saw rapid development, and the 
provincial government steered Changsha’s urban growth southward toward Zhuzhou and Xiangtan. 
91 By the same token, the environmental protection agenda pursued under Su Rong in the late 2000s can be understood 
both as a reaction to Beijing’s call for Jiangxi to do more to protect the quality of its freshwater (which was, in turn, 
essential to water quality in downstream reaches of the Yangtze River), and also as response to pressure from many 
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pull of different government levels and actors for control over Jiangxi’s development agenda 
resulted in policymakers’ attending to a broader range of concerns and interests than in Hunan. 
While this may have harmed Jiangxi’s chances of repositioning itself in China’s urban and industrial 
economy, it had clear benefits for many ordinary people and smaller cities across the province.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
localities within the province for a larger share of investment (many of the environmental projects launched were located 
in areas outside the capital city). 
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VI: Generalizing Key Claims – Evidence from 20 Provinces 
 
Introduction 
 The foregoing chapters have examined the evolution of development policies in Jiangsu, 
Hunan, and Jiangxi, using process tracing to shed light on the factors influencing metropolitan bias 
outcomes. In each case, state interventions in urban and regional development were marked by 
difficult tradeoffs, debates, and conflicts. Under different economic and political conditions, policy 
outcomes varied dramatically across the three provinces and over time. Metropolitan-oriented 
development emerged earlier and went further in Hunan than in Jiangsu or Jiangxi.  
I have argued that two variables in particular – the relative economic performance of a 
province and the intergovernmental power balance between provincial authorities and other tiers – 
influence the degree of metropolitan bias in development policy. Metropolitan bias should be greater, 
other things equal, in cases of lagging economic performance than in cases where provinces are 
performing well relative to their counterparts. This is because government actors at different levels 
should be more supportive of policies that concentrate resources to build competitive urban centers 
when provinces confront economic marginalization. We should also see greater metropolitan bias 
when provincial governments are strong relative to other tiers and able to shape policies in line with 
their preferences, insofar as provincial authorities prioritize metropolitan development more than 
either city governments or central actors (taken in the aggregate). Lagging economic performance 
and high provincial strength may occur together, but it is not necessarily the case that the two 
conditions will coincide. There should be greater metropolitan bias when both conditions are 
present than when only one or the other occurs. Yet either condition on its own should still be 
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associated with greater metropolitan bias than is seen in cases of leading economic performance and 
provincial government weakness.1  
 To test whether these explanatory variables display the expected relationships with 
metropolitan bias outcomes and help to explain diverging development trajectories across China’s 
provinces more broadly, this chapter analyzes quantitative and qualitative evidence from beyond 
Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi. The analysis proceeds in three parts, as I evaluate different aspects of 
the argument and different observable implications of the main claims. First, to assess how well the 
explanatory variables account for variation in metropolitan bias outcomes across units, I carry out 
cross-sectional regression analysis using data from the full sample of provinces (n=20). Second, to 
test the relationship between key explanatory variables and metropolitan bias outcomes over time 
within provinces, I carry out panel (time-series cross-sectional) regression analysis using data from 20 
provinces for the years 2000-2010 (n=220). More fine-grained than the cross-sectional analysis, 
panel analysis is especially useful for testing the relationship between the nature of provincial leaders 
and metropolitan bias outcomes. Third, I look more closely at the case of Liaoning to gain insight 
into a key outlier and to assess how well the main causal narrative performs in a context with 
plausible alternative explanations of metropolitan bias.  
 Using these different modes of analysis, I find at least preliminary evidence to suggest that 
the explanatory factors highlighted above are important across China’s provinces more broadly. The 
concluding section summarizes my main findings while also discussing limitations of the analysis and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Intuitively, it seems possible that lagging economic performance and provincial government strength might have a 
multiplicative interaction rather than an additive one. On the one hand, the two variables might reinforce one another, 
with high levels of one variable increasing the potency of the other. On the other hand, if there is a ceiling or saturation 
point for metropolitan bias, high levels of one variable might limit the potential for an increase on the other variable to 
intensify metropolitan bias. I take an additive relationship as the starting point because I expect lagging performance or 
high strength to be associated with relatively high levels of metropolitan bias even at intermediate levels of the other 
variable, and because I expect metropolitan bias to be greatest when both explanatory variables are at high levels. 
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lingering questions. Additional regression results and further information on my data and methods 
are provided in the dissertation’s Statistical Appendix.  
 
Analyzing the correlates of metropolitan bias across 20 provinces 
 How well does variation in relative economic performance and provincial government 
strength account for differences in metropolitan bias across China’s provinces? To examine whether 
these explanatory factors show the expected relationships with metropolitan bias outcomes more 
generally, I carry out cross-sectional regression analysis with data from the full sample of 20 
provinces. Through this analysis, I find support for the hypotheses that lagging economic 
performance and provincial government strength, respectively, are associated with greater 
metropolitan bias. Results from the regression analysis and simulation of quantities of interest 
suggest that the two explanatory variables influence metropolitan bias in an additive fashion. 
 
Hypotheses to be tested 
In previous chapters, I have argued that lagging economic performance and provincial 
government strength, either alone or in combination, should contribute to greater metropolitan bias. 
If this is true, we should find correlation in the expected direction among these variables across 
different Chinese provinces as a whole.  
Below, I test three related hypotheses for the period 2001-2010. First, I check whether 
lagging economic performance is associated with higher levels of metropolitan bias across China’s 
provinces. Second, I test whether provincial government strength is associated with greater 
metropolitan bias across provinces. Third, I explore whether there is indeed an additive relationship 
between the variables, such that the highest levels of metropolitan bias occur when economic 
performance is lagging and provincial governments are strong, the lowest levels occur when 
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economic performance is leading and provincial governments are weak, and intermediate levels are 
associated with mixed or intermediate values of the explanatory variables. At the same time, it is 
important to verify that these relationships hold after taking into account other explanatory factors 
such as the political status of top cities and the threat of social instability in different provinces.   
 
Methods and data 
To test these hypotheses, I regress provinces’ top-city investment share outcomes on the 
main explanatory variables and controls using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. I use data for 
the full sample of provinces (n=20), but also run regressions excluding my case-study provinces 
(Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi) to ensure that these observations do not drive the overall results.  
As in Chapter 2, I use top-city share of total provincial fixed-asset investment (FAI) for the 
period 2001-2010 as the dependent variable. So as to control for baseline predictors of top-city FAI 
share, I include terms for provincial population, 2000 top-city GDP share, change in top-city GDP 
share between 1996-2000, and 2000 GDP per capita, and also include a “coastal province” dummy 
to capture other differences between inland and coastal areas. In other regression specifications, I 
also include measures for provinces’ levels of urbanization, marketization, and economic openness. 
As discussed in the Statistical Appendix, most development indicators and economic data come 
from three sources: the China Data Online database (http://chinadataonline.org), a cities dataset 
obtained from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, and various provincial statistical yearbooks.2  
To operationalize relative economic performance, I calculate the difference between a given 
province’s compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of GDP and the overall national CAGR for the 
period from 1990-2000.3 I opt for GDP growth rate rather than another economic performance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 My indicator for marketization is the index from Fan Gang et al (2000). I use Shen Jianfa’s (2003) estimate of 2000 
urbanization level. As an indicator of economic openness, I calculate the ratio of provincial exports plus FDI to GDP.  
3 I adjust GDP growth rates for the varying rates of inflation recorded by different provinces.  
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measure because GDP is a comprehensive indicator, and because provincial GDP growth rates are 
closely watched and politically salient in China. Data for the full decade from 1990-2000 is used 
because I am interested in how provinces’ relative economic performance during an extended prior 
period influences their subsequent development approaches.4 As an alternative measure, I use the 
difference between a given province’s GDP growth and the average growth rate for the larger set of 
coastal or inland provinces. Data for GDP and inflation are obtained from China Data Online. 
                        Table 6.1: Different provinces’ relative economic performance, 1990-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Data Online; author’s calculations 
 
Operationalizing provincial government strength is a greater challenge, because provincial 
strength is a complex concept for which there are no existing measures. In the choice of several !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Because I analyze FAI outcomes for the whole decade between 2001-2010, it is appropriate to look at relative 
economic performance over a similarly long prior period. My theoretical expectation, and finding from the main case 
studies, is that a prolonged period of lagging performance may trigger a major adjustment of provincial development 
strategies. My expectations about the consequences of short-term – one or two-year – dips in relative economic 
performance are less clear, as such economic hiccups may be attributed to cyclical rather than structural problems. 
Unit 1990-2000 
inflation-
adjusted  
CAGR (%) 
Growth rate 
lead/lag (%) 
(national 
benchmark)  
Growth rate 
lead/lag (%) 
(regional 
benchmark) 
Hebei 11.6 1.5 0.0 
Shanxi 7.2 -2.9 -0.1 
Liaoning 8.0 -2.1 -3.5 
Jilin 9.1 -1.0 1.1 
Heilongjiang 8.0 -2.0 0.0 
Jiangsu 11.4 1.3 -0.2 
Zhejiang 12.2 2.2 0.7 
Anhui 7.7 -2.4 -0.3 
Fujian 13.8 3.7 2.2 
Jiangxi 8.6 -1.4 0.7 
Shandong 10.5 0.4 -1.1 
Henan 11.3 1.2 3.3 
Hubei 6.9 -3.1 -1.0 
Hunan 7.7 -2.4 -0.3 
Guangdong 13.4 3.4 1.9 
Guangxi 8.7 -1.4 0.7 
Sichuan 7.4 2.6 -0.5 
Guizhou 6.2 -3.9 -1.7 
Yunnan 7.2 -2.8 -0.7 
Shaanxi 7.5 -2.5 -0.4 
National avg 10.1 - - 
Avg  coastal 11.5 - - 
Avg  inland 8.0 - - 
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indicators, I take cues from Falletti’s (2005) approach for measuring the relative power of central 
and subnational governments.5 Theoretically, however, I understand provincial government strength 
as the administrative capacity and political leverage of the provincial tier relative to both Beijing 
above and city-level governments below. As such, I use an original index that addresses both 
institutional and leadership-related aspects of provincial strength, and that captures both “upward” 
and “downward” facets of provincial strength.  
The provincial government strength index takes an evenly weighted sum of scores on five 
indicators related to different dimensions of political and administrative strength, with a maximum 
possible value of 10 and a minimum possible value of 0. Some pairs of indicators are positively 
correlated with one another, while other pairs are negatively correlated or uncorrelated altogether.6 
Indeed, it is precisely because provinces are unlikely to be strong or weak on all of these different 
indicators simultaneously that this additive index, however crude, provides a useful measure of 
provincial-level strength.  
Two of the five indicators speak to the strength of provincial governments relative to cities. 
These include (1) the share of “local” (difang) fiscal expenditures in a province accounted for by the 
provincial tier of government, averaged for the two years 1999-2000; and (2) how many cities other 
than the provincial capital, if any, have representation on a given province’s provincial Party 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 To operationalize her concept of the “intergovernmental balance of power,” Falletti (2005) examines the subnational 
share of fiscal revenues, the subnational share of fiscal expenditures, the division of policymaking authority, the mode of 
appointment of subnational officials, and the representation of subnational units in national institutions. 
6 The two “downward” indicators of provincial government strength, provincial share of local fiscal expenditure and the 
number of cities other than the provincial capital that hold seats on the provincial Party standing committee, display a 
relatively strong but far from perfect correlation (coefficient of correlation=0.56). The two “upward” indicators are not 
significantly correlated with one another. Meanwhile, there is a reasonably strong correlation (0.40) between the 
proximity measure and the standing committee measure. The fiscal dependency measure has a strong negative 
correlation with provincial share of local revenue (-0.79) and with the provincial standing committee indicator (-0.68), 
which tends to limit extreme high and low scores on the index. The rising star indicator is not significantly correlated 
with any of the other indicators. 
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standing committee.7 I use the first indicator as a proxy for how dependent localities are on the 
provincial level for economic resources. When the provincial level controls a larger share of fiscal 
expenditure, provincial authorities have more sway over the allocation of resources in the province 
and can be expected to have greater bargaining power relative to cities. Fiscal data is obtained from 
China Data Online. The second indicator gets at the degree to which provincial-level politics and 
decision-making are insulated from sub-provincial interests. Where city-level leaders sit on the 
provincial Party standing committee, it should be easier for city-level governments to influence 
provincial decision-making, and more difficult for provincial-level priorities to dominate the making 
and implementation of policies. Data on provincial standing committee composition are taken from 
the China Directory series published by Radiopress, Inc.8  
 Two other indicators are used to proxy the amount of leverage provincial governments have 
vis-à-vis the central government. These include (3) the fiscal dependency of different provinces on 
the central government, calculated as a ratio of provinces’ overall fiscal expenditure to total local 
revenue; and (4) provinces’ geographic proximity to Beijing. Provinces rely on central fiscal transfers 
to help them cover the gap between their budgetary expenditures and locally controlled revenues. I 
assume that, other things equal, dependence on central largesse makes provincial governments more 
beholden to Beijing—and, by extension, to central policy priorities.9 Again, fiscal data are obtained 
from China Data Online. Second, I assume that provinces located nearer to Beijing geographically 
have had tighter bonds to the central state both historically and in more recent periods. In such 
cases, Beijing may have a greater capacity for oversight of provincial affairs, may be more involved 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 I gathered data on the makeup of provincial Party committees for the years 2000 and 2005. In most provinces, there is 
not frequent change in which sub-provincial cities have leaders who sit on the provincial Party committee. 
8 I assign Hebei a score of 0 on this indicator rather the 1 it would otherwise receive because the province surrounds the 
territory of both Beijing, China’s capital, and Tianjin, another centrally controlled municipality, and faces political 
constraints from the presence of such powerful localities. 
9 This is the typical finding of past China scholars. See, for instance, Watson et al (1999). 
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in provincial policymaking, and may also give or take more resources to/from provinces.10 I measure 
different provinces’ proximity to Beijing using the distance calculation tool in the Google Maps 
application (https://maps.google.com).11 
 The final indicator in the provincial strength index (5) records the number of “rising stars” 
who have held top leadership positions (either Party secretary or governor) in a province between 
2000-2010. Rising star leaders are identified as those whose age upon assuming the leadership post 
in a province was a standard deviation younger than the average age for incoming Party secretaries 
or governors, respectively.12 Following Li (2010), I assume that leaders who rise to high office at a 
young age enjoy either strong political patronage from top national Party leaders or exhibit unusual 
individual leadership talent. In either case, I assume that such leaders bring greater political capital 
and bargaining leverage to the provincial governments over which they preside. Data on leaders are 
taken from the Radiopress, Inc. China Directory series, from Baidu’s Baike online encyclopedia 
(http://baidu.baike.com), and from China Vitae (www.chinavitae.com). 
After collecting raw data for each of these sub-indicators for the 20 provinces, I compare the 
marks for different provinces and assign each province a score of 0, 1, or 2 on the indicator. A score 
of 2 signifies a relatively high level of provincial strength, while 1 signifies intermediate strength, and 
0 relatively low strength. Possible cumulative scores on the index range from 0 (indicating very low 
provincial-level strength) to 10 (indicating very high provincial-level strength). After I code for the 
different sub-indicators and sum them up, actual scores on the index range between 2 and 8, with 
the mean, median, and modal scores being 5.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Historically, there has not been a perfect correlation between central state penetration and provinces’ distance from 
Beijing, but it seems generally to be the case that Beijing has more tightly governed nearby provinces, and that provinces 
closer to the center have remitted more revenues. See Whitney (1970); Fitzgerald (2002). 
11 I measure the air distance from each province’s capital to Beijing.  
12 For Party secretaries, the median age at appointment is 58, and I code those appointed at age 54 or younger as rising 
stars. For governors, the median age at appointment is 56, and those under 52 are coded as rising stars. 
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I list each province’s scores for each provincial strength indicator and for the overall 
provincial government strength score in Table 6.2 below, and I present the raw data for each sub-
indicator in the Statistical Appendix.  
       Table 6.2: Provincial government strength – overall score and individual indicators 
Province Prov inc ia l  
s t r eng th  
index  
(0-10) 
Provincial share 
of local 
expenditures 
Sub-
provincial 
political 
clout 
Fiscal 
dependency on 
Beijing 
Proximity 
to Beijing 
Rising star 
leaders 
Hebei 4 1 0 2 0 1 
Shanxi 5 2 1 1 0 1 
Liaoning 3 0 0 1 0 2 
Jilin 4 2 0 0 1 1 
Heilongjiang 5 2 2 0 1 0 
Jiangsu 4 0 0 2 1 1 
Zhejiang 5 0 0 2 1 2 
Anhui 5 2 1 1 1 0 
Fujian 6 0 0 2 2 2 
Jiangxi 4 1 1 0 2 0 
Shandong 2 0 0 2 0 0 
Henan 4 1 1 1 0 1 
Hubei 6 1 2 1 1 1 
Hunan 8 2 2 0 2 2 
Guangdong 5 0 0 2 2 1 
Guangxi 7 1 1 1 2 2 
Sichuan 5 0 2 1 2 0 
Guizhou 6 2 2 0 2 0 
Yunnan 7 2 2 0 2 1 
Shaanxi 6 2 1 0 1 2 
                Sources: Author’s calculations using data from various sources. See Statistical Appendix for raw indicator scores. 
 
The two main explanatory variables do not show a clear linear relationship with one another, 
allaying concerns about multicollinearity. A scatterplot of provinces’ relative economic performance 
and provincial strength scores in Figure 6.3 below shows that there is no simple linear relationship 
between the variables. Several provinces with lagging performance also have higher strength, which 
is not surprising insofar as inland provinces are likely to have slower development and to display 
greater strength. Yet there are exceptions to this pattern, and there is no fixed overall trend. 
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    Figure 6.3: No clear linear relationship between key explanatory variables 
 
Alternate explanatory variables   
As I evaluate the relationship between these key explanatory variables and metropolitan bias, 
it is also important to examine whether alternate variables might do a better job of predicting 
metropolitan bias outcomes, and/or whether the inclusion of alternate variables in regression 
models might affect the observed relationship between the main explanatory variables and 
metropolitan bias. I look in particular at three possibilities: (1) that metropolitan bias outcomes are 
driven by certain cities’ close links with or special status under China’s central state; (2) that high 
levels of metropolitan bias are associated with the deputy-provincial rank some cities enjoy (which 
confers added administrative powers and resources); and (3) that state support has been directed to 
cities prone to social instability. 
First, it is possible that disproportionate concentration of investment in the top cities of 
some provinces reflects cities’ status as key administrative centers for the country more broadly. To 
test whether status as a key national center drives provincial metropolitan bias outcomes, I use a 
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dummy variable that indicates whether a province’s top city is home to a regional military command, 
a central bank branch, or the headquarters of one of China’s six historical macro-regions.13  
Second, cities with higher administrative rank may be empowered to adopt pro-investment 
policies or to lobby higher-level governments for policy benefits and state resources. In particular, 
past research by Chung (2010) and others finds that deputy-provincial cities enjoy certain 
administrative and economic policy privileges that give them advantages in economic competition. 
Accordingly, I test a dummy variable for whether or not the top city of a given province has deputy-
provincial status.14 
Finally, it is possible that high metropolitan bias reflects state efforts to head off social unrest 
by improving livelihoods and increasing public goods provision in the major cities of regions prone 
to instability (Wallace 2013). Given the difficulty of directly comparing levels of social unrest across 
different Chinese cities, I use the state-owned share of the economy in different provinces as a 
proxy for the magnitude of instability problems top cities faced heading into the 2000s. As Freeman 
(2002), Hurst (2009), and others note, provinces with large state-owned economic sectors faced 
particularly difficult structural transitions during the late 1990s and early 2000s, experiencing mass 
layoffs, economic stagnation, and social instability—especially in and around major cities.  
Summary statistics for the main dependent and explanatory variables, as well as control 
variables, are provided below in Table 6.4.  
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The provinces in the sample that contain key national centers include Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hubei, Guangzhou, 
Sichuan, and Shaanxi. 
14 The list of provinces in my sample for which this is true includes Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Shandong, Hubei, Guangzhou, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. 
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                   Table 6.4: Summary statistics for cross-sectional regressions 
 
                           Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
Regression results  
My main regression results are presented in Table 6.5 on the next page, and additional 
regression tables are presented in the Statistical Appendix.  
I first examine the relationship between relative provincial economic performance and 
metropolitan bias outcomes. While including the same set of baseline covariates used in Chapter 2 
for measuring metropolitan bias, I add the indicator for provinces’ relative GDP growth rate. (See 
specification 2 in Table 6.5 below.) As expected, I find that the GDP growth lead/lag term is 
negatively related to top-city FAI share, and that this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. The specification shows improved goodness-of-fit relative to the baseline model, with r2 
increasing from 0.79 to 0.85 (adjusted r2 increases from 0.71 to 0.78). Moreover, when I use an 
alternate measure of provincial relative economic performance – a province’s performance relative 
to the coastal or inland regional average – results are similar. Again, the GDP growth lead/lag shows 
up negative and significant at the 0.05 level, and goodness-of-fit improves noticeably relative to the 
baseline model. (See Table A.6 in the Statistical Appendix.) I also verify that dropping observations 
for the three case-study provinces does not affect the basic results.  
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DV: top-city faishare0110 20 0.270 0.083 0.135 0.410
gdppc 20 7,266.300 3,072.905 2,645 12,898
population 20 55.159 21.200 26.820 94.880
urbanization 20 36.245 11.168 23.380 55.660
gdpsharechange9600 20 0.019 0.023 -0.038 0.079
gdpshare2000 20 0.242 0.089 0.112 0.441
faishare9600 20 0.217 0.073 0.091 0.351
coastal 20 0.400 0.503 0 1
marketization 20 5.639 1.371 3.390 8.330
openness 20 0.153 0.199 0.033 0.884
gdpgrowth lag/lead 20 -0.009 0.023 -0.039 0.037
gdpgrowth lag/lead2 20 0.000 0.015 -0.036 0.033
provstrength 20 5.050 1.432 2 8
1
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     Table 6.5: Regression results – correlates of top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
  
            Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R.  
 
I next test the relationship between provincial government strength and metropolitan bias. 
While retaining the baseline covariates, I include the provincial government strength index discussed 
above. (See Table A.7 in the Statistical Appendix). When I run the regression with the provincial 
strength term, goodness-of-fit again improves noticeably over the baseline model, with r2 increasing 
from 0.79 to 0.84 (adjusted r2  increases from 0.71 to 0.77). As expected, the provincial strength term 
has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. When I drop observations 
for the three case-study provinces, this relationship does attenuate somewhat. The coefficient for the 
provincial strength term remains positive but shrinks in magnitude (from 0.016 to 0.010), and the p-
value increases to 0.36, so the relationship is no longer significant at conventional levels. 
2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.559⇤⇤ 0.543⇤⇤⇤ 0.565⇤⇤⇤
(0.204) (0.178) (0.140)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.587 0.669 0.496
(0.642) (0.562) (0.443)
population  0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
log GDPpc  0.013 0.019 0.043
(0.036) (0.034) (0.028)
coastal dummy  0.042  0.015  0.012
(0.033) (0.031) (0.024)
gdpgrowth lag/lead  1.514⇤⇤  1.645⇤⇤⇤
(0.654) (0.513)
provinicial strength 0.017⇤⇤
(0.006)
Constant 0.264  0.056  0.376
(0.290) (0.288) (0.249)
Observations 20 20 20
R2 0.785 0.848 0.914
Adjusted R2 0.708 0.777 0.864
Residual Std. Error 0.045(df = 14) 0.039(df = 13) 0.031(df = 12)
F statistic 10.210⇤⇤⇤(df = 5; 14) 12.044⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 13) 18.216⇤⇤⇤(df = 7; 12)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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 Next, I include both the relative economic performance term and the provincial government 
strength term in the model (see specification 3 in Table 6.5). I expect this model to outperform 
either of the single-explanatory-factor models, because the relationship between each explanatory 
variable and metropolitan bias should stand out more clearly after controlling for the other. Indeed, 
when both terms are included, we see a greater improvement over the baseline specification in 
goodness-of-fit than when either term is included individually: r2 increases from 0.79 to 0.91 
(adjusted r2 increases from 0.71 to 0.86). Both terms, moreover, display the expected relationship 
with top-city FAI share, and both are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or above. When 
observations for the case-study provinces are excluded, both terms retain the expected relationship 
with top-city FAI share and remain statistically significant at the 0.10 level or above.  
These findings thus offer support for my main hypotheses. Both key explanatory variables 
display the expected relationship with metropolitan bias across the broader sample of provinces. 
And with both explanatory variables included in the model, these relationships not only remain 
intact but grow more robust. Thus, an additive model with first-order terms for relative economic 
performance and provincial strength bears out the main hypotheses and performs well in explaining 
overall variation. 
To make these findings easier to visualize, I plot top-city FAI share residuals (my measure of 
metropolitan bias) against each of the explanatory variables in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 below using data 
from the 20 provinces in the larger sample. The plots make clear that the basic tendencies conform 
to expectations: relative economic performance is negatively related to metropolitan bias, and 
provincial strength is positively related. There is, of course, some dispersion in the data, and there 
are some striking outliers. Liaoning, for instance, has an observed top-city FAI share significantly 
higher than the fitted value in both plots. I take a closer look at this puzzling case later in the chapter. 
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         Figure 6.6: Lagging economic performance and metropolitan bias across 20 provinces 
                    
 Figure 6.7: Provincial government strength and metropolitan bias across 20 provinces  
 
Having examined the first-order relationships between the explanatory variables and top-city 
FAI share outcomes, it is important also to look at how relative performance and provincial strength 
interact. The above analysis does not clarify whether the relationship between each explanatory 
variable and metropolitan bias is invariant with respect to the other explanatory variable’s level. Are 
the two variables multipliers, reinforcing each other’s relationship with metropolitan bias? 
Conversely, do high levels of one variable weaken the other’s relationship with metropolitan bias?  
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To address these questions, I run additional variants of the above regression models with 
interaction terms. (See Table A.10 in the Statistical Appendix.) When an interaction term is added to 
the main model, the term shows a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The 
positive sign on the interaction term indicates that the positive relationship between provincial 
strength and metropolitan bias attenuates slightly when economic performance is lagging, and that 
the relationship between lagging economic performance and top-city FAI share weakens when 
provincial strength is higher. Rather than amplifying each other’s relationships with metropolitan 
bias, then, the explanatory variables appear to weaken one another’s effects. It is unclear how much 
stock to put in this finding, however; the result is very sensitive to a single outlying observation, and 
addition of the interaction term does not substantially improve the explanatory power of the model, 
in any event.15 A more conservative interpretation of the interaction term results would be that 
relative performance and provincial strength do not reinforce one another. 
 
Quantities of interest 
To assess the substantive importance of the coefficient estimates reported above, I use Imai, 
King, and Lau’s (2010) Zelig package for R to simulate key quantities of interest, including first 
differences in top-city FAI share with changes from low to high values on the key explanatory 
variables, and also conditional expectations for top-city FAI share given different combinations of 
values on the key explanatory variables. (See Table 6.8 below.) 
 Through simulation, I find that increasing either one of the key explanatory variables from a 
low (25th percentile) to a high (75th percentile) level while holding other covariates at their mean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 First, the interactive model does not display a dramatic improvement in explanatory power over the first-order model: 
r2 rises only slightly, from 0.91 to 0.93 (adjusted r2 rises from 0.86 to 0.89). Second, the observed interaction effect is 
very dependent on a single provincial observation—that of Liaoning, a stark outlier. When the Liaoning data point is 
dropped from the regression, the coefficient on the interaction term shrinks considerably and the term ceases to be 
statistically significant.  
 
                                                                                                                                            Chapter 6 
                                                                    273 
values yields a sizeable expected increase in the top-city share of provincial FAI. Changing a 
province’s GDP growth rate during the 1990s from 1.2 percent above the overall national CAGR to 
2.5 percent below the national value is expected to be associated with an increase of 6.5 percentage 
points in top-city FAI share. Meanwhile, increasing a province’s administrative strength index score 
from 4 to 6 is associated with an expected difference of 3.5 percentage points in top-city FAI share. 
Given that the sums of provincial FAI during the decade between 2001-2010 tend to be on the 
order of several hundred billion Chinese yuan, these differences of a few percentage points in top-
city FAI share are quite substantial—dozens of billions of yuan in absolute terms. 
 Simulation is also useful for examining how expected top-city FAI share varies with different 
combinations of values on the key explanatory variables, and for comparing expected values 
generated from models with and without interaction terms. Using coefficient estimates from a non-
interactive model, simulated top-city FAI share when both lagging economic performance and 
provincial strength are at 75th percentile levels and other variables held at their means is 0.32. If both 
explanatory variables are dropped to their 25th percentile levels, then simulated top-city FAI share 
falls dramatically, to 0.22. When provincial strength is held at the 75th percentile while lagging 
economic performance is at the 25th percentile, simulated top-city FAI share is 0.25. The simulated 
top-city FAI share is 0.28 when provincial strength is in the 25th percentile and lagging economic 
performance is set to the 75th percentile. As expected, the highest levels of top-city FAI share are 
obtained when both explanatory variables are set to high values, the lowest top-city FAI share levels 
are obtained when both explanatory variables set to low values, and setting one variable high and the 
other low produces an intermediate top-city FAI share level. Using coefficient estimates from the 
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interactive model instead of the non-interactive model, simulated top-city FAI share values for these 
different combinations change slightly, but the basic finding remains the same, as shown below.16  
             Table 6.8: Simulated first differences and expected values of top-city FAI share 
 
Explanatory variable 
of interest 
x1  
(25th percentile level of 
variable) 
x2 
(75th percentile 
level of variable) 
Level of other covariates Simulated first difference 
in top-city FAI share 
E(Y|X=x2) - 
E(Y|X=x1) 
GDP growth 
lag/lead (1990s) 
1.2% -2.5% Mean 0.065 
Provincial strength 4 6 Mean 0.035 
 
GDP growth lead/lag 
value set to 
Provincial strength 
value set to 
Other covariates 
set to 
Simulated top-city FAI 
share (model without 
interaction term) 
Simulated top-city FAI 
share (model with 
interaction term) 
75th percentile  75th percentile Mean 0.32 0.32 
75th percentile 25th percentile Mean 0.28  0.30 
25th percentile 75th percentile Mean 0.25  0.27 
25th percentile 25th percentile Mean 0.22  0.20 
 
In sum, simulation of quantities of interest shows that there is considerable variation in 
expected top-city FAI shares depending on whether explanatory variables are set to higher or lower 
levels. Because there is little difference in the results from models with and without an interaction 
term, and because the negative interaction observed between lagging economic performance and 
provincial strength is neither very strong nor very robust, it would seem appropriate to describe the 
relationship between the two explanatory variables and metropolitan bias as primarily additive.  
 
Addressing alternative explanations and the possibility of spurious correlation 
To check that my main findings are robust to the inclusion of other variables, I run 
additional regressions that in turn use indicators for provinces’ marketization level, urbanization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The highest simulated top-city FAI share results are obtained by setting both explanatory variables to high (75th) 
percentile values, while the lowest simulated top-city FAI is obtained by setting both variables to low (25th) percentile 
levels. Mixed (25th/75th and 75th/25th) combinations yield intermediate metropolitan bias outcomes.  
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level, top cities’ status as key national-center, and provinces’ social instability. The results from these 
regressions are shown in Tables A.8 and A.9 of the Statistical Appendix.  
Adding these terms to the models used earlier does not affect the main results, and none of 
the new terms comes up statistically significant when added to the main models.17 Terms for 
provincial marketization and urbanization show no clear relationship with metropolitan bias 
outcomes, and including them does not affect the main findings. When a dummy variable for 
whether a province’s top city is a key national center is included, the term shows up positive and is 
relatively large in magnitude. Nevertheless, the term falls short of statistical significance at 
conventional levels, and the main results are unaffected. Similarly, when I include an indicator for 
whether a province’s top city is a deputy-provincial level city, the term comes up positive but falls 
short of statistical significance. Again, the main results are not affected. Meanwhile, when I add a 
term for the state-controlled share of industry in a province (my proxy for social instability in the 
province), I find no relationship between the term and top-city FAI share degree, and the main 
findings are unaffected.  
 In addition to testing how well alternate explanatory factors perform, I also check whether 
operationalizing key explanatory variables in different ways yields the same basic findings. When I 
use alternative measures of lagging provincial economic performance, such as change in each 
province’s share of national total gross value of industrial output (GVIO) between 1990-2000, I 
obtain the same basic results: lagging economic performance in the 1990s is associated with higher 
metropolitan bias during the 2000s. And when I sequentially drop different sub-indicators from my 
original provincial strength index and re-run the regressions, I find that the main results still hold, 
suggesting that the provincial strength finding is not overly sensitive to the composition of the index.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The key national center dummy term does, however, have a positive and significant relationship with top-city FAI 
share when it is included along with baseline covariates and the main explanatory variables are dropped.  
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 A more fundamental question is whether these statistical findings might be compromised by 
endogeneity issues or by non-independence of the assignment and outcome of explanatory variable 
“treatment.” First, one could imagine that metropolitan bias in policies (or metropolitan-oriented 
development) drives lagging economic performance and/or the level of provincial government 
strength, rather than vice versa. For instance, entrenched favoritism toward a top city may hinder 
overall provincial development or strengthen the hand of the provincial government relative to 
localities over time. 
 I have tried to address this threat of endogeneity in different ways. By including ex ante 
(2000) top-city GDP share and recent change (1996-2000) in this share as regression covariates, I 
indirectly control for the extent to which policies have favored a top city in the past. In cases where 
policies have historically or recently favored the leading city, top-city GDP share and the 1996-2000 
increase in this share should both be larger. In addition, with one possible exception, my indicators 
for measuring provincial strength should not be affected by past metropolitan bias. A province’s 
distance from Beijing should bear no relation to past metropolitan bias, nor should the age (or 
political standing) of leaders appointed to the province. It is similarly unlikely that past metropolitan 
bias would affect a province’s degree of fiscal dependence on Beijing or the concentration of fiscal 
expenditure at the provincial level. On the other hand, it seems possible, if not likely, that 
metropolitan bias would affect which localities control seats on the provincial standing committee in 
the year 2000 or 2005. One would expect decisions about which local leaders have standing 
committee seats to have more to do with political considerations than with development strategies 
(or recent economic outcomes), but it is conceivable that local leaders might be appointed to or 
removed from the standing committee in conjunction with regional development approaches. If the 
standing committee indicator is dropped from the provincial strength index altogether, this weakens 
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the positive relationship between provincial government strength and metropolitan bias slightly but 
does not eliminate it.18  
 There is also the possibility that metropolitan bias and the level of explanatory variables in a 
given case are both affected by a causally prior variable. A particular concern is that the number of 
major cities in a province might affect policymakers’ proclivity toward metropolitan bias while also 
affecting relative economic performance and provincial strength. It is generally coastal provinces 
that have two or more large metropolitan areas, so the “coastal” dummy variable included in the 
various regression models should control for some of the effect of having multiple large cities on 
top-city FAI share. At the same time, there is no necessary relationship between the number of large 
cities a province contains and the level of metropolitan bias. Liaoning, for instance, is home to two 
very large cities and other major cities but nevertheless displays high metropolitan bias.19  
 
Explaining variation over time in metropolitan bias 
While cross-sectional analysis helps to clarify the correlates of variation in metropolitan bias 
outcomes across provinces, it is also important to examine the factors associated with metropolitan 
bias over time within provinces. As previous chapters make clear, many provinces have witnessed 
sharp variation from year to year in the share of FAI and other types of developmental resources 
flowing to their leading city. In the case studies of Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi, I have linked 
variation over time in metropolitan bias to changes in relative economic performance and provincial 
strength. To what extent is variation over time in metropolitan bias outcomes more generally 
explained by longitudinal variation in these factors?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 When running specification 3 from Table 6.5 above but dropping the standing committee indicator from the 
provincial strength index, the coefficient on provincial strength term drops from 0.17 to 0.14, but the term remains 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
19 Meanwhile, in Anhui and Hunan, two other provinces with very high metropolitan bias, the top cities did not initially 
stand head and shoulders above their counterparts: in both cases, there were several medium-sized or larger cities from 
which to choose as policymakers sought to develop growth poles. 
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To test whether key explanatory variables display the expected relationships with top-city 
FAI share outcomes over time within provinces during the 2000s, I carry out panel regression 
analysis with provincial fixed effects (n=220). Here the unit of analysis is the province-year, and I 
examine the correlates of variation in top-city FAI share over different years within cases. Through 
this analysis, I find additional evidence of a relationship between provincial government strength 
and metropolitan bias. I do not, however, find any clear relationship between the level of 
metropolitan bias in a given province-year and the relative economic performance of the province 
over a prior three-year period. 
 
Hypotheses to be tested 
My theoretical framework and case-study findings yield testable hypotheses about patterns of 
variation in metropolitan bias over time within provinces. First, I expect lagging provincial economic 
performance during an extended prior period to be associated with greater metropolitan bias in 
policies for a given province-year. The cross-sectional analysis above shows a long-term relationship 
between lagging economic performance and greater metropolitan bias: provinces with lagging 
performance during the 1990s have greater overall metropolitan bias during the 2000s. It stands to 
reason that lagging economic performance might lead to greater metropolitan bias over shorter (still 
multi-year) time intervals as well. For example, my findings from provincial case studies suggest that 
provinces’ economic performance over the preceding three to five years in some cases has strongly 
influenced development policy approaches. We might thus expect to see a more general relationship 
between top-city FAI shares and provinces’ relative GDP growth rates during the prior few years. 
Second, I expect variation over time in provincial government strength to be associated with 
shifts in the degree of metropolitan bias observed. Although some aspects of provincial government 
strength are unlikely to change much over an interval of a few years, top provincial leaders typically 
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rotate frequently, with tenures usually lasting between two and four years (Li 2002). As discussed in 
earlier chapters, the nature of top provincial leaders is a key determinant of the political leverage a 
province enjoys relative to Beijing above and cities below. Insofar as provincial governments should 
be stronger when politically well-connected and individually dynamic leaders are in place, I expect to 
find greater metropolitan bias in policies during province-years with “rising star” leaders in place.  
 
Methods and data 
To test the correlates of metropolitan bias within provinces over time, I carry out panel 
regression analysis with provincial fixed effects. Inclusion of fixed effects restricts the analysis to 
variation in top-city FAI share over time within provinces: the regressions test whether the 
highlighted explanatory variables are associated with deviations from different provinces’ mean top-
city FAI shares after controlling for baseline factors. I draw data from 20 provinces and 11 years, for 
a total of 220 observations. For panel analysis, I use the “plm” R package created by Yves Croissant 
and Giovanni Millo (2008). 
The dependent variable for panel analysis is top-city share of total provincial FAI in a given 
province-year. As we have seen earlier, there is considerable year-to-year variation in top-city FAI 
share within provinces, which makes this dependent variable suitable for panel analysis. In analyzing 
metropolitan bias, of course, I am interested in deviations from a hypothetical baseline top-city FAI 
share rather than in top-city FAI share per se, so it is necessary to include control variables. I use a 
lagged (one-year) top-city GDP share term to control for the ex ante economic dominance of a top 
city within a given province, and I include year dummies to address the fact that some years are 
associated with higher top-city FAI share across the board.  
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To operationalize the key explanatory variables for panel analysis, it is necessary to have 
indicators that vary sufficiently over time within the observed 11-year window.20 I operationalize 
relative economic performance with a term that records the change in a given province’s share of 
China’s overall national GDP during the preceding three years.21 This indicator is meant to capture 
how well a given provincial economy has performed relative to the country as a whole during a 
multi-year prior period. As noted above, it is not clear that three years of lagging performance 
should have the same sort of effect on provincial policymaking that a decade-long trend of subpar 
performance might have. For the sake of statistical leverage, however, it is necessary to use an 
indicator for lagging economic performance with sufficient year-to-year variability.   
As an indicator for provincial government strength, I use a dummy variable that records 
whether or not a province’s top leader in a given year is a political rising star (in the sense defined 
earlier). I code this rising star dummy as “1” for province-years in which a rising star occupies the 
post of provincial Party secretary and “0” otherwise.22 By comparing top-city FAI shares during 
years with and without rising stars in place for the same province, we can assess the relationship 
between provincial strength and metropolitan bias.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 As discussed above, some indicators for key explanatory variables do not change much over time. A province’s 
economic performance relative to the national average during the preceding decade will not change much from year to 
year. Similarly, structural or institutional aspects of provincial administrative strength (distance from Beijing, fiscal 
dependency on Beijing, the share of local expenditures handled at the provincial level, etc.) may not fluctuate much, if at 
all, from year to year. On the other hand, there are dimensions of or indicators for the key explanatory variables that 
should move around much more from year-to-year. Provinces’ relative economic performance on short timescales (two 
or three years) varies considerably from year to year. And, as highlighted in preceding chapters, the top leaders of 
China’s provinces change quite frequently (typically every two to four years), with important implications for 
policymaking. By selecting indicators for relative economic performance and provincial administrative strength that vary 
from year to year, we can get sufficient statistical leverage to test the main hypotheses with time-series data both within 
and across provinces. 
21 I also try using alternate measures, such as the average margin by which a province’s annual GDP growth rate has led 
or lagged the overall national growth rate during the previous three years. Using alternate indicators of relative economic 
performance produces similar results. 
22 Once again, this “rising star” variable is coded as 1 for leaders who assume their provincial leadership post at an age at 
least one standard deviation below the average age for assuming this post. 
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Summary statistics for the dependent variable, explanatory variables, and main control 
variable are provided in Table 6.9 below. (Further information on the methods and data used for 
panel analysis is provided in the Panel Analysis section of the Statistical Appendix.) 
  Table 6.9: Summary statistics for panel regression analysis  
 
                                       Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R.  
Regression results  
The main regression results are presented in Table 6.10 below, while results for alternate 
model specifications can be found in Table A.11 of the Statistical Appendix. The results below are 
reported using panel-corrected standard errors à la Beck and Katz (1995).23 
On the one hand, I find support for the hypothesis that provincial government strength is 
associated with greater metropolitan bias. The rising star dummy variable comes up positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see specification 1 in Table 6.10). That is, looking within 
provinces over time and controlling for baseline factors, we find higher top-city FAI share during 
years with rising star Party secretaries in place than in years without rising stars. The coefficient 
estimate for the rising star dummy is substantively large: the presence of a rising star Party secretary 
is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in top-city FAI share during a given province-year. 
Dropping observations for the three main case-study provinces does not affect this finding.24 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Panel-corrected standard errors are estimated using the plm package for R. 
24 Table A.11 in the Statistical Appendix reports the results obtained using alternative ways of operationalizing the rising 
star variable. Besides the main approach – a dummy variable for whether the provincial Party secretary is a rising star – I 
also run regressions with a “governor rising star” dummy variable, an “either Party secretary or governor” dummy 
variable, and a “none, one, or both” categorical variable. As Table A.11 shows, I find strong, positive relationships 
between most of these rising star indicators and top-city FAI share. Although the presence of rising star Party secretaries 
is associated with higher top-city FAI share, there is no clear-cut relationship between rising star governors and top-city 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DV: top-city FAI share 220 0.261 0.086 0.084 0.444
lagged top-city GDP share 220 0.249 0.081 0.109 0.503
Party Secretary rising star 220 0.327 0.470 0 1
GDP share change prev 3 yrs 220 0.001 0.003  0.007 0.014
1
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     Table 6.10: Panel regression results – top-city FAI share with province fixed effects 
  
                    Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R.  
 
On the other hand, within-province panel analysis does not show any relationship between 
top-city FAI share and relative economic performance during the prior three-year period (see 
specification 2 in Table 6.10). Top-city FAI share is not systematically higher (or lower) for 
province-years following periods of lagging economic performance. While the coefficient for the 
relative economic performance term is negative, the term’s magnitude is very small—both in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
FAI share. I do find that the simultaneous presence of a rising star Party secretary and a rising star governor is associated 
with a greater top-city FAI share than having one or the other, but this result is driven by a handful of observations. 
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share by year
(1) (2) (3)
lagged top-city gdp share 0.263 0.282 0.263
(0.18) (0.19) (0.118)
2001 0.011⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2002 0.015 0.015⇤ 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
2003 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
2004 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
2005 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
2006 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
2007 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
2008 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
2009 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
2010 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Party Secretary rising star 0.017⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008)
GDP share change prev 3 yrs  0.166  0.198
(1.36) (1.32)
Observations 220 220 220
R2 0.421 0.391 0.422
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.334 0.358
F Statistic 11.410⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 188) 10.045⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 188) 10.483⇤⇤⇤ (df = 13; 187)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
1
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absolute sense and relative to the standard error estimate. Thus, I do not find support broadly for 
the proposition that metropolitan bias increases in the wake of a few years of lagging performance.   
To address the possibility that the results are influenced by unmodeled differences across 
provinces or years in the structure of error terms, I re-estimate standard errors with clustering of 
errors by province and by year.25 Using clustered errors does not affect the finding that province-
years with rising stars in place have higher top-city FAI share, other things equal. Clustering errors 
on either province or year inflates standard error estimates compared with those generated by OLS, 
but the rising star term remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level or above. Meanwhile, the 
relative performance term continues to fall far short of statistical significance. 
 In sum, analysis of variation in top-city FAI share over time within provinces yields a mixed 
picture. Although I find that the presence of rising star leaders (a proxy for heightened provincial 
government strength) is associated with a marked increase over the baseline in top-city FAI share, I 
see no clear relationship between the top-city share of FAI for a given province-year and the 
province’s relative economic performance over a prior three year period. It is possible that no such 
longitudinal relationship between relative economic performance and metropolitan bias holds; it is 
also possible that such a relationship exists (as suggested by case-study evidence), but that the 
specific indicators and time intervals used here have failed to capture it.26 In any event, more careful 
investigation of the longitudinal relationship between metropolitan bias outcomes and the 
highlighted explanatory variables will be necessary before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 I follow the approach of Bluhm (2013), implementing in R the functions carried out by Stata’s package for estimating 
standard errors with clustering by unit and by time period (See http://www.richard-bluhm.com/clustered-ses-in-r-and-
stata-2/).  
26 First, it seems possible that three years of lagging performance may be not be adequate to trigger a sweeping 
adjustment of provincial policies in the way that a decade of lagging performance might. Second, there is the question of 
whether it is a province’s performance relative to the country as a whole that matters, or whether performance relative to 
neighboring provinces is more relevant. Third, it is unclear whether differences in GDP growth rates offer the most 
meaningful measures of lagging performance, or whether there are other development indicators that would be superior.   
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Cracking a hard case: Qualitative evidence from Liaoning 
To evaluate the wider validity of the dissertation’s key claims, it is also helpful to look more 
closely at cases whose outcomes seem to be at odds with the main argument. If process-tracing 
reveals similar causal factors to be important to metropolitan bias outcomes even in “hard cases” 
where alternative explanations seem equally, if not more, plausible, this should boost our confidence 
in the main explanatory variables. The northeastern province of Liaoning, a puzzling outlier, 
represents one such case. By briefly examining the recent history of regional development policy in 
Liaoning, I hope to determine if and how relative economic performance and provincial government 
strength contributed to a trend of metropolitan-oriented development. 
At first glance, the case of Liaoning appears to sit uncomfortably with my main argument. 
Like Hunan, Liaoning shows high metropolitan bias in development during the 2000s, with a top-
city FAI share six percentage points higher than the fitted value.27 However, Liaoning remains a high 
outlier even after terms for the main explanatory variables are added to the regression model, 
suggesting that other factors may be driving metropolitan bias.  
There are also substantive reasons to question how important the explanatory variables I 
have highlighted are for Liaoning’s development outcomes. One might be inclined to interpret 
metropolitan bias in Liaoning more as a product of central policies and/or the dynamism of major 
cities than as a consequence of provincial-level factors. Located in northeast China near Beijing, 
Liaoning historically has had close ties to the central government and the state-led economy. At the 
same time, Liaoning contains two large metropolitan centers that are powerful entities in their own 
right. Shenyang, the provincial capital, has served as a key regional administrative and economic hub 
for the northeast throughout the post-1949 period. Dalian, Liaoning’s leading port city, is another 
major economic center with deputy-provincial level status.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Author’s regression analysis. See Chapter 2.  
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Upon closer inspection, however, I find that the explanatory factors highlighted above did 
play a key role in shaping Liaoning’s development approach during the 2000s. A provincial crisis of 
economic competitiveness triggered a major rethinking of development policies, and provincial 
authorities played a proactive, high-profile role in promoting metropolitan growth. The making and 
execution of development policies was undoubtedly a multilevel process, and central and city-level 
actions also mattered greatly. But provincial leaders served as key entrepreneurs for metropolitan-
oriented development, launching bold measures of their own and mobilizing central support. 
 
The provincial response to Liaoning’s crisis of competitiveness 
 Liaoning straddles China’s prosperous eastern seaboard and the country’s Manchurian 
rustbelt. A key base for state-owned heavy industry since the establishment of the PRC, Liaoning 
was a linchpin in China’s planned economy. Because of this, and also because of Liaoning’s 
geostrategic importance as a northeastern border area, the province has long maintained close ties 
with the central state. By virtue of its coastal location, however, Liaoning was also exposed relatively 
early to the pressures and opportunities of reform and opening. Shenyang, the provincial capital and 
largest city, was granted reform privileges relatively early, and was among the cities designated as 
separately planned (jihua danlie) municipalities in the 1980s. Dalian, meanwhile, developed rapidly as 
a center of trade and foreign investment after the 1980s (Schueller 1997). 
The economic challenges confronting Liaoning in the 1990s and early 2000s served as the 
backdrop for a major reorientation of policies in the province toward greater prioritization of 
competitiveness and metropolitan development. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Liaoning’s state-
owned industries suffered major operating losses (Schueller 1997), and Liaoning saw its share of 
China’s overall output in sectors such as textiles, electronics, and metallurgy drop (He and Pan 2011). 
Huge numbers of workers – probably over a million – in the state-owned industrial sector faced 
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layoffs or furloughs as a result of bankruptcies and industrial restructuring by the late 1990s, and the 
province was shaken by social unrest (Freeman 2002; Li 2004; McGee 2007).28 By the mid-1990s, 
top provincial officials understood that Liaoning’s traditional state-led, inward-oriented economic 
model must be substantially reformed, and the outward competitiveness of the province’s industries 
and cities enhanced (Schueller 1997, 99-101).29 In the near term, however, China’s impending 
accession to the WTO posed a further threat to Liaoning’s economic wellbeing and social stability. 
Provincial officials appealed to Beijing to reconsider rapid liberalization measures that would expose 
Liaoning’s struggling industries to even sharper competition, and pressed for more central aid to 
help get the province’s economy back on track (Freeman 2002).  
A change in Liaoning’s leadership at the start of the 2000s set the stage for a major shift in 
provincial policies, including a more proactive provincial role in urban and industrial development 
and restructuring. Following a corruption scandal, provincial governor Zhang Guoguang was 
replaced in 2001 by Bo Xilai, then a young, politically ambitious leader with a track record of 
promoting outward-oriented development as leader of Dalian (Freeman 2002). Bo had already 
established a reputation nationwide as a bold, individualistic politician with bright prospects.30 
During his tenure as Liaoning governor (alongside Party secretary Wen Shizhen), Bo would 
accelerate economic reforms and reorient the spatial focus of development policies to place more 
emphasis on its top cities. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Like other northeastern provinces, Liaoning also had to deal with the economic stagnation during the 1990s of 
medium-sized cities with resource-oriented or highly specialized industrial economies (Schueller 1997; Dong 2005). 
29 An increasingly sharp development gap had opened not just between Liaoning and other coastal provinces, with 
Liaoning lagging further behind in trade, foreign direct investment, and income growth, but also between Liaoning’s 
traditional core economic region around Shenyang and the thriving coastal city of Dalian (McGee 2007). In some ways, 
Dalian’s successful reinvention of itself during the late 1980s and early 1990s as an outward-oriented commercial and 
industrial center offered a template for Shenyang and other struggling cities in Liaoning to follow. 
30 Bo’s personal ties to the country’s Party and military elite as one of China’s foremost ‘princelings’, moreover gave him 
a broad and portable web of political resources (Li 2004). 
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As governor, Bo was active not only in overhauling Liaoning’s industrial economy but also 
in mobilizing central support and provincial resources for metropolitan development. Upon taking 
office, Bo actively promoted both foreign and state investment in Liaoning, and became a strong 
advocate for a new national-level Revive the Northeast Old Industrial Base strategy, touting the 
economic potential of Liaoning and its neighbors (Li 2004). Although Bo had close ties to Dalian 
from his time as Party chief there, he was also vocal about the need for an urban transformation in 
Shenyang. To make Liaoning economically competitive, it would be necessary to enhance the size, 
amenities, and business environment of its largest cities. In a public statement in October 2002, Bo 
praised the urban renewal and “clean-up” work being done in Shenyang, and called for Shenyang to 
play an even larger role in Liaoning’s economic development and urban construction going forward. 
Shenyang and Dalian, Bo said, should act as “locomotives” (huoche tou)  for Liaoning’s economy and 
grow into “international metropolises” (guojihua da dushi). To achieve this, Bo instructed provincial 
and city officials to draw up bold plans and pursue ambitious targets for metropolitan development 
(Liaoning ribao 10/30/2002).  
Bo called for using the resources of the provincial government to support Shenyang’s 
development, telling provincial departments to assist the city with investment attraction, technology 
renovation, services, infrastructure, and other major upgrading tasks (Liaoning ribao 6/28/2003). 
While Bo was governor, the provincial government lent its support to a new Shenyang Economic 
Area plan that envisioned a build-up of Shenyang’s urban infrastructure and industry and tighter 
integration of Shenyang with surrounding cities (Liaoning ribao 8/18/2005).31 Meanwhile, during 2003 
and 2004, Bo engaged in aggressive outreach to both external investors and the central government 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Under the arrangement, Shenyang was to more closely coordinate industrial and infrastructural development with 
neighboring cities such as Liaoyang and Fushun so as to enhance the overall competitiveness of the urban region 
(McGee 2007). 
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on behalf of Liaoning and its top metropolitan centers, traveling extensively and holding many 
events to promote investment in Liaoning’s top cities (Li 2004; Dong 2005).32  
Lobbying by Bo and other leaders from northeastern provinces appears to have factored 
importantly into Beijing’s launch of the Revive the Northeast program. The program brought 
Liaoning a variety of policy benefits and state resources after 2003, including VAT reductions for 
local industry, greater central fiscal support, and centrally backed industrial and technological 
upgrading projects (Li 2004; Dong 2005).33 Under the scheme, Beijing laid out broad economic and 
social development goals for the northeast and became more actively involved in supporting the 
region’s development. But in practice Liaoning and its neighbors had space to formulate their own 
concrete strategies for development and reform. Provincial leaders gained space to experiment with 
new economic and social policies, and they secured prompt central backing for dozens of major 
investment projects they had proposed (Chung et al 2009).  
After Bo Xilai left Liaoning in early 2004, the province soon gained another rising star in the 
figure of Li Keqiang, who was appointed Party chief at the end of the year. As one of Hu Jintao’s 
principal protégés,34 Li brought considerable political capital to deploy on behalf of Liaoning’s 
development and would prove to be a champion for metropolitan-oriented policies.  
Even more so than Bo, Li put the construction of larger, more integrated, and more 
competitive urban regions at the heart of his strategy for provincial economic development and 
structural transformation. In late 2004, shortly after taking office, Li used the occasion of his first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Shenyang in particular benefited dramatically from promotion efforts, recording a dramatic uptick in foreign direct 
investment in the mid-2000s (Li 2004; Dong 2005) 
33 Like other central development schemes, though, the Revive the Northeast program, was a platform for subnational 
initiative as much as a rigid top-down policy framework. The March 2003 No. 11 Central Document that introduced the 
policy highlighted policy goals such as faster industrial restructuring, greater marketization, technical upgrading and 
rehabilitation in old industry areas, and expanded social welfare provision, but it left many of the details and much of the 
implementation work to provincial governments (Central Committee 2003; Dong 2005). 
34 See Li (2002).  
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inspection visit in Shenyang to put forward plans for the development of “Greater Shenyang” (da 
shenyang) (Shenyang ribao 12/25/2004).35 The provincial government work report delivered in early 
2005 called for “constructing a Shenyang economic area that radiates to the whole northeast and has 
strong domestic and international competitiveness,” and in April 2005 the province convened a 
meeting of leaders to promote the Central Liaoning Urban Cluster (liaozhong chengshi qun) (Zhonghua 
gongshang shibao 4/19/2005).36 Over the following two years, the cities of the Greater Shenyang area 
signed further cooperation accords, and regional industry and infrastructure development progressed 
rapidly (Jingji ribao 2/19/2008). Through the end of his tenure, Li continued to champion the growth 
of Greater Shenyang.37 
Following Li’s departure later in 2007, Liaoning continued to pursue development of 
Greater Shenyang, and the province eventually obtained national-level recognition for the region in 
2010. But, as Lin Muxi, a prominent local academic noted, the Central Liaoning Urban Cluster 
strategy suffered from limited institutionalization, lacking an effective overall planning system and 
administrative coordination mechanism (Lin 2007). Without strong provincial leaders in place, 
orchestrating major urban and regional development strategies became more difficult. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 According to one media report, Li argued that “Shenyang is in the decisive position for Liaoning’s revitalization drive; 
the build-up of Shenyang is of utmost importance.” For metropolitan development to succeed, Li said, “it is necessary to 
have a certain scale, form accumulated wealth, logistical and human function, and build Shenyang into a regional central 
city” (Shenyang ribao 12/25/2004). 
36 At the meeting, Li said that in order to build up the city cluster as a whole, it was essential first to build up Shenyang 
further and strengthen its central city functions, relying on a “comprehensive” urban development approach that 
emphasized cultural and social development as well as rapid economic growth. Realizing these goals for the Shenyang 
region would be key for making Liaoning, and the northeast more broadly, China’s fourth national growth pole 
(Zhonghua gongshang shibao 2005).  
37 In 2007, for example, Li called for “urban integration” (tongchenghua) of Shenyang and nearby cities (Lin 2007). Under 
Li, Liaoning also pursued a “Five Points, One Line” (wu dian yi xian) regional development strategy. The program, 
launched in 2001, targeted Liaoning’s belt of coastal cities and was geared toward promoting the outward-oriented 
economy. Along with the Central Liaoning Urban Cluster initiative, this strategy was meant to help Liaoning achieve 
faster economic restructuring and outward-oriented growth. This strategy seemed to complement efforts in Greater 
Shenyang more than distract from them, however, insofar as it sought to expand Liaoning’s outward linkages and to 
better integrate the Shenyang area with port cities such as Yingkou (Ibid. 2007; Zhongguo jingying bao 9/7/2009). 
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In sum, then, the causal factors highlighted in this project also appear to have shaped 
Liaoning’s development trajectory in important ways. Liaoning’s difficult transition out of the 
planned economy and prolonged crisis of economic competitiveness in the 1990s and early 2000s 
provided the motive for a shift in provincial policies. Meanwhile, strong provincial leadership played 
an important role in the launch of major metropolitan-oriented initiatives and the mobilization of 
central policy support and resources.  
           Figure 6.11: Top-city share of provincial FAI and GDP in Liaoning, 1996-2010 
 
 
As Figure 6.11 above shows, Liaoning saw a sharp increase in the top-city concentration of 
FAI during the years when rising star leaders – first Bo and then Li – were in place. Between 2001 
and 2007, Shenyang’s FAI share first increased sharply, and then remained well above the city’s 
share of provincial GDP for several years. In the late 2000s, however, Shenyang’s share of 
Liaoning’s total FAI dropped. And, whereas Shenyang’s GDP growth had outpaced provincial 
growth every year but one between 2001-2007, the city’s share of Liaoning’s GDP dipped after 2007. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 This chapter has carried out additional quantitative and qualitative analysis of metropolitan 
bias outcomes to assess how well key claims generalize to the full sample of 20 provinces. I first 
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have tested whether key explanatory variables are correlated with metropolitan bias in the expected 
fashion across China’s provinces more broadly. Second, I have examined whether key explanatory 
factors are associated with metropolitan bias outcomes in the expected way over time within 
provinces. Finally, I have examined additional qualitative evidence from Liaoning province to check 
whether similar causal processes are at work in a “hard case.” These approaches yield several pieces 
of evidence consistent with the dissertation’s core argument that lagging economic performance and 
provincial government strength, separately or in conjunction, contribute to greater metropolitan bias. 
At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that not all regression results support the main 
hypotheses, and that some of the evidence presented is more suggestive than conclusive. 
 Cross-sectional regression analysis provides evidence that expected relationships between 
key explanatory variables and metropolitan bias outcomes hold across the broader sample of 20 
provinces. As expected, lagging provincial-level economic performance during a prior period is 
associated with higher top-city FAI share. Similarly, provincial-level administrative strength – 
operationalized using an original index that combines five indicators – is associated with higher top-
city FAI share. When both relative economic performance and provincial strength are included in 
the regression model, each term retains the expected sign and remains significant at conventional 
levels. Results from regression analysis and simulation of quantities of interest are consistent with 
the expectation that metropolitan bias is greatest when both lagging economic performance and high 
provincial strength are present. The main findings hold when the main explanatory variables are 
operationalized differently, and when alternative explanatory variables are included. 
Panel analysis, which tests how well key explanatory variables account for variation in 
metropolitan bias over time within provinces, provides further support for the provincial strength 
hypothesis but does not offer support for the lagging performance hypothesis. I find a substantively 
large and statistically robust relationship between the presence of “rising star” provincial Party chiefs 
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and higher top-city FAI share, which I interpret as support for the claim that provincial-level 
political clout leads to more concentration of policy support and resources in top cities. I do not, 
however, find a relationship over time within provinces between lagging economic performance 
(measured for the preceding three-year period) and top-city FAI share.  
The case study of Liaoning, meanwhile, provides further support for my argument insofar as 
it shows that the pursuit of a metropolitan-oriented development model during the 2000s was 
closely related to concerns over lagging economic performance and reflected political initiative at the 
provincial level. Historical evidence from Liaoning helps address potential objections that 
metropolitan bias is simply a result of city-level dynamism, on the one hand, or national-level 
policies, on the other. Liaoning’s top city, Shenyang, had in preceding years faced major economic 
difficulties and was widely perceived as underperforming economically. As such, the heavy state 
support Shenyang received in the 2000s was less an affirmation of rapid growth than an effort to 
rekindle a struggling metropolis. And while central government support played an important role in 
Shenyang’s post-2001 boom, aggressive outreach by provincial leaders such as Bo Xilai played a key 
role in mobilizing central government resources in the first place. By setting in motion pro-
metropolitan development strategies within their provinces and then lobbying Beijing to provide 
higher-level recognition and material support, activist provincial leaders leveraged central assistance 
on behalf of subnational development interests.38  
Needless to say, the analysis presented here has important limitations and can be improved 
upon by future work. First, the quantity, quality, and range of statistical data used are limited. Going 
forward, it will be helpful to make use of data from a larger number of units and years, to collect 
data on a wider range of indicators, and to make better use of city-level statistical data. Second, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 This is not to suggest that Beijing was not interested in and amenable to promoting rapid development in Shenyang, 
which have long served as a key regional hub in the northeast.  
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approaches used for operationalizing key variables are not wholly satisfactory. In particular, one can 
imagine developing superior index-style measures for relative economic performance and provincial 
government strength.39 Third, while I have been able to test for the existence of statistical 
correlations that are consistent with my key hypotheses, the analysis lacks rigorous strategies for 
causal identification. Particularly where panel analysis is concerned, it may be possible to establish 
stronger grounds for causal inference through the inclusion of additional control variables and the 
use of other statistical methods. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 When evaluating the relationship between lagging economic performance and metropolitan bias, for instance, it is not 
clear that it should be a province’s performance relative to a broader national or regional average that is most decisive. A 
province’s performance relative to its immediate neighbors, for instance, might be the most politically salient and 
economically important consideration. Similarly, it is not immediately clear whether one should use GDP growth 
performance as opposed to other, more specific development indicators. I have tried including a few other measures in 
my analysis, such as performance of the secondary sector and foreign economic activity growth, but it may be that there 
are other economic indicators that loom larger in the minds of policymakers and are more important in terms of the 
competitive pressures provinces face. Provincial strength is even harder to quantify. In designing a provincial strength 
index, I have tried to balance the goal of simplicity and easy interpretation, on the one hand, with the goal of capturing 
different dimensions of intergovernmental power, on the other.  
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VII: Conclusions and Comparative Implications  
 
“Do not suppose that these efforts to promote agglomeration and congestion are wholly 
spontaneous. On the contrary, strenuous efforts were made–and continue to be made–to ensure it.” 
—Lewis Mumford, The City in History (1961), 539 
 
“It is not suggested that governments should appoint a Minister for Initiating Growth and a Minister 
for Restoring Balance; but to think in terms of these two tasks may perhaps serve to give ministers 
and governments a clearer conception of their role within the development process.” 
    —Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (1978), 204 
 
Introduction 
 This concluding chapter reviews key themes and findings from preceding chapters, and 
discusses how the project fits into and adds to a larger body of China-focused and comparative 
scholarship on development politics and urban governance. I begin by providing an overview of the 
dissertation’s main empirical findings. I next discuss the project’s contributions to the academic 
literature, highlighting three areas of theoretical and empirical progress. Third, I consider the cross-
national implications of my findings, exploring how the arguments here may help to make sense of 
development outcomes in Brazil and India. Finally, I describe some of the major limitations of the 
study, and suggest ways for future work to improve upon and extend this research.  
 
Empirical findings 
 This project has presented several empirical findings that should be of interest to scholars of 
Chinese and comparative development politics and urban governance. Some of these findings are 
descriptive in nature, and help clarify patterns of development and governance in contemporary 
China. Others are explanatory, identifying some of the key variables and dynamics that contribute to 
metropolitan bias in development policies and shape patterns of urban and regional growth. 
In the dissertation, I have described dramatic variation over time and across provinces in the 
extent to which investment and economic growth have been concentrated in leading urban areas. Of 
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course, historical trends and basic structural characteristics of provinces and cities explain much of 
this variation. Yet, marked variation across similarly situated units, and sharp fluctuation over time 
within cases, calls for a closer look at how policy factors affect urban and regional development.  
The project has emphasized the important ways in which higher-level governments shape 
the growth of cities and regions, including the “strenuous efforts” to build up metropolitan centers 
seen in some cases. Changing central policies and institutions have contributed to the broad 
metropolitan turn in China’s urban development since the mid-1990s, but do not fully explain 
development approaches at the provincial level. Central policies are often ambivalent or flexible in 
practice, and different parts of the central government do not always work in concert. Like previous 
scholars, I find the making of development policy in China to be a contested, multilevel process in 
which different state actors seek to assert their interests. Absent rigid central control, the provincial 
scale is crucial for urban and regional governance, and bargaining among multiple government levels 
and actors significantly shapes policy outcomes. It is thus necessary to examine how provincial-level 
variables affect the formulation and implementation of development policy.  
 I find that the degree of metropolitan bias in development policies varies with provinces’ 
relative economic performance. In provinces where economic growth has lagged behind the national 
or regional average for extended periods, such as Hunan, policymakers attach high priority to 
building large, attractive metropolitan areas, which they see as essential for enhancing overall 
provincial economic competitiveness. Indeed, across the sample of 20 provinces, there is greater 
metropolitan bias in investment in provinces that were economic laggards during the prior decade. 
 I also find a relationship between metropolitan bias and the strength of provincial 
governments relative to other levels. Provincial governments evince a stronger preference for 
metropolitan-oriented development than either central policymakers or local governments (in the 
aggregate). In provinces where the provincial establishment is institutionally strong and in a position 
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to shape development policies in line with its own priorities (such as Hunan), and/or during periods 
when “rising star” provincial leaders are in place (as with Jiangxi in the early 2000s), development 
policies tend to prioritize metropolitan development to a greater degree. Across the 20-province 
sample, I find a strong correlation between a measure of provincial government strength and 
metropolitan bias in investment, and using longitudinal analysis I find that the presence of rising star 
leaders is associated with higher top-city concentration of investment. 
 Lagging economic performance and provincial strength seem to influence metropolitan bias 
in an additive manner. Lagging economic performance or high provincial government strength may 
contribute to a higher degree of metropolitan bias in development policies even in the absence of 
the other condition. Metropolitan bias tends to be greatest, however, when both conditions are 
present. The case of Hunan illustrates this proposition: whereas lagging economic performance led 
to continual prioritization of metropolitan development between the late 1990s and late 2000s, even 
greater state support was mobilized behind Changsha’s development when politically strong 
provincial leaders were in place in the late 2000s. Analysis of data from 20 provinces suggests that an 
additive relationship between the explanatory variables and metropolitan bias exists more generally.  
 Finally, through case studies and analysis of changing national-level policies, I have 
presented a variety of evidence to show that urban and regional policy is an integral and thus highly 
contested part of China’s development politics. Many national and subnational development policies 
in China are spatially selective, and the building of competitive regions and cities – as much as the 
building of industrial champions – has been a key plank of development strategies. Because of the 
significant distributive and governance consequences of urban and regional policies, the making of 
spatial policies is highly politicized. The case of Jiangsu is instructive. Even in a relatively open and 
market-oriented provincial economy, state interventions had a considerable influence on urban and 
regional development patterns. Because Jiangsu faced major tensions between the goals of efficiency 
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and equity in development, however, and because various government levels and actors had a hand 
in policymaking, urban and regional policies proved contentious and shifted often. 
 
Contributions to the China and comparative literatures  
 An overarching aim of this study has been to highlight the proactive role higher-level 
governments play in shaping the development of cities and regions, and to analyze the politics that 
surround such state interventions. On the one hand, this project joins other recent work in 
“bringing the state back in”1 to the study of urban and regional development. Following the lead of 
Brenner (2004), Xu (2008), Wallace (2013), Kennedy (2014), and others, I have tried to show how 
higher-level governments and state institutions not only set the parameters for urban growth but 
also intervene in more direct ways to steer development. On the other hand, to a greater extent than 
most work on urban and regional development, this project brings politics back into the state. I have 
tried to disaggregate and politicize “the state,” highlighting the varying priorities of different 
government actors and foregrounding both cooperation and conflict between different 
administrative levels and constituencies. Rooted in this broad approach, the project contributes to 
existing academic literature in three more specific ways, which I discuss below. 
 
Developing a richer understanding of metropolitan bias 
 One central contribution of this project has been to develop a clearer picture of the nature 
and determinants of metropolitan bias. Scholars have long called attention to urban bias, broadly, 
and the heavy concentration of investment and policy support in metropolitan cities in the context 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I borrow this phrase from Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol’s (1985) edited volume of the same name. My project is 
indebted to and tries to build upon the post-1980s wave of political science and development scholarship that calls for 
conceptualizing the state not simply as an arena for politics but also as a key actor – or, more accurately, set of actors – 
with autonomous capacity to shape societal outcomes, and with distinct economic and political interests. 
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of development. And, as discussed in the first chapter, recent work has highlighted the emergence in 
recent decades of competitiveness-oriented strategies to build up metropolitan regions in China, 
India, and other settings. But existing research does not always highlight the larger political context 
of metropolitan-oriented development strategies—the policy tradeoffs and political conflicts 
surrounding decisions to concentrate state support in top cities rather than distribute resources more 
widely. Furthermore, much research portrays the metropolitanization of urban and economic 
growth as a broad trend, rather than analyzing how outcomes vary across different settings. 
In theorizing metropolitan bias, I highlight the fact that higher-level policies actively favor 
some locations over other locations in the allocation of economic resources and state support, and 
emphasize that the degree of spatial bias in development policies is a variable. I call attention to the 
different tradeoffs metropolitan bias involves from the standpoint of policymakers, and, accordingly, 
how preferences toward metropolitan bias may vary across different parts of the state and under 
different economic circumstances. Depending on which development priorities are most salient, and 
which actors dominate the making of policies, I argue, policies may show greater or lesser favoritism 
toward leading urban areas. 
Beyond theorizing metropolitan bias more clearly, I have assessed metropolitan bias 
empirically using top-city investment share and other indicators. Through qualitative analysis of 
development policies and quantitative analysis of outcomes across multiple provinces and years, I 
have charted broad trends as well as puzzling variation in metropolitan bias outcomes. And, using 
both case studies and statistical work, I have shown an association between metropolitan bias, on 
the one hand, and lagging economic performance and provincial government strength, on the other.  
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Broadening the study of state-led development  
 This project also contributes to our understanding of the modes and politics of state-led 
development, both in China and more broadly. It adds to a growing body of research that highlights 
the continued importance of statist policy logics in a more open and competitive Chinese economy.2 
I emphasize how central and provincial-level plans and administrative initiatives powerfully influence 
the growth of cities even at a time when municipal governments have become very strong actors in 
their own right. I show that this is particularly true in inland provinces, where challenges of lagging 
urbanization and industrialization create space for major state interventions. 
 Much comparative scholarship on state-led development focuses too narrowly on questions 
of industrial policy. Building on past research by China scholars, I emphasize the role urban and 
regional policies and spatially selective interventions play in state-led development. I show that the 
“growth pole” logic of concentrating investment in strategic locations is alive and well in China, 
even as it assumes new forms. In a more open 21st-century economy where large metropolitan areas 
provide the best territorial platforms for business activity, Chinese provinces are seeking to build up 
urban champions of their own that can compete with established global cities. By promoting heavy 
investment in top cities, policymakers hope to reap economies of scale in investment, foster 
agglomeration economies for industry, and create more attractive showcases for their regions. Many 
of these efforts to build competitive cities are more top-down and statist than “neoliberal” in nature. 
 At the same time, I show that development approaches have differed considerably in leading 
and lagging areas of China. Scholars from Gerschenkron (1962) on have observed that crises of 
backwardness – whether objective or socially constructed – provide the political fuel for programs 
of state-led development. Backwardness, or lagging development, is fundamentally a relative concept, 
and lagging economic performance matters to the extent that different territorial units are engaged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See, for instance, Heilmann and Melton (2013); Huang (2008). 
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in competition with one another. This study thus emphasizes the ways in which the competitive 
context of development matters for policy approaches. In particular, I show that metropolitan-
oriented development strategies in China’s provinces are fundamentally linked with efforts to 
enhance competitiveness vis-à-vis other regions. For provinces that have underperformed 
economically and face worsening marginalization, such concerns are especially salient.  
 
Analyzing multilevel politics and governance 
 Finally, this project contributes to the study of policymaking in large, multilevel polities. Past 
work by China and comparative scholars has made important strides in describing and theorizing 
multilevel political systems and policy processes.3 Many questions remain, however, and debates 
persist over how to conceptualize central-local relations and locate power in “fragmented” states. In 
this study, I try to reconcile conflicting images of China’s central-local relations by emphasizing the 
flexibility and variability across provinces of intergovernmental dynamics. 
 Most scholars of contemporary China would agree that the making of development policy is 
a fragmented and less-than-fully institutionalized process. Yet researchers have differing views about 
the consequences of Beijing’s efforts since the mid-1990s to rebuild central state authority and 
administrative capacity, and about the dynamics of policymaking. Some scholars have perceived a 
striking recentralization of administrative power.4 Others have emphasized the growing power of 
subnational governments—especially municipal-level governments.5 Another point of contention 
has been whether provincial governments, seen by many as a key locus of state power in the 1980s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), Li (1997), Zheng (2007), Faletti (2005), and Sinha (2005) among others have done 
very important work in this regard.  
4 See, for example, Yang (2004); Naughton (2007).  
5 See, for example, Hsing (2010), Luo and Shen (2008).  
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and 1990s, remain important in today’s system.6 Different views of the intergovernmental 
distribution of power naturally lead to different conclusions about which actors and priorities really 
drive the making of economic policy in China. 
 This dissertation tries to show that there is no single answer to the questions of where power 
resides in China’s multilevel system and who dictates policy outcomes. Building on insights from 
past scholarship, I emphasize three key facts about development policymaking in multilevel systems 
such as China’s. First, policymaking is a very fluid, very political process. Different government 
levels and actors engage in a hierarchical back-and-forth, but the crafting and implementation of 
policies is shaped as much by intergovernmental power considerations as by institutional rules. In 
different places, and at different times, different players may dominate the formulation and 
implementation of policies. Second, provinces continue to serve as crucial units for governance. 
Provincial authorities may or may not have the power to translate their own preferences into 
concrete policy outcomes. In any case, however, many important policies are necessarily formulated 
and staged at the provincial level—both because provinces are as large as major countries, and 
because provinces occupy a pivotal position in the administrative hierarchy. Third, provinces and/or 
cities may be able to achieve dramatic development results by tapping into the power and resources 
of the central state. China’s central government holds sovereign authority and controls many 
resources, but it does not always function in a coordinated fashion. In much the same way as Sinha 
(2005) describes in her research on India, subnational governments can sometimes take the initiative 
in their interactions with the center, mobilizing central resources and policy support behind 
subnational development strategies.   
 A crucial determinant of policy outcomes in large, multilevel systems like China is what 
Falleti (2005) calls the “intergovernmental balance of power.” I adapt this concept somewhat to fit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Donaldson (2010); Fitzgerald (2002).  
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the Chinese context, emphasizing the relative strength of provincial governments as an important 
variable in the policy process. I argue that provincial authorities’ ability to shape development 
policies around the interests of the provincial unit – as opposed to the interests of different localities 
or the interests of the nation as a whole – depends on the administrative capacity and political 
leverage they have vis-à-vis Beijing above and local governments below. Policymaking dynamics 
differ, I show, between “strong” provinces such as Hunan and “weaker” provinces like Jiangxi. 
 
Taking the argument to other contexts 
 The main claims I advance in this project apply primarily to the contemporary Chinese 
setting, as noted upfront. At the same time, of course, the phenomenon of metropolitan bias is 
neither peculiar to China nor confined to the precise historical moment examined here. It is thus 
important to consider whether, or to what extent, the arguments I present here can shed light on 
development policy outcomes in other geographic and temporal contexts. 
If the arguments I make in the study are able to travel cross-nationally, Brazil and India 
should be among the most natural destinations. Like China, both are large developing nations with 
multilevel administrative systems, and both have historically followed state-led development 
trajectories. One can therefore expect to observe in the states of Brazil and India dynamics similar to 
those seen in China’s provinces. Along these lines, the following sections look briefly at the cases of 
Brazil’s Minas Gerais state and India’s Andhra Pradesh state as plausibility probes for taking the 
argument elsewhere. A first glance suggests that metropolitan bias in Brazil and India is associated 
with the same types of economic and political conditions I have highlighted in the Chinese context. 
Moving beyond the so-called “BRIC” nations, some elements of the argument presented 
here may apply more broadly. Though the dissertation has focused on explaining the development 
approaches of provincial units, it is possible that some sovereign states may be subject to analogous 
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economic and political dynamics. Like China’s provinces, many medium-sized countries confront 
the twin challenges of coordinating urban and regional development internally and maintaining a 
competitive position in the global economy and international order. Countries such as Malaysia, 
Poland, Colombia, and Ghana – to name but a few – face difficult tradeoffs as they pursue rapid 
economic growth and work to enhance their international standing. Fostering attractive, globally 
connected metropolitan centers (e.g. Kuala Lumpur, Warsaw, etc.) may help these countries in their 
efforts to secure mobile capital and to obtain support and recognition from foreign governments or 
international organizations. At the same time, however, national leaders in these countries face 
demands from domestic constituencies to distribute the gains of development more evenly, and may 
feel pressure from foreign governments or international elites to attend to a wide range of 
development goals, non-economic as well as economic. The development approaches such countries 
pursue – and, in particular, the extent to which policymakers prioritize the build-up of leading urban 
areas relative to other development tasks – may be influenced by the same kinds of factors that 
affect policy approaches in China’s provinces. Both the economic performance of these countries 
relative to external benchmarks (such as the performance of nearby countries), and the political 
strength of national authorities relative to subnational and supranational forces may affect the extent 
to which resources are mobilized behind the agenda of metropolitan development. 
It is also important to consider the temporal scope conditions of the arguments advanced 
here. Given its emphasis on place competition, the theoretical framework I have advanced fits most 
neatly with the historical conditions of the post-1980s period of high globalization. This period has 
been characterized by economic restructuring, global integration, intensifying competition, and rapid 
growth in large swaths of the developing world. In many parts of the world, particularly in East Asia 
and South Asia, this period has also featured widespread state intervention in the spatial economy to 
promote urban and industrial competitiveness. While one can draw important distinctions between 
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this post-1980s “neoliberal” period and the preceding decades, there are some crucial continuities as 
well, and the scope conditions I have emphasized were also present to some degree during the mid-
20th century. Between the 1950s and 1970s, several countries in East Asia and Latin America saw 
surging growth as they combined selective economic liberalization with state-led development of 
industry and infrastructure. Especially in places like Brazil, the build-up of major metropolitan 
centers was a key part of efforts to promote economic development and internationalization. 
 
The case of Minas Gerais, Brazil (1960s-1970s) 
Minas Gerais is a large state in the interior of Brazil that borders the states of Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro to the north. Although it is Brazil’s second most populous state, Minas Gerais for 
much of its history has remained largely rural, with an economy oriented toward mining and 
agriculture. Only since the mid-20th century has Belo Horizonte, the capital, risen to become a major 
metropolis and industrial center. During the 1960s and 1970s, Belo Horizonte saw especially rapid 
growth, with large-scale industry development and a major expansion of its urban area (Eakin 2001).   
Belo Horizonte’s explosive economic and urban growth depended on strong support from 
both state and federal governments. From the early 20th century, provincial elites in Minas Gerais 
sought to build an inland metropolis, and “strong emphasis was placed on physical infrastructure to 
attract industrial capital and to occupy the new capital of the state” (Soares de Moura Costa 2011). 
Between the 1930s and 1950s, Belo Horizonte saw a build-up of basic industries and new city 
districts, and grew to become one of Brazil’s significant urban centers (Ibid.; Eakin 2001, 86). But it 
was during Brazil’s period of military dictatorship and import-substitution industrialization in the 
1960s and 1970s that a particularly aggressive strategy of metropolitan development emerged. 
During these decades, policymakers worked to turn Belo Horizonte and the surrounding area into a 
hub of state industry and a “paradise of multinationals” (Montero 2001). The state government 
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rolled out large subsidies and preferential policies to attract industrial investment, and oversaw the 
construction of special infrastructure and industrial estates, including a new Cidade Industrial on the 
outskirts of the city (Eakin 2001, 111, 130-133). Policymakers actively courted multinationals such as 
Italian automaker Fiat, which established a huge facility just outside the capital.7 With government 
support and increasingly strong agglomeration effects, industrial and urban growth in Belo 
Horizonte far outpaced that in other parts of Minas Gerais (Eakin 2001, 132-133; Montero 2001). 
A key factor contributing to Minas Gerais’s metropolitan-oriented development approach 
was Mineiro elites’ urgent concern with overcoming economic marginalization. During the mid-20th 
century, Minas Gerais remained peripheral in a national economy dominated by Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro. With a limited capital base and relatively few entrepreneurs, proximity to Brazil’s 
metropolitan regions was both “a blessing and a challenge” (Montero 2001; Eakin 2011). As new 
opportunities to attract large-scale investments from state-owned enterprises and multinationals 
emerged in the 1960s, Minas Gerais had to contend with its stronger neighbors. Provincial elites 
believed that Minas needed a larger and more attractive urban-industrial center of its own in order to 
break out of its “colonial” position in the domestic economy and move into more lucrative 
downstream industries (Eakin 2001, 131, 162). In practice, this would mean pooling investment and 
focusing more administrative energy to raise the profile of Belo Horizonte. 
The build-up of Belo Horizonte was conceived and carried out as a project of the state 
government, and the administrative capacity and political clout of the Minas Gerais establishment 
helped make the city’s rise possible. State-level authorities have traditionally been powerful under 
Brazil’s federal arrangements, but Minas Gerais’s provincial establishment during the mid-20th 
century was particularly strong. Minas Gerais had a socially cohesive government and business elite, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 With continued support from the state government, the project grew to become Fiat’s biggest facility worldwide and 
served as the nucleus for a larger cluster of automotive industries (Eakin 2001, 132-133; Montero 2001). 
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and throughout the 1960s and 1970s saw “low levels of conflict among the political class” (Montero 
2001). Internally unified, enjoying support from business elites, and facing limited lower-class 
mobilization, the state government had the political autonomy to carry out a highly interventionist 
development strategy. Beyond its internal cohesion, Minas Gerais’s government also enjoyed 
privileged ties with the federal establishment. The state’s influence in national politics and state 
bureaucrats’ connections in national ministries helped the state to bring large amounts of federal 
investment and resources to the Belo Horizonte area (Ibid.).  
 Thus, the development experience of Minas Gerais during the 1960s and 1970s resonates 
with the arguments I have put forward in this study. In Minas Gerais, as in Hunan, the impetus of 
lagging development and the activism of a strong provincial establishment brought about a rapid 
build-up of metropolitan infrastructure and industry. This development trajectory was neither 
inevitable nor fixed; it was sustained by a particular combination of political and economic forces. 
Indeed, spatial and industrial policies in Minas Gerais changed quickly following Brazil’s mid-1980s 
democratization, which shook up the state’s political establishment. New governors placed more 
emphasis on spurring development in smaller cities and outlying areas of the state (Montero 2001). 
 
The case of Andhra Pradesh, India (1990s-2000s) 
 Andhra Pradesh is a large and populous state in southeastern India, bordering Maharashtra 
(home to Mumbai), Karnataka (Bangalore), and Tamil Nadu (Chennai).8 The state was first created 
through the amalgamation of the princely state of Hyderabad and neighboring areas as a homeland 
for Telugu speakers following Indian independence, and the large inland city of Hyderabad 
continued to serve as its capital thereafter. Beyond its urban core, Andhra Pradesh contains many !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In early 2014, it was announced that Andhra Pradesh would subsequently be divided into two states. One, Telangana, 
would include the region surrounding Hyderabad in the northwestern portion of the former state. The other, an Andhra 
Pradesh successor state, would include the southern and coastal regions of the former state. 
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densely populated rural areas and several smaller urban centers. Hyderabad has remained the largest 
city and leading economic center of Andhra Pradesh throughout, but the metropolitan area saw 
especially dramatic growth in the 1990s and 2000s, when it underwent a major transformation to 
become one of India’s leading hubs of information technology (IT) industry.  
 Given Hyderabad’s size and historical importance, it is natural that the city has received 
much attention from state policymakers. It is striking, however, that Andhra Pradesh authorities 
made the build-up of Hyderabad their overwhelming priority during the 1990s and 2000s, even as 
much of the state remained rural and poor. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Andhra Pradesh worked 
aggressively to remake the city as a world-class hub of industry and commerce and “a growth engine 
for the entire region” (Kennedy 2007). Hyderabad was the focal point of the 1999 Andhra Pradesh 
Vision 2020 plan, which called for improving the quality of economic governance in the state and 
using strong policy support to foster advanced industries and global economic linkages. Under an IT 
industry development initiative launched in the early 2000s, Andhra Pradesh offered large subsidies 
to firms locating in the Hyderabad environs (Ibid.; Kennedy 2004). The state also invested heavily in 
new industry clusters and development districts on Hyderabad’s urban fringe, beginning with the 
construction of HITEC city, and later planning a much larger Cyberabad Development Area with 
world-class transport infrastructure (Kennedy 2007). Over the following years, state authorities 
continued their efforts to build a global city, pushing forward plans for a consolidated Greater 
Hyderabad to facilitate urban governance and large-scale projects (Kennedy 2014, 121-122). 
 Andhra Pradesh’s relative economic position factored importantly in the adoption of a 
metropolitan-oriented development strategy. Like other states, Andhra Pradesh faced a more 
competitive economic environment following India’s early-1990s market reforms. Across the 
country, liberalization put pressure on state-level policymakers to enhance the competitiveness of 
local industries and cities (Shaw 2012). But Andhra Pradesh’s position in the Indian economy made 
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metropolitan development an especially high priority. Though surrounded by several of India’s most 
economically dynamic states, Andhra Pradesh until the 1990s had remained a middle-of-the-pack 
performer in terms of economic growth, living standards, and industrial competitiveness (Kohli 
2012, 122; Kennedy 2014). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state faced rising competitive 
pressure as neighboring Karnataka and Tamil Nadu also worked to turn their capital cities into 
globally oriented economic hubs (Kennedy 2004, 35-36; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). The threat of 
Bangalore or Chennai eclipsing Hyderabad as a regional economic center further galvanized efforts 
to speed up urban development in Andhra Pradesh. 
 Just as important in Andhra Pradesh’s metropolitan development push, though, was the 
administrative strength and political initiative of the state government. The successor to one of 
India’s most dynamic princely states, Andhra Pradesh from early on had possessed a relatively 
strong administrative apparatus (Beverley 2013). After the 1980s, the rise of regional parties created 
a political basis for more developmentally oriented policies. As was the case more broadly, identity 
politics increasingly displaced class-based mobilization. Regional parties such as the Telugu Desam 
Party championed business interests, giving state authorities more room to maneuver on 
development policy matters (Kennedy 2007; Murali 2010).  
Of particular importance was the rise of an energetic and politically well-connected leader, 
Chandrababu Naidu, who served as chief minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1995 to 2004. A 
famously entrepreneurial politician who combined aggressive publicity efforts, administrative 
reforms, and high-level political maneuvering, Naidu played a key role in mobilizing state resources 
and public opinion behind a Hyderabad-centered development agenda (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001; 
Kennedy 2004). Besides promoting a competitiveness agenda within Andhra Pradesh, Naidu took 
advantage of political opportunities at the national level to advance the state’s development interests. 
By positioning the Telugu Desam Party as a pivotal partner in India’s coalition government during 
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the late 1990s and early 2000s, Naidu gained the political leverage needed to extract central policy 
support and resources for Andhra Pradesh (Kennedy 2007). 
 In sum, Andhra Pradesh represents another case in which a metropolitan-oriented 
development strategy arose in conjunction with the economic pressures of lagging development and 
the political initiative of a strong provincial establishment. Along with the Minas Gerais case, 
evidence from Andhra Pradesh suggests that the explanatory factors I have highlighted in the 
Chinese setting may indeed be helpful in explaining development policy outcomes more widely.  
 
Limitations of the study and directions for future research 
 Along with its substantive contributions, this study has a number of methodological and 
substantive limitations that call for analysis and point to useful avenues for future research. First and 
foremost, this study, like so many on China, suffers from difficulties of access. It is hard to get inside 
the black box of China’s bureaucratic and intergovernmental politics, let alone inside the blacker box 
of elite politics, yet elite dynamics are crucial for understanding policy outcomes. By gaining better 
access to high-level policymakers, and by examining new archival evidence as it becomes available, 
future research may be able to give clearer answers about how key policy ideas originated, why 
particular strategies won out, and why particular areas or sectors were favored. 
 Second, and just as important, is the problem of the quality and consistency of the data – 
especially the quantitative data – used here. Development indicators from China are notoriously 
inaccurate and are in some cases inconsistent across units and over time. I have strived in this 
project to find credible and comparable data for key outcomes and variables, but by making use of 
alternative data and indicators it may be possible to check more carefully the findings presented here. 
 Third, the statistical and analytical methods I use may not conclusively answer the empirical 
questions posed. This project has opted for simple and transparent statistical methods, in hopes that 
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any inferential errors present will be easier to identify and correct. However, the statistical methods I 
employ do not meet the standards required for causal inference. Going forward, it will be helpful to 
conduct stronger and more discriminating quantitative tests of the project’s main claims, and to 
derive and check for other observable implications of the theory. 
 Fourth, like many studies of political economy, this study grapples with the problem of how 
analytically to separate the political from the economic. When studying a setting such as China, 
where the categories of state and non-state, market and non-market blend together, it is necessary to 
transcend conventional ways of thinking and talking about what is political and what is economic. 
While few observers of China would question that politics and state intervention pervade the 
workings of the economy, there is also no question that market logics increasingly suffuse the 
workings of the state. Political economists are thus in urgent need of better analytical categories and 
vocabularies for explaining development outcomes in such hybrid systems. 
 Fifth, this study has compressed a variety of urban and regional development approaches 
into a typology of high and low metropolitan bias. I have argued that the extent to which 
governments privilege core metropolitan areas is a crucial aspect of development strategies. 
However, by focusing on the metropolitan/non-metropolitan dimension, I have given short shrift to 
other tradeoffs of spatial development policy. Notwithstanding excellent work by many scholars,9 
important questions about various aspects of urban, rural, and regional development policy remain. 
Nevertheless, with China’s leaders committed to moving hundreds of millions more rural residents 
into cities, it is especially crucial to clarify the policy logics that underpin competing approaches to 
urban development, and the political factors that determine which approaches prevail. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Shirk (1993), Wang and Hu (1999), Goodman (2004), and others have examined the politics of China’s regional 
development policies. Donaldson (2011), Looney (2012), and others have explored why economic policies favor rural 
areas and help the poor to a greater extent in some cases than others. 
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 Finally, this study has focused on the causes of metropolitan bias to the exclusion of 
considering its consequences. I have described some of the benefits and costs of metropolitan bias, 
but have avoided the question of whether metropolitan bias is, in the end, a wise approach to 
development or a costly mistake. One reason to bracket this question is the possibility that 
concentrating investment in key cities may be a sound strategy in some cases but a bad idea in others. 
When the economic regions of leading cities do not align well with the political boundaries of 
provinces, for instance, metropolitan-oriented policies may do too little to advance provincial 
development more broadly. Just as important, the internal structure of metropolitan growth and 
governance may significantly affect economic, social, and political outcomes. 
Given that many Chinese provinces have already chosen to invest heavily in leading cities 
and advanced industries, a key question is how flexible and responsive government policies will be in 
the face of evolving development needs. As Hirschman (1978) and others suggest, it is the nature of 
economic development to progress through an alternation of rapid, localized bursts of growth and 
periods of recovery and rebalancing. Governments, Hirschman argues, have an important role to 
play in both systole and diastole, pushing development forward but also helping to relieve pressure 
and restore equilibrium (202-204). China’s policymakers surely have shown an impressive capacity 
where the first function is concerned, achieving development of key cities and industries at an 
unprecedented speed. The question is how readily policymakers can retool the growth machine to 
promote greater social and spatial equity, and more sustainable development. Since the mid-2000s, 
China’s central leaders have taken many important steps to reorient public investment and policy 
support toward priorities like healthcare, education, and social security. At the same time, however, 
there are powerful interests aligned with metropolitan-oriented development, and there are limits to 
what the central government can accomplish on its own.  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
 
 
Data sources and operationalization of key variables 
 I draw most economic, development, and fiscal data from the “provincial statistics,” “city 
statistics,” and “national statistics” data series on the University of Michigan China Data Center’s 
China Data Online web service (http://chinadataonline.org); from the annual provincial statistical 
yearbooks published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); and from a proprietary China 
cities dataset acquired from the NBS. Some exceptions include the data used for secondary 
regression models, including a provincial marketization index calculated Fan et al (2001), an 
urbanization estimate calculated by Shen Jianfa (2006), and information on the status of particular 
cities as deputy-provincial level units (Chung 2010) or as key regional centers (baike.baidu.com). 
Data on provincial leaders are obtained from Radiopress, Inc.’s China Directory series; the China Vitae 
website (www.chinavitae.com); and Baidu’s online encyclopedia (baike.baidu.com).  
In many cases it is necessary to carry out further computations using raw statistical data prior 
to statistical analysis, and I have noted these instances where they occur throughout the dissertation.  
 
Fixed-asset investment (FAI) data sources 
The city-level and province-level fixed-asset investment (FAI) data used in the dissertation 
reflect totals for entire prefectural or provincial units, rather than for urban districts only. I use data 
for full units rather than for urban districts only for two main reasons. First, the official boundaries 
of “urban areas” (shiqu) are frequently altered, and they often fail to align with the true extent of 
built-up areas. Second, at a theoretical level, I am interested in how investment is distributed across 
different urban regions. Prefectural units, which often operate as economically integrated regions 
(see Ke 2010), are the closest approximation of urban regions for which data are readily available.  
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The data on fixed-asset investment (FAI), including provincial total FAI and top-city FAI, 
were culled from three sources—the official China cities statistical dataset obtained from NBS, the 
city-level statistics database from China Data Online, and relevant provincial statistical yearbooks. 
Due to inconsistent practices in the tabulation of FAI across different years and different sources, it 
was necessary to piece data together from multiple sources to assemble the most consistent set of 
data series possible. For each province, I attempted to find FAI data that included totals for full 
prefectural city areas or full provinces, and that included the category of real-estate development 
(fangdichan kaifa). In a handful of cases, calculating FAI values required adding separate totals for real 
estate development and FAI exclusive of real estate development. Despite the author’s best efforts, 
it is possible that FAI data are not perfectly comparable for all years and units. Tabulation problems 
are a bigger concern for pre-2002 data than post-2002 data, however, whereas most of the data 
analyzed in the project is for the 2001-2010 period. And, to the extent that there is inconsistency in 
the data, I do not have any reason to think that it follows a systematic pattern across units.  
There is also, of course, the question of whether – tabulation issues aside – city-level and 
provincial-level data recorded for different years and units are accurate enough for purposes of 
comparison. Two considerations may assuage concerns that inaccuracy in the statistical data biases 
findings. First, while it is possible that data from wealthier and more developed regions are more 
likely to be accurate, I do not have reason to think that there is systematic bias in which specific city- 
or provincial-level units misreport their numbers. Second, the fact that I use city-to-province ratios 
of FAI and GDP as key variables helps address concerns about inaccuracy. If growth and 
investment data from a given province are distorted, they are likely to be distorted in a similar 
fashion, such that using a ratio at least partly controls for any distortion. For more in-depth 
discussions of the upsides and downsides of using Chinese prefectural-level and provincial-level data 
see Herrmann-Pillath et al (2002) and Shih (2008). 
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                    Table A.1: Sources for FAI data 
 
Province Data sources  
Hebei China Data Online (CDO) for 1996-1999; provincial yearbooks for 2000-
2002; CDO 
Shanxi CDO used for all years 
Liaoning Yearbooks used for 1996-2001; CDO thereafter 
Jilin CDO used for all years 
Heilongjiang CDO used for all years 
Jiangsu Yearbook   1996-2002; CDO used otherwise 
Zhejiang Yearbooks used for all years 
Anhui CDO used for all years 
Fujian CDO used for all years 
Jiangxi China Data Online/NBS for all years 
Shandong Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Henan Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Hubei Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Hunan China Data Online/NBS for all years 
Guangdong Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Guangxi Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Sichuan CDO used for all years 
Guizhou Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
Yunnan CDO used for all years 
Shaanxi Yearbooks used for 1996-2002; CDO thereafter 
!
 
 
Measuring relative economic performance 
 The relative economic performance of different provinces is one of the principal explanatory 
variables emphasized in the project. To operationalize relative economic performance, I calculate the 
difference between each province’s compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of GDP and the overall 
national or macro-regional (coastal or inland) CAGR of GDP for the period from 1990-2000. I 
discuss my approach in more detail in Chapter 6, and Table 6.1 presents provinces’ absolute and 
relative GDP growth rates (adjusted for inflation using provincial consumer price indices). Both 
GDP data and inflation data are obtained from China Data Online. 
 
Measuring provincial government strength  
Provincial government strength is the other key explanatory variable I highlight in the 
dissertation. My approach for operationalizing provincial government strength for cross-sectional 
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regression analysis is discussed in Chapter 6. Table A.3 below provides the raw measures for each 
provincial strength indicator and the scores given to each province for each indicator, and lists the 
overall provincial strength scores that are obtained from summing the latter up.  
          Table A.2: Provincial government strength (sub-indicator scores in parentheses) 
 
Province Provincial 
share of local 
expenditures 
Cities beside 
provincial 
capital on 
provincial 
committee 
Fiscal self-
sufficiency of 
province (total 
expenditure/tot
al revenue) 
Distance 
from 
Beijing (air 
distance in 
miles) 
Rising star 
leaders 
(number of 
rising stars 
2000-2010) 
Prov inc ia l  
s t r eng th  
index  
(0-10) 
Hebei 
 
0.27  
(1) 
Tangshan 
(0)* 
1.62 
(2) 
165 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
4 
Shanxi 
 
0.30 
(2) 
None 
(1) 
1.82 
(1) 
250 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
5 
Liaoning 
 
0.20 
(0) 
Dalian 
(0) 
1.69 
(1) 
392 
(0) 
2 
(2) 
3 
Jilin 
 
0.40 
(2) 
Yanbian 
(0) 
2.41 
(0) 
532 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
Heilongjiang 
 
0.39 
(2) 
None 
(2) 
2.03 
(0) 
657 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
5 
Jiangsu 
 
0.20 
(0) 
Suzhou 
(0) 
1.37 
(2) 
557 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
4 
Zhejiang 
 
0.17 
(0) 
Ningbo 
(0) 
1.33 
(2) 
697 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
5 
Anhui 
 
0.33 
(2) 
Wuhu 
(1) 
1.73 
(1) 
560 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
5 
Fujian 
 
0.23 
(0) 
Xiamen 
(0) 
1.36 
(2) 
966 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
6 
Jiangxi 
 
0.24 
(1) 
Ganzhou 
(1) 
1.99 
(0) 
780 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
4 
Shandong 
 
0.18 
(0) 
Qingdao, 
Yantai 
(0) 
1.34 
(2) 
227 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
2 
Henan 
 
0.26 
(1) 
Luoyang 
(1) 
1.76 
(1) 
392 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
4 
Hubei 
 
0.26 
(1) 
None 
(2) 
1.73 
(1) 
652 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
6 
Hunan 
 
0.32 
(2) 
None 
(2) 
1.92 
(0) 
833 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
8 
Guangdong 
 
0.16 
(0) 
Shenzhen, 
Foshan 
(0) 
1.22 
(2) 
1170 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
5 
Guangxi 
 
0.28 
(1) 
Beihai 
(1) 
1.72 
(1) 
1271 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
7 
Sichuan 
 
0.23 
(0) 
None 
(2) 
1.83 
(1) 
943 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
5 
Guizhou 
 
0.31 
(2) 
None 
(2) 
2.33 
(0) 
1107 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
6 
Yunnan 
 
0.31 
(2) 
None 
(2) 
2.24 
(0) 
1304 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
7 
Shaanxi 
 
0.39 
(2) 
Yan’an 
(1) 
2.15 
(0) 
560 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
6 
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For both cross-sectional analysis and panel analysis, I use the presence of “rising star” 
leaders as a measure of provincial strength (see Chapter 6). Table A.4 lists the Party secretaries of 
each of the 20 provinces in my sample for the period 1996-2010, providing data on leaders’ tenures 
and on whether or not leaders are coded as rising stars. 
              Table A.3: List of provincial Party secretaries for 20 provinces 
Province Leader Tenure Age upon 
appointment 
Rising star? 
Hebei Cheng Weigao (8,	) 1993-1998 63 N 
Hebei Ye Liansong (]+I) Nov 1998-June 2000 64 N 
Hebei Wang Xudong (D) June 2000-Nov 2002 54 Y 
Hebei /"#; Nov 2002-Aug 2007 59 N 
Hebei /#*#*/#6g Aug 2007-Aug 2011 61 N 
Shanxi *	**$cC Sep 1993-June 1999 59 N 
Shanxi /##%#a June 1999-June 2005 54 Y 
Shanxi /#/$(*#G July 2005-May 2010 55 N 
Shanxi */#*#&#O May 2010-2013 58 N 
Liaoning 
*#S r Sep 1993-Aug 1997 64 N 
Liaoning #.#@^ Aug 1997-Dec 2004 57 N 
Liaoning &/#X; Dec 2004-2007 50 Y 
Liaoning /##-* Oct 2007-2009 63 N 
Liaoning /##D Jan 2010-Oct 2011 60 N 
Jilin /#/#H? 1995-1998 50 Y 
Jilin /#*# *#D6 Aug 1998-Dec 2006 57 N 
Jilin /##D Dec 2006-Jan 2010 57 N 
Jilin *##/pF 2010-2012 47 Y 
Heilongjiang *#l Apr 1994-July 1997 65 N 
Heilongjiang *$*/#{w July 1997-2003 58 N 
Heilongjiang $#	/)/# Mar 2003-Dec 2005 63 N 
Heilongjiang /#*#!*$#7 Dec 2005-2008 62 N 
Heilongjiang #,*/#kz 2008-2013 57 N 
Jiangsu #*/#-$*` Sep 1993-Dec 1999 62 N 
Jiangsu */#-*Tf 1999-2002 55 N 
Jiangsu */#/$XQU 2002-2007 52 Y 
Jiangsu /#/$*/u!/ Oct 2007-Dec 2010 62 N 
Zhejiang "#Xh* Dec 1988-Sep 1998 62 N 
Zhejiang /#/#H? 1998-2002 53 Y 
Zhejiang #%#0 2002-2007 49 Y 
Zhejiang /$$#.*< 2007-2012 60 N 
Anhui *$##j> Apr 1989-Aug 1998 63 N 
Anhui */#-*Tf 1998-1999 54 Y 
Anhui /#/*/D/ Jan 2000-Dec 2004 55 N 
Anhui 
*$#!$# E 2004-2007 58 N 
Anhui /##(/#D ' Dec 2007-May 2010 62 N 
Anhui /#/$(*#G May 2010-2013 60 N 
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           Table A.3 (Continued): List of provincial Party secretaries for 20 provinces 
Fujian /#!#LN 1993-1996 56 N 
Fujian ##-`J Oct 1996-Dec 2000 57 N 
Fujian $#*H Dec 2000-Feb 2004 55 N 
Fujian */#$#A Feb 2004-Nov 2009 52 Y 
Fujian *#*#!/#p9Y 2009-2010 60 N 
Jiangxi *
*/#.#q2 1995-1997 58 N 
Jiangxi ***$M\ Apr 1997-Apr 2001 59 N 
Jiangxi #/#.*|5 2001-2007 54 Y 
Jiangxi *$#_j 2007-2013 59 N 
Shandong /$/$= Oct 1994-Apr 1997 65 N 
Shandong *
*/#.#q2 1997-2002 59 N 
Shandong /#
/$!	1 2002-2007 56 N 
Shandong /#*$X5 2007-2008 61 N 
Shandong /# /#yZB Mar 2008-2013 55 N 
Henan /#*#X9 1992-1998 52 Y 
Henan /$##4x Jul 1998-Sep 2000 62 N 
Henan #*-*/#` 2000-2002 60 N 
Henan &/#X; 2002-2004 48 Y 
Henan  *
*/#*#{9 Dec 2004-Nov 2009 61 N 
Henan */#$#A Nov 2009-Mar 2013 58 N 
Hubei /=o Feb 1995-Dec 2000 61 N 
Hubei /#*%#< Dec 2000-Dec 2001 64 N 
Hubei *#(#% Dec 2001-2007 57 N 
Hubei *$#&*/#[m Dec 2007-Dec 2010 62 N 
Hunan /#/$!#DN Sep 1993-Sep 1998 62 N 
Hunan /##+*n. Sep 1998-Dec 2005 58 N 
Hunan /#*#,/#9} 2006-2010 53 Y 
Hunan $*/#" 2010-2013 50 Y 
Guangdong 	&- May 1993-Mar 1997 58 N 
Guangdong /#*#X9 1998-2002 54 Y 
Guangdong /#/#H? 2002-2007 56 N 
Guangdong /#/#V 2007-Dec 2012 52 Y 
Guangxi /$	*!#CN Oct 1990-Jul 1997 64 N 
Guangxi /$$*#~O Jul 1997-Jun 2006 56 N 
Guangxi */$i: Jun 2006-Nov 2007 53 Y 
Guangxi 
*$# *#% Nov 2007-Dec 2012 54 Y 
Sichuan &o Mar 1993-1999 62 N 
Sichuan $*$# /#"3B 1999-2002 58 N 
Sichuan /#*.$#x Dec 2002-Dec 2006 59 N 
Sichuan */$i: 2007-2012 54 Y 
Guizhou *	/#'#i
s Jun 1993-Jan 2001 60 N 
Guizhou /#*#!*$#7 2001-Dec 2005 57 N 
Guizhou $#-*/#RtQ Dec 2005-Aug 2010 60 N 
Guizhou /#(*() 2010-2012 60 N 
Yunnan 
/$/#	W Jun 1995-Aug 1997 54 Y 
Yunnan #*#Pv Aug 1997-Oct 2001 51 Y 
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          Table A.3 (Continued): List of provincial Party secretaries for 20 provinces 
Yunnan /#%ed Oct 2001-Aug 2011 56 N 
Shaanxi #-*/#b Nov 1994-Jan 1997 63 N 
Shaanxi /#*$X5 Jan 1997-2007 51 Y 
Shaanxi /$K 2007-Nov 2012 50 Y 
        Data sources: Radiopress, Inc. China Directory; China Vitae; baike.baidu.com; author’s calculations.  
 
Outcomes: FAI share and GDP share in 20 provinces 
 Using the time-series city-level and province-level FAI data, I examine trends over time in 
top-city FAI share and top-city GDP share for each of the 20 provinces in the sample. I describe 
these trends in Chapter 2, while charts showing the time trends for each province are presented 
below in Figure A.5.  
 
Figure A.4: Time trends of top-city FAI share (thick line) and GDP share (thin line)  
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Figure A.4 (cont.): Time trends of top-city FAI share (thick line) and GDP share (thin line)  
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Cross-sectional regression analysis 
 The methods and data used for province-level cross-sectional regression analysis, and the 
main results from the analysis, are discussed in Chapter 6. Regression tables for additional regression 
specifications are included below.  
 
Table A.5: Lagging economic performance is associated with greater top-city FAI share 
!
Note: Model number three drops observations for Jiangsu, Hunan, Jiangxi to ensure that main results still hold. Table generated with 
Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.543⇤⇤⇤ 0.488⇤⇤ 0.622⇤⇤⇤
(0.178) (0.183) (0.193)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.669 0.889 0.394
(0.562) (0.581) (0.591)
population 0.0001 0.00000 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log GDPpc 0.019  0.002 0.009
(0.034) (0.032) (0.036)
coastal dummy  0.015  0.049  0.008
(0.031) (0.029) (0.033)
GDP growth lag/lead  1.514⇤⇤  1.303⇤
(0.654) (0.675)
GDP growth lag/lead regional  1.469⇤⇤
(0.653)
Constant  0.056 0.168 0.019
(0.288) (0.259) (0.301)
Observations 20 20 17
R2 0.848 0.845 0.871
Adjusted R2 0.777 0.774 0.794
Residual Std. Error 0.039(df = 13) 0.040(df = 13) 0.039(df = 10)
F statistic 12.044⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 13) 11.821⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 13) 11.262⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 10)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.6: Provincial government strength is associated with greater top-city FAI share 
 
Note: Model number three drops observations for Jiangsu, Hunan, Jiangxi to ensure that main results still hold. Table 
generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.580⇤⇤⇤ 0.565⇤⇤⇤ 0.560⇤⇤
(0.183) (0.140) (0.174)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.423 0.496 0.506
(0.579) (0.443) (0.527)
population 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
log GDPpc 0.006 0.043 0.045
(0.033) (0.028) (0.037)
coastal dummy  0.043  0.012  0.011
(0.029) (0.024) (0.029)
GDP growth lag/lead  1.645⇤⇤⇤  1.655⇤⇤
(0.513) (0.626)
Provincial strength 0.016⇤ 0.017⇤⇤ 0.017⇤
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Constant  0.003  0.376  0.389
(0.288) (0.249) (0.340)
Observations 20 20 17
R2 0.840 0.914 0.909
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.864 0.838
Residual Std. Error 0.040(df = 13) 0.031(df = 12) 0.035(df = 9)
F statistic 11.411⇤⇤⇤(df = 6; 13) 18.216⇤⇤⇤(df = 7; 12) 12.822⇤⇤⇤(df = 7; 9)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.7: Main results are robust to including other covariates or operationalizing 
provincial strength without “rising star” sub-indicator!
 
!
 
                       Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.563⇤⇤⇤ 0.568⇤⇤⇤ 0.588⇤⇤⇤
(0.144) (0.149) (0.154)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.577 0.501 0.439
(0.482) (0.464) (0.490)
population 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
log GDPpc 0.035 0.047 0.044
(0.033) (0.044) (0.031)
coastal dummy  0.015  0.012 0.00001
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
gdpgrowth lag/lead  1.858⇤⇤  1.660⇤⇤  1.577⇤⇤
(0.668) (0.553) (0.560)
provinicial strength 0.016⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.006)
marketization 0.008
(0.015)
urbanization  0.0002
(0.001)
prov strength excl. leaders 0.019⇤⇤
(0.008)
Constant  0.335  0.403  0.374
(0.269) (0.349) (0.280)
Observations 20 20 20
R2 0.916 0.914 0.897
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.852 0.837
Residual Std. Error 0.032(df = 11) 0.032(df = 11) 0.034(df = 12)
F statistic 15.010⇤⇤⇤(df = 8; 11) 14.630⇤⇤⇤(df = 8; 11) 14.957⇤⇤⇤(df = 7; 12)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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     Table A.8: Including alternative explanatory factors does not affect main findings 
 
 
                        Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.577⇤⇤⇤ 0.419⇤ 0.543⇤⇤
(0.147) (0.195) (0.175)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.578 0.718 0.484
(0.488) (0.487) (0.465)
population 0.0003  0.0001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log GDPpc 0.044 0.039 0.039
(0.029) (0.028) (0.033)
coastal dummy  0.014  0.029  0.014
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026)
gdpgrowth lag/lead  1.780⇤⇤  1.223⇤  1.577⇤⇤
(0.600) (0.645) (0.618)
provinicial strength 0.015⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
state-owned share  0.049
(0.101)
key city 0.028
(0.026)
dep prov status 0.006
(0.026)
Constant  0.352  0.287  0.341
(0.262) (0.261) (0.305)
Observations 20 20 20
R2 0.916 0.922 0.914
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.865 0.852
Residual Std. Error (df = 11) 0.032 0.031 0.032
F statistic (df = 8; 11) 14.949⇤⇤⇤ 16.270⇤⇤⇤ 14.681⇤⇤⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.9: The interaction term (GDP growth lag/lead*provincial strength) coefficient 
suggests a substitutive rather than complementary relationship between key variables 
!
 
Note: Model number three drops results for Liaoning to ensure that main results still hold. Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s 
Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
  
 
Panel regression analysis  
The dissertation uses (time-series cross-sectional) regression analysis as a further test of the 
relationship between key explanatory variables and metropolitan bias outcomes. The main results for 
panel analysis with provincial fixed effects are presented in Chapter 6. Table A.11 below shows the 
results obtained when operationalizing the rising star variable in different ways: using Party 
secretaries, governors, either, or both. 
2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share (2001-2010)
(1) (2) (3)
top-city gdpshare2000 0.524⇤⇤⇤ 0.524⇤⇤⇤ 0.503⇤⇤⇤
(0.130) (0.116) (0.123)
top-city gdpsharechange 0.723 0.731⇤ 0.827⇤
(0.426) (0.367) (0.407)
population 0.001⇤ 0.001 0.001
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log GDPpc 0.037 0.016 0.026
(0.026) (0.022) (0.025)
coastal dummy  0.009  0.071⇤⇤⇤  0.027
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
GDP growth lag/lead  5.675⇤⇤  3.755
(2.287) (2.488)
GDP growth lag/lead regional  6.078⇤⇤
(2.225)
Provincial strength 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.026⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Interaction Term 0.744⇤ 0.489
(0.413) (0.423)
Interaction Term Regional 0.989⇤
(0.509)
Constant  0.385  0.131  0.272
(0.228) (0.186) (0.227)
Observations 20 20 19
R2 0.934 0.948 0.946
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.911 0.903
Residual Std. Error 0.028(df = 11) 0.025(df = 11) 0.027(df = 10)
F statistic 19.322⇤⇤⇤(df = 8; 11) 25.166⇤⇤⇤(df = 8; 11) 21.990⇤⇤⇤(df = 8; 10)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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              Table A.10 – Provincial Party secretaries are the rising stars who matter 
 
Table generated with Hlavac (2014)’s Stargazer package (5.0) for R. 
 
 
Dependent variable:
Top-city FAI share by year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lagged top-city gdp share 0.263⇤⇤ 0.271⇤⇤ 0.261⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤
(0.105) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106)
2001 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2002 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2003 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2004 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.061⇤⇤⇤ 0.061⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2005 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2006 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2007 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2008 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2009 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2010 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Party secretary rising star 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.005)
Governor rising star 0.007
(0.008)
Either PS/gov rising star 0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.005)
Sum PS/gov =1 0.013⇤⇤
(0.005)
Sum PS/gov = 2 0.038⇤⇤⇤
(0.014)
Observations 220 220 220 220
R2 0.421 0.393 0.415 0.425
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.336 0.355 0.361
F Statistic 11.410⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 188) 10.142⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 188) 11.133⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 188) 10.631⇤⇤⇤ (df = 13; 187)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Selected Interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted with provincial policy experts, local academics, policymakers, 
businesspeople, journalists, and others in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Changsha, Nanchang, Nanjing, 
and Suzhou between 2011-2013. I preserve the anonymity of interview subjects in accordance with 
the research protocol approved by the Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects, but I provide a unique code for each interviewee, and give the location, year, and month of 
interviews, and a general description of each interviewee. For example, interview code BJ011109a 
indicates interviewee BJ01, the year 2011 (11), the month September (09), and the first interview (a). 
A table listing the various interviewees and interview dates and locations is provided below. 
 
 
Interview subject Description Location Interview date(s) 
BJ01 Foreign business association 
representative 
Beijing September 2011 
BJ02 International financial 
institution official 
Beijing October 2011 
BJ03 Central government 
researcher 
Beijing October 2011 
BJ04 Foreign business association 
representative 
Beijing November 2011 
BJ05 Foreign business association 
representative 
Beijing December 2011 
BJ06 Central government 
researcher 
Beijing February 2012; July 2013 
BJ07 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Beijing February 2012 
BJ08 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Beijing June 2012 
BJ09 Central government 
researcher 
Beijing June 2012; January 2013 
BJ10 Bank official Beijing June 2012 
BJ11 International financial 
institution official 
Beijing June 2012 
BJ12 Bank official Beijing June 2012 
BJ13 Urban planner and 
government researcher 
Beijing January 2013 
BJ14 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Beijing July 2013 
BJ15 Academic researcher Beijing July 2013 
BJ16 Central government official Beijing July 2013 
CS01 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Changsha November 2011; March 2012 
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CS02 Provincial government 
researcher 
Changsha November 2011; March 2012 
CS03 Local businessperson  Changsha November 2011 
CS04 Provincial government 
official 
Changsha November 2011 
CS05 Bank official Changsha November 2011 
CS06 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Changsha March 2012 
CS07 Provincial government 
official 
Changsha March 2012 
CS08 City government official Changsha March 2012 
CS09 Provincial government 
researcher 
Changsha March 2012; May 2012 
CS10 Academic researcher Changsha March 2012 
CS11 Academic researcher Changsha March 2012 
CS12 Academic researcher Changsha March 2012 
CS13 Academic researcher Changsha March 2012 
CS14 Urban planner Changsha March 2012 
CS15 Foreign businessperson Changsha March 2012 
CS16 Foreign businessperson Changsha March 2012 
CS17 Academic researcher Changsha May 2012 
CS18 Provincial government 
official 
Changsha May 2012 
CS19 Provincial government 
official 
Changsha May 2012 
NC01 Journalist Nanchang January 2013 
NC02 Local businessperson Nanchang January 2013 
NC03 Academic researcher  Nanchang January 2013 
NC04 Provincial government 
researcher 
Nanchang January 2013 
NJ01 Urban planner Nanjing January 2012; April 2012 
NJ02 Regional planner and 
academic researcher 
Nanjing April 2012 
NJ03 Urban planner and academic 
researcher 
Nanjing April 2012; May 2012 
NJ04 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Nanjing April 2012; May 2012 
NJ05 Academic researcher and 
land planner 
Nanjing April 2012; May 2012 
NJ06 Academic researcher Nanjing April 2012 
NJ07 Provincial government 
researcher 
Nanjing May 2012 
NJ08 Former provincial 
government official 
Nanjing May 2012 
NJ09 City government researcher Nanjing May 2012 
NJ10 Academic researcher Nanjing May 2012 
NJ11 Academic researcher Nanjing July 2013 
SH01 Municipal government 
researcher 
Shanghai January 2013 
SZ01 Former city government 
official 
Suzhou July 2013 
SZ02 Academic researcher and 
urban planner 
Suzhou July 2013 
SZ03 Urban planner and 
government consultant 
Suzhou July 2013 
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XA01 Provincial enterprise 
executive 
Xi’an November 2011; February 
2012 
XA02 Provincial government 
researcher 
Xi’an November 2011; February 
2012 
XA03 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Xi’an November 2011; February 
2012 
XA04 Provincial government 
researcher 
Xi’an November 2011; March 2012 
XA05 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Xi’an November 2011 
XA06 Academic researcher Xi’an November 2011; March 2012 
XA07 Provincial government 
official 
Xi’an February 2012 
XA08 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Xi’an February 2012 
XA09 Provincial government 
researcher 
Xi’an February 2012; March 2012 
XA10 Urban planner and 
government consultant 
Xi’an March 2012; June 2012 
XA11 Academic researcher and 
government consultant 
Xi’an March 2012; June 2012; July 
2013 
XA12 Development zone official Xi’an March 2012 
XA13 Development zone 
researcher 
Xi’an March 2012 
XA14 Provincial government 
official 
Xi’an March 2012 
XA15 Foreign businessperson Xi’an March 2012 
XA16 Foreign businessperson Xi’an March 2012 
XA17 Journalist Xi’an June 2012 
XA18 Academic researcher and 
provincial government 
advisor 
Xi’an June 2012; July 2013 
XA19 Urban planner Xi’an June 2012 
XA20 Provincial government 
researcher 
Xi’an July 2013 
XA21 Academic researcher Xi’an July 2013 
XA22 Journalist Xi’an July 2013 
 
 
 
